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A people who forgets their past has no future. This is what the ancient Greek philosopher Plato once said. In the middle of the last century, “fifteen sister republics” united “ Great Russia", inflicted a crushing defeat on the plague of humanity - fascism. The fierce battle was marked by a number of victories of the Red Army, which can be called key. The topic of this article is one of the decisive battles of the Second World War - the Kursk Bulge, one of the fateful battles that marked the final mastery of the strategic initiative by our grandfathers and great-grandfathers. From that time on, the German occupiers began to be crushed on all fronts. The purposeful movement of fronts to the West began. From that time on, the fascists forgot what “forward to the East” meant.

Historical parallels

The Kursk confrontation took place 07/05/1943 - 08/23/1943 on the original Russian Land, over which the great noble prince Alexander Nevsky once held his shield. His prophetic warning to the Western conquerors (who came to us with a sword) about imminent death from the onslaught of the Russian sword that met them once again took effect. It is characteristic that the Kursk Bulge was somewhat similar to the battle given by Prince Alexander to the Teutonic Knights on 04/05/1242. Of course, the armament of the armies, the scale and time of these two battles are incommensurable. But the scenario of both battles is somewhat similar: the Germans with their main forces tried to break through the Russian battle formation in the center, but were crushed by the offensive actions of the flanks.

If we pragmatically try to say what is unique about the Kursk Bulge, a brief summary will be as follows: unprecedented in history (before and after) operational-tactical density on 1 km of front.

Battle disposition

The offensive of the Red Army after the Battle of Stalingrad from November 1942 to March 1943 was marked by the defeat of about 100 enemy divisions, thrown back from North Caucasus, Don, Volga. But due to the losses suffered by our side, by the beginning of spring 1943 the front had stabilized. On the map of the fighting in the center of the front line with the Germans, towards the Nazi army, a protrusion stood out, to which the military gave the name Kursk Bulge. The spring of 1943 brought calm to the front: no one was attacking, both sides were rapidly accumulating forces in order to again seize the strategic initiative.

Preparation for Nazi Germany

After the defeat of Stalingrad, Hitler announced mobilization, as a result of which the Wehrmacht grew, more than covering the losses incurred. There were 9.5 million people “under arms” (including 2.3 million reservists). 75% of the most combat-ready active troops (5.3 million people) were on the Soviet-German front.

The Fuhrer longed to seize the strategic initiative in the war. The turning point, in his opinion, should have occurred precisely on that section of the front where the Kursk Bulge was located. To implement the plan, the Wehrmacht headquarters developed the strategic operation “Citadel”. The plan involved delivering attacks converging on Kursk (from the north - from the Orel region; from the south - from the Belgorod region). In this way, the troops of the Voronezh and Central Fronts fell into the “cauldron”.

For this operation, 50 divisions were concentrated in this section of the front, including. 16 tank and motorized troops, totaling 0.9 million selected, fully equipped troops; 2.7 thousand tanks; 2.5 thousand aircraft; 10 thousand mortars and guns.

In this group, the transition to new weapons was mainly carried out: Panther and Tiger tanks, Ferdinand assault guns.

In preparing the Soviet troops for battle, one should pay tribute to the leadership talent of Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief G.K. Zhukov. He, together with the Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky, reported to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief J.V. Stalin the assumption that the Kursk Bulge would become the main future site of the battle, and also predicted the approximate strength of the advancing enemy group.

On the front line, the fascists were opposed by the Voronezh (commander - General Vatutin N.F.) and the Central Fronts (commander - General Rokossovsky K.K.) with a total number of 1.34 million people. They were armed with 19 thousand mortars and guns; 3.4 thousand tanks; 2.5 thousand aircraft. (As we can see, the advantage was on their side). Secretly from the enemy, the reserve Steppe Front (commander I.S. Konev) was located behind the listed fronts. It consisted of a tank, aviation and five combined arms armies, supplemented by separate corps.

Control and coordination of the actions of this group were carried out personally by G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky.

Tactical battle plan

Marshal Zhukov's plan assumed that the battle on the Kursk Bulge would have two phases. The first is defensive, the second is offensive.

A deeply echeloned bridgehead (300 km deep) was equipped. The total length of its trenches was approximately equal to the Moscow-Vladivostok distance. It had 8 powerful lines of defense. The purpose of such defense was to weaken the enemy as much as possible, deprive him of the initiative, making the task as easy as possible for the attackers. In the second, offensive phase of the battle, two offensive operations were planned. First: Operation Kutuzov with the aim of eliminating the fascist group and liberating the city of Orel. Second: “Commander Rumyantsev” to destroy the Belgorod-Kharkov group of invaders.

Thus, with the actual advantage of the Red Army, the battle on the Kursk Bulge took place on the Soviet side “from defense.” For offensive actions, as tactics teach, two to three times the number of troops was required.

Shelling

It turned out that the time of the offensive of the fascist troops became known in advance. The day before, German sappers began making passages in the minefields. Soviet front-line intelligence began a battle with them and took prisoners. The time of the offensive became known from the “tongues”: 03:00 07/05/1943.

The reaction was prompt and adequate: At 2-20 07/05/1943, Marshal Rokossovsky K.K. (commander of the Central Front), with the approval of the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief G.K. Zhukov, carried out a preventive powerful artillery shelling by frontal artillery forces. This was an innovation in combat tactics. The occupiers were fired upon by hundreds of Katyusha rockets, 600 guns, and 460 mortars. For the Nazis this was a complete surprise; they suffered losses.

Only at 4:30, having regrouped, they were able to carry out their artillery preparation, and at 5:30 go on the offensive. The Battle of Kursk has begun.

Start of the battle

Of course, our commanders could not predict everything. In particular, both the General Staff and Headquarters expected the main blow from the Nazis in the southern direction, towards the city of Orel (which was defended by the Central Front, commander - General Vatutin N.F.). In reality, the battle on the Kursk Bulge from the side of German troops was focused on the Voronezh Front, from the north. Two battalions of heavy tanks, eight tank divisions, a division of assault guns, and one motorized division moved against Nikolai Fedorovich’s troops. In the first phase of the battle, the first hot spot was the village of Cherkasskoe (virtually wiped off the face of the earth), where two Soviet rifle divisions held back the advance of five enemy divisions for 24 hours.

German offensive tactics

This Great War is famous for its martial art. The Kursk Bulge fully demonstrated the confrontation between two strategies. What did the German offensive look like? Heavy equipment was moving ahead along the front of the attack: 15-20 Tiger tanks and Ferdinand self-propelled guns. Following them were from fifty to a hundred medium Panther tanks, accompanied by infantry. Thrown back, they regrouped and repeated the attack. The attacks resembled the ebb and flow of the sea, following each other.

We will follow the advice of the famous military historian, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Professor Matvey Vasilyevich Zakharov, we will not idealize our defense of the 1943 model, we will present it objectively.

We have to talk about German tank battle tactics. The Kursk Bulge (this should be admitted) demonstrated the art of Colonel General Hermann Hoth; he “jewelfully,” if one can say so about tanks, brought his 4th Army into battle. At the same time, our 40th Army with 237 tanks, the most equipped with artillery (35.4 units per 1 km), under the command of General Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko, turned out to be much to the left, i.e. out of work The opposing 6th Guards Army (commander I.M. Chistyakov) had a gun density per 1 km of 24.4 with 135 tanks. Mainly the 6th Army, far from the most powerful, was hit by Army Group South, whose commander was the most gifted Wehrmacht strategist, Erich von Manstein. (By the way, this man was one of the few who constantly argued on issues of strategy and tactics with Adolf Hitler, for which, in fact, he was dismissed in 1944).

Tank battle near Prokhorovka

In the current difficult situation, in order to eliminate the breakthrough, the Red Army brought into battle strategic reserves: the 5th Guards Tank Army (commander P. A. Rotmistrov) and the 5th Guards Army (commander A. S. Zhadov)

The possibility of a flank attack by the Soviet tank army in the area of ​​the village of Prokhorovka was previously considered by the German General Staff. Therefore, the divisions “Totenkopf” and “Leibstandarte” changed the direction of attack to 90 0 - for a head-on collision with the army of General Pavel Alekseevich Rotmistrov.

Tanks on the Kursk Bulge: 700 combat vehicles went into battle on the German side, 850 on our side. An impressive and terrible picture. As eyewitnesses recall, the roar was so loud that blood flowed from the ears. They had to shoot point-blank, which caused the towers to collapse. When approaching the enemy from the rear, they tried to fire at the tanks, causing the tanks to burst into flames. The tankers seemed to be in prostration - while they were alive, they had to fight. It was impossible to retreat or hide.

Of course, it was unwise to attack the enemy in the first phase of the operation (if during the defense we suffered losses of one in five, what would they have been like during the offensive?!). At the same time, Soviet soldiers showed real heroism on this battlefield. 100,000 people were awarded orders and medals, and 180 of them were awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Nowadays, the day of its end - August 23 - is celebrated annually by residents of the country like Russia.

All-Russian Society for the Protection of Historical and Cultural Monuments

Moscow city branch

Military History Club

M. KOLOMIETS, M. SVIRIN

with the participation of O. BARONOV, D. NEDOGONOV

IN We present to your attention an illustrated publication dedicated to the fighting on the Kursk Bulge. When compiling the publication, the authors did not set themselves the goal of giving a comprehensive description of the course of hostilities in the summer of 1943. They used mainly domestic documents of those years as primary sources: combat logs, reports on combat operations and losses provided by various military units, and work protocols commissions involved in July-August 1943 studying new models of German military equipment. The publication deals primarily with the actions of anti-tank artillery and armored forces and does not consider the actions of aviation and infantry formations.

P after the end of the winter of 1942-43. The offensive of the Red Army and the counterattack of the German task force "Kempf" The Eastern Front in the area of ​​​​the cities of Orel-Kursk-Belgorod took on bizarre shapes. In the Orel area, the front line jutted out in an arc into the location of the Soviet troops, and in the Kursk area, on the contrary, it formed a depression in a westerly direction. This characteristic configuration of the front prompted the German command to plan the spring-summer campaign of 1943, which relied on the encirclement of Soviet troops near Kursk.

A unit of 150-mm self-propelled guns on the chassis of the French tractor "Lorraine" before the battles.

Oryol direction. June 1943

Plans of the German command

N Despite the defeat at Stalingrad and in the North Caucasus, the Wehrmacht was still quite capable of advancing, delivering quick and powerful blows, as demonstrated by the battles of the spring of 1943 near Kharkov. However, under the current conditions, the Germans could no longer conduct a large-scale offensive on a wide front, as in previous summer campaigns. Some representatives of the German generals proposed starting a positional war, actively developing the occupied territories. But Hitler did not want to cede the initiative to the Soviet command. He wanted to inflict a powerful blow on the enemy on at least one sector of the front, so that a decisive success with minor losses of his own would allow him to dictate his will to the defenders in further campaigns. The Kursk ledge, saturated with Soviet troops, was ideally suited for such an offensive. The German plan for the spring-summer campaign of 1943 was as follows: to deliver powerful attacks in the direction of Kursk from the north and south under the base of the bulge, to encircle the main forces of the two Soviet fronts (Central and Voronezh) and destroy them.

The conclusion about the possibility of destroying Soviet troops with small losses of their own followed from the experience of the summer operations of 1941-42. and was to a large extent based on an underestimation of the capabilities of the Red Army. After successful battles near Kharkov, the German high command decided that the crisis on the Eastern Front had already passed and the achievement of success during the summer offensive near Kursk was beyond doubt. On April 15, 1943, Hitler issued Operational Order No. 6 on the preparation of the Kursk operation, called “Citadel,” and the development of the subsequent large-scale offensive to the east and southeast, codenamed “Operation Panther.”

Before the attack. "Mapder III" and panzergrenadiers at the starting position. July 1943

"Tigers" of the 505th battalion on the march.

By denuding neighboring sections of the Eastern Front and transferring all operational reserves to the disposal of Army Groups Center and South, three mobile strike groups were formed. The 9th Army was located south of Orel, and the 4th Tank Army and Task Force Kempf were located in the Belgorod area. The number of troops involved in Operation Citadel was seven army and five tank corps, which included 34 infantry, 14 tank, 2 motorized divisions, as well as 3 separate heavy tank battalions and 8 assault gun battalions, which accounted for more than 17 percent of the infantry , up to 70 percent of tank and up to 30 percent of motorized divisions of the total number of German troops on the Eastern Front.

Initially, it was planned to begin offensive operations on May 10-15, but this date was subsequently postponed to June, then to July due to the unavailability of Army Group South (some authors believe that this date was postponed due to the unavailability of Panther tanks, however, according to Manstein’s reports, on May 1, 1943, he had a personnel shortage in his units that reached 11-18%.

German tank PzKpfw IV Ausf G in an ambush. Belgorod district, June 1943

"Ferdinand" of the 653rd tank destroyer battalion before the battles.

Availability of tanks and assault guns in other units of the ground forces

Besides: Assault guns StuG 111 and Stug 40 in assault battalions and anti-tank companies of infantry divisions -
455: 105-mm assault howitzers - 98, StulG 33 assault infantry guns in the 23rd Panzer Division - 12. 150-mm Hummel self-propelled guns - 55 and more than 160 Marder anti-tank self-propelled guns. There is no exact data available for the remaining self-propelled guns.

Soviet command plans

G The main feature of the Battle of Kursk, which distinguishes it from other operations of the Second World War, was that it was here that for the first time in two years since the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR, the Soviet command correctly determined the direction of the main strategic offensive of the German troops and managed to prepare for it in advance.

In the course of analyzing the situation that developed on the Central and Voronezh fronts in the spring of 1943, based on information transmitted by British intelligence, as well as short-term strategic games at the General Staff in April 1943, it was assumed that it was the Kursk floor that the German command would try to take revenge for the Stalingrad “cauldron”.

During the discussion of plans to counter the German offensive, members of the General Staff and members of the Headquarters proposed two options for the summer campaign of 1943. One was to deliver a powerful preemptive strike on the German troops even before the start of the offensive, defeat them in deployment positions, and then launch a decisive offensive by forces of five fronts with the aim of quickly reaching the Dnieper.

The second provided for the meeting of the advancing German troops with a pre-prepared defense in depth, equipped big amount artillery in order to exhaust their strength in defensive battles and then go on the offensive with fresh forces on three fronts.

The most ardent supporters of the first version of the campaign were the commander of the Voronezh Front N. Vatutin and member of the front's military council N. Khrushchev, who asked to strengthen their front with one combined arms and one tank army in order to go on the offensive by the end of May. Their plan was supported by Headquarters representative A. Vasilevsky.

The second option was supported by the command of the Central Front, which rightly believed that a preemptive strike would be accompanied by large losses of Soviet troops, and the reserves accumulated by German troops could be used to prevent the development of our offensive and launch powerful counterattacks during it.

The problem was resolved when the supporters of the second option were supported by G. Zhukov, who called the first scenario “a new option for the summer of 1942,” when German troops not only repelled a premature Soviet offensive, but were able to encircle the bulk of the Soviet troops and gain operational space for an attack on Stalingrad . I. Stalin, apparently convinced by such a clear argument, took the side of a defensive strategy.

203-mm howitzers B-4 of the breakthrough artillery corps in positions.

The presence of tank and artillery weapons in some armies of the Central and Voronezh fronts

Notes:
* - there is no division into medium and light tanks, however, the 13th Army had at least 10 T-60 tanks and approx. 50 T-70 tanks
** - including 25 SU-152, 32 SU-122, 18 SU-76 and 16 SU-76 on a captured chassis
*** - including 24 SU-122, 33 SU-76 on domestic and captured chassis
**** - including medium tanks M-3 "General Lee"
On the Voronezh Front, the data is quite contradictory, since front-line reports submitted by the chief of logistics and the commander differ significantly. According to the report of the chief of logistics, another 89 light T-60 and T-70), as well as 202 medium tanks (T-34 and M-3), should be added to the indicated number.

Preparing for battle

P The upcoming battles presented the command of the Red Army with a number of difficult tasks. Firstly, German troops carried out in 1942-43. reorganization and rearmament with new types of military equipment, which provided them with some qualitative advantage. Secondly, the transfer of fresh forces from Germany and France to the Eastern Front and the total mobilization carried out allowed the German command to concentrate a large number of military formations in this area. And finally, the lack of experience in the Red Army in conducting successful offensive operations against a strong enemy made the Battle of Kursk one of the most significant events of the Second World War.

Despite the numerical superiority of domestic tanks, they were qualitatively inferior to German combat vehicles. The newly formed tank armies turned out to be cumbersome and difficult to control formations. A significant part of Soviet tanks were light vehicles, and if we take into account the often extremely poor quality of crew training, it becomes clear how difficult a task awaited our tankers when they met the Germans.

The situation in the artillery was somewhat better. The basis of the equipment of the anti-tank regiments of the Central and Voronezh fronts were 76-mm divisional guns F-22USV, ZIS-22-USV and ZIS-3. Two artillery regiments were armed with more powerful 76-mm guns mod. 1936 (F-22), transferred from the Far East, and one regiment - 107 mm M-60 guns. The total number of 76 mm guns in anti-tank artillery regiments was almost twice the number of 45 mm guns.

True, if in the initial period of the war the 76-mm divisional gun could be successfully used against any German tank at all effective fire distances, now the situation has become more complicated. The new heavy German tanks “Tiger” and “Panther”, modernized medium tanks and assault guns expected on the battlefields were practically invulnerable in the frontal area at a distance of over 400 m, and there was no time to develop new artillery systems.

Preparing a firing point by the crew of Sergeant Tursunkhodzhiev's anti-tank gun. The picture shows a 76.2 mm F-22 gun. 1936 of one of the IPTAP reserves of the High Command. Oryol direction, July 1943

By order of the State Defense Committee (GOKO) in the spring of 1943, production of 57-mm anti-tank (ZIS-2) and tank (ZIS-4M) guns, which had been stopped in the fall of 1941 due to their high complexity, was resumed. However, by the beginning of the battle on the Kursk Bulge they did not have time to get to the front. The first artillery regiment, armed with 57-mm ZIS-2 cannons, arrived on the Central Front only on July 27, 1943, and on Voronezh even later. In August 1943, T-34 and KV-1s tanks armed with ZIS-4M guns, called “tank-fighter”, also arrived at the front. In May-June 1943, it was planned to resume production of 107-mm M-60 guns, but for the needs of anti-tank defense they turned out to be too heavy and expensive. In the summer of 1943, the TsAKB was developing the 100-mm S-3 anti-tank gun, but it was still far from being put into service. The 45-mm battalion anti-tank gun, improved in 1942, was adopted in the winter of 1943 under the designation M-42 to replace the 45-mm gun mod. 1937, but its use did not provide significant superiority, since it could be considered quite effective only when using a sub-caliber projectile against the side armor of German tanks from short distances.

The task of increasing the armor penetration of domestic anti-tank artillery by the summer of 1943 was reduced mainly to the modernization of existing armor-piercing ammunition for 76-mm divisional and tank guns. Thus, in March 1943, a 76-mm sub-caliber projectile was put into mass production, penetrating armor up to 96-84 mm thick at a distance of 500-1000 m. However, the volume of production of sub-caliber shells in 1943 was extremely insignificant due to the lack of tungsten and molybdenum, which were mined in the Caucasus. The shells were issued to gun commanders of anti-tank regiments
(IPTAP) on account, and the loss of at least one shell was punished quite severely - up to and including demotion. In addition to sub-caliber ones, a new type of armor-piercing shell with localizers (BR-350B) was also introduced into the ammunition load of 76-mm guns in 1943, which increased the armor penetration of the gun at a distance of 500 m by 6-9 mm and had a more durable casing.

Heavy tank KV-1s of the Guard Lieutenant Kostin's heavy tank regiment of the breakthrough of the 5th Guards Tank Army before the battles. July 1943

Tested in the fall of 1942, cumulative 76-mm and 122-mm shells (called “armor-burning”) began to enter the troops in April-May 1943. They could penetrate armor up to 92 and 130 mm thick, respectively, but due to the imperfections of the fuses, they cannot was used in long-barreled divisional and tank guns (most often the shell exploded in the gun barrel). Therefore, they were included only in the ammunition of regimental, mountain guns and howitzers. For infantry weapons, the production of hand-held anti-tank cumulative grenades with a stabilizer began, and for anti-tank rifles (PTR) and heavy-caliber DShK machine guns, new armor-piercing bullets with a carbide core containing tungsten carbide were introduced.

Especially for the summer campaign of 1943, in May, the People's Commissariat of Armaments (NKV) was issued a large, above-plan order for armor-piercing (and semi-armor-piercing) shells for guns that were not previously considered anti-tank: 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, as well as 122-mm 152-mm long-range cannons and howitzers. The NKV enterprises also received an additional order for KS Molotov cocktails and FOG mounted high-explosive flamethrowers.

76-mm divisional gun mod. 1939/41 ZIS-22 (F-22 USV), one of the main Soviet anti-tank weapons in the summer of 1943.

In the artillery workshops of the 13th Army in May 1943, 28 “portable rocket guns” were manufactured, which were separate guides from the Katyusha, mounted on a light tripod.

All available light artillery weapons (caliber from 37 to 76 mm) were aimed at fighting tanks. Heavy cannon-howitzer batteries, heavy mortars and Katyusha rocket launcher units also learned to repel attacks from tank sub-frames. Temporary instructions and instructions for shooting at moving armored targets were specially issued for them. Anti-aircraft batteries armed with 85-mm cannons were transferred to the front reserve to cover particularly important areas from tank attacks. It was forbidden to fire at aircraft batteries allocated for anti-tank missiles.

Rich trophies captured during the Battle of Stalingrad were also preparing to greet their former owners with fire. At least four artillery regiments received captured equipment: 75 mm RaK 40 cannons (instead of 76 mm USV and ZIS-3) and 50 mm RaK 38 cannons (instead of 45 mm cannons). Two anti-tank artillery regiments, transferred to the fronts for reinforcement from the Headquarters reserve, were armed with captured 88-mm FlaK 18 / FlaK 36 anti-aircraft guns.

But it was not only the material part that occupied the minds of the domestic command. To no lesser extent, this also affected (for the first, and, apparently, the last time) issues of organization and thorough combat training of personnel.

Firstly, the staff of the main anti-tank defense unit was finally approved - the anti-tank artillery regiment (IPTAP), which consisted of five four-gun batteries. A larger unit - a brigade (IPTABr) - consisted of three regiments and, accordingly, fifteen batteries. This consolidation of anti-tank units made it possible to counteract large numbers of enemy tanks and at the same time maintain an artillery reserve for operational fire maneuvers. In addition, the fronts also included combined-arms anti-tank brigades, which were armed with one light artillery regiment and up to two battalions of anti-tank rifles.

Secondly, all artillery units selected fighters who had achieved success in the fight against new German tanks (not only the Tiger and Panther were new; many artillerymen had not encountered the new modifications of the PzKpfw IV and StuG assault guns until the summer of 1943 40), and were appointed commanders of guns and platoons in newly formed units. At the same time, crews that were defeated in battles with German tanks, on the contrary, were withdrawn to rear units. For two months (May-June) there was a real hunt for “cannon snipers” among the artillery units of the fronts. These gunners were invited to the IPTAP and IPTAB, which, by order of Headquarters, increased their pay and rations in May 1943. For additional training of IPTAP gunners, in addition to practical training, up to 16 combat armor-piercing shells were also allocated.

The training units used captured medium tanks to make mock-ups of the Tigers, welding additional armor plates onto the frontal part of the hull and turret. Many gunners, practicing shooting at moving models (the models were towed on long cables behind artillery tractors or tanks), achieved the highest skill, managing to hit the gun barrel, the commander's turret, or the mechanic's viewing device from a 45-mm or 76-mm cannon. a tank driver moving at a speed of 10-15 km/h (this was the real speed of the tank in battle). Crews of howitzers and large-caliber guns (122-152 mm) also underwent mandatory training in firing at moving targets.

Engineering support for defense lines

TO At the beginning of July 1943, the Kursk ledge was defended by the following group of Soviet troops. The right side of the 308 km long protrusion was occupied by troops of the Central Front (front commander - K. Rokossovsky). In the first echelon, the front had five combined arms armies (48, 13, 70, 65 and 60th), the 2nd Tank Army, as well as the 9th and 19th Tank Corps were located in reserve. The left front, 244 km long, was occupied by the troops of the Voronezh Front (front commander - N. Vatutin), having in the first echelon the 38th, 40th, 6th Guards and 7th Guards armies, and in the second echelon - the 69th Army and 35th 1st Guards Rifle Corps. The front reserve consisted of the 1st Tank Army, as well as the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps.

In the rear of the Central and Voronezh fronts, the Steppe Front (front commander I. Konev) occupied the defense, consisting of six combined arms, one tank army, as well as four tank and two mechanized corps. The defense of Soviet troops in the Kursk salient was sharply different from that in the battle of Moscow and Stalingrad. It was deliberate, prepared in advance and carried out in conditions of some superiority in forces over the German troops. When organizing the defense, the experience accumulated by Moscow and Stalishrad was taken into account, especially in terms of engineering and defensive measures.

In the armies of the first echelon of fronts, three defensive lines were created: the main army defense line, the second defense line 6-12 km from it, and the rear defensive line, located 20-30 km from the first. In certain especially critical areas, these zones were reinforced with intermediate defense lines. In addition, the forces of the fronts also organized three additional frontal defensive lines.

Thus, in the expected directions of the enemy’s main attacks, each front had 6 lines of defense with a separation depth of up to 110 km on the Central Front and up to 85 km on the Voronezh Front.

The volume of work carried out by the engineering services of the fronts was colossal. In the Central Front alone, in April-June, up to 5,000 km of trenches and communication passages were opened, more than 300 km of wire barriers were installed (of which about 30 km were electrified), more than 400,000 mines and landmines were installed, over 60 km of overcuts were opened up to 80 km of anti-tank ditches.

To enlarge - click on the image

The system of engineering barriers in the main defensive zone included anti-tank ditches, gouges and scarps, tank traps, surprises, landmines and minefields. On the Voronezh Front, mine fire explosives (MOF) were first used, which were a box with incendiary bottles, in the center of which a heavy bomb, grenade or anti-personnel mine was placed. Several barrage fields were created from such land mines, which proved to be very effective both against infantry and against light and medium tanks.

In addition, to carry out the operational laying of mines directly in front of the advancing tanks (in those years called “impudent mining”), special mobile barrage detachments (PZO) were organized as part of an engineer-assault sapper company, reinforced by a platoon of anti-tank rifles and/or a machine-gun platoon on cargo trucks. off-road vehicles or captured armored personnel carriers.

The main defense line was divided into battalion areas (up to 2.5 km along the front and up to 1 km in depth) and anti-tank strong points covered by a network of engineering barriers. Two or three battalion areas formed a regimental sector (up to 5 km along the front and up to 4 km in depth). Anti-tank strong points (formed by the artillery of rifle regiments and divisions) were located primarily in battalion defense areas. The advantage of the northern sector of defense was that all anti-tank strong points located on the sector of the rifle regiments, by order of the front commander K. Rokossovsky, were united into anti-tank areas, the commandants of which were appointed by the commanders of the rifle regiments. This facilitated the process of interaction between artillery and rifle units when repelling enemy attacks. On the southern front, by order of the Headquarters representative A. Vasilevsky, this was prohibited, and anti-tank strong points often had no idea about the state of affairs in neighboring defense sectors, being, in essence, left to their own devices.

By the beginning of the fighting, the troops occupied four defensive lines - entirely the first (main) line of defense and most of the second, and in the directions of a probable enemy attack, also the rear army line and the first front line.

To enlarge - click on the image

All armies of the Central and Voronezh fronts were significantly reinforced by RVGK artillery. The command of the Central Front had at its disposal, in addition to 41 artillery regiments of rifle divisions, also 77 artillery regiments of the RVGK, not counting anti-aircraft and field rocket artillery, i.e. a total of 118 artillery and mortar regiments. The anti-tank artillery of the RVGK was represented by ten separate IPTAPs and three IPTABr (three regiments each). In addition, the front included three combined arms anti-tank brigades and three light artillery brigades (three light artillery regiments each), which were also transferred to anti-tank defense. Taking into account the latter, the entire anti-tank artillery of the RVGK front numbered 31 regiments.

The Voronezh Front included, in addition to 35 artillery regiments of rifle divisions, also 83 reinforcement artillery regiments, i.e. also 118 artillery and mortar regiments, of which there were a total of 46 anti-tank fighter regiments.

The anti-tank fighter regiments were almost completely equipped with materiel and personnel (in terms of the number of guns - up to 93%, in terms of personnel - up to 92%). There were insufficient means of traction and vehicles (especially on the Voronezh front). The number of engines per gun ranged from 1.5 to 2.9 (with the required number of 3.5). The most widely represented vehicles were vehicles with a carrying capacity from 1.5 to 5 tons (GAZ, ZIS and American trucks), and there was a particularly acute shortage of tractors of the STZ-5 (Nati) type (up to half of the allotted quantity) and off-road passenger cars of the Willys and GAZ-67 type (up to 60% of the allotted quantity).

On the northern front, the troops of the 13th Army received the greatest artillery reinforcement as they were located in the most threatened direction. On the southern front, reinforcements were distributed between the 6th Guards and 7th Guards armies.

On both fronts, special artillery and anti-tank reserves were created. In addition to standard anti-tank guns, they also included battalions and companies of armor-piercing soldiers, as well as 76 and 85 mm anti-aircraft guns removed from air defense. In order to somehow compensate for the weakening of air defense, the Headquarters transferred to the front command several additional units of 37-mm anti-aircraft guns and 12.7-mm machine guns. Anti-aircraft guns, converted to the category of anti-tank guns, were installed for the most part in pre-equipped positions near tank-dangerous directions in the near rear of the front. It was forbidden to fire from these batteries at aircraft, and more than 60% of their ammunition consisted of armor-piercing shells.

The crew of Sergeant Filippov's ZIS-22 gun is preparing to meet German tanks.

Heavy 203-mm howitzer B-4 of the breakthrough artillery corps in a position under a camouflage network. Oryol direction, July 1943

A camouflaged Soviet medium tank in an ambush on the outskirts of the station. Ponyri.

Defensive battles on the northern front

2 On July 1943, the command of the Central and Voronezh Fronts received a special telegram from Headquarters, which stated that the start of the German offensive should be expected between July 3 and 6. On the night of July 5, reconnaissance of the 15th Infantry Division of the 13th Army encountered a group of German sappers making passages in minefields. In the ensuing skirmish, one of them was captured and indicated that the German offensive should begin on July 5 at 3 a.m. The commander of the Central Front, K. Rokossovsky, decided to forestall the German offensive by conducting artillery and air counter-training. At 2 hours 20 minutes, a 30-minute artillery counter-preparation was carried out in the zone of the 13th and 48th armies, in which 588 guns and mortars were involved, as well as two regiments of field rocket artillery. During the shelling, the German artillery responded very sluggishly; a large number of powerful explosions were noted behind the front line. At 4:30 a.m. the counter-preparatory preparation was repeated.

The air strike on both fronts failed due to his poor preparation. By the time our bombers took off, everything german planes were in the air, and the bomb strike fell mostly on empty or half-empty airfields.

At 5:30 a.m., German infantry, supported by tanks, attacked the entire defense line of the 13th Army. The enemy exerted particularly strong pressure on the right flank of the army - in the Maloarkhangelskoye region. The infantry was stopped by mobile barrage fire, and tanks and assault guns fell into minefields. The attack was repulsed. After 7 hours 30 minutes, the Germans changed the direction of the main attack and launched an offensive on the left flank of the 13th Army.

Until 10:30 a.m., German troops were unable to get close to the positions of the Soviet infantry, and only after overcoming the minefields did they break into Podolyan. Units of our 15th and 81st divisions were partially encircled, but successfully repelled attacks by German motorized infantry. According to various reports, during July 5, the Germans lost from 48 to 62 tanks and assault guns in minefields and from Soviet artillery fire.

On the night of July 6, the command of the Central Front maneuvered artillery reserves and, following the order of the General Staff, prepared a counterattack against the German troops that had broken through.

The counterattack involved the breakthrough artillery corps of General N. Ignatov, a mortar brigade, two regiments of rocket mortars, two regiments of self-propelled artillery, two tank corps (16th and 19th), a rifle corps and three rifle divisions. Infantry and tanks of the 16th. struck on the morning of July 6 on a front up to 34 km wide. The enemy artillery was silent, suppressed by the fire of the breakthrough artillery corps, but the tanks of the 107th Tank Brigade, having pushed the German troops 1-2 km in the direction of Butyrka, came under sudden fire from German tanks and self-propelled guns buried in the ground. IN short term the brigade lost 46 tanks, and the remaining 4 retreated to their infantry. The commander of the 16th Tank, seeing this situation, ordered the 164th Tank Brigade, moving in a ledge after the 107th Brigade, to stop the attack and retreat to its original position. The 19th, having spent too much time preparing a counterattack, was ready for it only in the afternoon and therefore did not go on the offensive. The counterattack did not reach main goal- restoration of the previous line of defense.

"Tigers" of the 505th Heavy Tank Battalion are advancing towards the front line. July 1943

A column of French cars from one of the motorized units of the German troops. Orlovskoe e.g., July 1943

Command tank PzKpfw IV Ausf F in battle. Oryol eg.

The radio relay station of Army Group Center maintains contact with the headquarters of the 9th Army. July 1943

After our troops went on the defensive, the Germans resumed their attack on Olkhovatka. From 170 to 230 tanks and self-propelled guns were thrown here. Positions of the 17th Guards. The corps here were reinforced by the 1st Guards. an artillery division, one IPTAP and a tank regiment, and the Soviet tanks standing in the defense were dug into the ground.

Fierce fighting took place here. The Germans quickly regrouped and delivered short powerful attacks with tank groups, between attacks on the heads of the infantrymen of the 17th Guards. The corps was bombed by German dive bombers. By 16 o'clock the Soviet infantry had retreated to their original positions, and the 19th since. received an order to carry out a counterattack against the exposed flank of the German group. Having launched the attack at 17 o'clock, our tank corps was met by dense fire from German anti-tank and self-propelled guns and suffered heavy losses. However, the German offensive on Olkhovatka was stopped.

Artillerymen of the 13th Army fire at enemy assault guns. July 1943

German tanks of the 2nd Panzer Division on the offensive. July 1943

To enlarge - click on the image

Armor-piercers change their firing position. July 1943

T-70 and T-34 tanks of the 2nd Tank Army move forward for a counterattack. July 1943

Tank reserves are moving towards the front. The picture shows American medium tanks "General Lee", supplied to the USSR under Lend-Lease. July 1943

German artillerymen repulse an attack by Soviet tanks. July 1943

The anti-tank self-propelled gun "Mapder III" covers the advance of German tanks.

Losses of equipment of the 2nd Tank Army in defensive battles

Note: The general list of losses does not include the losses of attached units and subunits, including three tank regiments armed with Lend-Lease tanks.

Defense st. Ponyri

P After failures on the flanks of the 13th Army, the Germans concentrated their efforts on taking the Ponyri station, which occupied a very important strategic position, covering railway Orel-Kursk.

The station was well prepared for defense. It was surrounded by controlled and unguided minefields, in which a significant number of captured aerial bombs and large-caliber shells, converted into tension-action landmines, were installed. The defense was reinforced with tanks dug into the ground and a large amount of anti-tank artillery (13th IPTABr and 46th light artillery brigade).

Against the village “1st Ponyri” On July 6, the Germans abandoned up to 170 tanks and self-propelled guns (including up to 40 Tigers of the 505th heavy tank battalion) and infantry of the 86th and 292nd divisions. Having broken through the defenses of the 81st Infantry Division, German troops captured “1st Ponyri” and quickly advanced south to the second line of defense in the area of ​​“2nd Ponyri” and Art. Ponyri. Until the end of the day, they tried to break into the station three times, but were repulsed. The counterattack carried out by the 16th and 19th Tank Corps turned out to be uncoordinated and did not reach the goal (recapture the 1st Ponyri). However, the day for regrouping forces was won.

On July 7, the Germans could no longer advance on a wide front and threw all their forces against the defense center of the Ponyri station. At approximately 8 o'clock in the morning, up to 40 German heavy tanks (according to the classification that existed in the Red Army, German medium tanks PzKpfw IV Ausf H were considered heavy), with the support of heavy assault guns, advanced to the defense line and opened fire on the positions of the Soviet troops. At the same time, the 2nd Ponyri came under air attack from German dive bombers. After about half an hour, the Tiger tanks began to approach the forward trenches, covering the medium tanks and armored personnel carriers with infantry. Heavy assault guns fired from the spot at the detected firing points to support the offensive. The dense PZO of large-caliber artillery and the “impudent mining” carried out by units of engineering assault brigades with the support of divisional guns forced German tanks to retreat to their original position five times.

However, at 10 am, two battalions of German infantry with medium tanks and assault guns managed to break into the northwestern outskirts of “2 Ponyri”. The reserve of the commander of the 307th division brought into battle, consisting of two infantry battalions and a tank brigade, with the support of artillery, made it possible to destroy the group that had broken through and restore the situation. After 11 o'clock the Germans began attacking Ponyri from the northeast. By 3 p.m. they had taken possession of the 1st May state farm and came close to the station. However, all attempts to break into the territory of the village and station were unsuccessful. July 7 was a critical day on the Northern Front, when the Germans had great tactical successes.

Heavy assault guns "Ferdinand" before the attack of Art. Ponyri. July 1943

On the morning of July 8, German troops, supported by 25 medium tanks, 15 heavy Tiger tanks and up to 20 Ferdinand assault guns, again attacked the northern outskirts of the station. Ponyri. When repelling the attack with fire from the 1180th and 1188th IPTAP, 22 tanks were knocked out, including 5 Tiger tanks. Two Tiger tanks were set on fire by KS bottles thrown by infantrymen Kuliev and Prokhorov from the 1019th Regiment.

In the afternoon, German troops again tried to break through bypassing the station. Ponyri - through the agricultural enterprise “1 May”. However, here, through the efforts of the 1180th IPTAP and the 768th LAP, with the support of infantry and a battery of “portable jet guns,” the attack was repulsed. On the battlefield, the Germans left 11 burned out and 5 destroyed medium tanks, as well as 4 damaged assault guns and several armored vehicles. Moreover, according to reports from the infantry command and artillery reconnaissance, the “rocket guns” accounted for 3 German combat vehicles. For the next two days nothing new will be introduced into the disposition of troops in the area of ​​the station. Ponyri. On July 9, the Germans put together an operational strike group of 45 heavy Tiger tanks of the 505th heavy tank battalion (according to other sources - 40 Tiger tanks), the 654th battalion of Ferdinand heavy assault guns, as well as the 216th division of 150 -mm assault tanks and a division of 75mm and 105mm assault guns. The command of the group (according to the testimony of prisoners) was carried out by Major Kal (commander of the 505th heavy tank battalion). Directly behind the group were medium tanks and motorized infantry in armored personnel carriers. Two hours after the start of the battle, the group broke through the agricultural farm “1 May” to the village. Goreloye. In these battles, German troops used a new tactical formation, when in the first ranks of the strike group a line of Ferdinand assault guns moved (rolling in two echelons), followed by the Tigers, covering the assault guns and medium tanks. But near the village. Gorelo, our artillerymen and infantrymen allowed German tanks and self-propelled guns into a pre-prepared artillery fire bag formed by the 768th, 697th and 546th LAPs and the 1180th IPTAP, supported by long-range artillery fire and rocket mortars. Finding themselves under powerful concentrated artillery fire with different directions, having also found themselves in a powerful minefield (most of the field was mined by captured aerial bombs or landmines buried in the ground, containing 10-50 kg of tola) and subjected to raids by Petlyakov dive bombers, the German tanks stopped. Eighteen combat vehicles were shot down. Some of the tanks left on the battlefield turned out to be serviceable, and six of them were evacuated at night by Soviet repairmen, after which they were handed over to 19 tanks. to replenish lost equipment.

The next day the attack was repeated. But even now the German troops failed to break through to the station. Ponyri. A major role in repelling the offensive was played by the anti-aircraft defense system supplied by the special purpose artillery division (203 mm howitzers and 152 mm howitzer guns). By midday the Germans had withdrawn, leaving seven more tanks and two assault guns on the battlefield. On July 12-13, the Germans carried out an operation to evacuate their damaged tanks from the battlefield. The evacuation was covered by the 654th Ferdinand assault gun division. The operation as a whole was a success, but the number of Ferdinands left on the battlefield with the undercarriage damaged by mines and artillery fire increased to 17. The counterattack of our infantrymen was carried out with the support of a battalion of T-34 tanks and a T-70 battalion (from the 3 troops transferred here .) pushed back the German troops that approached the outskirts of Ponyri. At the same time, the Germans did not have time to evacuate the damaged heavy Ferdinands, some of which were set on fire by their own crews, and some by our infantrymen, who used KS bottles against the crews of vehicles that offered resistance. Only one Ferdinand received a hole in the side near the brake drum, although it was fired upon by seven T-34 tanks from all directions. In total, after the fighting in the area of ​​the station. Ponyri - agricultural farm "1 May" there were 21 Ferdinand assault guns left with a damaged chassis, a significant part of which were set on fire by their crews or advancing infantrymen. Our tankers, who supported the infantry counterattack, suffered heavy losses not only from the fire of German assault guns, but also because, while approaching the enemy, a company of T-70 tanks and several T-34s mistakenly ended up in their own minefield. This was the last day when German troops came close to the outskirts of the station. Ponyri.

German artillery is shelling Soviet positions. July-August 1943.

Ferdinand assault guns, knocked out on the outskirts of the station. Ponyri. July 1943

The battlefield after the Soviet counterattack. troops in the area of ​​the station. Ponyri - village. Goreloye. On this field, German Ferdinand assault guns and a company of Soviet T-34/T-70 tanks were blown up by Soviet landmines. July 9-13, 1943

German tank PzKpfw IV and armored personnel carrier SdKfz 251, knocked out on the outskirts of the station. Ponyri. July 15, 1943

Special Purpose Artillery Division Gen. Ignatiev when repelling the German offensive at the station. Ponyri. July 1943

"Ferdinand", hit by artillery near the village. Goreloye. The gun mantlet was damaged, the starboard roller and drive wheel were broken.

The Brummber assault tank was destroyed by a direct hit from a heavy shell. Outskirts of the station Ponyri July 15, 1943

Tanks of the 3rd regiment of the 2nd tank division, knocked out on the outskirts of the station. Ponyri. July 12-15, 1943

A damaged PzBefWg III Ausf H is a command vehicle with a mock-up gun and a telescopic antenna.

PzKpfw III Ausf N support tank, armed with a short-barreled 75 mm gun.

Defensive battles of the 70th Army

IN In the defense zone of the 70th Army, the most fierce battles took place in the area of ​​the village. Kutyrki-Teploe. Here the 3rd Fighter Brigade bore the brunt of the blow from the German tank forces. The brigade organized two anti-tank areas in the Kutyrki-Teploye area, each of which housed three artillery batteries (76 mm guns and 45 mm guns), one mortar battery (120 mm mortars) and a battalion of anti-tank rifles. During July 6-7, the brigade successfully held back enemy attacks, destroying and knocking out 47 tanks here. Interestingly, the commander of one of the batteries of 45-mm guns, Captain Gorlitsin, positioned his guns behind the reverse slope of the ridge and hit the emerging German tanks in the opening bottom before the tank could respond with aimed fire. Thus, in one day his battery destroyed and damaged 17 tanks without losing a single person from their fire. On July 8 at 8:30 a group of German tanks and assault guns in the amount of up to 70 pieces. with machine gunners on armored personnel carriers went to the outskirts of the village. Samodurovka, with the support of dive bombers, carried out an attack in the direction of Teploye-Molotychi. Until 11:30, the brigade’s artillerymen, despite heavy losses suffered from air raids (until July 11, 1943, German aviation dominated the air), held their positions, but by 12:30, when the enemy launched a third attack from the Kashar area in the direction Teploe, the first and seventh batteries of the brigade were almost completely destroyed, and the German panzergrenadiers managed to occupy Kashar, Kutyrki, Pogoreltsy and Samodurovka. Only on the northern outskirts of Teploe did the sixth battery hold out, in the area of ​​height 238.1 the fourth battery and mortars fired, and on the outskirts of Kutyrka the remnants of an armor-piercing unit, supported by two captured tanks, fired at the German infantry that had broken through. Colonel Rukosuev, who commanded this anti-tank area, brought his last reserve into battle - three light batteries of 45-mm guns and a battalion of anti-tank rifles. The breakthrough was localized.

Panzergrenadiers and anti-tank self-propelled guns "Mapder III" in battle in the area of ​​the village. Kashara.

German six-barreled Nebelwerfer rocket mortars repelling a Soviet counterattack.

The crew of Sergeant Kruglov's 45-mm gun knocked out 3 German tanks in battles. July 1943

Medium tanks MZ at the starting position. Oryol eg. July-August 1943

On July 11, the Germans tried to strike here again with large forces of tanks and motorized infantry. However, now the advantage in the air was with Soviet aviation, and the attacks of Soviet dive bombers mixed up the battle formation of the tanks deployed to attack. In addition, the advancing troops met not only the 3rd Fighter Brigade, which had been badly battered the day before, but also the 1st Anti-Tank Fighter Brigade, which had been transferred to this area, and two anti-aircraft divisions (one of the divisions was armed with captured 88-mm Flak anti-aircraft guns 18). Over the course of two days, the brigade repulsed 17 tank attacks, knocking out and destroying 6 heavy (including 2 Tigers) and 17 light and medium tanks. In total, in the defense area between us. points Samodurovka, Kashara, Kutyrki. Teploye, height 238.1, on a field measuring 2 x 3 km after the battles, 74 damaged and burned German tanks, self-propelled guns and other armored vehicles were discovered, including four Tigers and two Ferdinands. On July 15, with the permission of the front commander K. Rokossovsky, this field was filmed by newsreels who came from Moscow, and it was after the war that they began to call it “the field near Prokhorovka” (near Prokhorovka there were not and could not be “Ferdinands”, which flash on the screen “Prokhorovsky " field).

An armored ammunition carrier SdKfz 252 follows at the head of a column of assault guns.

"Tiger", shot down by Sergeant Lunin's crew. Oryol eg. July 1943

Soviet intelligence officers who captured a serviceable PzKpfw III Ausf N and brought it to the location of their troops. July 1943.

Defensive battles on the southern front

4 July 1943, at 16:00, after air and artillery strikes on military outpost positions of the Voronezh Front, German troops with up to an infantry division, supported by up to 100 tanks, conducted reconnaissance in force from the Tomarovka area to the north. The battle between the military guards of the Voronezh Front and the reconnaissance units of Army Group South lasted until late at night. Under cover of the battle, German troops took up their starting position for the offensive. According to the testimony of German prisoners captured in this battle, as well as defectors who surrendered on July 3-4, it became known that the general offensive of German troops on this section of the front was scheduled for 2 hours 30 minutes on July 5.

To facilitate the position of the combat guard and inflict losses on the German troops in their initial positions, at 22:30 on July 4, the artillery of the Voronezh Front conducted a 5-minute artillery attack on the identified German artillery positions. At 3 a.m. on July 5, counterpreparations were carried out in full.

Defensive battles on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge were distinguished by great ferocity and heavy losses on our side. There were several reasons for this. Firstly, the nature of the terrain was more favorable for the use of tanks than on the northern front. Secondly, the representative of the Headquarters, A. Vasilevsky, who was overseeing the preparation of the defense, forbade the commander of the Voronezh Front, N. Vatutin, to unite anti-tank strong points into areas and assign them to infantry regiments, believing that such a decision would complicate control. And thirdly, German air supremacy here lasted almost two days longer than on the Central Front.

The main blow was delivered by German troops in the defense zone of the 6th Guards Army, along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway, simultaneously in two areas. Up to 400 tanks and self-propelled guns were concentrated in the first section, and up to 300 in the second.

The first attack on the positions of the 6th Guards. The army in the direction of Cherkassy began at 6 o'clock on July 5 with a powerful raid of dive bombers. Under cover of the raid, a motorized infantry regiment went on the attack with the support of 70 tanks. However, he was stopped in the minefields and was additionally fired upon by heavy artillery. An hour and a half later the attack was repeated. Now the attacking forces were doubled. In the forefront were German sappers, trying to make passages in the minefields. But this attack was repelled by infantry and artillery fire from the 67th Infantry Division. Under the influence of heavy artillery fire, German tanks were forced to break formation even before entering into fire contact with our troops, and the “impudent mining” carried out by Soviet sappers greatly hampered the maneuver of combat vehicles. In total, the Germans lost 25 medium tanks and assault guns here from mines and heavy artillery fire.

German tanks, supported by assault guns, attack the Soviet defenses. July 1943. The silhouette of a bomber is visible in the air.

To enlarge - click on the image

A Mapder III tank destroyer follows an exploded MZ Lee medium tank.

A column of one of the motorized units of the German troops is heading towards the front. Oboyanskoe e.g., July 1943

Having failed to take Cherkassy with a frontal attack, German troops struck in the direction of Butovo. At the same time, several hundred attacked Cherkasskoe and Butovo German planes. By noon on July 5, in this area, the Germans managed to wedge themselves into the defense line of the 6th Guards. army. To restore the breakthrough, the commander of the 6th Guards. I. Chistyakov's army introduced anti-tank reserves - the 496th IPTAP and the 27th IPTAB. At the same time, the front command gave the order to the 6th Army. advance to the Berezovka area in order to liquidate the planned dangerous breakthrough of German tanks with a flank attack.

Despite the emerging breakthrough of German tanks, by the end of the day on July 5, the artillerymen managed to restore the precarious balance, however, at the cost of large losses of personnel (up to 70%). The reason for this was that the infantry units in a number of defense sectors retreated in disarray, leaving the artillery on direct fire without cover. During the day of continuous fighting in the Cherkassk-Korovino area, the enemy lost 13 tanks from IPTAP fire, including 3 heavy Tiger types. Our losses in a number of units amounted to up to 50% of personnel and up to 30% of materiel.

On the night of July 6, a decision was made to strengthen the defensive lines of the 6th Guards. army with two tank corps of the 1st Tank Army. By the morning of July 6, the 1st Tank Army, with the forces of the 3rd Mechanized and 6th Tank Corps, took up defense on its designated line, covering the Oboyan direction. In addition, the 6th Guards. the army was additionally reinforced by the 2nd and 5th Guards. TK, which came out to cover the flanks.

The main direction of attacks of German troops the next day was Oboyanskoye. On the morning of July 6, a large column of tanks moved from the Cherkasy region along the road. The guns of the 1837th IPTAP, hidden on the flank, opened sudden fire from a short distance. At the same time, 12 tanks were knocked out, among which one Panther remained on the battlefield. It is interesting to note that in these battles, Soviet artillerymen used the tactics of so-called “flirting guns”, allocated as bait to lure enemy tanks. “Flirting guns” opened fire on the columns from a great distance, forcing the advancing tanks to deploy in minefields and expose their sides to the batteries lying in ambush.

As a result of the fighting on July 6, the Germans managed to capture Alekseevka, Lukhanino, Olkhovka and Trirechnoye and reach the second defensive line. However, on the Belgorod-Oboyan highway their advance was stopped.

German tank attacks in the direction of Bol. The beacons also ended in nothing. Having met heavy fire from Soviet artillery here, the German tanks turned to the northeast, where, after a long battle with units of the 5th Guards Tank. they managed to capture Luchki. A major role in repelling the German attack was played by the 14th IPTAB, which was deployed from the front reserve and deployed at the Yakovlevo-Dubrava line, knocking out up to 50 German combat vehicles (data confirmed by the report of the captured team).

SS artillerymen support the attack of their infantry with fire. Prokhorovskoe eg.

Soviet T-70 tanks of the "Revolutionary Mongolia" column (112 armored vehicles) are moving forward to attack.

PzKpfw IV Ausf H tanks of the Grossdeutschland (Greater Germany) division are fighting.

Radio operators of Field Marshal Manstein's headquarters at work. July 1943

German Panther tanks of the 10th Tank Brigade, PzKpfw IV Ausf G of the Grossdeutschland division and StuG 40 assault guns in the Oboyan direction. July 9-10, 1943

On July 7, the enemy brought up to 350 tanks into battle and continued attacks in the Oboyan direction from the Bol region. Lighthouses, Krasnaya Dubrava. All units of the 1st Tank Army and the 6th Guards entered the battle. army. By the end of the day, the Germans managed to advance in the Bol area. Beacons at 10-12 km. causing heavy losses to the 1st Tank Army. The next day, the Germans brought 400 tanks and self-propelled guns into battle in this area. However, the night before, the command of the 6th Guards. The army was transferred to the threatened direction by the 27th IPTAB, whose task was to cover the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. By the morning, when the enemy broke through the defenses of the infantry and tank units of the 6th Guards. army and the 1st Tank Army and came out, it seemed, onto an open highway; two “flirting” guns of the regiment opened fire on the column from a distance of 1500-2000 m. The column changed formation, pushing heavy tanks forward. Up to 40 German bombers appeared over the battlefield. After half an hour, the fire of the “flirting guns” was suppressed, and when the tanks began to rebuild for further movement, the regiment opened fire on them from three directions from an extremely short distance. Since most of the regiment's guns were located on the flank of the column, their fire was very effective. Within 8 minutes, 29 enemy tanks and 7 self-propelled guns were destroyed on the battlefield. The blow was so unexpected that the remaining tanks, without accepting the battle, quickly retreated towards the forest. Of the destroyed tanks, repairmen of the 6th Tank Corps of the 1st Tank Army were able to repair and put into operation 9 combat vehicles.

On July 9, the enemy continued attacks in the Oboyan direction. Attacks by tanks and motorized infantry were supported by aviation. The strike groups managed to advance here to a distance of up to 6 km, but then they came across well-equipped anti-aircraft artillery positions, adapted for anti-aircraft defense, and tanks buried in the ground.

In the following days, the enemy stopped ramming our defenses with a direct blow and began to look for weak areas in it. Such a direction, according to the German command, was Prokhorovskoye, from where it was possible to get to Kursk by a roundabout route. For this purpose, the Germans concentrated a group in the Prokhorovka area, which included the 3rd Tank, numbering up to 300 tanks and self-propelled guns.

Infantrymen of the Das Reich division help pull out a stuck Tiger.

Tankers of the 5th Guards. tank army is preparing a tank for battle.

StuG 40 Ausf G assault gun, knocked out by Captain Vinogradov.

IN On the evening of July 10, the command of the Voronezh Front received an order from Headquarters to conduct a counterattack on a large group of German troops accumulated in the Mal area. Beacons, Ozerovsky. To carry out a counterattack, the front was reinforced by two armies, the 5th Guards, under the command of A. Zhadov, and the 5th Guards Tank, under the command of P. Rotmistrov, transferred from the Stepnoy Front. However, preparations for a counterattack, which began on July 11, were thwarted by the Germans, who themselves inflicted two powerful blows on our defense in this area. One is in the direction of Oboyan, and the second is towards Prokhorovka. As a result of sudden attacks, some formations of the 1st Tank and 6th Guards armies retreated 1-2 km in the direction of Oboyan. A much more serious situation has developed in the Prokhorovsky direction. Due to the sudden withdrawal of some infantry units of the 5th Guards Army and the 2nd Tank Corps, artillery preparations for a counterattack, which began on July 10, were disrupted. Many batteries were left without infantry cover and suffered losses both in deployment positions and on the move. The front found itself in a very difficult situation. German motorized infantry entered the village. Prokhorovka and began crossing the Psel River. Only the quick introduction of the 42nd Infantry Division into the battle, as well as the transfer of all available artillery to direct fire, made it possible to stop the advance of German tanks.

The next lazy 5th Guards. The tank army, reinforced by attached units, was ready to launch an attack on Luchki and Yakovlevo. P. Rotmistrov chose the army deployment line to the west and southwest of the station. Prokhorovka at the front 15 km. At this time, German troops, trying to develop their offensive in a northern direction, struck in the defense zone of the 69th Army. But this offensive was rather of a distracting nature. By 5 o'clock in the morning, units of the 81st and 92nd Guards. The rifle divisions of the 69th Army were thrown back from the defensive line and the Germans managed to capture the villages of Rzhavets, Ryndinka, and Vypolzovka. A threat arose to the left flank of the unfolding 5th Guards. tank army, and, by order of the Headquarters representative A. Vasilevsky, front commander N. Vatutin gave the order to send the mobile reserve of the 5th Guards. tank army into the defense zone of the 69th Army. At 8 o'clock in the morning, the reserve group under the command of General Trufanov launched a counterattack on the units of German troops that had broken through.

At 8:30, the main forces of the German troops, consisting of the tank divisions Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, Das Reich and Totenkopf, numbering up to 500 tanks and self-propelled guns (including 42 Tiger tanks), went on the offensive in the direction Art. Prokhorovka in the highway and railway zone. This grouping was supported by all available air forces.

Tanks of the 6th Panzer Division on the approach to Prokhorovka.

Flamethrowers before the attack.

Anti-aircraft self-propelled gun SdKfz 6/2 fires at Soviet infantry. July 1943

After a 15-minute artillery barrage, the German group was attacked by the main forces of the 5th Guards. tank army. Despite the suddenness of the attack, the masses of Soviet tanks in the area of ​​the Oktyabrsky state farm were met with concentrated fire from anti-tank artillery and assault guns. General Bakharov's 18th Tank Corps broke into the Oktyabrsky state farm at high speed and, despite heavy losses, captured it. However, near the village. Andreevka and Vasilyevka he met an enemy tank group, which had 15 Tiger tanks. Trying to break through the German tanks blocking the path, conducting a counter battle with them, units of the 18th Tank Corps were able to capture Vasilyevka, but as a result of the losses they suffered, they were unable to develop the offensive and at 18:00 went on the defensive.

The 29th Panzer Corps fought for height 252.5, where it was met by tanks of the SS division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler. Throughout the day, the corps fought a maneuver battle, but after 16 hours it was pushed back by the approaching tanks of the SS Tottenkopf division and, with the onset of darkness, went on the defensive.

The 2nd Guards Tank Corps, advancing in the direction of Kalinin, at 14:30 suddenly collided with the SS tank division "Das Reich" moving towards. Due to the fact that the 29th Tank Corps was bogged down in battles at height 252.5, the Germans inflicted on the 2nd Guards. The tank corps was hit in the exposed flank and forced to retreat to its original position.

The assault guns withdraw after the battle. Unit unknown.

Command tank PzKpfw III Ausf The SS division "Das Reich" follows the burning medium tanks "General Lee". Presumably, Prokhorovskoye, for example. July 12-13, 1943

Scouts of the 5th Guards. tank army on Ba-64 armored vehicles. Belgorod eg.

2nd Tank Corps, which provided the junction between the 2nd Guards. tank corps and the 29th tank corps, was able to somewhat push back the German units in front of him, but came under fire from assault and anti-tank guns pulled up from the second line, suffered losses and stopped.

By noon on July 12, it became clear to the German command that the frontal attack on Prokhorovka had failed. Then it decided to cross the river. Psel, to move part of the forces north of Prokhorovka to the rear of the 5th Guards Tank Army, for which the 11th Tank Division and the remaining units of the SS Tank Division Totenkopf were allocated (96 tanks, a motorized infantry regiment, up to 200 motorcyclists with the support of two divisions of assault guns ). The group broke through the battle formations of the 52nd Guards. rifle division and by 1 p.m. captured height 226.6.

But on the northern slopes of the heights, the Germans ran into stubborn resistance from the 95th Guards. rifle division of Colonel Lyakhov. The division was hastily reinforced with an anti-tank artillery reserve consisting of one IPTAP and two separate divisions of captured guns. Until 6 p.m., the division successfully defended itself against advancing tanks. But at 20:00, after a powerful air raid, due to the lack of ammunition and large losses of personnel, the division, under the attacks of approaching German motorized rifle units, retreated beyond the village of Polezhaev. Artillery reserves had already been deployed here, and the German offensive was stopped.

The 5th Guards Army also failed to complete its assigned tasks. Faced with massive fire from German artillery and tanks, the infantry units advanced forward to a distance of 1-3 km, after which they went on the defensive. In the offensive zones of the 1st Tank Army, 6th Guards. Army, 69th Army and 7th Guards. The army did not have a decisive success either.

Soviet self-propelled howitzer SU-122 in the Prokhorovsky bridgehead area. July 14, 1943.

Repairmen evacuate a damaged T-34 under enemy fire. Evacuation is carried out strictly according to instructions so that the frontal armor remains facing the enemy.

"Thirty-four" of plant No. 112 "Krasnoe Sormovo", somewhere near Oboyan. Most likely - 1st Tank Army, July 1943.

Thus, the so-called “tank battle of Prokhorovka” did not take place on any separate field, as was said before. The operation was carried out on a front with a length of 32-35 km and consisted of a series of separate battles using tanks on both sides. In total, according to estimates from the command of the Voronezh Front, 1,500 tanks and self-propelled guns from both sides took part in them. 5th Guards The tank army, operating in a zone 17-19 km long, together with the attached units, at the beginning of the battles numbered from 680 to 720 tanks and self-propelled guns, and the advancing German group - up to 540 tanks and self-propelled guns. In addition, from the south in the direction of st. Prokhorovka was led by the Kempf group, consisting of the 6th and 19th Panzer Divisions, which had about 180 tanks, which were opposed by 100 Soviet tanks. In the battles of July 12 alone, the Germans lost to the west and southwest of Prokhorovka, according to reports from the front command, about 320 tanks and assault guns (according to other sources - from 190 to 218), the Kempf group - 80 tanks, and the 5th Guards. tank army (excluding the losses of General Trufanov’s group) - 328 tanks and self-propelled guns (total losses of materiel of the 5th Guards Tank Army with attached units reached 60%). Despite the large concentration of tanks on both sides, the main losses to tank units were inflicted not by enemy tanks, but by enemy anti-tank and assault artillery.

T-34 tanks destroyed during the Soviet counteroffensive near Prokhorovka.

"Panther", hit by a gun from ml. Sergeant Egorov at the Prokhorovsky bridgehead.

The counterattack of the troops of the Voronezh Front did not end in the destruction of the wedged German group and therefore was considered a failure immediately after completion, but since it allowed the German offensive to bypass the cities of Oboyan and Kursk to be thwarted, its results were later considered a success. In addition, it is necessary to take into account the fact that the number of German tanks participating in the battle and their losses, given in the report of the command of the Voronezh Front (commander N. Vatutin, member of the military sonnet - N. Khrushchev), are very different from the reports of the unit commanders. From this we can conclude that the scale of the “Prokhorov Battle” could have been greatly inflated by the front command in order to justify the large losses of personnel and equipment during the failed offensive.

German T-34 of the Das Reich division, shot down by the crew of Sergeant Kurnosov’s gun. Prokhorovskoe eg. July 14-15, 1943

The best armor-piercing soldiers of the 6th Guards. armies that knocked out 7 enemy tanks.

Fighting east of Belgorod

N The battles against the German army group “Kempf” in the defense zone of the 7th Guards Army were less fierce. This direction was not considered the main one, and therefore the organization and density of anti-tank guns along the 1 km front were lower than on the Belgorod-Kursk front. It was believed that the Northern Donets River and the railway embankment would play a role in the defense of the army line.

On July 5, the Germans deployed three infantry and three tank divisions in the Grafovka, Belgorod sector and, under the cover of aviation, began to cross the North. Donets. In the afternoon, their tank units launched an offensive in the Razumnoye, Krutoy Log sector in the eastern and northeastern directions. An anti-tank stronghold located in the Krutoy Log area repelled two large tank attacks by the end of the day, knocking out 26 tanks (of which 7 were previously blown up by mines and landmines). On July 6, the Germans again advanced in the north east direction. To strengthen the 7th Guards Army, the front command reassigned four rifle divisions to it. From the army reserve, the 31st IPTAB and the 114th Guards IPTAP were transferred to it. To cover the junction between the 6th and 7th Guards armies, the 131st and 132nd separate battalions of anti-tank rifles were deployed.

The most difficult situation developed in the Yastrebovo area, where the enemy concentrated up to 70 tanks and launched an attack along the river bed. Reasonable. The 1849th IPTAP that arrived here did not have time to turn around before the approach of the German troops, and then the commander put forward the second battery for a surprise flank attack on the moving tanks. Hiding behind buildings, the battery approached the tank column at a distance of 200-500 m and, with sudden flank fire, set fire to six tanks and destroyed two tanks. Then, for an hour and a half, the battery repelled tank attacks, maneuvering between buildings, and retreated only on the orders of the regiment commander, when the regiment prepared for battle. By the end of the day, the regiment repelled four large tank attacks, knocking out 32 tanks and self-propelled guns. The regiment's losses amounted to up to 20% of its personnel.

German motorized unit on the offensive in the Belgorod area.

To strengthen the defense, the brigade commander also sent the 1853rd IPTAP to Yastrebovo, which was located in the second echelon behind the 1849th.

On July 7, the Germans brought up their artillery here, and after a powerful air raid and artillery barrage (from 9:00 to 12:00), their tanks went on the attack under the cover of a barrage of fire. Now their attack was carried out in two directions - along the river. Reasonable (a group of more than 100 tanks, self-propelled guns and other armored combat vehicles) and a frontal attack from a height of 207.9 in the direction of Myasoedovo (up to 100 tanks). The infantry cover abandoned Yastrebovo, and the artillery regiments were put in a difficult position, as the infiltrated enemy infantry began to fire at the battery positions from the flank and rear. Since the flanks were exposed, the enemy managed to capture two batteries (3rd and 4th), and they had to retreat back, defending themselves from both tanks and infantry. However, the breakthrough on the left flank was localized by the 1853rd IPTAP stationed in the second echelon. Soon units of the 94th Guards arrived. page of the division, and the situation, which was rocking, was saved. But by evening, the infantry, which did not have time to gain a foothold, was hit by a powerful air strike and, after being bombarded by artillery, abandoned Yastrebovo and Sevryukovo. The 1849th and 1853rd IPTAP, which suffered heavy losses in the morning, were unable to hold back the German tanks and infantry that rushed after our fleeing infantry, and retreated in battle, also taking with them all the damaged guns.

Anti-tank self-propelled guns "Marder-lll" follow the streets of Kharkov.

German anti-aircraft gunners cover the crossing of the Donets. July 1943

From July 8 to July 10, the fighting in this area was of a local nature, and it seemed that the Germans were exhausted. But on the night of July 11, they launched a surprise attack from the Melekhovo area to the north and northwest with the goal of breaking through to Prokhorovka. The infantry units of the 9th Guards and 305th Rifle Divisions defending in this direction, who did not expect such a powerful blow, retreated. To cover the exposed section of the front, on the night of July 11-12, the 10th IPTABr was transferred from the Headquarters reserve. In addition, the 1510th IPTAP and a separate anti-tank rifle battalion were involved in this area. These forces, together with infantry units of the 35th Guards. page of the corps, did not allow us to develop an offensive in the direction of the station. Prokhorovka. In this area, the Germans managed to break through only as far as the Sev River. Donets.

The last major offensive operation was carried out by German troops on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge on July 14-15, when, with counter attacks on Shakhovo from the Ozerovsky and Shchelokovo areas, they tried to encircle and destroy our units defending in the triangle of Teterevino, Druzhny, Shchelokovo.

"Tiger" on the street of Belgorod. July 1943

"Tigers" in the battle for the village. Maksimovka. Belgorod eg.

Soviet intelligence officers in an ambush at a destroyed Marder III self-propelled gun.

The German troops, which went on the offensive on the morning of July 14, managed to encircle some units of the 2nd Guards. because and the 69th Army, but the troops not only held most of the previously occupied positions, but even constantly counterattacked (2nd Guards Tank). It was not possible to destroy the encircled group before July 15, and by dawn it minimal losses went to the location of her troops.

The defensive battle lasted two weeks (from July 5 to July 18) and achieved its goal: to stop and bleed the German troops and preserve their own forces for the offensive.

According to reports and reports on the action of artillery on the Kursk Bulge, during the period of defensive battles, all types of ground artillery knocked out and destroyed 1,861 enemy combat vehicles (including tanks, self-propelled guns, assault guns, heavy cannon armored vehicles and cannon armored personnel carriers).

Repairmen are restoring a damaged tank. Field repair team of Lieutenant Shchukin. July 1943

Offensive operation in the Oryol direction

ABOUT The peculiarity of the offensive near Kursk was that it was carried out on a wide front by large forces of three fronts (Central, Voronezh and Steppe), with the participation of the left wing of the Western and Bryansk fronts.

Geographically, the offensive of the Soviet troops was divided into the Oryol offensive operation (the left wing of the Western, as well as the Central and Bryansk fronts) and the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (Voronezh and Steppe fronts). The Oryol offensive operation began on July 12, 1943 with an attack from the Western and Bryansk fronts, which were joined by the Central on July 15. The main defensive line of Army Group Center on the Oryol salient had a depth of about 5-7 km. It consisted of strong points interconnected by a network of trenches and communication passages. In front of the front edge, wire barriers were installed in 1-2 rows of wooden stakes, reinforced in critical directions with wire fences on metal posts or Bruno spirals. There were also anti-tank and anti-personnel minefields. A large number of machine-gun armored caps were installed in the main directions, from which dense crossfire could be conducted. All settlements were adapted for all-round defense, and anti-tank obstacles were erected along the banks of the rivers. However, many engineering structures were not completed, since the Germans did not believe in the possibility of a widespread offensive by Soviet troops on this section of the front.

Soviet infantrymen are mastering the English Universal armored personnel carrier. Oryol eg. August 1943

To carry out the offensive operation, the General Staff prepared the following strike groups:
- at the northwestern tip of the Oryol ledge, at the confluence of the Zhizdra and Resseta rivers (50th Army and 11th Guards Army);
- in the northern part of the ledge, near the city of Volkhov (61st Army and 4th Tank Army);
- in the eastern part of the ledge, east of Orel (3rd Army, 63rd Army and 3rd Guards Tank Army);
- in the southern part, near the station. Ponyri (13th, 48th, 70th armies and 2nd tank army).

The forces of the advancing fronts were opposed by the German 2nd Tank Army, 55th, 53rd and 35th Army Corps. According to domestic intelligence data, they had (including army reserves) up to 560 tanks and self-propelled guns. The first echelon divisions had 230-240 tanks and self-propelled guns. The group operating against the Central Front included three tank divisions: the 18th, 9th and 2nd. located in the offensive zone of our 13th Army. There were no German tank units in the offensive zone of the 48th and 70th armies. The attackers had absolute superiority in manpower, artillery, tanks and aviation. In the main directions, the superiority in infantry was up to 6 times, in artillery up to 5...6 times, in tanks - up to 2.5...3 times. German tank and anti-tank units were significantly weakened in previous battles and therefore did not offer much resistance. The rapid transition of Soviet troops from defense to a large-scale offensive did not give German troops the opportunity to reorganize and complete repair and restoration work. According to reports from the advancing units of the 13th Army, all captured German field repair shops were filled with damaged military equipment.

T-34s, equipped with PT-3 mine trawls, are moving towards the front. July-August 1943

A German RaK 40 anti-tank gun fires at attacking Soviet tanks. Scissors for cutting barbed wire are attached to the gun shield. August 1943

A unit of tank destroyers and assault guns on vacation.

Soviet tank of the 22nd Tank Brigade. enters a burning village. Voronezh Front.

German tank PzKpfw IV Ausf H, knocked out by a Glagolev gun. Oryol, for example, August 1943.

On the morning of July 12, at 5:10, immediately after the rain, the Soviet command launched air and artillery preparations, and at 5:40 the assault on the Oryol ledge from the north and northeast began. By 10:00 the main defensive line of German troops was broken through in three places, and units of the 4th Panzer Army entered the breakthrough. However, by 16:00 the German command was able to regroup its forces and, having withdrawn a number of units from under the station. Ponyri, stop the development of the Soviet offensive. By the evening of the first day of the offensive, Soviet troops were able to advance 10-12 km in the north-west, and up to 7.5 km in the north. In the eastern direction, progress was insignificant.

The next day, the northwestern group was sent to destroy large strongholds in the villages of Staritsa and Ulyanovo. Using a smoke screen and demonstrating an attack with. An oxbow from the north, the advancing units secretly bypassed populated areas and launched a tank attack from the southeast and west. Despite the good supply of settlements, the enemy garrison was completely destroyed. In this battle, the engineering assault search units performed best, skillfully “smoking out” German firing points in houses with flamethrowers. At this time in the village. The advancing troops in Ulyanovsk with false attacks pulled the entire German garrison to the western outskirts, which made it possible to almost unhinderedly break into the village in tanks from the side of the village. Old woman. During the liberation of this important stronghold, losses on the part of the attackers were small (only ten people were killed).

With the elimination of these centers of resistance, the path to the south and southeast was opened for our troops. The troops advancing in these directions created a threat to German communications between Orel and Bryansk. In two days of fighting, but according to the testimony of prisoners, the German 211th and 293rd infantry divisions were practically destroyed, and the 5th Panzer Division, which had suffered heavy losses, was withdrawn to the rear. The defense of the German troops was broken through at a front of 23 km and to a depth of 25 km. However, the German command competently operated with the available reserves, and by July 14 the offensive in this sector was suspended. The fighting took on a positional character.

The troops of the 3rd Army and the 3rd Guards Tank Army, advancing on Orel from the east, successfully crossed several water obstacles and, bypassing pockets of resistance, tried to break through to Orel on the move. By the time of entry into battle on July 18. 3rd Guards The tank army had 475 T-34 tanks, 224 T-70 tanks, 492 guns and mortars. They created a serious danger for the German troops of cutting their group in half, and therefore anti-tank reserves were brought in against them on the evening of July 19.

Soldiers and commanders of the engineer assault brigade who distinguished themselves in the battles for Oryol.

The N-2-P pontoon park is moving towards the front. Oryol eg.

“Forward to Orel!” Heavy 203-mm howitzers B-4 on the march.

However, since the front was broken through in a wide area, the actions of the German command were reminiscent of patching up holes in Trishka’s caftan, and were ineffective.

On July 22, the advanced units of the 61st Army broke into Volkhov, improving the position of the troops of the Bryansk Front. At the same time, the troops of the 11th Guards. The armies cut the Bolkhov-Orel highway, creating a threat of encirclement for the German Bolkhov group.

At this time, the 63rd Army and units of the 3rd Guards. The tank army fought heavy battles with the German 3rd Tank Division, transferred from Novo-Sokolniki, and units of the 2nd Tank and 36th Mechanized Divisions, transferred from near Ponyri. Particularly heavy fighting took place in the Zusha-Oleshnya interfluve, where the Germans had a well-prepared defensive line, which they tried to occupy with suitable forces. The troops of the 3rd Army immediately captured a bridgehead on the banks of the river. Oleshnya in the Aleksandrov area, where the transfer of tanks of the 3rd Guards began. tank army. But south of Aleksandrovka the offensive was unsuccessful. It was especially difficult to fight against German tanks and assault guns buried in the ground. However, by July 19, our troops reached the river. Oleshnya along its entire length. On the night of July 19 along the German defense line on the river. Oleshnya was subjected to a heavy air raid, and in the morning artillery preparation began. At noon, Oleshnya was crossed in several places, which created a threat of encirclement of the entire Mnensky group of Germans, and on July 20 they left the city almost without a fight.

On July 15, units of the Central Front also switched to offensive action, taking advantage of the withdrawal of part of the German forces from near Ponyri. But until July 18, the successes of the Central Front were rather modest. Only on the morning of July 19, the Central Front broke through the German defense line 3...4 km in the northwest direction, bypassing Orel. At 11 o'clock the tanks of the 2nd Tank Army were introduced into the breakthrough.

The SU-122 crew receives a combat mission. North of Orel, August 1943.

SU-152 of Major Sankovsky, which destroyed 10 German tanks in the first battle. 13th Army, August 1943

It is interesting to note that the artillery pieces transferred to the tank forces for reinforcement were towed by some of the advancing tanks of the 16th Tank. (for which the tanks were equipped with tow hooks), and their crews were tank landings. The unity of ammunition for tank and anti-tank guns helped to cope with the problem of ammunition supply for the guns, and most of the ammunition was transported by standard tractors (Studebaker, GMC, ZiS-5 vehicles and the STZ-Nati tractor) and was used by both artillerymen and and tank crews. Such organizations helped to effectively use artillery and tanks when overcoming enemy fortified points. But they didn’t have much time to shoot at tanks. The main targets of Soviet tanks and anti-tank artillery were armored machine guns, anti-tank guns and German self-propelled guns. However, 3rd Tk. the same 2nd Tank Army used the attached anti-tank and light artillery illiterately. The regiments of the central brigade were assigned to tank brigades, which split them into battlefields and transferred them to tank battalions. This destroyed the leadership of the brigade, leading to the fact that the batteries were left to their own devices. The commanders of the tank battalions demanded that the batteries accompany the tanks under their own power in their battle formations, which led to unjustifiably large losses of materiel and personnel of the 2nd IPTABr (trucks in the battle formations of tanks were easy prey for all types of weapons). Yes, and the 3rd shopping mall itself. suffered heavy losses in the Trosna area, trying, without reconnaissance and artillery support, to attack head-on the fortified positions of German grenadiers, reinforced with anti-tank self-propelled guns and assault guns. The advance of the Central Front developed slowly. To speed up the advance of front units and due to large losses in tanks, on July 24-26, the Headquarters transferred the 3rd Guards. tank army from the Bryansk Front to the Central Front. However, by this time the 3rd Guards. The tank army also suffered heavy losses and therefore was unable to seriously influence the speed of the front's advance. On July 22-24, the most difficult situation was created for the German troops defending near Orel. To the west of Volkhov, Soviet troops created the greatest threat to the main communications of German troops. On July 26, a special meeting was held at Hitler’s headquarters on the situation of German troops on the Oryol bridgehead. As a result of the meeting, a decision was made to withdraw all German troops from the Oryol bridgehead beyond the Hagen Line. However, the retreat had to be delayed as much as possible due to the unpreparedness of the defense line in engineering terms. However, on July 31, the Germans began a systematic withdrawal of their troops from the Oryol bridgehead.

To enlarge - click on the image

On the first days of August, battles began for the outskirts of the city of Orel. On August 4, the 3rd and 63rd armies fought in the eastern outskirts of the city. From the south, Oryol was surrounded by mobile formations of the Central Front, which put the defending German troops in a difficult situation and forced an urgent retreat. By August 5, the fighting in the city moved to the western outskirts, and on August 6 the city was completely liberated.

At the final stage of the struggle for the Oryol bridgehead, battles unfolded for the city of Karachev, covering the approaches to Bryansk. The fighting for Karachev began on August 12. Engineering units played an important role during the offensive here, restoring and clearing roads destroyed by German troops during the retreat. By the end of August 14, our troops broke through the German defenses east and northeast of Karachev and captured the city the next day. With the release of Karachev, the liquidation of the Oryol group was practically completed. By August 17-18, the advancing Soviet troops reached the Hagen line.

WITH it is read that the offensive on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge began on August 3, but this is not entirely true. As early as July 16, German troops located in the area of ​​the Prokhorovsky bridgehead, fearing flank attacks by Soviet troops, began to retreat to their original positions under the cover of powerful rearguards. But Soviet troops were unable to immediately begin pursuing the enemy. Only on July 17, units of the 5th Guards. army and 5th Guards. tank armies were able to shoot down the rear guards and advance 5-6 km. On July 18-19 they were joined by the 6th Guards. army and 1st tank army. The tank units advanced 2-3 km, but the infantry did not follow the tanks. In general, the advance of our troops these days was insignificant. On July 18, all available forces of the Steppe Front under the command of General Konev were to be brought into battle. However, before the end of July 19, the front was regrouping its forces. Only on July 20 did the front forces, consisting of five combined arms armies, manage to advance 5-7 km.

On July 22, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts launched a general offensive and by the end of the next day, having broken through the German barriers, they basically reached the positions that our troops occupied before the start of the German offensive on July 5. However, further advance of the troops was stopped by German reserves.

Headquarters demanded that the offensive be continued immediately, but its success required a regrouping of forces and replenishment of personnel and materiel. After listening to the arguments of the front commanders, Headquarters postponed the further offensive by 8 days. In total, by the beginning of the second phase of the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation, there were 50 rifle divisions in the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts. 8 tank corps, 3 mechanized corps and, in addition, 33 tank brigades, several separate tank regiments and self-propelled artillery regiments. Despite the regrouping and replenishment, the tank and artillery units were not fully staffed. The situation was somewhat better at the Voronezh Front, in the zone of which more powerful counterattacks by German troops were expected. Thus, at the beginning of the counteroffensive, the 1st Tank Army had 412 T-34, 108 T-70, 29 T-60 tanks (549 in total). 5th Guards The tank army at the same time consisted of 445 tanks of all types and 64 armored vehicles.

Artillerymen of a fighter brigade (combined arms type) pursue a retreating enemy.

The offensive began at dawn on August 3 with a powerful artillery barrage. At 8 am, infantry and breakthrough tanks went on the offensive. German artillery fire was indiscriminate. Our aviation reigned supreme in the air. By 10 o'clock the advanced units of the 1st Tank Army crossed the Worksla River. In the first half of the day, infantry units advanced 5...6 km, and the front commander, General Vatutin, brought the main forces of the 1st and 5th Guards into battle. tank armies. By the end of the day, units of the 1st Tank Army had advanced 12 km into the German defense and approached Tomarovka. Here they encountered powerful anti-tank defense and were temporarily stopped. Units of the 5th Guards. The tank army advanced significantly further - up to 26 km and reached the Good Will area.

In a more difficult situation, units of the Steppe Front advanced north of Belgorod. Without such reinforcement means as the Voronezh one, its offensive developed more slowly, and by the end of the day, even after the tanks of the 1st Mechanized Corps were brought into battle, units of the Steppe Front advanced only 7...8 km.

On August 4 and 5, the main efforts of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts were aimed at eliminating the Tomarov and Belgorod corners of resistance. On the morning of August 5, units of the 6th Guards. The armies began fighting for Tomarovka and by evening cleared it of German troops. The enemy actively counterattacked in groups of 20-40 tanks with the support of assault guns and motorized infantry, but to no avail. By the morning of August 6, the Tomarov resistance center was cleared of German troops. At this time, the mobile group of the Voronezh Front advanced 30-50 km deep into the enemy’s defenses, creating a threat of encirclement for the defending troops.

On August 5, troops of the Voronezh Front began fighting for Belgorod. Troops of the 69th Army entered the city from the north. Having crossed the Northern Donets, the troops of the 7th Guards reached the eastern outskirts. army, and from the west Belgorod was bypassed by the mobile formations of the 1st mechanized corps. By 18:00 the city was completely cleared of German troops, and a large amount of abandoned German equipment and ammunition was captured.

The liberation of Belgorod and the destruction of the Tomarov resistance center allowed the advancing mobile groups of the Voronezh Front, consisting of the 1st and 5th Guards. tank armies to move into operational space. By the end of the third day of the offensive, it became clear that the rate of advance of the Soviet troops on the Southern Front was significantly higher than the Orel floor. But for the successful offensive of the Steppe Front he did not have enough tanks. By the end of the day, at the request of the command of the Steppe Front and a representative of the Headquarters, the front was allocated 35 thousand people, 200 T-34 tanks, 100 T-70 tanks and 35 KV-lc tanks for replenishment. In addition, the front was reinforced with two engineering brigades and four regiments of self-propelled artillery.

Grenadier after the battle. August 1943

On the night of August 7, Soviet troops attacked the German resistance center in Borisovka and took it by noon the next day. In the evening our troops took Grayvoron. Here intelligence reported that a large column of German troops was moving towards the city. The artillery commander of the 27th Army ordered that all available artillery weapons be deployed to destroy the column. More than 30 large-caliber guns and a battalion of rocket-propelled mortars suddenly opened fire on the column, while new guns were hastily installed in positions and started firing. The blow was so unexpected that many German vehicles were abandoned in perfect working order. In total, more than 60 guns of caliber from 76 to 152 mm and about 20 rocket launchers took part in the shelling. More than five hundred corpses, as well as up to 50 tanks and assault guns, were left behind by German troops. According to the testimony of prisoners, these were the remnants of the 255th, 332nd, 57th Infantry Divisions and parts of the 19th Tank Division. During the fighting on August 7, the Borisov group of German troops ceased to exist.

On August 8, the right-flank 57th Army of the Southwestern Front was transferred to the Steppe Front, and on August 9, the 5th Guards was also transferred. tank army. The main direction of advance of the Steppe Front was now to bypass the Kharkov group of German troops. At the same time, the 1st Tank Army received orders to cut the main railways and highways leading from Kharkov to Poltava, Krasnograd and Lozovaya.

By the end of August 10, the 1st Tank Army managed to capture the Kharkov-Poltava railway, but its further advance to the south was stopped. However, Soviet troops approached Kharkov to a distance of 8-11 km, threatening the communications of the Kharkov defensive group of German troops.

A StuG 40 assault gun, knocked out by a Golovnev gun. Okhtyrka area.

Soviet self-propelled guns SU-122 in the attack on Kharkov. August 1943.

Anti-tank gun RaK 40 on a trailer near an RSO tractor, left after artillery shelling near Bogodukhov.

T-34 tanks with infantry troops in the attack on Kharkov.

In order to somehow improve the situation, on August 11 German troops launched a counterattack in the Bogodukhovsky direction against units of the 1st Panzer Army with a hastily assembled group, which included the 3rd Panzer Division and units of the SS tank divisions Totenkopf and Das Reich " and "Viking". This blow significantly slowed down the pace of advance not only of the Voronezh Front, but also of the Steppe Front, since some of the units had to be taken from the latter to form an operational reserve. By August 12, in the Valkovsky direction south of Bogodukhov, the Germans constantly attacked with tank and motorized infantry units, but were unable to achieve decisive success. How they failed to recapture the Kharkov-Poltava railway. To strengthen the 1st Tank Army, which by August 12 consisted of only 134 tanks (instead of 600), the battered 5th Guards was also transferred to the Bogodukhovskoe direction. tank army, which included 115 serviceable tanks. On August 13, during the fighting, the German formation managed to somewhat wedge itself into the junction between the 1st Tank Army and the 5th Guards. tank army. The anti-tank artillery of both armies ceased to exist, and the commander of the Voronezh Front, Gen. Vatutin decided to bring the reserves of the 6th Guards into battle. army and all the reinforcement artillery, which deployed south of Bogodukhov.

On August 14, the intensity of German tank attacks subsided, while units of the 6th Guards. The armies achieved significant success, advancing 4-7 km. But the next day, German troops, having regrouped their forces, broke through the defense line of the 6th Tank Corps and went to the rear of the 6th Guards. army, which was forced to retreat to the north and go on the defensive. The next day, the Germans tried to build on their success in the 6th Guards zone. army, but all their efforts came to nothing. During the Bogodukhov operation against enemy tanks, the Petlyakov dive bombers performed especially well, and at the same time, the insufficient effectiveness of the Ilyushin attack aircraft was noted (by the way, the same results were noted during defensive battles on the northern front).

The crew is trying to right the overturned PzKpfw III Ausf M tank. SS Panzer Division "Das Reich".

German troops retreat across the Donets River. August 1943

T-34 tanks destroyed in the Akhtyrka area.

Soviet troops are moving towards Kharkov.

The Steppe Front had the task of destroying the Kharkov defensive unit and liberating Kharkov. Front commander I. Konev, having received intelligence information about the defensive structures of German troops in the Kharkov region, decided to destroy, if possible, the German group on the approaches to the city and prevent the withdrawal of German tank troops into the city limits. On August 11, the advanced units of the Steppe Front approached the outer defensive perimeter of the city and began its assault. But only the next day, after all the artillery reserves had been brought in, was it possible to somewhat penetrate it. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the 5th Guards. The tank army was involved in repelling the German snowflakes in the Bogodukhov area. There were not enough tanks, but thanks to the actions of the artillery, on August 13, the 53rd, 57th, 69th and 7th Guards. The armies broke through the outer defensive perimeter and approached the suburbs.

Between August 13-17, Soviet troops began fighting on the outskirts of Kharkov. The fighting did not stop at night. Soviet troops suffered heavy losses. So, in some regiments of the 7th Guards. The army on August 17 numbered no more than 600 people. The 1st Mechanized Corps had only 44 tanks (less than the size of the tank brigade), more than half were light. But the defending side also suffered heavy losses. According to the reports of prisoners, in some companies of the units of the Kempf group defending in Kharkov there were 30...40 people left.

German artillerymen fire from an IeFH 18 howitzer at advancing Soviet troops. Kharkov direction, August 1943

Studebakers with ZIS-3 anti-tank guns on a trailer follow the advancing troops. Kharkov direction.

The Churchill heavy tank of the 49th Guards Heavy Tank Regiment of the 5th Tank Army breakthrough follows a broken eight-wheeled armored car SdKfz 232. On the side of the tank’s turret is the inscription “For Radianska Ukraine.” Kharkov direction, July-August 1943.

Scheme of the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation.

To enlarge - click on the image

On August 18, German troops made another attempt to stop the troops of the Voronezh Front, striking north of Akhtyrka on the flank of the 27th Army. The attack force included the Grossdeutschland motorized division, transferred from near Bryansk. The 10th motorized division, parts of the 11th and 19th tank divisions and two separate battalions of heavy tanks. The group consisted of about 16 thousand soldiers, 400 tanks, about 260 guns. The group was opposed by units of the 27th Army consisting of approx. 15 thousand soldiers, 30 tanks and up to 180 guns. To repel a counterattack, up to 100 tanks and 700 guns could be brought in from neighboring areas. However, the command of the 27th Army was late in assessing the timing of the offensive of the Akhtyrka group of German troops, and therefore the transfer of reinforcements began already during the German counteroffensive that had begun.

On the morning of August 18, the Germans carried out a strong artillery barrage and launched an attack on the positions of the 166th division. Until 10 o'clock the division's artillery successfully repelled attacks by German tanks, but after 11 o'clock, when the Germans brought up to 200 tanks into battle, the division's artillery was disabled and the front was broken through. By 13 o'clock the Germans had broken through to the division headquarters, and by the end of the day they had advanced in a narrow wedge to a depth of 24 km in a south-easterly direction. To localize the attack, the 4th Guards were introduced. tank corps and units of the 5th Guards. tank corps, which attacked the group that had broken through to the flank and rear.

The Br-2 long-range 152 mm gun is preparing to open fire on retreating German troops.

German artillerymen repulse an attack by Soviet troops.
Despite the fact that the attack by the Akhtyrka group was stopped, it greatly slowed down the advance of the troops of the Voronezh Front and complicated the operation to encircle the Kharkov group of German troops. Only on August 21-25 the Akhtyrsk group was destroyed and the city was liberated.

Soviet artillery enters Kharkov.

T-34 tank on the outskirts of Kharkov.

"Panther", knocked out by a crew of Guards. senior sergeant Parfenov on the outskirts of Kharkov.

While the troops of the Voronezh Front were fighting in the Bogodukhov area, the advanced units of the Steppe Front approached Kharkov. On August 18, troops of the 53rd Army began fighting for a heavily fortified forest area on the northwestern outskirts of the city. The Germans turned it into a fortified area, stuffed with machine gun emplacements and anti-tank guns. All attempts by the army to break through the massif into the city were repulsed. Only with the onset of darkness, having moved all the artillery to open positions, the Soviet troops managed to knock down the defenders from their positions, and by the morning of August 19 they reached the Uda River and began crossing in some places.

Due to the fact that most of the retreat routes of the German group from Kharkov were cut off, and the threat of complete encirclement loomed over the group itself, in the afternoon of August 22, the Germans began to withdraw their units from the city limits. However, all attempts by Soviet troops to break into the city were met with dense artillery and machine-gun fire from units left in the rearguard. In order to prevent German troops from withdrawing combat-ready units and serviceable equipment, the commander of the Steppe Front gave the order to conduct a night assault. Huge masses of troops were concentrated in a small area adjacent to the city, and at 2 a.m. on August 23 they began the assault.

“Tamed” “Panther” on the street of liberated Kharkov. August-September 1943

Total losses of tank armies during offensive operations

Note: The first number is tanks and self-propelled guns of all brands, in brackets - T-34

Irreversible losses amounted to up to 31% for T-34 tanks, and up to 43% of total losses for T-70 tanks. The sign “~” marks very contradictory data obtained indirectly.

Units of the 69th Army were the first to rush into the city, followed by units of the 7th Guards Army. The Germans retreated, covered by strong rearguards, reinforced tanks and assault guns. At 4:30 a.m. the 183rd Division reached Dzerzhinsky Square, and by dawn the city was mostly liberated. But only in the afternoon did the fighting end on its outskirts, where the streets were clogged with equipment and weapons abandoned during the retreat. On the evening of the same day, Moscow saluted the liberators of Kharkov, but fighting continued for another week to destroy the remnants of the Kharkov defensive group. On August 30, residents of Kharkov celebrated the complete liberation of the city. The Battle of Kursk is over.

CONCLUSION

TO The Battle of Ur was the first battle of the Second World War, in which masses of tanks took part on both sides. The attackers tried to use them according to the traditional scheme - to break through defensive lines in narrow areas and further development offensive The defenders also relied on the experience of 1941-42. and initially used their tanks to carry out counterattacks designed to restore the difficult situation in certain sectors of the front.

However, this use of tank units was not justified, since both sides underestimated the increased power of their opponents' anti-tank defenses. The German troops were surprised by the high density of Soviet artillery and the good engineering preparation of the defense line. The Soviet command did not expect the high maneuverability of German anti-tank units, which quickly regrouped and met counterattacking Soviet tanks with well-aimed fire from ambushes even in the face of their own advance. As practice showed during the Battle of Kursk, the Germans achieved better results using tanks in the manner of self-propelled guns, firing at Soviet positions from a great distance, while infantry units stormed them. The defenders achieved better results by also using tanks “self-propelled”, firing from tanks buried in the ground.

Despite the high concentration of tanks in the armies of both sides, the main enemy of armored fighting vehicles remains anti-tank and self-propelled artillery. The total role of aviation, infantry and tanks in the fight against them was small - less than 25% of the total number of those shot down and destroyed.

However, it was the Battle of Kursk that became the event that prompted the development by both sides of new tactics for the use of tanks and self-propelled guns in the offensive and defensive.

Battle of Kursk, 1943

Since March 1943, the headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SHC) had been working on a strategic offensive plan, the task of which was to defeat the main forces of Army Group South and Center and crush enemy defenses on the front from Smolensk to the Black Sea. It was assumed that the Soviet troops would be the first to go on the offensive. However, in mid-April, based on information that the Wehrmacht command was planning to launch an offensive near Kursk, it was decided to bleed the German troops with a powerful defense and then launch a counteroffensive. Possessing strategic initiative, the Soviet side deliberately began military operations not with an offensive, but with a defense. The development of events showed that this plan was correct.

Since the spring of 1943, Nazi Germany has launched intense preparations for the offensive. The Nazis established mass production of new medium and heavy tanks and increased the production of guns, mortars and combat aircraft compared to 1942. Due to total mobilization, they almost completely made up for the losses suffered in personnel.

The fascist German command decided to conduct a major offensive operation in the summer of 1943 and again seize the strategic initiative. The idea of ​​the operation was to encircle and destroy Soviet troops in the Kursk salient with powerful counter strikes from the areas of Orel and Belgorod to Kursk. In the future, the enemy intended to defeat Soviet troops in the Donbass. To carry out the operation near Kursk, called “Citadel,” the enemy concentrated enormous forces and appointed the most experienced military leaders: 50 divisions, among others. 16 tanks, Army Group Center (commander Field Marshal G. Kluge) and Army Group South (commander Field Marshal E. Manstein). In total, the enemy strike forces included over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2,700 tanks and assault guns, and more than 2,000 aircraft. An important place in the enemy's plan was given to the use of new military equipment - Tiger and Panther tanks, as well as new aircraft (Focke-Wulf-190A fighters and Henschel-129 attack aircraft).

The Soviet command countered the offensive of fascist German troops against the northern and southern fronts of the Kursk ledge, which began on July 5, 1943, with a strong active defense. The enemy, attacking Kursk from the north, was stopped four days later. He managed to wedge 10-12 km into the defense of the Soviet troops. The group advancing on Kursk from the south advanced 35 km, but did not reach its goal.

On July 12, Soviet troops, having exhausted the enemy, launched a counteroffensive. On this day, in the area of ​​the Prokhorovka railway station, the largest oncoming tank battle of the Second World War took place (up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns on both sides). Developing the offensive, Soviet ground forces, supported by air strikes from the 2nd and 17th Air Armies, as well as long-range aviation, by August 23 pushed the enemy back 140-150 km to the west, liberating Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov.

The Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including 7 tank divisions, over 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns. The balance of forces at the front changed sharply in favor of the Red Army, which provided it with favorable conditions for the deployment of a general strategic offensive.

Having revealed the offensive plan of the fascist German command, the Supreme High Command Headquarters decided to exhaust and bleed the enemy’s strike forces through deliberate defense, and then complete their complete defeat with a decisive counteroffensive. The defense of the Kursk ledge was entrusted to the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts. Both fronts numbered more than 1.3 million people, up to 20 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3,300 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,650 aircraft. The troops of the Central Front (48, 13, 70, 65, 60th combined arms armies, 2nd tank army, 16th air army, 9th and 19th separate tank corps) under the command of General K. K. Rokossovsky should were to repel the enemy's attack from Orel. In front of the Voronezh Front (38th, 40th, 6th and 7th Guards, 69th Armies, 1st Tank Army, 2nd Air Army, 35th Guards Rifle Corps, 5th and 2nd Guards Tank Corps) , commanded by General N.F. Vatutin, was tasked with repelling the enemy’s attack from Belgorod. In the rear of the Kursk ledge, the Steppe Military District was deployed (from July 9 - Steppe Front: 4th and 5th Guards, 27th, 47th, 53rd Armies, 5th Guards Tank Army, 5th Air Army, 1 Rifle, 3 tank, 3 motorized, 3 cavalry corps), which was the strategic reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters.

Enemy troops: in the Oryol-Kursk direction - the 9th and 2nd armies of Army Group "Center" (50 divisions, including 16 motorized tank divisions; commander - Field Marshal G. Kluge), in the Belgorod-Kursk direction - 4th Panzer Army and Task Force Kempf of Army Group South (commander - Field Marshal General E. Manstein).

The commander of the central front considered Ponyri and Kursk the most likely direction of action for the enemy's main forces, and Maloarkhangelsk and Gnilets as auxiliary forces. Therefore, he decided to concentrate the main forces of the front on the right wing. The decisive massing of forces and assets in the direction of the expected enemy attack made it possible to create high densities in the 13th Army zone (32 km) - 94 guns and mortars, of which more than 30 anti-tank artillery guns, and about 9 tanks per 1 km of front.

The commander of the Voronezh Front determined that the enemy’s attack could be in the directions of Belgorod and Oboyan; Belgorod, Korocha; Volchansk, Novy Oskol. Therefore, it was decided to concentrate the main forces in the center and on the left wing of the front. Unlike the Central Front, the first-echelon armies received wide defense zones. However, even here, in the zone of the 6th and 7th Guards Armies, the density of anti-tank artillery was 15.6 guns per 1 km of front, and taking into account the assets located in the second echelon of the front, up to 30 guns per 1 km of front.

Based on our intelligence data and the testimony of prisoners, it was established that the enemy offensive would begin on July 5. Early in the morning of this day, artillery counter-preparation, planned in the fronts and armies, was carried out on the Voronezh and central fronts. As a result, it was possible to delay the enemy’s advance for 1.5 - 2 hours and somewhat weaken his initial blow.

On the morning of July 5, the Oryol enemy group, under the cover of artillery fire and with the support of aviation, went on the offensive, delivering the main blow to Olkhovatka, and auxiliary blows to Maloarkhangelsk and Fatezh. Our troops met the enemy with exceptional resilience. The Nazi troops suffered heavy losses. Only after the fifth attack did they manage to break into the front line of defense of the 29th Rifle Corps in the Olkhovat direction.

In the afternoon, the commander of the 13th Army, General N.P. Pukhov, moved several tank and self-propelled artillery units and mobile barrage units to the main line, and the front commander moved howitzer and mortar brigades to the Olkhovatka area. Decisive counterattacks by tanks in cooperation with rifle units and artillery stopped the enemy’s advance. On this day, fierce battles also broke out in the air. The 16th Air Army supported the fighting of the defending troops of the central front. By the end of the day, at the cost of huge losses, the enemy managed to advance 6-8 km in the Olkhovat direction. In other directions his attacks were unsuccessful.

Having determined the direction of the enemy's main efforts, the front commander decided on the morning of July 6 to launch a counterattack from the Olkhovatka area to Gnilusha in order to restore the position of the 13th Army. The 17th Guards Rifle Corps of the 13th Army, the 2nd Tank Army of General A.G. Rodin and the 19th Tank Corps were involved in the counterattack. As a result of the counterattack, the enemy was stopped in front of the second line of defense and, having suffered heavy losses, was unable to continue the offensive in all three directions in the following days. After the counterattack, the 2nd Tank Army and the 19th Tank Corps went on the defensive behind the second line, which strengthened the position of the troops of the Central Front.

On the same day, the enemy launched an offensive in the direction of Oboyan and Korocha; The main blows were taken by the 6th and 7th Guards, 69th Army and 1st Tank Army.

Having failed to achieve success in the Olkhovat direction, the enemy launched an attack on Ponyri on the morning of July 7, where the 307th Rifle Division was defending. During the day she repelled eight attacks. When enemy units broke into the northwestern outskirts of the Ponyri station, the division commander, General M.A. Enshin, concentrated artillery and mortar fire on them, then launched a counterattack with the forces of the second echelon and the attached tank brigade and restored the situation. On July 8 and 9, the enemy continued attacks on Olkhovatka and Ponyri, and on July 10, against the troops of the right flank of the 70th Army, but all his attempts to break through the second line of defense were thwarted.

Having exhausted their reserves, the enemy was forced to abandon the offensive and on July 11 went on the defensive.

German soldiers in front of a Tiger tank, during the Battle of Kursk in June-July 1943

The enemy also launched a general offensive against the troops of the Voronezh Front on the morning of July 5, delivering the main attack with the forces of the 4th Tank Army on Oboyan, and with the auxiliary operational group Kempf on Korocha. The fighting became especially fierce in the Oboyan direction. In the first half of the day, the commander of the 6th Guards Army, General I.M. Chistyakov, moved to the first line of defense part of the anti-tank artillery brigade, two tank and one self-propelled artillery regiments and a tank brigade. By the end of the day, the troops of this army inflicted heavy losses on the enemy and stopped his attacks. The main line of our defense was broken through only in certain areas. In the Korochan direction, the enemy managed to cross the Northern Donets south of Belgorod and seize a small bridgehead.

In the current situation, the front commander decided to cover the Oboyan direction. To this end, on the night of July 6, he moved the 1st Tank Army of General M.E. Katukov, as well as the 5th and 2nd Guards Tank Corps, operationally subordinate to the 6th Guards Army, to the second line of defense. In addition, the army was reinforced with front-line artillery.

On the morning of July 6, the enemy resumed the offensive in all directions. In the Oboyan direction, he repeatedly launched attacks from 150 to 400 tanks, but each time he met powerful fire from infantry, artillery and tanks. Only towards the end of the day did he manage to break into the second line of our defense.

On that day, in the Korochan direction, the enemy managed to complete the breakthrough of the main defense line, but his further advance was stopped.

Heavy German tanks "Tiger" (Panzerkampfwagen VI "Tiger I") at the attack line, south of Orel. Battle of Kursk, mid-July 1943

On July 7 and 8, the Nazis, bringing fresh reserves into the battle, again tried to break through to Oboyan, expand the breakthrough towards the flanks and deepen it in the direction of Prokhorovka. Up to 300 enemy tanks were rushing to the northeast. However, all enemy attempts were paralyzed by the active actions of the 10th and 2nd Tank Corps, advanced from the reserves of the Headquarters to the Prokhorovka area, as well as by the active actions of the 2nd and 17th Air Armies. In the Korochan direction, enemy attacks were also repulsed. The counterattack carried out on July 8 by formations of the 40th Army on the left flank of the enemy’s 4th Tank Army, and by units of the 5th and 2nd Guards Tank Corps on its left flank, significantly eased the position of our troops in the Oboyan direction.

From July 9 to July 11, the enemy brought additional reserves into the battle and at any cost sought to break through along the Belgorod highway to Kursk. The front command promptly deployed part of its artillery to help the 6th Guards and 1st Tank Armies. In addition, to cover the Oboyan direction, the 10th Tank Corps was regrouped from the Prokhorovka area and the main aviation forces were targeted, and the 5th Guards Tank Corps was regrouped to strengthen the right flank of the 1st Tank Army. Through the joint efforts of ground forces and aviation, almost all enemy attacks were repulsed. Only on July 9, in the Kochetovka area, enemy tanks managed to break through to the third line of our defense. But two divisions of the 5th Guards Army of the Steppe Front and advanced tank brigades of the 5th Guards Tank Army were advanced against them, which stopped the advance of enemy tanks.

SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf", Kursk, 1943.

There was clearly a crisis brewing in the enemy's offensive. Therefore, the chairman of the Supreme Command headquarters, Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky and the commander of the Voronezh Front, General N. F. Vatutin, decided on the morning of July 12 to launch a counterattack from the Prokhorovka area with the forces of the 5th Guards Army of General A. S. Zhdanov and the 5th Guards Tank Army of General P. A. Rotmistrov, as well as the forces of the 6th Guards and 1st Tank Armies in the general direction of Yakovlevo with the goal of the final defeat of the wedged enemy group. From the air, the counterattack was to be provided by the main forces of the 2nd and 17th air armies.

On the morning of July 12, the troops of the Voronezh Front launched a counterattack. The main events took place in the area of ​​the Prokhorovka railway station (on the Belgorod - Kursk line, 56 km north of Belgorod), where the largest oncoming tank battle of the Second World War took place between the advancing enemy tank group (4th Tank Army, Task Force Kempf ") and the Soviet troops that launched a counterattack (5th Guards Tank Army, 5th Guards Army). On both sides, up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns simultaneously participated in the battle. Air support for the enemy strike group was provided by aviation from Army Group South. Air strikes against the enemy were carried out by the 2nd Air Army, units of the 17th Air Army, and long-range aviation (about 1,300 sorties were carried out). During the day of battle, the enemy lost up to 400 tanks and assault guns, over 10 thousand people. Having failed to achieve the intended goal - to capture Kursk from the southeast, the enemy (advanced on the southern front of the Kursk ledge to a maximum of 35 km) went on the defensive.

On July 12, a turning point occurred in the Battle of Kursk. By order of the Supreme Command Headquarters, the troops of the Western and Bryansk Fronts went on the offensive in the Oryol direction. Hitler's command was forced to abandon offensive plans and on July 16 began to withdraw its troops to their original position. The troops of the Voronezh, and from July 18, the Steppe fronts began to pursue the enemy and by the end of July 23 they had mostly reached the line they occupied at the beginning of the defensive battle.

Source: I.S. Konev "Notes of the Front Commander, 1943-1945", Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1989.

The Oryol salient was defended by troops of the 2nd Tank and 9th Field Armies, which were part of the Center group. They consisted of 27 infantry, 10 tank and motorized divisions. Here the enemy created a strong defense, the tactical zone of which consisted of two stripes with a total depth of 12 - 15 km. They had a developed system of trenches, communication passages and a large number of armored firing points. A number of intermediate defensive lines were prepared in the operational depth. The total depth of its defense on the Oryol bridgehead reached 150 km.

The Oryol group of the enemy was ordered by the Supreme Command Headquarters to defeat the troops of the left wing of the Western Front and the main forces of the Bryansk and Central Fronts. The idea of ​​the operation was to cut the enemy group into separate parts and destroy it with counter strikes from the north, east and south in the general direction of Oryol.

The Western Front (commanded by General V.D. Sokolovsky) received the task of delivering the main blow with the troops of the 11th Guards Army from the area southwest of Kozelsk to Khotynets, preventing the withdrawal of Nazi troops from Orel to the west and, in cooperation with other fronts, destroying them; with part of the forces, together with the 61st Army of the Bryansk Front, encircle and destroy the Bolkhov enemy group; carry out an auxiliary strike by troops of the 50th Army on Zhizdra.

The Bryansk Front (commanded by General M. M. Popov) was supposed to deliver the main blow with the troops of the 3rd and 63rd armies from the Novosil area to Orel, and a secondary blow with the forces of the 61st Army to Bolkhov.

The Central Front had the task of eliminating the wedged enemy group north of Olkhovatka, subsequently developing an attack on Kromy and, in cooperation with the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts, completing the defeat of the enemy in the Oryol salient.

Preparations for the operation at the fronts were carried out taking into account the fact that they had to break through the enemy’s prepared and deeply echeloned defenses for the first time and develop tactical success at a high pace. For this purpose, a decisive massing of forces and means was carried out, the combat formations of troops were echeloned deeper, success development echelons were created in the armies, consisting of one or two tank corps, the offensive was to be carried out day and night.

For example, with the total width of the 11th Guards Army's offensive zone being 36 km, a decisive massing of forces and assets was achieved in the 14-kilometer breakthrough area, which ensured an increase in operational-tactical densities. The average artillery density in the army breakthrough area reached 185, and in the 8th Guards Rifle Corps - 232 guns and mortars per 1 km of front. If the divisions' offensive zones in the counteroffensive near Stalingrad fluctuated within 5 km, then in the 8th Guards Rifle Regiment they were narrowed to 2 km. What was new compared to the counteroffensive at Stalingrad was that the battle formation of rifle corps, divisions, regiments and battalions was formed, as a rule, in two and sometimes in three echelons. This ensured an increase in the force of the strike from the depths and the timely development of the emerging success.

Characteristic of the use of artillery was the creation in armies of destruction and long-range artillery groups, groups of guards mortars and anti-aircraft artillery groups. The artillery training schedule in some armies began to include a period of shooting and destruction.

There have been changes in the use of tanks. For the first time, self-propelled artillery regiments were included in the tank groups for direct support of infantry (NTS), which were supposed to advance behind the tanks and support their actions with the fire of their guns. Moreover, in some armies, NPP tanks were assigned not only to the rifle divisions of the first, but also to the second echelon of the corps. Tank corps constituted mobile army groups, and tank armies were intended to be used for the first time as mobile groups of fronts.

The combat operations of our troops were to be supported by more than 3 thousand aircraft of the 1st, 15th and 16th Air Armies (commanded by Generals M.M. Gromov, N.F. Naumenko, S.I. Rudenko) of the Western, Bryansk and Central Fronts, and also long-range aviation.

Aviation was entrusted with the following tasks: to cover the troops of strike groups of the fronts during the preparation and conduct of operations; suppress resistance centers at the front line and in the immediate depths and disrupt the enemy command and control system for the period of aviation training; from the beginning of the attack, continuously accompany the infantry and tanks; ensure the introduction of tank formations into battle and their operations in operational depth; fight against suitable enemy reserves.

The counter-offensive was preceded by a lot of preparatory work. On all fronts, the initial areas for the offensive were well equipped, troops were regrouped, and large reserves of material and technical resources were created. A day before the offensive, reconnaissance in force was carried out on the fronts by the forward battalions, which made it possible to clarify the true outline of the front line of the enemy’s defense, and in some areas to capture the front trench.

On the morning of July 12, after powerful air and artillery preparation, which lasted about three hours, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive. The greatest success was achieved in the direction of the main attack of the Western Front. By mid-day, the troops of the 11th Guards Army (commanded by General I. Kh. Bagramyan), thanks to the timely entry into battle of the second echelons of rifle regiments and separate tank brigades, broke through the main enemy defense line and crossed the Fomina River. In order to quickly complete the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical zone, on the afternoon of July 12, the 5th Tank Corps was introduced into the battle in the direction of Bolkhov. On the morning of the second day of the operation, the second echelons of rifle corps entered the battle, which, together with tank units, bypassing strong enemy strongholds, with the active support of artillery and aviation, completed the breakthrough of the second line of its defense by mid-July 13.

After completing the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defense zone, the 5th Tank Corps and its 1st Tank Corps, introduced into the breakthrough to the right, together with the advanced detachments of rifle formations, proceeded to pursue the enemy. By the morning of July 15, they reached the Vytebet River and crossed it on the move, and by the end of the next day they cut the Bolkhov-Khotynets road. To delay their advance, the enemy pulled up reserves and launched a series of counterattacks.

In this situation, the commander of the 11th Guards Army regrouped the 36th Guards Rifle Corps from the left flank of the army and moved here the 25th Tank Corps, transferred from the front reserve. Having repelled enemy counterattacks, the troops of the 11th Guards Army resumed the offensive and by July 19 advanced up to 60 km, expanding the breakthrough to 120 km and covering the left flank of the Bolkhov enemy group from the southwest.

In order to develop the operation, the Supreme High Command Headquarters strengthened the western front with the 11th Army (commanded by General I. I. Fedyuninsky). After a long march, on July 20, an incomplete army was immediately introduced into battle at the junction between the 50th and 11th Guards armies in the direction of Khvostovichi. In five days, she broke the stubborn resistance of the enemy and advanced 15 km.

In order to completely defeat the enemy and develop the offensive, the commander of the Western Front in the middle of the day on July 26 brought into battle in the zone of the 11th Guards Army the 4th Tank Army transferred to him from the Headquarters reserve (commander General V.M. Badanov).

Having an operational formation in two echelons, the 4th Tank Army, after a short artillery preparation with the support of aviation, launched an offensive on Bolkhov, and then struck at Khotynets and Karachev. In five days she advanced 12 - 20 km. She had to break through intermediate defensive lines previously occupied by enemy troops. Through its actions, the 4th Tank Army contributed to the 61st Army of the Bryansk Front in the liberation of Bolkhov.

On July 30, the troops of the left wing of the Western Front (11th Guards, 4th Tank, 11th Army and 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps) in connection with the preparation of the Smolensk offensive operation were transferred to the subordination of the Bryansk Front.

The offensive of the Bryansk Front developed much more slowly than that of the Western Front. The troops of the 61st Army under the command of General P. A. Belov, together with the 20th Tank Corps, broke through the enemy’s defenses and, repelling his counterattacks, liberated Bolkhov on July 29.

The troops of the 3rd and 63rd armies, with the 1st Guards Tank Corps introduced into the battle in the middle of the second day of the offensive, completed the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defense zone by the end of July 13. By July 18, they approached the Oleshnya River, where they encountered fierce enemy resistance at the rear defensive line.

In order to speed up the defeat of the enemy's Oryol group, the Supreme High Command Headquarters transferred the 3rd Guards Tank Army (commanded by General P. S. Rybalko) from its reserve to the Bryansk Front. On the morning of July 19, it, with the support of formations of the 1st and 15th Air Armies and long-range aviation, went on the offensive from the Bogdanovo-Podmaslovo line and, repelling strong counterattacks of the enemy, by the end of the day broke through its defenses on the Oleshnya River. On the night of July 20, the tank army, having regrouped, struck in the direction of Otrada, assisting the Bryansk Front in defeating the Mtsensk enemy group. On the morning of July 21, after a regrouping of forces, the army attacked Stanovoy Kolodez and captured it on July 26. The next day it was transferred to the Central Front.

The offensive of the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts forced the enemy to pull back part of the forces of the Oryol group from Kursk direction and thereby created a favorable environment for the troops of the right wing of the Central Front to launch a counteroffensive. By July 18, they had restored their previous position and continued to advance in the direction of Krom.

By the end of July, troops on three fronts captured the enemy’s Oryol group from the north, east and south. The fascist German command, trying to prevent the threat of encirclement, on July 30 began the withdrawal of all its troops from the Oryol bridgehead. Soviet troops began pursuit. On the morning of August 4, the troops of the left wing of the Bryansk Front broke into Oryol and by the morning of August 5 liberated it. On the same day, Belgorod was liberated by the troops of the Steppe Front.

Having captured Orel, our troops continued the offensive. On August 18 they reached the Zhizdra, Litizh line. As a result of the Oryol operation, 14 enemy divisions were defeated (including 6 tank divisions)

3. Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (August 3 - 23, 1943)

The Belgorod-Kharkov bridgehead was defended by the 4th Tank Army and the Kempf task force. They consisted of 18 divisions, including 4 tank divisions. Here the enemy created 7 defensive lines with a total depth of up to 90 km, as well as 1 contour around Belgorod and 2 around Kharkov.

The idea of ​​the Supreme High Command headquarters was to use powerful blows from troops from adjacent wings of the Voronezh and steppe fronts to cut the opposing enemy group into two parts, subsequently deeply envelop it in the Kharkov region and, in cooperation with the 57th Army of the Southwestern Front, destroy it.

The troops of the Voronezh Front delivered the main blow with the forces of two combined arms and two tank armies from the area northeast of Tomarovka to Bogodukhov, Valki, bypassing Kharkov from the west, an auxiliary attack, also by the forces of two combined arms armies, from the Proletarsky area in the direction of Boromlya, in order to cover the main groups from the West.

The steppe front under the command of General I. S. Konev delivered the main blow with troops of the 53rd and part of the forces of the 69th armies from the area north-west of Belgorod to Kharkov from the north, an auxiliary blow was delivered by the forces of the 7th Guards Army from the area south-east of Belgorod to west direction.

By decision of the commander of the Southwestern Front, General R. Ya. Malinovsky, the 57th Army launched a strike from the Martovaya area to Merefa, covering Kharkov from the southeast.

From the air, the offensive of the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts was ensured by the 2nd and 5th air armies of generals S.A. Krasovsky and S.K. Goryunov, respectively. In addition, part of the long-range aviation forces was involved.

To achieve success in breaking through the enemy’s defenses, the command of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts decisively massed forces and assets in the directions of their main attacks, which made it possible to create high operational densities. Thus, in the zone of the 5th Guards Army of the Voronezh Front, they reached 1.5 km per rifle division, 230 guns and mortars and 70 tanks and self-propelled guns per 1 km of front.

There were characteristic features in planning the use of artillery and tanks. Artillery destruction groups were created not only in armies, but also in corps operating in the main directions. Separate tank and mechanized corps were to be used as mobile army groups, and tank armies - as a mobile group of the Voronezh Front, which was new in the art of war.

The tank armies were planned to be brought into battle in the offensive zone of the 5th Guards Army. They were supposed to operate in the directions: 1st Tank Army - Bogodolov, 5th Guards Tank Army - Zolochev and by the end of the third or fourth day of the operation reach the Valka, Lyubotin area, thereby cutting off the retreat of the Kharkov enemy group to the west.

Artillery and engineering support The introduction of tank armies into battle was entrusted to the 5th Guards Army.

For aviation support Each tank army was allocated one assault and fighter aviation division.

In preparing for the operation, it was instructive to disinform the enemy about the true direction of the main attack of our troops. From July 28 to August 6, the 38th Army, operating on the right wing of the Voronezh Front, skillfully imitated the concentration of a large group of troops in the Sumy direction. The fascist German command not only began to bombard areas of false troop concentrations, but also kept a significant number of its reserves in this direction.

A special feature was that the operation was prepared in a limited time. Nevertheless, the troops of both fronts were able to prepare for the offensive and provide themselves with the necessary material resources.

Hiding behind destroyed enemy tanks, the soldiers move forward, Belgorod direction, August 2, 1943.

On August 3, after powerful artillery preparation and air strikes, front troops, supported by a barrage of fire, went on the offensive and successfully broke through the first enemy position. With the introduction of second echelons of regiments into battle, the second position was broken through. To increase the efforts of the 5th Guards Army, advanced tank brigades of the corps of the first echelon of tank armies were brought into battle. They, together with rifle divisions, completed the breakthrough of the enemy’s main defense line. Following the advanced brigades, the main forces of the tank armies were brought into battle. By the end of the day, they had overcome the second line of enemy defense and advanced 12 - 26 km in depth, thereby separating the Tomarov and Belgorod centers of enemy resistance.

Simultaneously with the tank armies, the following were introduced into the battle: in the zone of the 6th Guards Army - the 5th Guards Tank Corps, and in the zone of the 53rd Army - the 1st Mechanized Corps. They, together with rifle formations, broke the enemy’s resistance, completed the breakthrough of the main defensive line, and by the end of the day approached the second defensive line. Having broken through the tactical defense zone and destroyed the nearest operational reserves, the main strike group of the Voronezh Front began pursuing the enemy in the morning of the second day of the operation.

On August 4, troops of the 1st Tank Army from the Tomarovka area began to develop an offensive to the south. Its 6th Tank and 3rd Mechanized Corps, with reinforced tank brigades ahead, advanced 70 km by mid-day on August 6th. In the afternoon of the next day, the 6th Tank Corps liberated Bogodukhov.

The 5th Guards Tank Army, bypassing the enemy's centers of resistance from the west, struck at Zolochev and broke into the city on August 6.

By this time, the troops of the 6th Guards Army had captured the enemy’s strong defense center of Tomarovka, surrounded and destroyed his Borisov group. The 4th and 5th Guards Tank Corps played a major role in this. Developing the offensive in southwest direction, they bypassed the Borisov group of Germans from the west and east, and on August 7, with a swift blow, they broke into Grayvoron on the move, thereby cutting off the enemy’s escape routes to the west and south. This was facilitated by the actions of the auxiliary group of the Voronezh Front, which went on the offensive on the morning of August 5 in its direction.

The troops of the Steppe Front, having completed the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defense zone on August 4, captured Belgorod by storm by the end of the next day, after which they began to develop an offensive against Kharkov. By the end of August 7, the breakthrough front of our troops had reached 120 km. Tank armies advanced to a depth of 100 km, and combined arms armies - up to 60 - 65 km.

Kislov Photos

The troops of the 40th and 27th armies, continuing to develop the offensive, reached the Bromlya, Trostyanets, Akhtyrka line by August 11. A company of the 12th Guards Tank Brigade, led by Captain I.A. Tereshchuk, broke into Akhtyrka on August 10, where it was surrounded by the enemy. For two days, Soviet tank crews, without communication with the brigade, were in besieged tanks, repelling the fierce attacks of the Nazis who tried to capture them alive. Over two days of fighting, the company destroyed 6 tanks, 2 self-propelled guns, 5 armored cars and up to 150 enemy soldiers and officers. With two surviving tanks, Captain Tereshchuk fought out of the encirclement and returned to his brigade. For decisive and skillful actions in battle, Captain I. A. Tereshchuk was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

By August 10, the main forces of the 1st Tank Army reached the Merchik River. After capturing the city of Zolochev, the 5th Guards Tank Army was reassigned to the Steppe Front and began regrouping in the Bogodukhov area.

Advancing behind the tank armies, the troops of the 6th Guards Army reached northeast of Krasnokutsk by August 11, and the 5th Guards Army captured Kharkov from the west. By this time, the troops of the Steppe Front had approached the outer defensive perimeter of Kharkov from the north, and the 57th Army, transferred to this front on August 8, from the east and southeast.

The fascist German command, fearing the encirclement of the Kharkov group, by August 11 concentrated three tank divisions east of Bogodukhov (Reich, Death's Head, Viking) and on the morning of August 12 launched a counterattack on the advancing troops of the 1st Tank Army in the general direction on Bogodukhov. An oncoming tank battle unfolded. During its course, the enemy pushed back the formations of the 1st Tank Army by 3-4 km, but was unable to break through to Bogodukhov. On the morning of August 13, the main forces of the 5th Guards Tank, 6th and 5th Guards armies were brought into battle. The main forces of front-line aviation were also sent here. It conducted reconnaissance and carried out operations to disrupt the railway and road transport of the Nazis, assisted combined arms and tank armies in repelling counterattacks of the Nazi troops. By the end of August 17, our troops finally thwarted the enemy’s counterattack from the south on Bogodukhov.

Tankers and machine gunners of the 15th Guards Mechanized Brigade advance on the city of Amvrosievka, August 23, 1943.

However, the fascist German command did not abandon its plan. On the morning of August 18, it launched a counterattack from the Akhtyrka area with three tank and motorized divisions and broke through the front of the 27th Army. Against this enemy grouping, the commander of the Voronezh Front advanced the 4th Guards Army, transferred from the reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, the 3rd mechanized and 6th tank corps of the 1st Tank Army from the Bogodukhov area, and also used the 4th and 5th separate guards tank corps. These forces, by striking the enemy’s flanks by the end of August 19, stopped his advance from the west to Bogodukhov. Then the troops of the right wing of the Voronezh Front struck the rear of the Akhtyrka group of Germans and completely defeated it.

At the same time, troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began the assault on Kharkov. On the night of August 23, formations of the 69th and 7th Guards armies captured the city.

Soviet soldiers inspect a German heavy tank "Panther" destroyed on the Prokhorovsky bridgehead, Belgorod region. 1943

Photo - A. Morkovkin

The troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts defeated 15 enemy divisions, advanced 140 km in the southern and southwestern direction, and came close to the Donbass enemy grouping. Soviet troops liberated Kharkov. During the occupation and battles, the Nazis destroyed about 300 thousand civilians and prisoners of war in the city and region (according to incomplete data), about 160 thousand people were driven to Germany, they destroyed 1,600 thousand m2 of housing, over 500 industrial enterprises, all cultural and educational , medical and communal institutions.

Thus, Soviet troops completed the defeat of the entire Belgorod-Kharkov enemy group and took an advantageous position to launch a general offensive with the aim of liberating Left Bank Ukraine and Donbass.

4. Main conclusions.

The counteroffensive of the Red Army near Kursk ended in an outstanding victory for us. Irreversible losses were inflicted on the enemy, and all his attempts to hold strategic bridgeheads in the Orel and Kharkov areas were thwarted.

The success of the counteroffensive was ensured primarily by the skillful choice of the moment when our troops went on the offensive. It began in conditions when the main German attack groups suffered huge losses and a crisis was defined in their offensive. Success was also ensured by the skillful organization of strategic interaction between groups of fronts attacking in the western and southwestern, as well as in other directions. This did not allow the fascist German command to regroup troops in areas that were dangerous to them.

The success of the counteroffensive was greatly influenced by the large strategic reserves of the Supreme High Command Headquarters previously created in the Kursk direction, which were used to develop the offensive of the fronts.

For the first time, Soviet troops solved the problem of breaking through the enemy’s previously prepared, deeply echeloned defense and subsequent development of operational success. This was achieved thanks to the creation of powerful strike groups in the fronts and armies, the massing of forces and means in breakthrough areas and the presence of tank formations in the fronts, and large tank (mechanized) formations in the armies.

Before the start of the counteroffensive, reconnaissance in force was carried out more widely than in previous operations, not only by reinforced companies, but also by advanced battalions.

During the counteroffensive, the fronts and armies gained experience in repelling counterattacks from large enemy tank formations. It was carried out with close cooperation between all branches of the military and aviation. In order to stop the enemy and defeat his advancing troops, fronts and armies with part of their forces switched to a tough defense while simultaneously delivering a powerful blow to the flank and rear of the enemy’s counterattack group. As a result of the increase in the number of military equipment and reinforcement means, the tactical densities of our troops in the counteroffensive near Kursk increased by 2-3 times in comparison with the counteroffensive near Stalingrad.

What was new in the field of offensive combat tactics was the transition of units and formations from single-echelon to deeply echeloned combat formations. This turned out to be possible due to the narrowing of their sectors and offensive zones.

In the counteroffensive near Kursk, the methods of using military branches and aviation were improved. On a larger scale, tank and mechanized troops were used. The density of NPP tanks compared to the counteroffensive at Stalingrad increased and amounted to 15 - 20 tanks and self-propelled guns per 1 km of front. However, when breaking through a strong, deeply layered enemy defense, such densities turned out to be insufficient. Tank and mechanized corps became the main means of developing the success of combined arms armies, and tank armies of a homogeneous composition became the echelon for developing the success of the front. Their use to complete the breakthrough of a previously prepared positional defense was a necessary measure, often leading to significant tank losses and weakening of tank formations and formations, but in specific conditions the situation justified itself. For the first time, self-propelled artillery regiments were widely used near Kursk. Experience has shown that they were an effective means of supporting the advance of tanks and infantry.

There were also peculiarities in the use of artillery: the density of guns and mortars in the direction of the main attack increased significantly; the gap between the end of artillery preparation and the beginning of support for the attack was eliminated; army artillery groups by number of corps

Situation and strengths of the parties

In the early spring of 1943, after the end of the winter-spring battles, a huge protrusion formed on the Soviet-German front line between the cities of Orel and Belgorod, directed to the west. This bend was unofficially called the Kursk Bulge. At the bend of the arc were located the troops of the Soviet Central and Voronezh fronts and the German army groups “Center” and “South”.

Some representatives of the highest command circles in Germany proposed that the Wehrmacht switch to defensive actions, exhausting the Soviet troops, restoring its own strength and strengthening the occupied territories. However, Hitler was categorically against it: he believed that german army is still strong enough to inflict on the Soviet Union major defeat and again seize the elusive strategic initiative. An objective analysis of the situation showed that the German army was no longer capable of attacking on all fronts at once. Therefore, it was decided to limit offensive actions to only one segment of the front. Quite logically, the German command chose the Kursk Bulge to strike. According to the plan, German troops were to strike in converging directions from Orel and Belgorod in the direction of Kursk. With a successful outcome, this ensured the encirclement and defeat of the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts of the Red Army. The final plans for the operation, codenamed "Citadel", were approved on May 10-11, 1943.

It was not difficult to unravel the plans of the German command regarding exactly where the Wehrmacht would advance in the summer of 1943. The Kursk salient, extending many kilometers into the territory controlled by the Nazis, was a tempting and obvious target. Already on April 12, 1943, at a meeting at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the USSR, it was decided to move to a deliberate, planned and powerful defense in the Kursk region. The Red Army troops had to hold back the onslaught of Nazi troops, wear down the enemy, and then launch a counteroffensive and defeat the enemy. After this, it was planned to launch a general offensive in the western and southwestern directions.

In case the Germans decided not to attack in the Kursk Bulge area, a plan of offensive actions was also created with forces concentrated on this section of the front. However, the defensive plan remained a priority, and it was its implementation that the Red Army began in April 1943.

The defense on the Kursk Bulge was built thoroughly. In total, 8 defensive lines with a total depth of about 300 kilometers were created. Huge attention was devoted to mining the approaches to the defense line: according to various sources, the density of minefields was up to 1500-1700 anti-tank and anti-personnel mines per kilometer of front. Anti-tank artillery was not distributed evenly along the front, but was collected in so-called “anti-tank areas” - localized concentrations of anti-tank guns that covered several directions at once and partially overlapped each other’s sectors of fire. In this way, the maximum concentration of fire was achieved and shelling of one advancing enemy unit was ensured from several sides at once.

Before the start of the operation, the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts totaled about 1.2 million people, about 3.5 thousand tanks, 20,000 guns and mortars, as well as 2,800 aircraft. The Steppe Front, numbering about 580,000 people, 1.5 thousand tanks, 7.4 thousand guns and mortars, and about 700 aircraft, acted as a reserve.

On the German side, 50 divisions took part in the battle, numbering, according to various sources, from 780 to 900 thousand people, about 2,700 tanks and self-propelled guns, about 10,000 guns and approximately 2.5 thousand aircraft.

Thus, by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Red Army had a numerical advantage. However, we should not forget that these troops were located on the defensive, and therefore, the German command had the opportunity to effectively concentrate forces and achieve the required concentration of troops in breakthrough areas. In addition, in 1943, the German army received a fairly large number of new heavy tanks "Tiger" and medium "Panther", as well as heavy self-propelled guns "Ferdinand", of which there were only 89 in the army (out of 90 built) and which, however, , themselves posed a considerable threat, provided they were used correctly in the right place.

The first stage of the battle. Defense

Both commands of the Voronezh and Central Fronts predicted the date of the German troops' transition to the offensive quite accurately: according to their data, the attack should have been expected in the period from July 3 to July 6. The day before the start of the battle, Soviet intelligence officers managed to capture “tongue,” who reported that the Germans would begin the assault on July 5.

The northern front of the Kursk Bulge was held by the Central Front of Army General K. Rokossovsky. Knowing the time of the start of the German offensive, at 2:30 a.m. the front commander gave the order to conduct a half-hour artillery counter-training. Then, at 4:30, the artillery strike was repeated. The effectiveness of this measure was quite controversial. According to reports from Soviet artillerymen, the Germans suffered significant damage. However, apparently, this was still not true. We know for sure about small losses in manpower and equipment, as well as about the disruption of enemy wire lines. In addition, the Germans now knew for sure that a surprise attack would not work - the Red Army was ready for defense.

At 5:00 am the German artillery preparation began. It had not yet ended when the first echelons of Nazi troops went on the offensive following the barrage of fire. German infantry, supported by tanks, launched an offensive along the entire defensive line of the 13th Soviet Army. The main blow fell on the village of Olkhovatka. The most powerful attack was experienced by the right flank of the army near the village of Maloarkhangelskoye.

The battle lasted approximately two and a half hours, and the attack was repulsed. After this, the Germans shifted their pressure to the left flank of the army. The strength of their onslaught is evidenced by the fact that by the end of July 5, the troops of the 15th and 81st Soviet divisions were partially surrounded. However, the Nazis had not yet succeeded in breaking through the front. In just the first day of the battle, German troops advanced 6-8 kilometers.

On July 6, Soviet troops attempted a counterattack with two tank, three rifle divisions and a rifle corps, supported by two regiments of guards mortars and two regiments of self-propelled guns. The impact front was 34 kilometers. At first, the Red Army managed to push the Germans back 1-2 kilometers, but then the Soviet tanks came under heavy fire from German tanks and self-propelled guns and, after 40 vehicles were lost, were forced to stop. By the end of the day, the corps went on the defensive. The counterattack attempted on July 6 did not have serious success. The front managed to be “pushed back” by only 1-2 kilometers.

After the failure of the attack on Olkhovatka, the Germans shifted their efforts in the direction of the Ponyri station. This station was of serious strategic importance, covering the Orel-Kursk railway. Ponyri were well protected by minefields, artillery and tanks buried in the ground.

On July 6, Ponyri was attacked by about 170 German tanks and self-propelled guns, including 40 Tigers of the 505th heavy tank battalion. The Germans managed to break through the first line of defense and advance to the second. Three attacks that followed before the end of the day were repulsed by the second line. The next day, after persistent attacks, German troops managed to get even closer to the station. By 15:00 on July 7, the enemy captured the “1 May” state farm and came close to the station. The day of July 7, 1943 became a crisis for the defense of Ponyri, although the Nazis still failed to capture the station.

At the Ponyri station, German troops used the Ferdinand self-propelled guns, which turned out to be a serious problem for the Soviet troops. Soviet guns were practically unable to penetrate the 200 mm frontal armor of these vehicles. Therefore, the Ferdinanda suffered the greatest losses from mines and air raids. The last day when the Germans stormed the Ponyri station was July 12.

From July 5 to July 12, heavy fighting took place in the 70th Army's zone of action. Here the Nazis launched an attack with tanks and infantry, with German air superiority in the air. On July 8, German troops managed to break through the defense, occupying several settlements. The breakthrough was localized only by introducing reserves. By July 11, Soviet troops received reinforcements as well as air support. The dive bomber strikes caused quite significant damage to German units. On July 15, after the Germans had already been completely driven back, in the field between the villages of Samodurovka, Kutyrki and Tyoploye, military correspondents filmed damaged German equipment. After the war, this chronicle began to be mistakenly called “footage from near Prokhorovka,” although not a single “Ferdinand” was near Prokhorovka, and the Germans failed to evacuate two damaged self-propelled guns of this type from near Tyoply.

In the zone of action of the Voronezh Front (commander - General of the Army Vatutin), combat operations began in the afternoon of July 4 with attacks by German units on the positions of the front's military outposts and lasted until late at night.

On July 5, the main phase of the battle began. On the southern front of the Kursk Bulge, the battles were much more intense and were accompanied by more serious losses of Soviet troops than on the northern one. The reason for this was the terrain, which was more suitable for the use of tanks, and a number of organizational miscalculations at the level of the Soviet front-line command.

The main blow of the German troops was delivered along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. This section of the front was held by the 6th Guards Army. The first attack took place at 6 a.m. on July 5 in the direction of the village of Cherkasskoye. Two attacks followed, supported by tanks and aircraft. Both were repulsed, after which the Germans shifted the direction of the attack towards the village of Butovo. In the battles near Cherkassy, ​​the enemy almost managed to achieve a breakthrough, but at the cost of heavy losses, Soviet troops prevented it, often losing up to 50-70% of the units' personnel.

During July 7-8, the Germans managed, while suffering losses, to advance another 6-8 kilometers, but then the attack on Oboyan stopped. The enemy was looking for a weak point in the Soviet defense and seemed to have found it. This place was the direction to the still unknown Prokhorovka station.

The Battle of Prokhorovka, considered one of the largest tank battles in history, began on July 11, 1943. On the German side, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps and the 3rd Wehrmacht Panzer Corps took part in it - a total of about 450 tanks and self-propelled guns. The 5th Guards Tank Army under Lieutenant General P. Rotmistrov and the 5th Guards Army under Lieutenant General A. Zhadov fought against them. There were about 800 Soviet tanks in the Battle of Prokhorovka.

The battle at Prokhorovka can be called the most discussed and controversial episode of the Battle of Kursk. The scope of this article does not allow us to analyze it in detail, so we will limit ourselves to only reporting approximate loss figures. The Germans irretrievably lost about 80 tanks and self-propelled guns, the Soviet troops lost about 270 vehicles.

Second phase. Offensive

On July 12, 1943, Operation Kutuzov, also known as the Oryol offensive operation, began on the northern front of the Kursk Bulge with the participation of troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts. On July 15, troops of the Central Front joined it.

On the German side, a group of troops consisting of 37 divisions was involved in the battles. According to modern estimates, the number of German tanks and self-propelled guns that took part in the battles near Orel was about 560 vehicles. Soviet troops had a serious numerical advantage over the enemy: in the main directions, the Red Army outnumbered German troops by six times in the number of infantry, five times in the number of artillery and 2.5-3 times in tanks.

German infantry divisions defended themselves on well-fortified terrain, equipped with wire fences, minefields, machine gun nests and armored caps. Enemy sappers built anti-tank obstacles along the river banks. It should be noted, however, that work on the German defensive lines had not yet been completed when the counteroffensive began.

On July 12 at 5:10 am, Soviet troops began artillery preparation and launched an air strike on the enemy. Half an hour later the assault began. By the evening of the first day, the Red Army, waging heavy fighting, advanced to a distance of 7.5 to 15 kilometers, breaking through the main defensive line of German formations in three places. Offensive battles continued until July 14. During this time, the advance of Soviet troops was up to 25 kilometers. However, by July 14, the Germans managed to regroup their troops, as a result of which the Red Army offensive was stopped for some time. The Central Front offensive, which began on July 15, developed slowly from the very beginning.

Despite the stubborn resistance of the enemy, by July 25 the Red Army managed to force the Germans to begin withdrawing troops from the Oryol bridgehead. In early August, battles began for the city of Oryol. By August 6, the city was completely liberated from the Nazis. After this, the Oryol operation entered its final phase. On August 12, fighting began for the city of Karachev, which lasted until August 15 and ended with the defeat of the group of German troops defending this locality. By August 17-18, Soviet troops reached the Hagen defensive line, built by the Germans east of Bryansk.

The official date for the start of the offensive on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge is considered to be August 3. However, the Germans began a gradual withdrawal of troops from their positions as early as July 16, and from July 17, units of the Red Army began pursuing the enemy, which by July 22 turned into a general offensive, which stopped at approximately the same positions that Soviet troops occupied at the start of the Battle of Kursk . The command demanded the immediate continuation of hostilities, but due to the exhaustion and fatigue of the units, the date was postponed by 8 days.

By August 3, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts had 50 rifle divisions, about 2,400 tanks and self-propelled guns, and more than 12,000 guns. At 8 o'clock in the morning, after artillery preparation, Soviet troops began their offensive. On the first day of the operation, the advance of units of the Voronezh Front ranged from 12 to 26 km. The troops of the Steppe Front advanced only 7-8 kilometers during the day.

On August 4-5, battles took place to eliminate the enemy group in Belgorod and liberate the city from German troops. By evening, Belgorod was taken by units of the 69th Army and the 1st Mechanized Corps.

By August 10, Soviet troops cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway. There were about 10 kilometers left to the outskirts of Kharkov. On August 11, the Germans struck in the Bogodukhov area, significantly weakening the pace of the offensive of both fronts of the Red Army. Fierce fighting continued until August 14.

The steppe front reached the near approaches to Kharkov on August 11. On the first day, the attacking units were not successful. Fighting on the outskirts of the city continued until July 17. Both sides suffered heavy losses. In both Soviet and German units, it was not uncommon to have companies numbering 40-50 people, or even less.

The Germans launched their last counterattack at Akhtyrka. Here they even managed to make a local breakthrough, but this did not change the situation globally. On August 23, a massive assault on Kharkov began; This day is considered the date of the liberation of the city and the end of the Battle of Kursk. In fact, the fighting in the city stopped completely only on August 30, when the remnants of German resistance were suppressed.

Dates of the Battle of Kursk: 07/05/1943 – 08/23/1943. The Great Patriotic War had 3 significant events:

• Liberation of Stalingrad;
• Battle of Kursk;
• Capture of Berlin.

Here we will talk about the greatest tank battle in modern history.

Battle for Kursk. The situation before the battle

Before the Battle of Kursk, Germany celebrated a small success, managing to recapture the cities of Belgorod and Kharkov. Hitler, seeing short-term success, decided to develop it. The offensive was planned on the Kursk Bulge. The salient, cut deep into German territory, could be surrounded and captured. The operation, approved on May 10-11, was called “Citadel”.

Strengths of the parties

The advantage was on the side of the Red Army. The number of Soviet troops was 1,200,000 people (against 900 thousand for the enemy), the number of tanks was 3,500 (2,700 for the Germans), guns were 20,000 (10,000), and aircraft were 2,800 (2,500).

The German army was replenished with heavy (medium) Tiger (Panther) tanks, Ferdinand self-propelled guns (self-propelled guns), and Foke-Wulf 190 aircraft. Innovations on the Soviet side were the St. John's wort cannon (57 mm), capable of penetrating the armor of the Tiger, and anti-tank mines, which caused significant damage to them.

Plans of the parties

The Germans decided to launch a lightning strike, quickly capture the Kursk ledge, and then continue a large-scale offensive. The Soviet side decided to first defend itself, launching counterattacks, and when the enemy was weakened and exhausted, go on the offensive.

Defense

We managed to find out that Battle of Kursk will begin on 06/05/1943. Therefore, at 2:30 and 4:30, the Central Front carried out two half-hour artillery counterattacks. At 5:00 the enemy’s guns responded, and then the enemy went on the offensive, exerting intense pressure (2.5 hours) on the right flank in the direction of the village of Olkhovatka.

When the attack was repulsed, the Germans intensified their attack on the left flank. They even managed to partially encircle two (15, 81) Soviet divisions, but failed to break through the front (advance 6-8 km). Then the Germans attempted to capture the Ponyri station in order to control the Orel-Kursk railway.

170 tanks and Ferdinand self-propelled guns broke through the first line of defense on July 6, but the second one held out. On July 7, the enemy came close to the station. The 200mm frontal armor became impenetrable to Soviet guns. Ponyri station was held due to anti-tank mines and powerful raids by Soviet aviation.

The tank battle near the village of Prokhorovka (Voronezh Front) lasted 6 days (10-16). Almost 800 Soviet tanks faced 450 enemy tanks and self-propelled guns. The overall victory was for the Red Army, but more than 300 tanks were lost versus 80 for the enemy. Average tanks The T-34 had difficulty resisting the heavy Tigers, and the light T-70 was generally unsuitable in open areas. This is where the losses come from.

Offensive

While the troops of the Voronezh and Central Fronts were repelling enemy attacks, units of the Western and Bryansk Fronts (July 12) went on the attack. For three days (12-14), fighting heavy battles, Soviet army was able to advance up to 25 kilometers.

And on July 15, the Central Front began its offensive. After 10 days, the Red Army captured the Oryol bridgehead, and on August 6, the city of Oryol.

The Voronezh Front, with the support of the reserve (Steppe Front), liberated Belgorod on August 5. Then the German resistance intensified. They launched counterattacks on the outskirts of Kharkov (Bogodukhova, Akhtyrka), even making a local breakthrough. However general situation hasn't changed.

August 23, when Kharkov was taken, is considered the day the Battle of Kursk ended, although fighting in the city stopped on August 30.

After the Battle of Kursk The Second World War has entered its final phase.

 

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