A passenger who survived a plane crash near Petrozavodsk: “The plane fell in absolute silence. A passenger who survived a plane crash near Petrozavodsk: “The plane fell in absolute silence. Work at the crash site.

Over decades of operation on the territory of the USSR and the post-Soviet space, TU-134 aircraft have established themselves as a reliable and trouble-free aircraft. However, there were some accidents. The TU-134 disasters occurred for various objective and subjective reasons, and they had one thing in common - human casualties. Some of them gave impetus to the gradual withdrawal of this model from service in civil aviation and their replacement with more modern aircraft.

The mere mention of major plane crashes makes you feel uneasy. The most resonant crashes were the following accidents:

The crash of the TU-134 plane near Minsk.
Accident in Ivanovo.
The crash of TU-134 in Kuibyshev.
Plane crash in Samara.
TU-134 crash during takeoff in Crimea.

Tragedy near Petrozavodsk

The TU-134 crash near Petrozavodsk occurred on June 20, 2011, and it was this that marked the beginning of the decommissioning of TU-134 aircraft in Russia.

During the landing approach, the aircraft came into contact with trees and crashed to the ground. Most of the passengers died as a result of the crash. This disaster became the largest in the Republic of Karelia. Experts would later cite the main reason as the erroneous actions of the plane’s crew, who refused to take the plane on a go-around in order to avoid falling in the absence of visibility of the landing strip.

In addition, the ship's navigator, who was intoxicated at the time of the flight, took the initiative in making critical decisions. The Petrozavodsk airport dispatcher tried several times to convince the crew not to land, but to no avail. Another prerequisite for the tragedy was an incorrect weather forecast transmitted to the crew by the airport's meteorological service. The outdated technical equipment of the aircraft also played an important role.

A memorial was erected at the crash site in memory of the victims of the tragedy, and seven victims received compensation. As a result of the trial, Rosaviation official Eduard Voitovsky, the head of the Petrozavodsk airport and the head of the airport's meteorological service were found guilty.

TU-134 crash near Minsk

On February 1, 1985, a major TU-134 crash occurred near Minsk. Almost after takeoff of the plane en route Minsk - Leningrad, both engines of the ship alternately failed, as a result of which the plane crashed in the forest. Of the 80 people on board, 22 survived. The investigation of the incident led to the conclusion that the crew members were not at fault in this incident. The question of how both aircraft engines became unusable remained controversial. TU-134 produced in 1977 was in excellent condition at that time.

As a result of the inspection, ice got into the engines, which led to their surge and destruction, was recognized as a possible cause.

It was not possible to reliably confirm this version, since the ice that may have gotten into the engines had melted at the time of the accident. Subsequent experiments with engines of this model nevertheless confirmed the version of ice entering the engine inlets, but did not reveal the cause of possible glaciation.

Tragedy in Ivanovo

The TU-134 crash in Ivanovo occurred on August 27, 1992 during the landing of the aircraft. The ship crashed onto non-residential buildings in the village of Lebyazhiy Lug near the airport.

No one was injured among the residents of the village, but all passengers and crew members present on board the plane died in a matter of seconds. The reasons for the terrible tragedy can be attributed to the uncoordinated actions of the aircraft crew and violations of flight and landing rules.

After the airport dispatcher commanded to descend, the plane banked to the right and left the airway.

The ship's commander attempted to pull the plane out of the roll and perform a maneuver by tilting the liner to the left. As a result of the resulting overloads, the ship did not have time to prepare for a safe landing, however, the commander insisted on continuing the descent without a missed approach. One of the plane's wings touched the trees, causing it to fall and collide with non-residential buildings. It was they who saved the residents of nearby houses in the village from possibly being included in the list of victims of the disaster. In fact, in this case, the main cause of the tragedy was the human factor.

Plane crash in Kuibyshev

One of the most ridiculous for its reason, but major tragedies is the TU-134 crash in Kuibyshev, which occurred on October 20, 1986.

The cause of the tragedy was a dispute between the aircraft commander and the rest of the crew over whether the former could land the ship blindly. Alexander Klyuev, the ship's commander, limited his visibility with a curtain on the cockpit window and in this position began to descend. The co-pilot was flying without a curtain, but did not warn his colleague about the possible danger and did not suggest a go-around approach.

After the fall, he actively helped passengers get out of the car engulfed in flames and died of a heart attack on the way to the hospital. Alexander Klyuev was subsequently charged. He was sentenced to 15 years, of which he spent six years in prison and was released after a review of the case. Thus, negligence and passion in the workplace led to the death of a large number of people.

Accident involving TU-134 in Samara

Like many previous incidents, the TU-134 crash in Samara occurred during landing.

Due to sharply deteriorating weather conditions and lack of visibility of the landing strip lights, the plane deviated from its course. The Kurumoch airport dispatcher informed the crew about this, however, he did so untimely and in insufficient detail for an objective assessment of the situation. The ship's crew did not consider it necessary to take the ship to the second circle, as a result of which the plane landed off the runway. The landing gear could not withstand the load and broke, and the plane itself fell on its side, and its front part broke off from the fuselage. Six people out of 57 on board died.

The ship's commander and co-pilot were found guilty of the incident and were sentenced to 4 and 2 years of suspended imprisonment.

Also, the situation was predetermined by deficiencies in regulatory documentation in the work of the airport dispatch service, which did not allow the dispatcher to timely transmit to the crew information about the deterioration of weather conditions and the extent of the aircraft’s deviation from the landing course.

The car rolled off the runway, where it hit a ravine with its landing gear and broke in half. Fuel leaking from under the destroyed right wing plane caught fire. Fortunately, none of the passengers were injured. The ship itself was written off after sustaining damage. Another successful moment was that the ship’s crew managed to divert the plane from the airport buildings, avoiding casualties.

This is only an incomplete list of accidents involving the TU-134 aircraft. Their number seems large in comparison with Vickers Viscount aircraft, the only accident involving which occurred in 1960 near Moscow. It is difficult to identify patterns that predict crashes. Each such case occurs due to an individual set of factors and is then thoroughly investigated. An approximate list of critical factors includes the following reasons:

Sharply deteriorating weather conditions are an objective reason, the occurrence of which is sometimes not possible to predict.
The human factor is a set of erroneous actions, wrong decisions made in a critical situation, criminal negligence that precedes a tragedy. Preventing these events is also very difficult.
Aircraft technical malfunction. As in the case of the crash near Minsk, this factor is not related to the negligence of the crew. It is not always possible to detect the causes of problems after an accident due to significant damage to the hull and engines.

However, airplanes have been and remain one of the safest modes of transport, where accidents are rather a rare exception to the rule. TU-134 made a contribution to the development of civil and military aviation of the USSR and Russia and can rightfully be considered worthy representatives of aircraft shipbuilding.

In contact with

Almost simultaneously, as a result of pre-planned terrorist acts, there were two crashes of Tu-134 and Tu-154 passenger planes flying from Moscow Domodedovo Airport to Volgograd and Sochi. Passengers and crew members of both planes—90 people—were killed.

The Tu-154B2 aircraft (tail number RA-85556) of Siberia Airlines, operating flight No. 1047 from Moscow to Sochi (Adler Airport) with 38 passengers and eight crew members on board, took off from Domodedovo Airport at 21:35. The Tu-134A aircraft (tail number RA-65080) of the Volga-Aviaexpress airline, operating flight No. 1303 from Moscow to Volgograd (Gumrak airport) with 35 passengers and nine crew members on board, took off from the same airport at 22:20 .

At 22:53, communication with the Tu-154B2 aircraft was lost, and its mark disappeared from the air traffic control radar screens. The plane at that time was at an altitude of 12,100 meters above the territory of the Rostov region.

Less than a minute later, at 22 hours 54 minutes, radio communication with the crew was interrupted and the radar mark of the Tu-134A aircraft, which at that time was at an altitude of 8100 meters above the territory of the Tula region, disappeared.

A Tu-154 plane that crashed near Rostov-on-Don before the disaster.

During the search and rescue operation, wreckage of a Tu-154B2 aircraft was discovered near the village of Glubokiy, Kamensk-Shakhtinsky district, Rostov region, and a Tu-134A aircraft was discovered near the village of Buchalki, Klimovsky district, Tula region. In the Rostov region, more than 220 people were involved in search and rescue work from the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations, in the Tula region - more than 300.

None of the 90 passengers and crew members of both aircraft. There were no casualties or destruction on the ground as a result of the crash of the liners.

By the morning of August 25, the bodies of all those killed in plane crashes near Tula and Rostov-on-Don were found, as well as the recorders of the crashed planes.

In connection with plane crashes in the Tula and Rostov regions on August 26, 2004 in Russia there was.

The investigation of these incidents was carried out by a joint investigative team consisting of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the FSB and the prosecutor's office. Specialists from specialized special services, including two teams of FSB explosives specialists, worked at the site of the crash of the Tu-134 and Tu-154 aircraft in the Tula and Rostov regions.

According to the order of the President of the Russian Federation, a State Commission was created to investigate the causes of the plane crashes of the Tu-154 and Tu-134 aircraft, chaired by the Minister of Transport of the Russian Federation Igor Levitin.

In the wreckage of the Tu-134 and Tu-154 aircraft, experts say there are particles of explosives.

On September 15, 2004, the State Commission to Investigate the Causes of Air Accidents concluded that the cause of the crashes of the Tu-154 and Tu-134 aircraft was the destruction of the aircraft structure in flight as a result of exposure to explosive charges in the passenger cabins.

Recording the parameters of the recorders showed that the planes had an identical shock impact inside the fuselage, and also that a catastrophic situation arose on the planes almost simultaneously and unexpectedly for the crews. According to him, after the explosions, within 2-3 seconds there was a violation of the kinematic control of the rudders and separation of the tail section. According to Levitin, further control of the aircraft in depressurization conditions became impossible.

At the same time, the commission established that there was no attack on the crew or hijacking of the planes, and the “panic button” on the Tu-154 that crashed in the Rostov region went off spontaneously, a few seconds after the structure of the machine was destroyed.

The Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation opened a criminal case under Article 205 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation "Terrorism".

As a result of operational investigative actions and technical examinations, it was established that the alleged perpetrators of the terrorist attacks used passports issued in the name of Amanat (Amanta) Nagaeva and Satsita Dzhebirkhanova. Both are natives of Chechnya. A resident of Grozny, Nagayeva, was among the passengers of the Tu-134 plane that crashed in the Tula region, and Dzhebirkhanova was on the list of passengers on the Tu-154 plane that crashed in the Rostov region.

The prosecutor's office charged the three arrested in the case of terrorist attacks on Tu-134 and Tu-154 - police captain - detective officer of the Line Department of Internal Affairs for Transport at Domodedovo Airport Mikhail Artamonov, resident of the Krasnodar Territory Armen Harutyunyan and Siberia Airlines employee Nikolai Korenkov.

That Captain Artamonov allowed two Chechen women who committed terrorist attacks through without inspection. According to him, Nagayeva and Dzhebirkhanova arrived at the capital’s airport on a flight from Makhachkala (Dagestan) along with two other Chechens. Line police officers identified them, took their passports and handed them over to the police captain, the anti-terrorism officer, to search their belongings and check for possible involvement in terrorist attacks, but the captain released them without any check.

According to the Prosecutor General, after this the Chechens began hastily obtaining plane tickets at the airport building. They were helped by a certain citizen, whose name the Prosecutor General named as “Arutyunov,” who traded in speculation on airline tickets. He took a total of five thousand rubles “for services” - two thousand from one Chechen and three thousand from another Chechen. Arutyunov handed over a thousand rubles to an employee of Siberia Airlines, whose duties included monitoring the registration and boarding of passengers. “The official wrote on Dzhebirkhanova’s ticket “Accept for transportation on flight 1047 08/24/2004” and the suicide bomber calmly boarded the plane,” the Prosecutor General said.

In April 2005, the Domodedovo City Court found Armen Harutyunyan and Siberia Airlines employee Nikolai Korenkov guilty of committing a crime under Article 204 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation - commercial bribery. Taking into account information about the identity of the accused, the court sentenced each of them to one and a half years of imprisonment to be served in a penal colony.

The Domodedovo court sentenced Artamonov to seven years in prison - the maximum term under Article 293 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (negligence). Later, the Moscow Regional Court reduced his sentence by one year, to six years.

Tu-134 plane crash near Syktyvkar - a crash that occurred on July 2, 1982 with an Aeroflot Tu-134AK aircraft en route from Vorkuta to Syktyvkar to Moscow. Due to a fire, the plane made an emergency landing in the forest and crashed. 54 people died.

Events

In the summer of 1982, the Tu-134AK airliner flew Vorkuta - Syktyvkar - Moscow under the control of the crew of the 75th Aeroflot flight squad. At the Vorkuta airport, all luggage was loaded into the rear luggage compartment, but it was not searched, which was allowed by the instructions. The plane arrived in Syktyvkar without incident and was preparing to depart for Moscow. 5 more passengers boarded. In total, there were 86 people on the plane, including 19 children.

At 09.55 Moscow time, the airliner left Syktyvkar airport and began climbing. When, 15 minutes later, the plane was already 140 kilometers from the airport and had gained an altitude of 6,700 meters, the commander reported to the dispatcher about the fire and began an emergency descent with a turn back to Syktyvkar.

The plane quickly descended to an altitude of 1000 meters. The salon quickly filled with smoke. The crew members who tried to put out the fire failed and returned to the cabin. Soon, the crew commander informed the dispatchers that he was preparing for an emergency landing outside the airfield. When the plane dropped to 300 meters, the radars lost it.

By this time, some of the passengers had already lost their creation due to smoke poisoning. For 9 minutes, the crew tried to find a landing site, but due to the low flight altitude and limited visibility (6 kilometers), they were unable to do so. Taking into account the heavy smoke, the commander was forced to decide to make an emergency landing directly into the mixed forest located below, without preparing the plane and passengers for emergency evacuation.

At 10:27, 75 kilometers southwest of Syktyvkar, a Tu-134 flying at an altitude of 23-25 meters above the ground collided with the tops of trees and, collapsing, rushed through the forest. In this case, the navigator, who remained at his workplace in the bow of the plane, immediately died. After 195 meters from the site of the first impact, the airliner touched the ground, and after 25 meters both wing consoles were torn off. Having rushed along the ground for 145 meters, the fuselage of the plane, destroyed into three parts, stopped. Fuel leaking from damaged fuel tanks ignited and a ground fire broke out, partially destroying the aircraft.

Passengers evacuated on their own through the service door of the front luggage compartment, the cabin window and fuselage fractures, while flight attendants helped the pilots and flight mechanics get out.

At 13:35, the crash site was found by a rescue helicopter, and at approximately 19:00 the survivors were evacuated. In total, 45 adult passengers, 7 children, a navigator and a flight mechanic (died from wounds) died in the disaster. The remaining 38 survivors (22 adult passengers, 12 children, pilots and flight attendants) suffered various injuries.

Air crash investigation

In general, the investigation by the IAC commission lasted 5 months, and fifty additional studies were carried out in various research institutes and organizations. Thus, for ground tests at Yerevan airport, the Tu-134A board 65657 was even burned.

According to data obtained from the black boxes of the aircraft, it turned out that 10 minutes after takeoff, the crew received the signal “Dim in the rear trunk.” The flight mechanic went to check the signal, but when he confirmed this, the crew commander decided to verify it personally. As a result, another 4 minutes were lost, during which the plane moved even further away from the airport and rose to an altitude of 6700 meters.

While the commander turned the plane around to return to the airport, the co-pilot and flight mechanic tried to put out the fire, but the smoke was so strong that they could not cope and returned to the cockpit to help with the landing.

There is a main version of the cause of the fire:

ignition of a self-igniting substance or liquid prohibited for transportation in the luggage of passengers with subsequent penetration of the burning liquid into the underground space or ignition of insulation of electrical wires soaked in flammable liquid in the luggage compartment

And an alternative version:

Among the 5 additional passengers who boarded in Syktyvkar were 2 people who worked as lumberjacks in Komi. They carried a Ural chainsaw with them in their hand luggage. There is a version that this chainsaw was put in the rear luggage compartment and it was the gasoline in its gas tank that could ignite.

During an emergency landing and subsequent fire, the plane was almost completely destroyed and the exact cause of the fire could not be determined.

Publication time: August 25, 2004 07:27 | last updated: December 6, 2017, 2:05 pm

ALL PHOTOS

Two passenger airliners crashed on Tuesday evening. One of them - Tu-134 - operating flight number 1303 Moscow-Volgograd crashed in the Tula region. The second - Tu-154 - was operating flight 1047 Moscow-Sochi and crashed near Rostov-on-Don. Both planes took off from the international capital airport "Domodedovo".

According to initial reports from officials and news agencies, The Tu-134 disappeared from radar screens at 22:56 in the Tula region, and the Tu-154 disappeared at 22:59 in the Rostov region.

At the same time, according to the Interstate Aviation Committee, the planes that crashed in the Tula and Rostov regions disappeared from radar screens with a difference of 1 minute, and not in 3, and at the same time, Tu-154 was the first to disappear from radar screens , crashed in the Rostov region, and in a minute - Tu-134 , crashed in the Tula region.

The wreckage of the Tu-134 was discovered near the village of Buchalki, Kimovsky district, Tula region. According to preliminary data, the plane fell from a height of 10 thousand meters. The Tu-154 fell in the Kamenets-Shakhtinsky district of the region, nine kilometers from the village of Glubokoe. The wreckage of the plane was discovered by rescuers on Wednesday at 8:14 Moscow time.

According to updated data, 90 people died. There were 38 passengers and 8 crew members on board the Tu-154. The Tu-134 carries 35 passengers and 9 crew members.

. This morning the airline received a telegram from the shift manager of the military sector of the Main Center of the Unified Air Traffic Management System of the Russian Federation, who indicates that in the Moscow and Rostov zonal centers a signal was simultaneously received from the Tu-134 and Tu-154: the Tu-154 alarm was activated plane hijacking. This happened immediately before the loss of contact with the aircraft and its disappearance from radar screens.

"08/24/04 IN THE MOSCOW BC AND ROSTOV BC THE MARKS FROM TU154 AND TU134 MISSED AT THE SAME TIME. ON ONE THE SIZZLE ALARM WAS GOTTEN ON. I ASK YOU TO STRENGTHEN VIGILITY AT AIRPORTS DURING INSPECTION OF PASSENGERS AND BOARDING THEM OLET".

The search for the Tu-154B (tail number RA-85556) of Siberia Airlines, which was flying to Sochi and disappeared from radar screens in the Rostov region, was greatly hampered by fog. The day before there was heavy rain in the Rostov region. However, at about 8 a.m. the plane was discovered.

Over the past 10 years, Tu-154 aircraft have been involved in plane crashes 12 times. In total, since 1986, more than 50 emergency incidents involving Tu-154 aircraft of various modifications have occurred in Russia and the CIS.

The prosecutor's office opened criminal cases regarding the crash of two Russian planes in the Tula and Rostov regions.

“Criminal cases have been initiated under Part 3 of Article 263 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation “violation of traffic safety rules and operation of railway, air or water transport,” a representative of the Information and Public Relations Department of the General Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation told Interfax on Wednesday.

He said that, on the instructions of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation Vladimir Ustinov, immediately after receiving primary information about what happened, Deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation Sergei Fridinsky went to the Rostov region, and Deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation Nikolai Savchenko went to Tula.

Investigators from the prosecutor's office began inspecting the crime scenes. Deputy Prosecutors General are organizing work to carry out urgent investigative actions on site, a representative of the Department of Information and Public Relations said.

In addition, specialists from specialized special services, including two teams of explosives specialists from the FSB of Russia, are working at the crash site of the Russian Tu-134 aircraft near Tula and Tu-154 near Rostov.

For ethical reasons, airport employees manning the hotline do not provide a complete list of passengers on the two flights. Relatives of those traveling on two flights are asked to call 504-02-99.

Callers to the hotline receive a response based on specific names. If the caller gives a last name, he is told whether such a person was on board or not.

By now it is known that the Tu-134 was piloted by the general director of the Volga-Aviaexpress airline, Yuri Baichkin. There were 35 passengers and 9 crew members on board the plane.

Also known full list of passengers and crew of the Tu-154. Sibir Airlines reported that flight 1047 was carried out by aircraft commander Mikhail Guryev (1st class pilot), co-pilot Yuri Andrushchenko (2nd class pilot), navigator Yuri Korol (1st class pilot), flight engineer Andrey Ermolaev (2nd class pilot) - Moscow, senior flight attendant Olga Bykovskaya, flight attendants Sergey Ivanov, Yana Tarsukova, Marina Khudeeva - Barnaul.

The Tu-154B-2 (RA-85556) aircraft was produced by the Kuibyshev Aviation Plant on September 27, 1982, with serial number 82A556. This aircraft was one of the youngest in the Tu-154B series and flew no more than 60% of its service life. The design life of aircraft of this series from the start of operation is 50,000 flight hours. This aircraft flew only 30,751 hours.

Tu-154B-2 (RA-85556) underwent one major overhaul at the civil aviation repair plant N411 (Minvody). The renovation was completed on August 25, 1993. The aircraft was undergoing scheduled maintenance on August 10, 2004.

The first, second and third power units worked on average 2,000 hours after overhaul (with an allowed 6,000 hours), and the auxiliary power unit only 569 hours with a possible resource of 1,800 hours.

Russian President Vladimir Putin was immediately informed about the tragedy that occurred with the Tu-134 and Tu-154 aircraft. Press Secretary of the Russian President Alexey Gromov reported this to RIA Novosti.

According to him, the President of Russia instructed the FSB of the Russian Federation to begin an immediate comprehensive investigation in connection with the tragedy.

“Vladimir Putin constantly receives reports from the heads of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the FSB and other law enforcement agencies of Russia,” Gromov said.

On Wednesday evening, the Russian President arrived from Sochi to Moscow. This was announced by presidential press secretary Alexei Gromov.

Vladimir Putin also appointed Russian Transport Minister Igor Levitin as chairman of the state commission to investigate the causes of the Tu-154 and Tu-134 plane crashes. The President instructed the Minister to submit proposals on the composition of the commission as soon as possible.

The head of the Federal Service for Supervision of Transport of the Russian Federation, Alexander Neradko, flew to the place where fragments of the TU-134 aircraft were found in the Tula region. A group of specialists went with him to draw preliminary conclusions about the possible causes of the tragedy.

An interdepartmental task force has been created to investigate incidents

An operational group has been created in connection with an accident involving planes of Siberia and Volga-Aviaexpress airlines. The group was headed by the Deputy Head of the Department of State Policy in the Field of Civil Aviation of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation Karl Ruppel.

The group included representatives of airlines, aviation security services and the interstate aviation committee. “We are currently collecting information about the incident,” said a representative of the aviation authorities.

Security measures were strengthened at all Russian airports immediately after the bombing of a bus stop in Moscow.

Russian aviation authorities have taken measures to strengthen aviation security, a representative of the Russian aviation authorities told Interfax on Wednesday night.

Measures to ensure aviation security consist of suppressing acts of unauthorized interference in the activities of civil aviation, the representative of the aviation authorities recalled.

Strengthening security measures was also confirmed at Sheremetyevo International Airport.

Today, the Tu-154 is the most common aircraft in most CIS countries, operating flights on domestic and international routes. Experts believe that in the coming years we will still have to fly the Tu-154, reports "Theme of the day" .

The first flight of the Tu-154 took place in 1968. Tu-154M is the latest modification of the Tu-154 model, designed for medium distances.

Tu-154M entered commercial use in 1984. Produced until 1998. This modification differs from previous series for the better in the reliable and more economical D-30 KU-154 engine.

Subject to some modifications to engine noise and radio navigation equipment, the Tu-154M satisfies the stringent requirements already introduced for aircraft in European airspace and those that will come into force in 2002.

Loading options: 180 short-haul seats, or 164 economy class seats, or 154 economy class seats and from 8 to 24 first and business class seats.

The State Civil Aviation Service of Russia (GSCA) claims that they have no complaints about the Tu-154, the aircraft meets all flight safety requirements.

According to Aeroflot Flight Safety Inspectorate employees, Tu-154M aircraft are reliable. When analyzing the number of incidents by month, none of them showed a spike in incidents, which indicates the stability of the aircraft in all weather conditions.

Aeroflot is also pleased with this aircraft, where out of 111 aircraft, 24 are Tu-154M. Russia's second largest airline, Sibir, is also not going to give up this aircraft.

According to the Aeroflot press service, in 1997-2000 the reliability level (no flight incidents) on the Tu-154M was 99.90%. Three nines in a row in this indicator are considered the highest class in the best airlines in the world. The likelihood of Tu-154M engine failure is minimal: in this indicator, our aircraft surpasses even the A310 produced by Airbus. The same can be said about aircraft control systems and landing gear operation.

Character Crash during landing Cause Crew error Place Besovets village (Prionezhsky district, Republic of Karelia), 1.2 km from Petrozavodsk airport, Petrozavodsk () Coordinates HGIOL Dead 47 Wounded 5 Aircraft

A crashed plane 2 years before the disaster Model Tu-134A-3 Airline RusAir Departure point Domodedovo, Moscow Destination Petrozavodsk Flight TsGI-9605 (RLU-243) Board number RA-65691 Date of issue April 29, 1980 Passengers 43 Crew 9 Survivors 5 Media files on Wikimedia Commons

Information about flight 9605

Airplane

External images
	Aircraft RA-65691 shortly before the disaster

Tu-134A-3 (registration number RA-65691, factory 63195, serial 57-03) was produced by the Kharkov Aviation Plant on April 29, 1980. On May 7, 1980, it was transferred to the Aeroflot airline (from May 7, 1980 to August 21, 1984 - MGA USSR, 235th Separate Representative JSC, from August 21, 1984 to August 1993 - MGA USSR, North Caucasus UGA, Volgograd OJSC). From March 1993 to August 4, 2000, it belonged to the Volga-Aviaexpress airline (from August 25, 1998 to August 4, 2000, it was in storage). On August 4, 2000, it was purchased by the Kazan airline "Tatarstan", from which from February 28 to August 27, 2001 it was leased to the Cheboksary AP - Chuvashia. In March 2011, it was purchased by RusAir airline. Equipped with two D-30-III bypass turbojet engines from the Perm Motor Plant. On the day of the disaster, the airliner had completed 20,977 takeoff-landing cycles and had flown 35,591 hours.

Crew and passengers

The plane was flown by an experienced crew, the composition of which was as follows:

The aircraft commander (PIC) is 44-year-old Alexander Ivanovich Fedorov. Experienced pilot, worked for RusAir airlines for 3 months (since March 2011). He flew the Mi-8 helicopter and the An-2 plane. In the position of commander of the Tu-134 - since 2008 (before that he flew it as a co-pilot). Flew 8,501 hours, 3,158 of them on a Tu-134 (1,627 of them as PIC).
The second pilot is 40-year-old Sergei Nikolaevich Karyakin. Experienced pilot, worked for RusAir airlines for 7 months (since November 2010). He flew the An-2 plane. As a Tu-134 co-pilot since April 2007. Flew 2846 hours, 1099 of them on Tu-134.
The navigator-instructor is 50-year-old Amanberdy Ataev. Worked at RusAir airline for 10 months (since August 2010). As a navigator he flew the An-24 aircraft. He has served as a Tu-134 navigator since March 1985, and as a Tu-134 navigator-instructor since 1997. Flighted 13,699 hours, 13,464 of them on the Tu-134.
The flight mechanic is 56-year-old Viktor Evgenievich Timoshenko. Worked for RusAir airlines for 5 years (since July 2005). As a flight mechanic he flew the Yak-40 aircraft. In the position of flight mechanic of the Tu-134 - since December 2001. Flight time was 11,231, 2,494 of which were on Tu-134.

Three flight attendants worked in the aircraft cabin:

Yulia Sergeevna Gurina, 28 years old.
Elena Nikolaevna Erofeeva, 27 years old.
Yulia Sergeevna Skvortsova, 24 years old.

The crew also included aircraft technicians Alexander Alexandrovich Fedorchenko (44 years old) and Mikhail Nikitich Karpuk (57 years old).

In total, there were 52 people on board the plane - 43 passengers and 9 crew members. One of the passengers was FIFA referee Vladimir Pettai.

Chronology of events

Preceding circumstances

On June 17, 2011, RusLine airline flight RLU-243, which was supposed to take place on June 20 of the same year on the Moscow-Petrozavodsk route, was duly replaced by RusAir airline flight TsGI-9605 on June 20, 2011 on the Moscow-Petrozavodsk route. Petrozavodsk on a Tu-134A-3 aircraft, board RA-65691, which accepted passengers on all previously sold air tickets. The aircraft was replaced in connection with the planned increase in passenger traffic on the Moscow-Petrozavodsk-Moscow line, in connection with which a decision was made to increase the number of passenger seats on this flight from 50 to 66. RusLine Airlines carried out air transportation on Bombardier CRJ-100 aircraft /200 in a 50-seat configuration (there were no Tu-134 aircraft in the RusLine airline fleet). According to other sources, the RusLine airline did not have a sufficient number of aircraft to carry out regular transportation, because Flight changes have been made before. In addition, at the time of departure on June 20, 2011, 47 tickets were sold for this flight, and as of June 17, 2011 - 35 tickets, which did not indicate a sharp increase in passenger traffic.

Departure from Moscow

Flight TsGI-9605 took off from Domodedovo Airport at 22:30 MSK (18:30 UTC). The weather forecast for Petrozavodsk included: ground wind 120°, 4 m/s, visibility 3000 meters, at times deteriorating to 1500 meters, light rain, haze, significant cloudiness of 5-7 octants with a lower limit of 120 meters, at times 90 meters, overcast 8 octants with a lower limit of 3000 meters. When transmitting weather data, the weather forecaster on duty at the Petrozavodsk airport warned the commander of his intention to prepare an adjustment to the forecast, as he expected worsening weather in the airport area. According to the current regulations, changes in the weather forecast are transmitted to the crews upon their requests, which the crew of flight 9605 did not make before takeoff, despite the departure delay of 20 minutes. For the main part of the route from Moscow to Petrozavodsk, flight TsGI-9605 flew at a flight level of 9100 meters.

Approach to Petrozavodsk

At 23:10, at the request of the crew, Petrozavodsk-Tower dispatcher Sergei Shmatkov transmitted information about the actual weather of Petrozavodsk for 22:00 to flight 9605: ground wind 80°, 2 m/s, visibility 2100 m, overcast, at the main point 140 meters, on the near drive 200 meters, MKpos = 12°. The actual weather did not correspond to the airfield operating minimum approved by the operator (RusAir airline), however, the PIC unreasonably continued the flight to the destination. After complete pre-landing preparations, at 23:20 MSK the crew began their descent.

At 23:28, the crew lowered the aircraft to 4,500 meters and received permission to descend to a transition level of 1,500 meters. At 23:30 the crew was given the actual weather: calm, visibility 2100 meters, haze, overcast, at the main observation point (OPP) 130 meters, at the BPRM - 170 meters. Flight 9605 made an approach at a heading of 12° in conditions of low clouds and poor visibility, while deviating from the calculated vertical descent profile and landing course. At that moment, at the Petrozavodsk airport, according to official weather observations, the height of the cloud base (VNGO) was 120-150 meters, the visibility range was 2100-2500 meters. The minimum (minimum descent altitude × visibility range) of the Petrozavodsk airfield, indicated by the airport in the NOTAM, for civil aircraft of class C, D according to the OSP (the main landing system - far and near positioning radio beacons) with fixation of the entry point to the glide path, was with a landing course of 012 110 ×2100 m. At the same time, the officially observed weather (120×2100 m) did not correspond to the operational minimum of Petrozavodsk Airport (165×3500 m), approved by the operator, and in accordance with the Federal Aviation Rules “Preparation and execution of flights in civil aviation of the Russian Federation” (FAP-128) did not give the right to the PIC to perform descent and approach. However, in violation of FAP-128, the crew was guided by the minimum specified in the NOTAM.

At 23:32 at an altitude of 2700 meters, the PIC turned off the side channel autopilot and subsequently piloted in manual mode. At 23:33, the crew reported the altitude (1500 meters), set the airport pressure, adjusted the ARC No. 1 and No. 2 to DPRM and BPRM and continued to descend to 900 meters. At 23:35 the crew received permission to descend to 500 meters. After completing the fourth turn, the plane found itself four kilometers to the left of Runway No. 01 of Petrozavodsk Airport. The starting point for the fourth turn entered into the system was 1.6 km from the runway, while the required lead to start the turn is 3-3.2 km. The southeast wind of up to 9 m/s also contributed to the exit from the turn with lateral deviation. After exiting the turn with a lateral deviation in order to reach the runway alignment, the navigator gave the commander the command to perform a turn to the right on a course of 30°.

Decline

At 23:36, at the command of the PIC, the flight engineer lowered the landing gear. At 23:36:40, the navigator reported that the runway was 21 kilometers away and the plane was 2.3 km to the left of the runway alignment. At 23:37:28, the dispatcher informed the crew that they were 18 km away from the runway and that the aircraft was on a landing course. At 23:37:35 the commander took a heading of 15° (taking into account the left drift angle of 3°). At the command of the PIC, the flight mechanic began to lower the flaps, first to 20° and then to 30°. At the end of the flap extension, the navigator informed that the distance was 500 meters to the TVG and that the aircraft was strictly on the runway alignment. When the flaps were extended, the flight altitude of flight 9605 increased from 500 to 550 meters due to the fact that the PIC did not timely compensate for the increase in wing lift when the flaps were extended by deflecting the steering column " Push».

After the navigator's information that the aircraft was at the glide path entry point, the PIC, maintaining a magnetic course of 16°, from an altitude of 550 meters began to descend at a speed of 290-300 km/h with a calculated vertical descent speed of 4 m/s. After the co-pilot reported that he was ready to land, the dispatcher gave the go-ahead for landing and reported that the plane was 8 kilometers from the airport. At 23:38:54, the navigator informed the commander of the need to increase the heading by 3° in order to compensate for the drift due to the presence of a crosswind from the right. Due to entering the glide path at an altitude of 550 meters, while maintaining a vertical speed calculated for entering the glide path at an altitude of 500 meters, the airliner passed the DPRM at an altitude of 385 meters, 55 meters higher than the specified one. After passing the DPRM, at the navigator’s command given to adjust the trajectory, the commander increased the vertical rate of descent to 6 m/s.

At 23:39:21 the navigator determined the drift angle of 5° to the left and gave the command: 5 drift to the left, we are on this course, don’t take the left. At 23:39:35 the navigator reported: Removal 4, control 220, while vertical 6 meters. With a further decrease at an altitude of 150-200 meters, the wind weakened and the drift decreased. The commander continued to maintain a course of 17°, which led to a deviation to the right of the given trajectory. Since the navigator maintained the direction according to the KLN-90B satellite navigation system, without taking into account the ARC readings, the aircraft’s deviation to the right of the runway axis turned out to be unnoticed by the crew.

At an altitude of 150 meters and 3 kilometers from the runway, the aircraft crossed the specified descent glide path, to maintain which it was necessary to set the vertical speed of descent to 4 m/s, while the vertical speed maintained by the PIC continued to be about 5-5.5 m/s. With. During a further descent at an altitude of 140 m (the height of the beginning of the visual assessment) and 110 m (the height of the decision), in violation of the crew members’ operating technology, the navigator did not give the command “ Grade" And " VLOOKUP" But instead of a go-around, the PIC continued to descend below the flight path without establishing visual contact with the approach lights and ground landmarks. The co-pilot, if there was a vertical speed of more than 5 m/s at an altitude of less than 100 meters, did not give a command Steep decline. From a height of 70 meters, the flight mechanic began counting the altitude using the radio altimeter every 10 meters.

At 23:40:02 the navigator gave the command: Removal two, score. The ratio of the height and distance of the airliner from the runway indicated that the aircraft was significantly below the specified descent trajectory. However, the crew continued their descent at the same vertical speed. At the navigator's command " Grade“The commander, without transferring control to the co-pilot, began to establish contact with ground references, as a result of which control over the aircraft’s descent parameters was lost, which contributed to the development of a right roll and the maintenance of an increased vertical speed.

Catastrophe

At an altitude of 60 meters, a dangerous approach to the ground alarm went off, in which case the PIC was obliged to immediately begin a missed approach. At 23:40:05 the PIC reported: I don't see it yet. I'm watching, but did not announce his decision. The co-pilot, who was obliged in this case to initiate a missed approach, also did not do this. At 23:40:08, the navigator reported a distance of 1.5 kilometers at the same time as the flight mechanic counted the altitude of 50 meters. The plane, being significantly below the glide path, continued to evade to the right with a bank of 5-6°. Crew control of altitude, rate of descent, roll and heading was lost as all crew members attempted to establish visual contact with ground references. However, the actual weather conditions during the landing approach in the area of the DPRM and BPRM (low layered clouds 30-40 meters high, turning into fog with a visibility of 500-700 meters) did not allow the crew to establish visual contact with ground landmarks until the aircraft collided with trees. The crew made no attempts to stop the descent and begin a go-around until the collision.

At 23:40:12 MSK, 2 seconds after the flight mechanic counted the altitude of 40 meters, the plane began to collide with trees. The first contact with the trees (the top of a pine tree 25 meters high) occurred at a distance of 1260 meters from the runway at an altitude of 32 meters at a speed of 280 km/h. Simultaneously with the collision with the tree, the PIC deflected the steering wheel all the way to pitch up, creating an angle of attack up to supercritical. The right roll, due to the destruction of the end part of the right half-wing, began to increase vigorously. Continuing to collide with trees, flight TsGI-9605 with a developing right bank flew another 510 meters from the place of the first collision with trees and crashed into the parapet of the road at the intersection of the A133 Petrozavodsk-Suoyarvi highway and the turn to the airport in an almost inverted position (bank more than 90°) and with a pitch angle of at least −10° (dive). The liner began to collapse, caught fire, plowed about 150 meters along the ground and stopped 1.2 kilometers from Petrozavodsk airport and only 20 meters from residential buildings in the village of Besovets. 425 meters from the site of the first collision with trees, the plane crossed the power line leading to the BPRM and broke the wires. This caused a short-term (5 seconds) shutdown of the low-intensity lighting system. The plane was completely destroyed and caught fire.

The disaster occurred at the coordinate point 61°52′10″ n. w. 34°08′53″ E. d. HGIOL .

Transcript of negotiations


23:36:07	PC	Lateral left 4 let's go for now.
23:36:12	PC	Distance 23 kilometers.
23:36:14	2P	TsGI 96-0-5, took 500.
23:36:16	Di	TsGI 96-0-5, offset 24, to the left of landing, 500 before entering the glide path.
23:36:28	BM	The chassis is being released.
23:36:30	PC	Total 21, approaching the course.
23:36:41	PC	Here is entry point 10, to the left are 2 and 3, we approach the course.
23:37:05	PC	To the left is a kilometer and 200 meters.
23:37:08	PC	7 kilometers to the entry point.
23:37:14	2P	Come on 20 flaps (nrzb).
23:37:16	PIC	We can handle 370 speed.
23:37:19	Di	TsGI 96-0-5, removal 18, on landing course.
23:37:25	PC	(nrzb) 500, take the boarding pass, 15 uh... take it for now.
23:37:30	PC	Left 3 demolition.
23:37:36	PC	Well, yes, that would be it, as long as we bring it to 15.
23:37:41	PC	We go 200 meters to the left.
23:37:44	PC	4 kilometers to the point.
23:37:46	PIC	Flaps 20.
23:37:57	PC	3rd drift to the left, on this course.
23:37:59	BM	20 released.
23:38:03	PC	2 kilometers to the entry point.
23:38:04	PIC	Flaps 30.
23:38:15	BM	30 released.
23:38:16	PC	(nrzb) 500 meters to the point, strictly on the line right now.
23:38:20	Di	TsGI 96-0-5, removal 11, on course, approaching glide path.
23:38:25	2P	We approach the glide path, TsGI 96-0-5, maintain 500.
23:38:28	PC	Entry point 10 and 4, descending, vertical 4 meters.
23:38:31	PIC	Control by card.
23:38:47	PC	The control is completed.
23:38:49	2P	TsGI 96-0-5, we are descending, ready to land.
23:38:54	PC	To the right 3rd course.
23:38:56	Di	TsGI 96-0-5, distance 8, on landing course, landing cleared.
23:39:03	2P	TsGI 96-0-5, landing cleared, long-range flight.
23:39:10	PC	Distance 6 kilometers, (nrzb) vertical 5 meters.
23:39:11	2P	We were cleared to land.
23:39:14	PIC	I’m holding 5, let’s go a little higher, right?
23:39:16	PC	Yes, we are going higher, 6 meters vertical.
23:39:21	PC	So, there is a 5th drift to the left, we are going on this course, don’t take the left.
23:39:24	PIC	Fine.
23:39:34	PC	Removal 4, control 220, 6 meters so far.
23:39:48	PC	So, let's go on this course.
23:39:50	PC	Removal 3, 150 on glide path.
23:40:02	PC	Removal 2, score.
23:40:04	BM	60.
23:40:05	PIC	I don't see it yet.
23:40:07	PIC	I'm watching.
23:40:08	PC	(nrzb) one and a half kilometers.
23:40:10	BM	40 meters.
23:40:12		The sound of hitting a pine tree.
23:40:13	2P	Fucking mother!!!
23:40:14	E	(nrzb).
23:40:14		End of recording.

Rescue operation

One of the surviving passengers was able to get out of the plane on his own. Local residents dragged some of the victims away from the burning wreckage. The first fire truck (from the airport), according to the airport director, arrived at the scene of the disaster in a minute and a half. The people who rescued the survivors were later awarded medals.

Victims and victims

There were 52 people on board flight 9605 - 43 passengers (including 8 children) and 9 crew members. The plane crash killed 44 people - 36 passengers (including 7 children) and 8 crew members (all four pilots, both aircraft technicians and two flight attendants). Eight people survived, but were injured, including one flight attendant and one child. Doctors assessed the condition of seven of the eight survivors as “extremely serious.” The Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations sent an Il-76 aircraft equipped with medical modules to Karelia to evacuate victims. There were 15 doctors from the Centrospas squad and five psychologists on board the plane. The next day, one of the survivors, a nine-year-old child, died in the Children's Republican Hospital of Karelia; thus, the number of victims increased to 45 people. On June 25, another surviving passenger died in hospital, and another survivor died later in the day. The number of victims of the disaster increased to 47 people.

Killed and injured by country

A country	Dead	Victims
	38	5
/

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