The Altai Mountains are the highest point. Altai (Mountain System). Location of Altai mountain ranges

The Battle of Kursk is one of the largest and most important battles of the Great Patriotic War, which took place from July 5 to August 23, 1943.
The German command gave a different name to this battle - Operation Citadel, which, according to Wehrmacht plans, was supposed to counterattack the Soviet offensive.

Causes of the Battle of Kursk

After the victory at Stalingrad, the German army began to retreat for the first time during the Great Patriotic War, and Soviet army launched a decisive offensive that could only be stopped at the Kursk Bulge and the German command understood this. The Germans organized a strong defensive line, and in their opinion, it should have withstood any attack.

Strengths of the parties

Germany
At the start of the Battle of Kursk, the Wehrmacht troops numbered more than 900 thousand people. In addition to the huge amount of manpower, the Germans had a considerable number of tanks, among which were tanks of all the latest models: these are more than 300 Tiger and Panther tanks, as well as a very powerful tank destroyer (anti-tank gun) Ferdinand or Elephant "including about 50 combat units.
It should be noted that among the tank army there were three elite tank divisions, which had not suffered a single defeat before - they included real tank aces.
And in support of the ground army, an air fleet was sent with a total of more than 1,000 combat aircraft of the latest models.

USSR
To slow down and complicate the enemy's offensive, the Soviet Army installed approximately one and a half thousand mines on every kilometer of the front. The number of infantrymen in the Soviet Army reached more than 1 million soldiers. And the Soviet Army had 3-4 thousand tanks, which also exceeded the number of German ones. However, a large number of Soviet tanks are outdated models and are not rivals to the same “Tigers” of the Wehrmacht.
The Red Army had twice as many guns and mortars. If the Wehrmacht has 10 thousand of them, then the Soviet Army has more than twenty. There were also more planes, but historians cannot give exact figures.

Progress of the battle

During Operation Citadel, the German command decided to launch a counterattack on the northern and southern wings of the Kursk Bulge in order to encircle and destroy the Red Army. But German army failed to implement this. The Soviet command hit the Germans with a powerful artillery strike to weaken the initial enemy attack.
Before the start of the offensive operation, the Wehrmacht launched powerful artillery strikes on the positions of the Red Army. Then, on the northern front of the arc, German tanks went on the offensive, but soon encountered very strong resistance. The Germans repeatedly changed the direction of the attack, but did not achieve significant results; by July 10, they managed to break through only 12 km, losing about 2 thousand tanks. As a result, they had to go on the defensive.
On July 5, the attack began on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge. First came a powerful artillery barrage. Having suffered setbacks, the German command decided to continue the offensive in the Prokhorovka area, where tank forces were already beginning to accumulate.
The famous Battle of Prokhorovka, the largest tank battle in history, began on July 11, but the height of the battle in the battle was on July 12. On a small section of the front, 700 German and about 800 Soviet tanks and guns collided. The tanks of both sides mixed and throughout the day many tank crews left their combat vehicles and fought in hand-to-hand combat. By the end of July 12, the tank battle began to wane. The Soviet army failed to defeat the enemy's tank forces, but managed to stop their advance. Having broken a little deeper, the Germans were forced to retreat, and the Soviet Army launched an offensive.
German losses in the Battle of Prokhorovka were insignificant: 80 tanks, but the Soviet Army lost about 70% of all tanks in this direction.
In the next few days, they were almost completely bled dry and had lost their attacking potential, while the Soviet reserves had not yet entered the battle and were ready to launch a decisive counterattack.
On July 15, the Germans went on the defensive. As a result, the German offensive did not bring any success, and both sides suffered serious losses. The number of those killed on the German side is estimated at 70 thousand soldiers, a large amount of equipment and guns. According to various estimates, the Soviet army lost up to 150 thousand soldiers, a large number of this figure being irretrievable losses.
The first offensive operations on the Soviet side began on July 5, their goal was to deprive the enemy of maneuvering his reserves and transferring forces from other fronts to this section of the front.
On July 17, the Izyum-Barvenkovsky operation began from the Soviet army. The Soviet command set the goal of encircling the Donbass group of Germans. The Soviet army managed to cross the Northern Donets, seize a bridgehead on the right bank and, most importantly, pin down German reserves on this section of the front.
During the Mius offensive operation of the Red Army (July 17 - August 2), it was possible to stop the transfer of divisions from Donbass to the Kursk Bulge, which significantly reduced the defensive potential of the arc itself.
On July 12, the offensive began in the Oryol direction. Within one day, the Soviet army managed to drive the Germans out of Orel, and they were forced to move to another defensive line. After Orel and Belgorod, the key cities, were liberated during the Oryol and Belgorod operations, and the Germans were driven back, it was decided to arrange a festive fireworks display. So on August 5, the first fireworks display during the entire period of hostilities in the Great Patriotic War was organized in the capital. During the operation, the Germans lost over 90 thousand soldiers and a large amount of equipment.
In the southern region, the offensive of the Soviet army began on August 3 and was called Operation Rumyantsev. As a result of this offensive operation, the Soviet army managed to liberate a number of strategically important cities, including the city of Kharkov (August 23). During this offensive, the Germans attempted to counterattack, but they did not bring any success to the Wehrmacht.
From August 7 to October 2, the offensive operation “Kutuzov” was carried out - the Smolensk offensive operation, during which the left wing of the German armies of the “Center” group was defeated and the city of Smolensk was liberated. And during the Donbass operation (August 13 – September 22), the Donetsk basin was liberated.
From August 26 to September 30, the Chernigov-Poltava offensive operation took place. It ended in complete success for the Red Army, since almost all of Left Bank Ukraine was liberated from the Germans.

Aftermath of the battle

The Kursk operation became a turning point in the Great Patriotic War, after which the Soviet Army continued its offensive and liberated Ukraine, Belarus, Poland and other republics from the Germans.
The losses during the Battle of Kursk were simply colossal. Most historians agree that more than a million soldiers died on the Kursk Bulge. Soviet historians say that the losses of the German army amounted to more than 400 thousand soldiers, the Germans talk about a figure of less than 200 thousand. In addition, great amount equipment, aircraft and guns.
After the failure of Operation Citadel, the German command lost the ability to carry out attacks and went on the defensive. In 1944 and 45, local offensives were launched, but they did not bring success.
The German command has repeatedly said that defeat on the Kursk Bulge is a defeat on the Eastern Front and it will be impossible to regain the advantage.

On August 23, Russia celebrates the Day of the Defeat of Nazi Troops in the Battle of Kursk

There is no analogue in world history to the Battle of Kursk, which lasted 50 days and nights - from July 5 to August 23, 1943. The victory in the Battle of Kursk was a decisive turn in the course of the Great Patriotic War. The defenders of our Motherland managed to stop the enemy and inflict a deafening blow on him, from which he could not recover. After the victory in the Battle of Kursk, the advantage in the Great Patriotic War was already on the side of the Soviet army. But such a radical change cost our country dearly: military historians still cannot accurately estimate the losses of people and equipment on the Kursk Bulge, agreeing on only one assessment - the losses of both sides were colossal.

According to the plan of the German command, the Soviet troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts defending in the Kursk region were to be destroyed as a result of a series of massive attacks. The victory in the Battle of Kursk gave the Germans the opportunity to expand their plan of attack on our country and their strategic initiative. In short, winning this battle meant winning the war. In the Battle of Kursk, the Germans had high hopes for their new equipment: Tiger and Panther tanks, Ferdinand assault guns, Focke-Wulf-190-A fighters and Heinkel-129 attack aircraft. Our attack aircraft used new anti-tank bombs PTAB-2.5-1.5, which penetrated the armor of the fascist Tigers and Panthers.

The Kursk Bulge was a protrusion about 150 kilometers deep and up to 200 kilometers wide, facing west. This arc was formed during the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine. The battle on the Kursk Bulge is usually divided into three parts: the Kursk defensive operation, which lasted from July 5 to 23, the Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and the Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3 - 23).

The German military operation to seize control of the strategically important Kursk Bulge was codenamed “Citadel”. The avalanche attacks on Soviet positions began on the morning of July 5, 1943, with artillery fire and air strikes. The Nazis advanced on a broad front, attacking from heaven and earth. As soon as it began, the battle took on a grandiose scale and was extremely tense. According to data from Soviet sources, the defenders of our Motherland were confronted by about 900 thousand people, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars, about 2.7 thousand tanks and more than 2 thousand aircraft. In addition, aces of the 4th and 6th fought in the air from the German side air fleets. The command of the Soviet troops managed to assemble more than 1.9 million people, more than 26.5 thousand guns and mortars, over 4.9 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units and about 2.9 thousand aircraft. Our soldiers repelled attacks by enemy strike forces, showing unprecedented tenacity and courage.

On July 12, Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge went on the offensive. On this day, in the area of ​​the Prokhorovka railway station, 56 km north of Belgorod, the largest oncoming tank battle of the Second World War took place. About 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part in it. The battle of Prokhorovka lasted all day, the Germans lost about 10 thousand people, over 360 tanks and were forced to retreat. On the same day, Operation Kutuzov began, during which the enemy’s defenses were broken through in the Bolkhov, Khotynets and Oryol directions. Our troops advanced into German positions, and the enemy command gave the order to retreat. By August 23, the enemy was thrown back 150 kilometers to the west, and the cities of Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov were liberated.

Aviation played a significant role in the Battle of Kursk. Air strikes destroyed a significant amount of enemy equipment. The advantage of the USSR in the air, achieved during fierce battles, became the key to the overall superiority of our troops. In the memoirs of the German military, one can feel admiration for the enemy and recognition of his strength. German General Forst wrote after the war: “Our offensive began, and a few hours later a large number of Russian aircraft appeared. Air battles broke out above our heads. During the entire war, none of us saw such a spectacle.” A German fighter pilot from the Udet squadron, shot down on July 5 near Belgorod, recalls: “Russian pilots began to fight much harder. Apparently you still have some old footage. I never thought that I would be shot down so soon...”

And about how fierce the battles were on the Kursk Bulge and about the superhuman efforts that this victory was achieved, the memoirs of the commander of the battery of the 239th mortar regiment of the 17th artillery division, M.I. Kobzev, can best tell:

– “The fierce battles on the Oryol-Kursk Bulge in August 1943 are especially etched in my memory,” Kobzev wrote. - It was in the Akhtyrka area. My battery was ordered to cover the retreat of our troops with mortar fire, blocking the path of the enemy infantry advancing behind the tanks. The calculations of my battery had a hard time when the Tigers began to shower it with a hail of fragments. They disabled two mortars and almost half the servants. The loader was killed by a direct hit from a shell, an enemy bullet hit the gunner in the head, and number three had his chin torn off by a shrapnel. Miraculously, only one battery mortar remained intact, camouflaged in the thickets of corn, which, together with a scout and a radio operator, the three of us dragged 17 kilometers for two days until we found our regiment retreating to the assigned positions.

On August 5, 1943, when the Soviet army clearly had an advantage in the Battle of Kursk in Moscow, for the first time in 2 years since the beginning of the war, an artillery salute thundered in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod. Subsequently, Muscovites often watched fireworks on the days of significant victories in the battles of the Great Patriotic War.

Vasily Klochkov

The Battle of Kursk is the largest tank battle of World War II. It happened on July 12, 1943 on the Kursk Bulge near Prokhorovka. The battle was bloody, with more than 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns taking part in it on both sides. It was this battle that largely predetermined the outcome of all military operations near Kursk and Orel in the summer of 1943, which led to a strategic turning point in World War II.

The battle consisted of two stages - defensive and offensive.

By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Supreme High Command Headquarters had created a grouping (Central and Voronezh Fronts) with 1,336 thousand people, more than 19 thousand guns and mortars, 3,444 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,172 aircraft. For the offensive, the fascist German command attracted troops from the Army Groups “Center” (G. Kluge) and “South” (E. Manstein), concentrating in them 70% of the tank divisions and over 65% of the combat aircraft operating on the Soviet-German front. The enemy group numbered over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2,700 tanks and assault guns, and about 2,050 aircraft. An important place in the enemy's plan was given to the massive use of new tanks and self-propelled guns.

The first stage is the Kursk strategic defensive operation on July 5-23, 1943. The operation was carried out by troops of the Central, Voronezh and Steppe fronts. During the fighting, additional commands of the Steppe Front, 27th, 47th and 53rd combined arms, 5th Guards Tank and 5th Air Armies, five tank and one mechanized corps, 19 divisions and one brigade were introduced. The duration of the operation is 19 days. The width of the combat front is 550 km. The depth of withdrawal of Soviet troops is 12-35 km. In terms of its scope and intensity, the Kursk defensive operation is one of the largest battles of the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War. During the defensive battles, the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts bled and then stopped the advance of the strike forces of the fascist German army and created favorable conditions for launching a counteroffensive in the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov directions. Hitler's plan to defeat Soviet troops in the Kursk salient was a complete failure.

Second stage: Oryol strategic offensive operation (Kutuzov) July 12 - August 18, 1943 and Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operation (Rumyantsev) August 3 - 23, 1943.

The Oryol operation was carried out by troops of the Bryansk, Central Fronts and part of the forces of the Western Front. During the offensive, the commands of the 11th combined arms, 3rd guards and 4th tank armies, five tank, one mechanized and one cavalry corps, and 11 divisions were additionally introduced. The duration of the operation is 38 days. The width of the combat front is 400 km. The depth of advance of Soviet troops is 150 km. Average daily rate of advance: rifle formations 4-5 km; tank and mechanized formations 7-10 km. During the offensive, Soviet troops inflicted major defeat German Army Group Center liberated a significant territory from the occupiers, including the regional center of Orel. With the liquidation of the enemy's Oryol bridgehead, from which he launched his attack on Kursk, the situation on the central sector of the Soviet-German front changed dramatically, and wide opportunities opened up for developing an offensive in the Bryansk direction and the entry of Soviet troops into the eastern regions of Belarus.

The Belgorod-Kharkov operation was carried out by troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts. During the offensive, additional commands of the 4th Guards, 47th and 57th armies, tank and mechanized corps, 19 divisions and two brigades were introduced. The duration of the operation is 21 days. The width of the combat front is 300-400 km. The depth of advance of Soviet troops is 140 km. Average daily rate of advance: rifle formations - 7 km, tank and mechanized formations - 10-15 km. During the operation, troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts defeated the powerful Belgorod-Kharkov enemy group and liberated the Kharkov industrial region, the cities of Belgorod and Kharkov. Favorable conditions were created for the liberation of Left Bank Ukraine. In the Prokhorovka area alone, where the largest oncoming tank battle of World War II took place on July 12, the enemy lost 400 tanks and more than 10 thousand people killed. As a result of the counteroffensive, enemy groups in the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov directions were defeated.

In the Battle of Kursk, the Wehrmacht lost about 500 thousand people, 1.5 thousand tanks, over 3.7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns. His offensive strategy was a complete failure. Germany and its allies were forced to go on the defensive in all theaters of World War II. The strategic initiative finally passed into the hands of the Soviet command. This battle and the exit of Soviet troops to the Dnieper completed a radical turning point in the course of the war.

BATTLE OF KURSK: FIGURES AND FACTS

The general balance of forces and means of the warring parties by the beginning of July 1943

Composition of the Voronezh Front on July 5, 1943

Commander – Army General N.F. Vatutin.

The 38th, 40th, 6th and 7th Guards armies were deployed in the first echelon of the front. In the second echelon were the 1st Tank and 69th Armies, in reserve were the 35th Guards Rifle Corps, the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps and artillery, anti-aircraft units and formations. The Oboyan direction was covered by the 6th Guards Army (commander - Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov) consisting of the 22nd Guards Rifle Corps (71, 67, 90 Guards Rifle Division), 23 Guards Rifle Corps (51, 52, 89 Guards Rifle Division, 375 sd). The Korochan direction was covered by the 7th Guards Army (commander - Lieutenant General Shumilov M.S.) consisting of the 24th Guards Rifle Corps (15, 36, 72nd Guards Rifle Division), 25th Guards Rifle Corps (73, 78, 81st Guards Rifle Division, 213 sd)

Composition of the Steppe Military District at the beginning of the battle

Commander Colonel General I.S. Konev

4th and 5th Guards, 27th, 47th, 53rd combined arms armies, 5th Guards Tank Army, 5th Air Army, as well as one rifle, three tank, three mechanized and three cavalry corps. Total: soldiers and officers - 573 thousand people, guns and mortars - 7401, tanks and self-propelled guns - 1551, aircraft - more than 500.

Losses of the Voronezh Front in the defensive operation

According to the combat report of the Voronezh Front headquarters No. 01398 to the Chief of the General Staff on losses from July 4 to 22: killed - 20,577, missing - 25,898, total irretrievable human losses - 46,504, wounded - 54,427, total human losses - 100,931. Equipment lost irretrievably: tanks and self-propelled guns - 1,628, guns and mortars - 3,609, aircraft - 387 (damaged).

Soviet troops (Voronezh and Steppe fronts) as of August 3, 1943

Soldiers and officers - 980,500 people; guns and mortars - 12,000 pieces; tanks and self-propelled guns - 2400 pieces; aircraft - 1,300 pieces.

List of units and formations that took part in the liberation of Belgorod on August 5, 1943.

89 Guards SD, 305, 375 SD 48SK, 93, 94 Guards SD, 96 TBR 35 SK, 10 OIPTABR. 26 ZENAD, 315 Guards. minregiment 69A IIISD 49sk 7th Guards A 19 mechanized brigade, 37 mechanized brigade, 35 mechanized brigade, 218 tbr I mechanized corps 53A 16th breakthrough artillery division RGK 302 IAD and 264 IAD 4 fighter air corps; I Guards bad and 293 bad I Bomber Corps; 266 shad, 203 shad, 292 shad I assault air corps 5 VA 23 Guards. long-range air regiment.

Nazi troops

The composition of the units of Army Group South allocated to the group for the attack on Kursk

48 Panzer Corps and 2 SS Panzer Corps of the 4th Panzer Army; army group "Kempf" consisting of 11, 42 army corps, 3 tank corps. In total, 14 divisions were involved, including 8 tank and one motorized, and also at the disposal of the commander of the GA "YUG" were: 503 separate battalion of heavy tanks "Tiger", 39 tank regiment "Panther", 228 and 911 separate divisions of assault guns. Total strength of the group: 440,000 soldiers and officers, up to 4,000 guns and mortars, 1,408 tanks and assault guns (including 200 Panthers and 102 Tigers), approximately 1,050 aircraft.

Losses of Army Group South from July 5 to July 17, 1943

The 4th TA and AG Kempf lost about 40,000 killed, wounded and missing from July 4 to 23. During the period from July 5 to July 17, more than 1,000 tanks and self-propelled guns were damaged, 190 vehicles were irretrievably lost (including 6 Tigers and 44 Panthers). 1,200 guns and mortars were disabled.

Nazi troops (4th Panzer Army and Task Force Kempf) as of August 3, 1943

Soldiers and officers - 200,000 people; guns and mortars - 3,000 pieces; tanks and self-propelled guns - 600 pieces; Aircraft - 1,000 pieces.

BATTLE OF PROKHOROVSKY - LEGEND AND REALITY


Karl-Heinz Friser - military historian

(Germany)

A) Soviet encirclement plan.

During the first two years of the war, the Red Army achieved qualitative progress. But the initial stage of the Battle of Kursk demonstrated how much more tactically competent the Wehrmacht was. At the strategic level, however, she managed to create a real masterpiece even before the first tactical actions began. This was expressed not only in hiding individual armies and entire army groups in the depths of space from German intelligence. It was, for example, the Steppe Front as a strategic reserve. Undoubtedly, this is one of the most outstanding examples of camouflage to deceive the enemy during the war.

The use of strategic reserves was planned only at the beginning of the offensive of the Soviet troops in the summer, in order to bury the German troops defeated in defensive battles near Kursk like an avalanche. But when the Voronezh Front was threatened with collapse, a few days later this avalanche was set in motion - in the direction of Prokhorovka. This was supposed not only to stop the Nazi invaders, but to “encircle and destroy” the three German tank corps that had rushed forward. The Supreme Command of the Red Army did not want an “ordinary victory,” but a “crushing victory,” i.e. "Cannes" is a kind of tank Stalingrad.

The front line almost facilitated the pincer operation of the 4th Panzer Army, which was advancing north. In front of the massive armored wedges, however, there was a long narrow corridor, convenient for a flank attack. Vatutin, in accordance with the Operational Plan of the Headquarters, developed an attack plan in four directions - to create strike groups on both flanks of the tank armies in the Yakovlevo-Bykovka direction to threaten the rear of the 48th Panzer Corps and the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. In addition, counter attacks by combined arms armies were planned. According to this plan, the German tank corps, unaware of the trap, were to be attacked from four sides:

From the west by the forces of the 1st Tank Army (6th and 41st Tank Corps, as well as the 3rd Mechanized and 5th Guards Tank Corps),

From the north-west by the forces of the 6th Guards Army,

From the northeast by the forces of the 5th Guards Army of the Steppe Front,

From the east - by the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army of the Steppe Front (XVIII-XXIX Tank Corps and 5th Guards Mechanized Corps), reinforced by the 2nd Tank and 2nd Guards Tank Corps, as well as other independent formations.

The situation was no better for the 3rd Panzer Corps of Task Force Kempf, located southeast. According to Vatutin's plan, the Soviet 7th Guards Army was supposed to attack the corps on the flank in the Razumny area (Belgorod direction). The decisive day of the Battle of Kursk, according to the Soviet Headquarters, was July 12. On this day, in the north of the Kursk ledge, the Bryansk Front and most of the forces of the Western Front went on the offensive against the scattered forces of the 2nd Tank Army of the Wehrmacht. As the front collapsed, Model's 9th Army stopped its attack on Kursk.

On the same day, a crushing blow was planned against the attacking formations of Army Group South. Powerful forces were represented by the 5th Guards Tank Army, which had a total of 909 tanks and 42 assault guns. This army was tasked with stopping the 2nd SS Panzer Corps in the battle near Prokhorovka.

B) Prokhorovka. Legend and Reality

The Battle of Kursk is often referred to as the turning point of the Second World War, effectively decided on July 12, 1943 in the largest tank battle in the Prokhorovka area. This thesis is found mainly in Soviet historiography. Supposedly, the leading edge of the entire course of World War II was the wide isthmus between the Psel River and the Prokhorovka railway station near Belgorod. In a truly titanic duel between two steel armadas, no less than 1,500 tanks collided in a limited space. From the Soviet point of view, this represented a collision of two moving avalanches - 800 Soviet tanks against 750-800 German ones. On July 12, 400 German tanks were destroyed and units of the SS Panzer Corps suffered losses. Marshal Konev melodramatically called this battle "the swan song of the German tank forces."

The creator of the myth about Prokhorovka is Lieutenant General Rotmistrov, who commanded the 5th Guards Tank Army, which on July 12 suffered the heaviest losses of its entire existence. Since he needed to justify himself to Stalin, he composed a legend about the great victory over the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. This myth was also adopted by Western historians and continues to this day.

“By chance, just at the same time, German tanks launched an attack from the opposite side of the field. Huge masses of tanks rushed into a head-on collision. Taking advantage of the confusion, the T-34 crews attacked the Tigers and Panthers, firing at the sides or rear where ammunition was stored at a short distance. The failure of the German offensive at Prokhorovka marked the end of Operation Citadel. More than 300 German tanks were destroyed on July 12. The Battle of Kursk tore the heart out of the German army. The Soviet success at Kursk, in which so much was at stake, was the most important success in the entire war.”

In German historiography, the vision of this battle is even more dramatized. In “the largest tank battle in history,” “two armored formations with a very complex structure faced each other in open close combat in an area no more than 500 meters wide and 1000 meters deep.

What the Battle of Prokhorovka was like in reality.

Firstly, it should be noted that the 2nd SS Panzer Corps on July 12, 1943 could not have lost 300 or (like Rotmistrov) 400 tanks;

In total, in the entire Operation Citadel, his total losses amounted to only 33 tanks and assault guns, which is clearly evident from German documents. He could not resist the Soviet troops, even without losing the Panthers and Ferdinands, because they were not in his composition;

In addition, Rotmistrov’s statement about the destruction of 70 Tigers is a fiction. On that day, only 15 tanks of this type were ready for use, of which only five saw action in the Prokhorovka area. In total, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, by decree on July 12, had a total of 211 tanks, 58 assault guns, and 43 tank destroyers (self-propelled guns) in working order. However, since the SS Panzergrenadier Division “Totenkopf” was advancing to the north on that day, above the Psel River, the 5th Guards Tank Army had to be confronted by 117 serviceable and combat-ready tanks, 37 assault guns and 32 fighters, as well as another 186 combat vehicles.

Rotmistrov had 838 combat vehicles ready for battle on the morning of July 12 and another 96 tanks were on the way. He thought about his five corps and withdrew the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps into reserve and gave it about 100 tanks to protect his left flank from the forces of the Wehrmacht 3rd Tank Corps advancing from the south. 186 tanks and self-propelled guns of the Leibstandarte and Reich divisions were involved in the battle against 672 Soviet ones. Rotmistrov’s operational plan can be characterized by two directions of the main attack:

The main blow was delivered frontally from the northeast against the SS panzergrenadier division Leibstandarte. It was applied from Prokhorovka between the railway embankment and the Psel River. However, since the river was swampy, there was only one section of 3 kilometers left for maneuver. In this area, to the right of Psel, the 18th Tank Corps was concentrated, and to the left of the railway embankment, the 29th Tank Corps. This meant that on the first day of the battle, more than 400 combat vehicles went to 56 tanks, 20 tank destroyers and 10 Leibstandarte assault guns. The Russian superiority was approximately fivefold.

At the same time, another blow was to be delivered to the German flank at the junction between the Leibstandarte and Reich divisions. Here the 2nd Guards Tank Corps advanced, supported by the 2nd Tank Corps. In total, about 200 Soviet tanks were ready to fight against the German division, which consisted of 61 combat-ready tanks, 27 assault guns and twelve tank destroyers.

In addition, we should not forget about the formations of the Voronezh Front, especially the 69th Army, which fought in this direction. In the battle zone of the 5th Guards Tank Army, in addition to reserve units, formations of the 5th Guards Army, for example, the 9th Guards Parachute Division, also operated. Vatutin also sent Rotmistrov 5 artillery and 2 mortar regiments, reinforced with anti-tank units, and 10 anti-tank artillery brigades. As a result, in the Prokhorovka area the density of fire was such that the chances of surviving outside armor protection were minimal. The Soviet counterattack was supported by two air armies, while the German side could only occasionally count on air support at the climax of the battle. The 8th Air Corps was supposed to allocate two-thirds of the aircraft at its disposal for operations on other fronts, in particular in the offensive zone of the 9th Army.

In this regard, the psychological aspect should not be neglected. In the 2nd SS Panzer Corps since July 5, soldiers were in continuous combat and experienced serious supply difficulties. Now they found fresh Soviet units, namely the elite units of the Fifth Guards Tank Army led by P.A. Rotmistrov, a famous tank specialist in the Red Army. The Germans were afraid of the principles of warfare by Russian troops, the distinctive feature of which was an avalanche-like massive attack without taking into account losses. It was not just the overwhelming numerical superiority that caused concern. The attacking soldiers often fell into a kind of trance and did not react to the danger at all. What role vodka played in the fighting on the Eastern Front was no secret to the Germans; Russian historiography, apparently, only recently began to consider this topic. According to two American military historians, such a violent attack near Prokhorovka on July 12 was not without the use of psychotropic drugs.

This may be a partial explanation for the mysterious events that occurred at altitude 252.2. For the rest it was a complete surprise. This was an outstanding achievement by Rotmistrov and his staff - to quickly and quietly bring an armada of tanks and other weapons into battle. Vehicle. This was supposed to be the logical conclusion of a three-day march with a length of 330-380 km. German intelligence indeed expected a counterattack, but not on such a scale.

The day of July 11 ended with local success for the Leibstandarte panzergrenadier division. The next day, the division was tasked with overcoming the anti-tank ditch. Then it swept over the height of 252.2 like a “giant wave”. Having occupied the heights, the Leibstandarte went to the Oktyabrsky state farm, where it encountered resistance from the 9th Guards Airborne Division 2.5 kilometers from Prokhorovka. But at the same time, they themselves exposed the flanks of their position. On the right flank, the Leibstandarte could be supported by the motorized division "Das Reich". An even more dangerous situation arose on the left wing, which was almost hanging in the air.

Commander of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps Obergruppenführer P. Hausser (left)
sets the task to the artillery commander of the SS division Death's Head, SS Brigadeführer Priss

Since the attack of the SS motorized division Death's Head was not in the east, but rather in the north, the striking wedges dispersed. A gap was created, which was monitored by the Leibstandarte intelligence department, but was unlikely to be controlled by it. An enemy strike along the Psela could lead to fatal consequences at this stage. Therefore, the Leibstandarte was tasked with stopping the enemy’s advance.

The 2nd SS Panzer Corps went on the offensive the next day. The first blow, under the noticeable impact of the entire artillery of the corps, was the attack of the “Totenkopf” division on the Pselsky bridgehead and the dominant height of 226.6. Only after capturing the heights north of the Psel River could the other two divisions continue their attack. The Leibstandarte formations advanced scatteredly. On the right southern wing of the railway embankment the 1st SS Motorized Regiment operated; to the left, closer to height 252.2, the 2nd SS Motorized Regiment operated. The tank regiment redeployed to a bridgehead beyond Height 252.2 to recuperate. But the regiment actually consisted of only one battalion with three companies, and one battalion of heavy tanks with four combat-ready Tigers. The second battalion, equipped with Panther tanks, was sent to the zone of operation of the Das Reich division.

It is necessary to note the following bright point - in the space between the Prokhorovka station and the Psel River there was no German tank army with 800 combat-ready tanks, as Soviet historians claim, but only one tank battalion. Also a legend is the fact that on the morning of July 12, two tank armadas met in battle, attacking in close formation, like knights clad in armor.

According to Rotmistrov, at 7:30 (8:30 Moscow time) the attacks of the Leibstandarte tankmen began - “In deep silence, the enemy appeared behind us, without receiving a worthy response, because we had seven difficult days of fighting and sleep, as a rule, was very short".

At that time, the 3rd tank battalion of the 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Regiment was operating on the front line, whose commander was Sturmbannführer Jochen Peiper, who became famous later (during the offensive in the Ardennes).

Joachim Piper

The day before, his formation occupied the trenches at an altitude of 252.2. On this hill on the morning of July 12, the following scene played out: “We were almost all asleep when they suddenly, with the support of aviation, threw all their tanks and motorized infantry at us. It was hell. They were around us, above us, and between us. We fought against each other." The first German tankman who saw the approaching columns of Soviet tanks was Obersturmführer Rudolf von Ribbentrop (son of the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs J. von Ribbentrop - A.K.)

Rudolf von Ribbentrop

When he looked up at 252.2 that morning, he saw a purple flare that meant "Attention Tanks." While the other two tank companies continued to stand behind the ditch, he led his company's seven Panzer IV tanks into the attack. Suddenly he saw a huge tank column coming towards him. “Having walked 100 - 200 meters, we were shocked - 15, 20, 30, 40, and then simply countless numbers of Russian T-34s appeared in front of us. Now this wall of tanks was coming at us. Vehicle after vehicle, wave after wave, increasing incredible pressure, coming at us at maximum speed. Seven German tanks had no chance against superior forces. Four of them were immediately captured, and the other three tanks escaped."

At this moment, the 29th Tank Corps, led by Major General Kirichenko, consisting of 212 combat vehicles, entered the battle. The attack was carried out by the 31st and 32nd tank brigades and the 53rd motorized rifle brigade, with the support of a self-propelled gun regiment and the 26th Guards Airborne Regiment. When the tanks passed the peak of height 252.2 at maximum speed, they went down the slope to attack two German tank companies that were stationed in the valley and opened fire on them. The Russians mistook the German tanks for Tigers and wanted to destroy them using their technical superiority. A German eyewitness reported: “Those who saw all this believed in the kamikaze attack that the Russians were forced to undertake. If the Russian tanks had continued to break through, the collapse of the German front would have followed.”

However, in a matter of minutes everything changed, and the seemingly inevitable success turned into a disaster for the attackers. The reason for this was incredible Soviet carelessness. The Russians forgot about their anti-tank ditches. The aforementioned obstacles, 2 meters deep, were dug by Soviet sappers below the level of Hill 252.2 along the entire line of the German - and now Soviet - attack. The German soldiers saw the following picture: “All the new T-34s were going up the hill, and then picking up speed and falling into their own anti-tank ditches before seeing us.” Ribbentrop was saved by the fact that he managed to slip between Soviet tanks in his tank, covered with a dense cloud of dust: “Well, obviously, these were T-34s trying to get out of their own ditches. The Russians were concentrated on the bridge and presented an easy target for encirclement; most of their tanks were shot down. It was a Hell of fire, smoke, dead and wounded, as well as burning T-34s!” - he wrote.

On the opposite side of the ditch, there were only two German tank companies that could not stop this steel avalanche. But now there was no “shooting at a moving target.” Finally, four Tiger tanks, which were located on the left flank of the division, were brought into battle. The 2nd SS Panzer Regiment managed to carry out a counterattack before noon to capture Hill 252.2 and the Oktyabrsky state farm. The front edge of this height looked like a tank cemetery. Here were the most charred wrecks of more than 100 Soviet tanks and several armored personnel carriers from Peiper's battalion.

As can be seen from the logistics of the Leibstandarte division, on July 12, the division captured more than 190 abandoned Soviet tanks. Most of them were found in a small area on the indicated hill. However, this number seemed so incredible that Obergruppenführer Paul Hausser, commander of the II SS Panzer Corps, went to the front line to see it with his own eyes.

According to the latest Russian information, the 29th Tank Corps alone lost 172 of its 219 tanks and assault guns on July 12, 118 of which were permanently lost. The casualties in manpower amounted to 1,991 people, of which 1,033 were dead and missing.

While at height 252.2, the frontal attack of the 19th Panzer Corps was repulsed, the critical situation on the left flank of the Leibstandarte division reached its climax. Here, the offensive of units of the 18th Tank Corps of Major General Bakharov, advancing in the area of ​​the Psel River with forces of 170, 110 and 181 tank brigades, was supported by the 32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade and a number of front-line units, such as the 36th Guards Tank Regiment, equipped with British tanks." Churchill."

Commander of the 18th Tank Corps, Major General B.S. Bakharov

From the German point of view, this unexpected attack was the worst case scenario, namely, the attack was delivered into the previously described gap between the SS motorized divisions "Totenkopf" and "Leibstandarte". The 18th Soviet Tank Corps penetrated almost unhindered into enemy positions. The left flank of the 2nd SS Panzer Regiment was in disarray, and a clear front line no longer existed. Both sides lost control, control, and the course of the battle fell apart into many separate battles in which it was difficult to determine “who is attacking and who is defending.”

Commander of the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler division, SS Oberführer Theodor Wisch

Soviet ideas about this battle are full of myths, and in the next episode the level of drama reaches its apogee. On the morning of July 12, the second battalion of the 181st Armored Brigade of the 18th Tank Corps joined the offensive along the Petrovka-Psel line. A shell fired from a Tiger tank hit the T-34 tank of the guard battalion commander, Captain Skripkin. The tank driver Alexander Nikolaev replaced him in the burning car.

Senior lieutenant (captain during the Battle of Kursk) P.A. Skripkin,
commander of the 1st tank battalion 181st brigade 18th tank with his daughter Galya. 1941

This episode is traditionally interpreted as follows: “The tank driver Alexander Nikolaev jumped back into the burning tank, started the engine and rushed towards the enemy. The tank rushed like a flaming fireball towards the enemy. The Tiger stopped and prepared to retreat. But it was too late. A burning Soviet tank crashed into a German tank at full speed. The explosion shook the ground. The courage of the Soviet tank crews shocked the Germans, and they retreated."

Tank driver Alexander Nikolaev

This episode became business card Battle of Kursk. Artists captured this dramatic scene on artistic canvases, directors - on movie screens. But what did this incident look like in reality? The mechanic-driver of the allegedly exploded Tiger, Scharführer Georg Letzsch, describes the events as follows: “In the morning the company was on the left flank of the second tank division. Suddenly, about 50 enemy tanks, protected by a small forest, attacked us on a wide front [...] I knocked out 2 tanks T-34, one of which, blazing like a torch, was rushing towards me. At the last moment I was able to dodge the burning mass of metal that was coming at me with great speed.” The attack by the 18th Tank Corps was repelled with heavy losses, including (according to Soviet data) 55 tanks.

The attack of Soviet troops in the southeast of the Prokhorovka-Belgorod railway embankment developed no less unsuccessfully. At the Stalinskoe 1 state farm there was an SS panzergrenadier regiment operating on the right wing of the Leibstandarte division, without any tank support and with lightly armored Marder tank destroyers as reinforcement. They were opposed by the 25th Tank Brigade of the 19th Tank Corps, with the support of the 1446th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment of the 28th Guards Airborne Regiment and part of the formations of the 169th Tank Brigade of the 2nd Tank Corps.

To the south was the extended right flank of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which was covered by the Das Reich division. The 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the 2nd Tank Corps operated in this direction. Their attacks, planned in the Yasnaya Polyana-Kalinin direction, were repulsed after heavy fighting. Then German troops counterattacked and captured the village of Storozhevoye, located on the left wing.

The most significant successes were achieved on July 12 by the motorized SS division "Totenkopf", which, contrary to Soviet ideas, did not fight with the 5th Guards Tank Army of General Rotmistrov in the Prokhorovka area. In fact, all the tanks operated on the opposite bank of the Psel and attacked north from there. Despite the losses suffered, the division planned to counterattack in the Mikhailovka area in order to knock over the Soviet tanks, which were striking at the Leibstandarte division, with a blow in the back. But this attempt failed due to the swampy banks of the river. Only in the Kozlovka area did some infantry units remain, operating as part of the 6th SS Motorized Regiment. They stayed for south coast to provide a reserve.

SS Gruppenführer Max Simon - commander of the "Totenkopf" division

Also incorrect is Rotmistrov’s statement that on July 12 he launched an attack on the “Dead Head” positions with the forces of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps and with the help of his reserves. Although he sent the 24th Guards Tank Brigade and the 10th Guards Mechanized Brigade on an offensive north of the Psel River. But, as American historians write, these formations were delayed on the march and took part in the battle only the next day.

The "Dead Head" division at this time attacked the positions of the 5th Guards Army of General Alexei Semenovich Zhadov, reinforced by units of the 6th Guards Army and the 31st Tank Corps. By mid-day, crushing Russian attacks in the direction of the Prokhorovka-Kartashevka road were repulsed, which made Rotmistrov nervous. He was afraid of losing control of his formations due to the threat to his flanks and rear. This northernmost attack became the symbol of the entire day of July 12th. The German forces were initially surprised by the strength of the Soviet counteroffensive and huddled together to defend themselves, but then abruptly launched a counterattack and drove back the Soviet formations with heavy losses, leaving the Russians unable to continue their offensive in the afternoon.

(To be continued)

Transfer from German language carried out by ONER researcher Kadira A.S.

Kursk Bulge in brief about the battle

  • Advance of the German army
  • Advance of the Red Army
  • General results
  • About the Battle of Kursk even briefly
  • Video about the Battle of Kursk

How did the Battle of Kursk begin?

  • Hitler decided that it was at the location of the Kursk Bulge that a turning point in the seizure of territory should occur. The operation was called “Citadel” and was supposed to involve the Voronezh and Central fronts.
  • But, in one thing, Hitler was right, Zhukov and Vasilevsky agreed with him, the Kursk Bulge was supposed to become one of the main battles and, undoubtedly, the main thing, of the ones now coming.
  • This is exactly how Zhukov and Vasilevsky reported to Stalin. Zhukov was able to roughly estimate the possible forces of the invaders.
  • German weapons were updated and increased in volume. Thus, a grandiose mobilization was carried out. The Soviet army, namely those fronts that the Germans were counting on, were approximately equal in their equipment.
  • In some measures, the Russians were winning.
  • In addition to the Central and Voronezh fronts (under the command of Rokossovsky and Vatutin, respectively), there was also a secret front - Stepnoy, under the command of Konev, about which the enemy knew nothing.
  • The steppe front became insurance for two main directions.
  • The Germans had been preparing for this offensive since the spring. But when they launched an attack in the summer, it was not an unexpected blow for the Red Army.
  • The Soviet army also did not sit idle. Eight defensive lines were built at the supposed site of the battle.

Combat tactics on the Kursk Bulge


  • It was thanks to the developed qualities of a military leader, and the work of intelligence, that the command of the Soviet army was able to understand the enemy’s plans and the defense-offensive plan fit perfectly.
  • Defensive lines were built with the help of the population living near the battle site.
    The German side built a plan in such a way that the Kursk Bulge should help make the front line more even.
  • If this succeeded, then the next stage would be to develop an offensive into the center of the state.

Advance of the German army


Advance of the Red Army


General results


Reconnaissance as an important part of the Battle of Kursk


About the Battle of Kursk even briefly
One of the largest battlefields during the Great Patriotic War was the Kursk Bulge. The battle is summarized below.

All hostilities that occurred during the Battle of Kursk took place from July 5 to August 23, 1943. The German command hoped during this battle to destroy all Soviet troops representing the Central and Voronezh fronts. At that time they were actively defending Kursk. If the Germans had been successful in this battle, the initiative in the war would have returned to the Germans. In order to implement their plans, the German command allocated more than 900 thousand soldiers, 10 thousand guns of various calibers, and 2.7 thousand tanks and 2050 aircraft were allocated in support. New Tiger and Panther class tanks took part in this battle, as well as new Focke-Wulf 190 A fighters and Heinkel 129 attack aircraft.

The command of the Soviet Union hoped to bleed the enemy during its offensive, and then carry out a large-scale counterattack. Thus, the Germans did exactly what the Soviet army expected. The scale of the battle was truly enormous; the Germans sent almost their entire army and all available tanks to attack. However, the Soviet troops faced death, and the defensive lines were not surrendered. On the Central Front, the enemy advanced 10-12 kilometers; on Voronezh, the enemy’s penetration depth was 35 kilometers, but the Germans were unable to advance further.

The outcome of the Battle of Kursk was determined by the battle of tanks near the village of Prokhorovka, which took place on July 12. This was the largest battle of tank forces in history; more than 1.2 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units were thrown into battle. On this day, German troops lost more than 400 tanks and the invaders were driven back. After this, Soviet troops launched an active offensive, and on August 23, the Battle of Kursk was over with the liberation of Kharkov, and with this event, the further defeat of Germany became inevitable.


Despite the artistic exaggerations associated with Prokhorovka, the Battle of Kursk was indeed the last attempt by the Germans to win back the situation. Taking advantage of the negligence of the Soviet command and inflicting a major defeat on the Red Army near Kharkov in the early spring of 1943, the Germans received another “chance” to play the summer offensive card according to the models of 1941 and 1942.

But by 1943, the Red Army was already different, just like the Wehrmacht, it was worse than itself two years ago. Two years of bloody meat grinder were not in vain for him, plus the delay in starting the offensive on Kursk made the very fact of the offensive obvious to the Soviet command, which quite reasonably decided not to repeat the mistakes of the spring-summer of 1942 and voluntarily conceded to the Germans the right to launch offensive actions in order to wear down them on the defensive, and then destroy the weakened strike forces.

In general, the implementation of this plan once again showed how much the level of strategic planning of the Soviet leadership had increased since the start of the war. And at the same time, the inglorious end of the “Citadel” once again showed the subsidence of this level among the Germans, who tried to reverse the difficult strategic situation with obviously insufficient means.

Actually, even Manstein, the most intelligent German strategist, had no special illusions about this decisive battle for Germany, reasoning in his memoirs that if everything had turned out differently, then it would have been possible to somehow jump from the USSR to a draw, that is, in fact admitted that after Stalingrad there was no talk of victory for Germany at all.

In theory, the Germans, of course, could push through our defenses and reach Kursk, encircling a couple of dozen divisions, but even in this wonderful scenario for the Germans, their success did not lead them to solving the problem of the Eastern Front, but only led to a delay before the inevitable end, because By 1943, Germany's military production was already clearly inferior to the Soviet one, and the need to plug the “Italian hole” did not make it possible to assemble any large forces to conduct further offensive operations on the Eastern Front.

But our army did not allow the Germans to amuse themselves with the illusion of even such a victory. The strike groups were bled dry during a week of heavy defensive battles, and then the roller coaster of our offensive began, which, starting in the summer of 1943, was practically unstoppable, no matter how much the Germans resisted in the future.

In this regard, the Battle of Kursk is truly one of the iconic battles of the Second World War, and not only due to the scale of the battle and the millions of soldiers and tens of thousands of military equipment involved. It finally demonstrated to the whole world and, above all, to the Soviet people, that Germany was doomed.

Remember today all those who died in this epochal battle and those who survived it, reaching from Kursk to Berlin.

Below is a selection of photographs of the Battle of Kursk.

Commander of the Central Front, Army General K.K. Rokossovsky and member of the Front Military Council, Major General K.F. Telegin at the forefront before the start of the Battle of Kursk. 1943

Soviet sappers install TM-42 anti-tank mines in front of the front line of defense. Central Front, Kursk Bulge, July 1943

Transfer of "Tigers" for Operation Citadel.

Manstein and his generals are at work.

German traffic controller. Behind is an RSO crawler tractor.

Construction of defensive structures on the Kursk Bulge. June 1943.

At a rest stop.

On the eve of the Battle of Kursk. Testing infantry with tanks. Red Army soldiers in a trench and a T-34 tank that overcomes the trench, passing over them. 1943

German machine gunner with MG-42.

Panthers are preparing for Operation Citadel.

Self-propelled howitzers "Wespe" of the 2nd battalion of the artillery regiment "Grossdeutschland" on the march. Operation Citadel, July 1943.

German Pz.Kpfw.III tanks before the start of Operation Citadel in a Soviet village.

The crew of the Soviet tank T-34-76 "Marshal Choibalsan" (from the "Revolutionary Mongolia" tank column) and the attached troops on vacation. Kursk Bulge, 1943.

Smoke break in German trenches.

A peasant woman tells Soviet intelligence officers about the location of enemy units. North of the city of Orel, 1943.

Sergeant Major V. Sokolova, medical instructor of anti-tank artillery units of the Red Army. Oryol direction. Kursk Bulge, summer 1943.

The German 105-mm self-propelled gun "Wespe" (Sd.Kfz.124 Wespe) from the 74th self-propelled artillery regiment of the 2nd tank division of the Wehrmacht, passes next to an abandoned Soviet 76-mm ZIS-3 gun in the area of ​​​​the city of Orel. German offensive operation "Citadel". Oryol Region, July 1943.

The Tigers are on the attack.

Photojournalist of the newspaper "Red Star" O. Knorring and cameraman I. Malov are filming the interrogation of the captured chief corporal A. Bauschof, who voluntarily went over to the side of the Red Army. The interrogation is conducted by Captain S.A. Mironov (right) and translator Iones (center). Oryol-Kursk direction, July 7, 1943.

German soldiers on the Kursk Bulge. Part of the body of the radio-controlled B-IV tank is visible from above.

German B-IV robot tanks and Pz.Kpfw control tanks destroyed by Soviet artillery. III (one of the tanks has the number F 23). Northern face of the Kursk Bulge (near the village of Glazunovka). July 5, 1943

Tank landing of sapper demolitions (sturmpionieren) from the SS division "Das Reich" on the armor of the StuG III Ausf F assault gun. Kursk Bulge, 1943.

Destroyed Soviet T-60 tank.

The Ferdinand self-propelled gun is on fire. July 1943, village of Ponyri.

Two damaged Ferdinands from the headquarters company of the 654th battalion. Ponyri station area, July 15-16, 1943. On the left is the headquarters "Ferdinand" No. II-03. The car was burned with bottles of kerosene mixture after its undercarriage was damaged by a shell.

The Ferdinand heavy assault gun, destroyed by a direct hit from an aerial bomb from a Soviet Pe-2 dive bomber. Tactical number unknown. Area of ​​Ponyri station and state farm "May 1".

Heavy assault gun "Ferdinand", tail number "723" from the 654th division (battalion), knocked out in the area of ​​the "1 May" state farm. The track was destroyed by projectile hits and the gun was jammed. The vehicle was part of the "Major Kahl's strike group" as part of the 505th heavy tank battalion of the 654th division.

A tank column is moving towards the front.

Tigers" from the 503rd heavy tank battalion.

Katyushas are firing.

Tiger tanks of the SS Panzer Division "Das Reich".

A company of American M3s General Lee tanks, supplied to the USSR under Lend-Lease, is moving to the front line of defense of the Soviet 6th Guards Army. Kursk Bulge, July 1943.

Soviet soldiers near a damaged Panther. July 1943.

Heavy assault gun "Ferdinand", tail number "731", chassis number 150090 from the 653rd division, blown up by a mine in the defense zone of the 70th army. Later, this car was sent to an exhibition of captured equipment in Moscow.

Self-propelled gun Su-152 Major Sankovsky. His crew destroyed 10 enemy tanks in the first battle during the Battle of Kursk.

T-34-76 tanks support the infantry attack in the Kursk direction.

Soviet infantry in front of a destroyed Tiger tank.

Attack of T-34-76 near Belgorod. July 1943.

Abandoned near Prokhorovka, faulty "Panthers" of the 10th "Panther Brigade" of the von Lauchert tank regiment.

German observers are monitoring the progress of the battle.

Soviet infantrymen hide behind the hull of a destroyed Panther.

The Soviet mortar crew changes its firing position. Bryansk Front, Oryol direction. July 1943.

An SS grenadier looks at a T-34 that has just been shot down. It was probably destroyed by one of the first modifications of the Panzerfaust, which were first widely used at the Kursk Bulge.

Destroyed German Pz.Kpfw tank. V modification D2, shot down during Operation Citadel (Kursk Bulge). This photograph is interesting because it contains the signature “Ilyin” and the date “26/7”. This is probably the name of the gun commander who knocked out the tank.

Leading units of the 285th Infantry Regiment of the 183rd Infantry Division engage the enemy in captured German trenches. In the foreground is the body of a killed German soldier. Battle of Kursk, July 10, 1943.

Sappers of the SS division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" near a damaged T-34-76 tank. July 7, area of ​​the village of Pselets.

Soviet tanks on the attack line.

Destroyed Pz IV and Pz VI tanks near Kursk.

Pilots of the Normandie-Niemen squadron.

Reflecting a tank attack. Ponyri village area. July 1943.

Shot down "Ferdinand". The corpses of his crew lie nearby.

The artillerymen are fighting.

Damaged German equipment during the battles in the Kursk direction.

A German tankman examines the mark left by a hit in the Tiger's frontal projection. July, 1943.

Red Army soldiers next to a downed Ju-87 dive bomber.

Damaged "Panther". I made it to Kursk as a trophy.

Machine gunners on the Kursk Bulge. July 1943.

Self-propelled gun Marder III and panzergrenadiers at the starting line before the attack. July 1943.

Broken Panther. The tower was torn down by an explosion of ammunition.

Burning German self-propelled gun "Ferdinand" from the 656th regiment on the Oryol front of the Kursk Bulge, July 1943. The photo was taken through the driver's hatch of the Pz.Kpfw control tank. III robotic tanks B-4.

Soviet soldiers near a damaged Panther. A huge hole from a 152-mm St. John's wort is visible in the turret.

Burnt tanks of the column "For Soviet Ukraine". On the tower torn down by the explosion one can see the inscription “For Radianska Ukraine” (For Soviet Ukraine).

Killed German tankman. In the background is a Soviet T-70 tank.

Soviet soldiers inspect a German heavy self-propelled artillery installation of the Ferdinand tank destroyer class, which was knocked out during the Battle of Kursk. The photo is also interesting because of the SSH-36 steel helmet, rare for 1943, on the soldier on the left.

Soviet soldiers near a disabled Stug III assault gun.

A German robot tank B-IV and a German motorcycle with a sidecar BMW R-75 destroyed on the Kursk Bulge. 1943

Self-propelled gun "Ferdinand" after the detonation of ammunition.

The crew of an anti-tank gun fires at enemy tanks. July 1943.

The picture shows a damaged German medium tank PzKpfw IV (modifications H or G). July 1943.

The commander of the Pz.kpfw VI "Tiger" tank No. 323 of the 3rd company of the 503rd battalion of heavy tanks, non-commissioned officer Futermeister, shows the mark of a Soviet shell on the armor of his tank to Sergeant Major Heiden. Kursk Bulge, July 1943.

Statement of combat mission. July 1943.

Pe-2 front-line dive bombers on a combat course. Oryol-Belgorod direction. July 1943.

Towing a faulty Tiger. On the Kursk Bulge, the Germans suffered significant losses due to non-combat breakdowns of their equipment.

T-34 goes on the attack.

The British Churchill tank, captured by the "Der Fuhrer" regiment of the "Das Reich" division, was supplied under Lend-Lease.

Tank destroyer Marder III on the march. Operation Citadel, July 1943.

and in the foreground on the right is a damaged Soviet T-34 tank, further on the left edge of the photo is a German Pz.Kpfw. VI "Tiger", another T-34 in the distance.

Soviet soldiers inspect an exploded German tank Pz IV ausf G.

Soldiers from the unit of Senior Lieutenant A. Burak, with the support of artillery, are conducting an offensive. July 1943.

A German prisoner of war on the Kursk Bulge near a broken 150-mm infantry gun sIG.33. The dead man lies on the right German soldier. July 1943.

Oryol direction. Soldiers under the cover of tanks go on the attack. July 1943.

German units, which include captured Soviet T-34-76 tanks, are preparing for an attack during the Battle of Kursk. July 28, 1943.

RONA (Russian People's Liberation Army) soldiers among captured Red Army soldiers. Kursk Bulge, July-August 1943.

Soviet tank T-34-76 destroyed in a village on the Kursk Bulge. August, 1943.

Under enemy fire, tankers pull a damaged T-34 from the battlefield.

Soviet soldiers rise to attack.

An officer of the Grossdeutschland division in a trench. Late July-early August.

Participant in the battles on the Kursk Bulge, reconnaissance officer, guard senior sergeant A.G. Frolchenko (1905 - 1967), awarded the Order of the Red Star (according to another version, the photo shows Lieutenant Nikolai Alekseevich Simonov). Belgorod direction, August 1943.

A column of German prisoners captured in the Oryol direction. August 1943.

German SS soldiers in a trench with an MG-42 machine gun during Operation Citadel. Kursk Bulge, July-August 1943.

On the left is an Sd.Kfz anti-aircraft self-propelled gun. 10/4 based on a half-track tractor with a 20-mm FlaK 30 anti-aircraft gun. Kursk Bulge, August 3, 1943.

The priest blesses Soviet soldiers. Oryol direction, 1943.

A Soviet T-34-76 tank knocked out in the Belgorod area and a tanker killed.

A column of captured Germans in the Kursk area.

German PaK 35/36 anti-tank guns captured on the Kursk Bulge. In the background is a Soviet ZiS-5 truck towing a 37 mm 61-k anti-aircraft gun. July 1943.

Soldiers of the 3rd SS Division "Totenkopf" ("Death's Head") discuss a defensive action plan with the Tiger commander from the 503rd Heavy Tank Battalion. Kursk Bulge, July-August 1943.

German prisoners in the Kursk region.

Tank commander, Lieutenant B.V. Smelov shows a hole in the turret of a German Tiger tank, knocked out by Smelov’s crew, to Lieutenant Likhnyakevich (who knocked out the last battle 2 fascist tanks). This hole was made by an ordinary armor-piercing shell from a 76-mm tank gun.

Senior Lieutenant Ivan Shevtsov next to the German Tiger tank he destroyed.

Trophies of the Battle of Kursk.

German heavy assault gun "Ferdinand" of the 653rd battalion (division), captured in good condition along with its crew by soldiers of the Soviet 129th Oryol Rifle Division. August 1943.

The eagle is taken.

The 89th Rifle Division enters liberated Belgorod.

 

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