The crash of the Aurora. Train schedule: Aurora High-speed train Aurora

You left so tragically, by accident,
God's will or just fate,
Let the memory of the accidental victims
Trains will carry across the earth...

August 16, 1988 at 18:25 at the first picket of the 308th kilometer of the Berezayka-Poplavenets section of the Bologovsky branch of Oktyabrskaya railway, at a speed of 155 km/h, high-speed passenger train No. 159 "Aurora" on the Leningrad-Moscow route crashed. In the crash, all 15 cars of the train were derailed. A fire broke out in the overturned restaurant carriage and spread to other carriages.
As a result of the crash, 31 people died, more than 100 received bodily injuries of varying severity, 2.5 km of the contact network, 0.5 km of the railway track were damaged, 12 cars were damaged to the point of exclusion from inventory, a complete interruption in train traffic was allowed on a section of over 15 hours.
One of the factors that caused such a number of victims was the unsuccessful design of the seats of passenger cars - during sudden braking, they were torn from their fastenings and, together with the passengers, accumulated at the front end of the cabin. After this incident, "Aurora" began to walk with compartment carriages instead of seated ones, and only in the early 2000s it was again composed of seated aircraft-type carriages, this time meeting the most stringent requirements.

The Aurora disaster is still remembered by many railway workers. High-speed train at that time - the beauty and pride of the road, the object of special attention. But the tragedy occurred, and many factors led to it, not all of which are known to this day.

The main fault, undoubtedly, is still Putin's. The official document says: “An analysis of the track condition at km 306-308 showed a continuous increase in the number and degree of faults. A day before the crash, when checking with a track measuring car, deviations in track maintenance at 306-308 km of grades IV and V were identified in terms of subsidence, distortions and track maintenance in plan. Such deviations did not ensure traffic safety at the established speeds of 160 km/h and, in accordance with technical instructions, required speed limits for 306 kilometers to 60 km/h, for 307 to 120 and 308 to 25 km/h.
It should be noted that on the indicated kilometers of track there were a large number of loose terminal bolts in violation of clause 2.6.1 of the Technical Instructions for the design, laying and maintenance of a continuous welded track, which states: “To ensure the required linear resistance, the standard pressing of the rail to the base in the fastening unit must be 19.6 kN. This norm for KB type fastenings corresponds to a torque of 120 Nm on the nut of each bolt, provided that the threads of the bolts and nuts are lubricated." For the track structure laid at 307-308 km, major repairs should have been carried out in accordance with current regulations on carrying out scheduled preventative repairs of the upper track structure after passing 500 million tons gross, medium repairs - after passing 280 million tons gross and lifting - after passing 150 million tons gross. This provision required lifting or mid-level repairs at least once every 5 years. Over an eight-year period, with the passage of 534.4 million tons gross, not a single type of track repair was carried out, which led to the loss of the load-bearing and drainage capacity of the ballast layer, the appearance of subsidence, distortions and liquefaction of the ballast layer (splash).
It was established that the senior road foreman (PDS) 2 hours before the passage passenger train No. 159 carried out track straightening at 307 km using the VPR-1200 machine at a rail temperature exceeding the temperature of their fastening by 30C (the permissible excess on a straight section is 20C). This is strictly prohibited in clause 4.2.1 of the Technical Instructions for the design, laying and maintenance of continuous track, since it leads to a weakening of the stability of the track and creates conditions for its curvature (ejection). Curvature of the path during ejection is the appearance of irregularities in horizontal plane, equal to 0.36-0.45 m over a length of 10-12 m, which is an obstacle to train movement.
At the point where VPR-1200 began work at the ninth picket of 307 km, as a result of incorrect work technology, a subsidence of the track was formed (according to the testimony of the senior road master who carried out the track work) with a depth of 10-15 mm and a length of 5 m, and the diversion of this deviation in the position of the rail track in longitudinal profile was up to 3% with an acceptable 1% at train speeds of more than 120 km/h (clause 1.5 of Instruction TsP/4402). The senior road foreman assessed this subsidence by eye. In fact, it was so large that it caused the first car and the locomotive of train No. 159, which was traveling along this kilometer of track at a speed of 155 km/h, to disengage.
The height difference of the automatic couplers at the moment of self-uncoupling turned out to be so large that the automatic coupler of the electric locomotive ChS6-017 in the first car damaged the supporting beam on which the transition platform rests. As a result of self-release and, consequently, a break in the brake line, emergency braking of the train occurred. In this case, an additional longitudinal force arose, transmitted to the track from the wheels of the rolling stock, which, in combination with temperature forces, led to the “thrust” of the weakened track at the end of the first picket of 308 km and the derailment of the cars, followed by a crash.
The high speed of passenger train No. 159 at the time of the crash was allowed due to the fact that the senior road foreman unreasonably, without eliminating the faults, canceled the warning, according to which the speed was limited to 60 km/h. The warning, which was in effect at km 308, was issued by the deputy head of the track measuring car; it could be canceled in accordance with clause 7.14 of the Instructions for ensuring the safety of train traffic during track work (TsP/4402) only by the head of the track.”

But not everything is so simple, and road foreman Nikolai Gavrilov, who, after an investigation, was sentenced to long term conclusion, it turned out to be just a switchman - the crash had to be blamed on someone. His superiors, who allowed such a situation with the time between repairs and the order of work, got away with only being removed from their positions.
Moreover. In the cabin of the electric locomotive driving the Aurora, there was an inspector - a driver-instructor. The regular driver of the Aurora saw that not everything was going well on the route, but in the current situation he made a difficult decision - to skip the dangerous section at speed - so there was some chance of staying on the rails. But the instructor, seeing this, went behind him and pulled the crane handle to the emergency braking position.
The braking of an almost 1000-ton mass rushing at a speed of 155 km/h led to the fact that the already weakened track could not stand it and an ejection occurred under the train. This version was not reflected in the documents, but the locomotive workers stubbornly adhere to it, although it is much easier to blame everything on the railway workers...

A small monument was built at the site of the disaster and a cross was erected. Every year, on August 16, both Aurora trains - from Moscow and St. Petersburg - are scheduled to make a five-minute stop at this place. Train and locomotive crews lay wreaths at the monument to the passengers who died here...

Branded train

Days of the week:

Distance: 650 km

Moscow Departure 13:45 Moscow time

Saint Petersburg Arrival 18:10 Moscow time

Travel time 4h 25m

Train information

Branded train 160A Aurora (Moscow - St. Petersburg) departs at 13:45:00 from Moscow station and after 4 hours 25 minutes. at 18:10:00 local time arrives at St. Petersburg station. The distance between them is 650 km.

The Aurora train (Moscow - St. Petersburg) is a branded Russian Railways train No. 159/160. The express runs on the Oktyabrskaya Railway on one of the most popular routes. Our website will help you buy tickets for the Aurora train, as well as get information about departure and arrival times, the location of seats on the Aurora train and full route following.

The signature Aurora train has a long and interesting story. This was the first high-speed daytime express, designed by order of the Ministry of Railways "On the preparation of the Leningrad-Moscow line for the movement of trains at increased speeds." First Express train Aurora covered the distance between Leningrad and Moscow in 5 hours 27 minutes on June 12, 1963. The Aurora carriages were painted red and creamy yellow, without the characteristic white stripes. The name of the train "Aurora" was written in chrome overhead letters. At first, the roof slopes were white.

It has not operated since 2010. Replaced by the signature train.

Branded train "Aurora" began moving on June 12, 1963. between Moscow and Leningrad (St. Petersburg). In 2009, the Aurora was replaced by the branded Sapsan train. A similar train on the same route is the Nevsky Express train. It began operating in 2001. During the period from 1984-2009. The electric train ER200 was running.

The Aurora train made its first voyage using ChS2-78. The train was controlled by driver Sakharov. The duration of the trip was 5 hours 27 minutes. Since 1965, the flight has become even faster - 4 hours 59 minutes. Since the 70s, due to the increase in the number of carriages, travel time has increased up to 7 hours. Thanks to the renewal of the locomotive fleet by the ChS6 train, travel time was reduced to 5 hours 30 minutes. The high-speed electric locomotive ChS6 could move up to 15 cars, with a maximum speed of 180 km/h.

A major accident of passenger train No. 159 “Aurora” of Oktyabrskaya Railway occurred in the summer of 1988 at 18:25 on the Berezayka-Poplavets section.

A major reconstruction of the Aurora train took place at the beginning of 2003. 15 cars of train No. 159/160 were modernized in order to increase the level of comfort and convenience. Finnish and Russian specialists were involved in the development of the new train interior design.

In 2008, Russian Railways announced that the Aurora route was inappropriate. There was no point in the flight due to the commissioning of the high-speed highway connecting Moscow and St. Petersburg. In this regard, flight number 159-160 was excluded from the schedule. In the spring of 2010, the Aurora flight ceased operations. Currently, it is completely replaced by the Sapsan high-speed train with the same number 159/160. It arrives at the final station in 4 hours. This is 30 minutes faster than its predecessor ER-200.V this moment The Aurora train is used as trains 217A/267A/268A. It transports people almost every day.

Schedule of the branded train "Aurora" (Moscow - St. Petersburg (Leningrad), St. Petersburg (Leningrad) - Moscow)

Compound branded train Previously, I departed from Moscow 3 times a day. The train arrived in St. Petersburg.

Moscow, Saint Petersburg

Route	Train number	Departure time	Arrival time
Moscow, Saint Petersburg →	752A	05:45	09:29	Find out prices
Moscow, Saint Petersburg St. Petersburg (Moskovsky station)	754A	06:45	10:50	Find out prices
Moscow, Saint Petersburg Moscow (Leningradsky Station) → St. Petersburg (Moskovsky station)	760A	09:40	13:43	Find out prices
Moscow, Saint Petersburg Moscow (Leningradsky Station) → St. Petersburg (Moskovsky station)	768A	16:05	19:58	Find out prices

Saint Petersburg - Moscow

for today for tomorrow for another date

Route	Train number	Departure time	Arrival time
Saint Petersburg - Moscow Moscow (Leningradsky station)	751A	05:30	09:08	Find out prices
Saint Petersburg - Moscow St. Petersburg (Moskovsky railway station) → Moscow (Leningradsky station)	753A	06:40	10:43	Find out prices
Saint Petersburg - Moscow St. Petersburg (Moskovsky railway station) → Moscow (Leningradsky station)	757A	08:47	12:57	Find out prices
Saint Petersburg - Moscow St. Petersburg (Moskovsky railway station) → Moscow (Leningradsky station)	759A	09:00	13:06	Find out prices
Saint Petersburg - Moscow St. Petersburg (Moskovsky railway station) → Moscow (Leningradsky station)	767A	14:10	18:07	Find out prices

You left so tragically, by accident,
God's will or just fate,
Let the memory of the accidental victims
Trains will carry across the earth...

On August 16, 1988, at 18:25, at the first picket of the 308th kilometer of the Berezayka-Poplavenets section of the Bologovsky branch of the Oktyabrskaya Railway, high-speed passenger train No. 159 "Aurora" on the Leningrad-Moscow route crashed at a speed of 155 km/h. In the crash, all 15 cars of the train were derailed. A fire broke out in the overturned restaurant carriage and spread to other carriages.
As a result of the crash, 31 people died, more than 100 received bodily injuries of varying severity, 2.5 km of the contact network, 0.5 km of the railway track were damaged, 12 cars were damaged to the point of exclusion from inventory, a complete interruption in train traffic was allowed on a section of over 15 hours.
One of the factors that caused such a number of victims was the unsuccessful design of the seats of passenger cars - during sudden braking, they were torn from their fastenings and, together with the passengers, accumulated at the front end of the cabin. After this incident, the Aurora began to operate with compartment cars instead of seated ones, and only in the early 2000s was it again composed of aircraft-type seated cars, this time meeting the most stringent requirements.

The Aurora disaster is still remembered by many railway workers. The high-speed train at that time was the beauty and pride of the road, an object of special attention. But the tragedy occurred, and many factors led to it, not all of which are known to this day.

The main fault, undoubtedly, is still Putin's. The official document says: “An analysis of the track condition at km 306-308 showed a continuous increase in the number and degree of faults. A day before the crash, when checking with a track measuring car, deviations in track maintenance at 306-308 km of grades IV and V were identified in terms of subsidence, distortions and track maintenance in plan. Such deviations did not ensure traffic safety at the established speeds of 160 km/h and, in accordance with technical instructions, required speed limits for 306 kilometers to 60 km/h, for 307 to 120 and 308 to 25 km/h.
It should be noted that on the indicated kilometers of track there were a large number of loose terminal bolts in violation of clause 2.6.1 of the Technical Instructions for the design, laying and maintenance of a continuous welded track, which states: “To ensure the required linear resistance, the standard pressing of the rail to the base in the fastening unit must be 19.6 kN. This norm for KB type fastenings corresponds to a torque of 120 Nm on the nut of each bolt, provided that the threads of the bolts and nuts are lubricated." For the track structure laid at 307-308 km, major repairs should have been carried out in accordance with the current regulations on carrying out scheduled preventative repairs of the upper track structure after skipping 500 million tons gross, medium repairs - after skipping 280 million tons gross and lifting - after skipping 150 million tons gross. This provision required lifting or mid-level repairs at least once every 5 years. Over an eight-year period, with the passage of 534.4 million tons gross, not a single type of track repair was carried out, which led to the loss of the load-bearing and drainage capacity of the ballast layer, the appearance of subsidence, distortions and liquefaction of the ballast layer (splash).
It was established that the senior road foreman (PDS), 2 hours before the passage of passenger train No. 159, straightened the track at 307 km using a VPR-1200 machine at a rail temperature exceeding the temperature of their fastening by 30C (the permissible excess on a straight section is 20C). This is strictly prohibited in clause 4.2.1 of the Technical Instructions for the design, laying and maintenance of continuous track, since it leads to a weakening of the stability of the track and creates conditions for its curvature (ejection). Track curvature during ejection is the appearance of an unevenness in the horizontal plane equal to 0.36-0.45 m over a length of 10-12 m, which is an obstacle to the movement of trains.
At the point where VPR-1200 began work at the ninth picket of 307 km, as a result of incorrect work technology, a subsidence of the track was formed (according to the testimony of the senior road master who carried out the track work) with a depth of 10-15 mm and a length of 5 m, and the diversion of this deviation in the position of the rail track in longitudinal profile was up to 3% with an acceptable 1% at train speeds of more than 120 km/h (clause 1.5 of Instruction TsP/4402). The senior road foreman assessed this subsidence by eye. In fact, it was so large that it caused the first car and the locomotive of train No. 159, which was traveling along this kilometer of track at a speed of 155 km/h, to disengage.
The height difference of the automatic couplers at the moment of self-uncoupling turned out to be so large that the automatic coupler of the electric locomotive ChS6-017 in the first car damaged the supporting beam on which the transition platform rests. As a result of self-release and, consequently, a break in the brake line, emergency braking of the train occurred. In this case, an additional longitudinal force arose, transmitted to the track from the wheels of the rolling stock, which, in combination with temperature forces, led to the “thrust” of the weakened track at the end of the first picket of 308 km and the derailment of the cars, followed by a crash.
The high speed of passenger train No. 159 at the time of the crash was allowed due to the fact that the senior road foreman unreasonably, without eliminating the faults, canceled the warning, according to which the speed was limited to 60 km/h. The warning, which was in effect at km 308, was issued by the deputy head of the track measuring car; it could be canceled in accordance with clause 7.14 of the Instructions for ensuring the safety of train traffic during track work (TsP/4402) only by the head of the track.”

But not everything is so simple, and road foreman Nikolai Gavrilov, who after an investigation was sentenced by the court to a long prison term, turned out to be just a switchman - the crash had to be blamed on someone. His superiors, who allowed such a situation with the time between repairs and the order of work, got away with only being removed from their positions.
Moreover. In the cabin of the electric locomotive driving the Aurora, there was an inspector - a driver-instructor. The regular driver of the Aurora saw that not everything was going well on the route, but in the current situation he made a difficult decision - to skip the dangerous section at speed - so there was some chance of staying on the rails. But the instructor, seeing this, went behind him and pulled the crane handle to the emergency braking position.
The braking of an almost 1000-ton mass rushing at a speed of 155 km/h led to the fact that the already weakened track could not stand it and an ejection occurred under the train. This version was not reflected in the documents, but the locomotive workers stubbornly adhere to it, although it is much easier to blame everything on the railway workers...

Crash site.

High-speed train "Aurora" on the ill-fated stretch.

New Aurora carriages.

Berezaika station.

Monument. The large number of flowers is explained by the fact that just a week ago it was the 20th anniversary of the tragedy...

Cross.

View from the tracks.

Fast train No. 258 Moscow-Murmansk. There is a “signal” sign installed on the contact network supports near the monument - drivers of passing trains blow a short whistle...

Another high-speed train is the famous “Nevsky Express” (166/165).

He quickly moves away towards St. Petersburg. It's time for us too - to catch the last train to Bologoye...

In the 80s, Aurora was the Soviet Sapsan. The running time of the train, which overtook the Red Arrow in 1965, was 4 hours 59 minutes. The crash of the Aurora, not very noticeable in the history of tragedies on railway route between two capitals, eyewitnesses remembered the tragedy as a sign of the “perestroika” that had begun in the country - in the tradition of glasnost, newspapers reported about the tragedy the very next day.

After talking with former passengers of the unsuccessful Aurora flight, AiF.ru correspondents recreated the events of the day and learned how people and services acted in a difficult situation.

Airplane type train

August 16, 1988, morning. On this day the family's vacation ended Valentina Grigorieva in Leningrad, with two children, she was in a hurry to catch a train to Moscow. The day didn't go well. At first, the neighbors couldn’t wait for a long time to give them the keys to their friends’ apartment. Then we waited for a late bus to the Moskovsky station. Valentina was afraid of not being able to catch the Aurora Express, which was supposed to bring them home in the evening.

In 1988, the high-speed train "Aurora" consisted of a power station car and 9 "aircraft" type cars. Express, distinguished by its atypical Soviet trains blue and white in color, “ran” at a speed of 180 km/h.

16.00, departure of the Aurora. We made it to the train safely. Valentina Grigorieva carried a huge suitcase into the carriage: before leaving for Leningrad, the family was preparing for the unpredictable northern weather. Following her, they climbed into the carriage 14 year old Ksenia And 8 year oldMatvey. The car was the 4th, second in order due to the absence of the first two. Inside, the train was different from the usual trains - six soft passenger seats in each row, separated by an aisle.

“We've been driving for about two hours. One of the passengers brought the famous Soviet chocolate “Inspiration” from the dining car. Mom suggested: let's go get some chocolate. But it was so hot that I didn’t want to go. Later, remembering this conversation, I thought we did the right thing. The people in the restaurant suffered more than others during the accident. And the crash happened within a few minutes,” recalls daughter Ksenia.

Path factor

11.00, Moscow. The driver of track measuring car No. 203, Melkov, has just sent an urgent telegram to the track workers from Bologoe. In the morning, he deciphered the tape of the passage of his carriage from Leningrad to Moscow and saw problems at the 307th - 308th kilometers. In the telegram, Melkov demanded that train speeds be limited to 25 km/h.

16.00, Berezaika-Poplavnets section, 307th km. Having started his shift, the senior road foreman comrade Gavrilov performed the daily routine work - walked around and straightened the railway tracks. The Berezayka-Poplavenets section was the weak point of the Oktyabrskaya Railway: during 8 years of operation, this section of the track was never repaired. At the rail joints, the fasteners were loose, fixing nuts were missing in some places, and the rail lines were skewed. Gavrilov sighed and knelt down to straighten out another distortion. Having touched the hot rails, I thought for a second: repairing at high temperatures created the risk of new irregularities appearing. But the distortion was severe, and the senior foreman decided to repair it.

17.00, Bologoe railway station. The telegraph operator at Bologoye station, remembering the telegram he had received from Moscow, leisurely took it to the railway department.

18.25, Berezaika-Poplavnets section. The Aurora crashes. All 15 carriages of the train derailed. A fire broke out in the overturned dining car from the kitchen stove. The fire quickly engulfed the entire carriage, spread to neighboring ones and ran along electrical wires.

22.00, track department of the Bologoe railway station. The senior road foreman responsible for the section of the route at kilometers 307-308 had just been informed of Melkov’s warning telegram. More than three hours have passed since the crash of the Aurora.

“Women bandaged the wounded, men broke out windows”

Valentina Grigorieva, Aurora passenger:“Not far from Bologoe, our carriage shook violently, it tilted and froze. We had no major damage or injuries. The boy lost his shoe, and everyone returned it to him. When they announced the crash, our first reaction was surprise.

Having got out of the carriage, we settled down not far from the tracks. People from other carriages approached us, they looked much worse - many had abrasions and wounds. Someone was left without things. A man wearing different shoes approached. Then - a man in a jacket with orders, he was wounded. I took the sheets out of my suitcase, tore them, washed them and bandaged the wound. Because after university I was a reserve nurse, medical care was quite professional.

Then some people brought a one-year-old girl. They asked: whose girl? The child could not yet speak, but did not cry. The girl was surprisingly lightly dressed. We wrapped her in our daughter's sweater and put on our son's Budenovka. We immediately decided that she could stay in our family.

The wounded lay in one place. Among them stood a woman with loose hair, her legs were motionless, covered with something. Seeing me with a girl in my arms, she shouted: “Lyuba, Lyuba!” Our girl's mother has been found.

Ksenia R., Aurora passenger:“We saw several carriages and a burning dining car. Black smoke was coming from it, the electrical wires began to melt and sag. The other part of the train rolled in the opposite direction - the destruction there was greater, but we did not see it. And they didn’t even know how serious the accident was. Therefore, there was probably no panic. Everyone found something to do: women collected bedding, water and bandaged the wounded. Men broke out windows in damaged carriages to free the hostages remaining there. I remember a woman with a badly cut face. She was very worried about her appearance, she cried, walked around and asked everyone for a mirror. They didn't give her a mirror.

“I remember the events of that day in separate flashes. There I first saw the corpse of a man with his arm unnaturally extended upward. Later I remembered, or imagined, that there were many dead, but my mother claims that we only caught one.”

“There were 28 dead. Talk about a larger number is fiction”

Around 21.00. A doctor arrived from Bologoe in a driazina and began examining the wounded. A train was brought to the Aurora, and the passengers of the crashed train were taken to Bologoe. There, at the station, they made lists for relatives. People lined up to send telegrams to their families.

Valentina Grigorieva tried to call home, but her husband was not there - he was apparently waiting for his family at the station. As it turned out later, the telegram did not reach him. From Bologoe, the Aurora passengers were sent to Moscow, seated in common and reserved seat carriages. Matvey slept on the top bunk without bed linen.

Elimination of the consequences of the crash proceeded slowly. The approach to the accident site was hampered by a swamp in which the train got stuck, and a rapidly spreading fire. Until late in the evening, residents of nearby areas reached the wrecked Aurora. settlements, military personnel, police officers and civil defense staff.

19.00, Aurora crash site. “On the day of the disaster, I took over as duty officer for the regiment; at about 19.00 the order came to alert some officers. The team went through all the regiments of the division - they called signalmen, warrant officers of technical services, a former military man who served in Vypolzovo tells AiF.ru correspondents. - While the rescue teams were forming up, we were informed that a train had derailed and it was necessary to go to the scene of the accident. Immediately after the formation, groups from each regiment went there. I was tasked with delivering a group of soldiers with radios to the site to provide communications during rescue operations. We left already in the dark and arrived after 23.00. There was a lot of equipment and soldiers not only from our division, but also from other units. I remember the mangled carriages, which were then dragged into the forest and were visible for several years from passing trains. There were few corpses covered with blankets, but those who participated in clearing the rubble saw a more terrible picture. Having handed over the radio operators to the senior, I returned to the regiment. A few days later, at the formation of the division, the division commander read out a letter of gratitude from the Ministry of Railways for providing assistance, presented valuable gifts to those who distinguished themselves and announced the number of deaths - 28 people. All the talk about more- fiction."

Alexander Viktorovich Gribov, major general, division commander of the 7th Rezhitsa missile division: “I was informed about the accident at approximately 19.00, and I immediately went to the Berezaika area. When I arrived, most of the victims had already been sent to hospitals, including our military hospital. Firefighters were at the scene of the accident, but the carriages were still burning. Arrived soon from Moscow First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR V. Gusev, Minister of the Ministry of Railways N. Konarev, Head of the Oktyabrskaya Railway A. Zaitsev and party workers.

The work to eliminate the consequences of the accident was carried out in a disorganized manner; I proposed appointing one person in charge and creating a small headquarters. G. Fadeev took over the management of the work. Around ten in the evening, all the healthy people were collected at the station in Bologoye, and the injured were distributed to hospitals. I don’t know who collected the dead. The major of our division approached me and reported that a living passenger had been found in the carriage lying under the embankment, who could not be removed. I conveyed the information to the railway workers, but they did not take it seriously; they assured me that all the people had been found.

Then I went to the carriage myself. The man was lying in the swamp inside the carriage, and water was gradually flowing into the broken windows. Another carriage was crushed on top. The position of the carriages was unstable, and at any moment they could lie completely on their sides. Then the water threatened to fill the lower carriage. One of our officers and I climbed inside and found the victim. The man was conscious, his left leg was pinched by the flattened inner lining of the carriage. There were several dead people lying in the carriage. I ordered the driver of my UAZ to bring a jack, we tried to open the trim with it, but nothing worked. Doctors from our hospital were at the scene of the accident and they suggested cutting off my leg. There was nothing else left for us.

The operation was carried out directly in a half-flooded carriage by the head of the surgical department of the hospital, Lieutenant Colonel of the Medical Service Vyacheslav Korolev. A second operation was performed at the hospital, and the man’s life was saved.”

“Memory seems to have erased this day”

August 17, morning, Leningradsky railway station in Moscow. Valentina's husband waited all night for her and the children at the station. I hardly slept. In the tradition of publicity spreading throughout the country, relatives waiting at the station were immediately informed about the crash of the Aurora. No one knew the exact number of deaths. Someone said that the disaster was severe and 80% of the passengers died.

When the train with former Aurora passengers arrived in Moscow, those meeting them were not allowed onto the platform. Valentina left the children at the carriage to carry the huge suitcase first. The minutes that the husband experienced when he saw Valentina walking without her children were the most difficult of that day. A few days later he fell ill.

Matvey R., Aurora passenger:“The events of that day were erased from my memory for some time, as if they had never happened. Probably, this is the property of children's memory - to clear itself of terrible episodes. Moreover, in my mind I always knew that I had witnessed the disaster, I even told my friends about it, as if I was retelling a book I had read. But at the same time I didn’t remember anything at all. Only over the years did memory “let go” of the tragedy, and footage appeared, compiled from the events of that day. Probably thanks to this there were no nightmares, no fear of trains or other consequences. At home we tried not to remember this day at all.”

After the crash of the Aurora, its carriages were modernized, and travel time increased to 5 hours 30 minutes. In April 2010, the legendary train, which had been transporting passengers for more than forty years, made its last trip. With the launch of the new Sapsan trains, the outdated Aurora became redundant on the line.

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