Neutral territories of the world. All disputed territories of the world (1 photo). “Are you, your royal face, throwing away government lands?”

Losses Defensive phase:

Participants: Central Front, Voronezh Front, Steppe Front (not all)
Non-refundable - 70 330
Sanitary - 107 517
Operation Kutuzov: Participants: Western Front (left wing), Bryansk Front, Central Front
Non-refundable - 112 529
Sanitary - 317 361
Operation "Rumyantsev": Participants: Voronezh Front, Steppe Front
Non-refundable - 71 611
Sanitary - 183 955
General in the battle for the Kursk ledge:
Non-refundable - 189 652
Sanitary - 406 743
In the Battle of Kursk in general
~ 254 470 killed, captured, missing
608 833 wounded, sick
153 thousand small arms units
6064 tanks and self-propelled guns
5245 guns and mortars
1626 combat aircraft

According to German sources 103 600 killed and missing on the entire Eastern Front. 433 933 wounded. According to Soviet sources 500 thousand total losses on the Kursk ledge.

1000 tanks according to German data, 1500 - according to Soviet data
less 1696 airplanes

The Great Patriotic War
Invasion of the USSR Karelia Arctic Leningrad Rostov Moscow Sevastopol Barvenkovo-Lozovaya Kharkiv Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad Rzhev Stalingrad Caucasus Velikie Luki Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh Voronezh-Kastornoye Kursk Smolensk Donbass Dnieper Right Bank Ukraine Leningrad-Novgorod Crimea (1944) Belarus Lviv-Sandomir Iasi-Chisinau Eastern Carpathians Baltics Courland Romania Bulgaria Debrecen Belgrade Budapest Poland (1944) Western Carpathians East Prussia Lower Silesia Eastern Pomerania Upper Silesia Vein Berlin Prague

The Soviet command decided to conduct a defensive battle, exhaust the enemy troops and defeat them, launching counterattacks on the attackers at a critical moment. For this purpose, a deeply layered defense was created on both sides of the Kursk salient. A total of 8 defensive lines were created. The average mining density in the direction of expected enemy attacks was 1,500 anti-tank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines for every kilometer of the front.

In the assessment of the forces of the parties in the sources, there are strong discrepancies associated with different definitions of the scale of the battle by different historians, as well as differences in the methods of recording and classifying military equipment. When assessing the forces of the Red Army, the main discrepancy is related to the inclusion or exclusion of the reserve - the Steppe Front (about 500 thousand personnel and 1,500 tanks) from the calculations. The following table contains some estimates:

Estimates of the forces of the parties before the Battle of Kursk according to various sources

Source	Personnel (thousands)		Tanks and (sometimes) self-propelled guns		Guns and (sometimes) mortars		Aircraft
	USSR	Germany	USSR	Germany	USSR	Germany	USSR	Germany
RF Ministry of Defense	1336	over 900	3444	2733	19100	about 10000	2172 2900 (including Po-2 and long range)	2050
Krivosheev 2001	1272
Glanz, House	1910	780	5040	2696 or 2928
Müller-Gill.				2540 or 2758
Zett., Frankson	1910	777	5128 +2688 “reserve rates” in total more than 8000	2451	31415	7417	3549	1830
KOSAVE	1337	900	3306	2700	20220	10000	2650	2500

The role of intelligence

However, it should be noted that back on April 8, 1943, G. K. Zhukov, relying on data from the intelligence agencies of the fronts Kursk direction very accurately predicted the strength and direction of German attacks on the Kursk Bulge:

...I believe that the enemy will launch the main offensive operations against these three fronts in order to, having defeated our troops in this direction, gain freedom of maneuver to bypass Moscow in the shortest direction.
2. Apparently, at the first stage, the enemy, having gathered the maximum of his forces, including up to 13-15 tank divisions, with the support of a large number of aircraft, will strike with his Oryol-Krom grouping bypassing Kursk from the northeast and by the Belgorod-Kharkov grouping bypassing Kursk from the southeast.

Thus, although the exact text of the “Citadel” fell on Stalin’s desk three days before Hitler signed it, four days before that the German plan became obvious to the highest Soviet military command.

Kursk defensive operation

The German offensive began on the morning of July 5, 1943. Since the Soviet command knew exactly the start time of the operation, at 3 a.m. ( german army fought according to Berlin time - translated into Moscow 5 o'clock in the morning), 30-40 minutes before it began, artillery and aviation counter-preparation was carried out.

Before the start of the ground operation, at 6 a.m. our time, the Germans also launched a bomb and artillery strike on the Soviet defensive lines. The tanks that went on the offensive immediately encountered serious resistance. The main blow on the northern front was delivered in the direction of Olkhovatka. Having failed to achieve success, the Germans moved their attack in the direction of Ponyri, but even here they were unable to break through the Soviet defense. The Wehrmacht was able to advance only 10-12 km, after which, from July 10, having lost up to two-thirds of its tanks, the German 9th Army went on the defensive. On the southern front, the main German attacks were directed towards the areas of Korocha and Oboyan.

July 5, 1943 Day one. Defense of Cherkasy.

To complete the assigned task, units of the 48th Tank Corps on the first day of the offensive (Day “X”) needed to break into the defenses of the 6th Guards. A (Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov) at the junction of the 71st Guards Rifle Division (Colonel I.P. Sivakov) and 67th Guards Rifle Division (Colonel A.I. Baksov), capture the large village of Cherkasskoe and make a breakthrough with armored units in direction to the village of Yakovlevo. The offensive plan of the 48th Tank Corps determined that the village of Cherkasskoe was to be captured by 10:00 on July 5. And already on July 6, units of the 48th Tank. were supposed to reach the city of Oboyan.

However, as a result of the actions of Soviet units and formations, their courage and fortitude, as well as their advance preparation of defensive lines, the Wehrmacht’s plans in this direction were “significantly adjusted” - 48 Tk did not reach Oboyan at all.

The factors that determined the unacceptably slow pace of advance of the 48th Tank Corps on the first day of the offensive were the good engineering preparation of the area by Soviet units (from anti-tank ditches almost throughout the entire defense to radio-controlled minefields), the fire of divisional artillery, guards mortars and the actions of attack aircraft against those accumulated in front of engineering barriers to enemy tanks, competent placement of anti-tank strong points (No. 6 south of Korovin in the 71st Guards Rifle Division, No. 7 southwest of Cherkassky and No. 8 southeast of Cherkassky in the 67th Guards Rifle Division), rapid reorganization of the battle formations of the 196th Guards Battalions .sp (Colonel V.I. Bazhanov) in the direction of the enemy’s main attack south of Cherkassy, timely maneuver by the divisional (245 detachment, 1440 gap) and army (493 iptap, as well as the 27th brigade of Colonel N.D. Chevola) anti-tank reserve, relatively successful counterattacks on the flank of the wedged units of the 3rd TD and 11th TD with the involvement of forces of 245 detachment (Lieutenant Colonel M.K. Akopov, 39 tanks) and 1440 sap (Lieutenant Colonel Shapshinsky, 8 SU-76 and 12 SU-122), as well as not completely suppressed resistance of the remnants of the military outpost in the southern part of the village of Butovo (3 baht. 199th Guards Regiment, Captain V.L. Vakhidov) and in the area of workers’ barracks southwest of the village. Korovino, which were the starting positions for the offensive of the 48th Tank Corps (the capture of these starting positions was planned to be carried out by specially allocated forces of the 11th Tank Division and 332nd Infantry Division by the end of the day on July 4, that is, on the day of “X-1”, but the resistance of the combat outpost was never completely suppressed by dawn on July 5th). All of the above factors influenced both the speed of concentration of units in their initial positions before the main attack, and their progress during the offensive itself.

A machine gun crew fires at advancing German units

Also, the pace of the corps' advance was affected by the German command's shortcomings in planning the operation and poorly developed interaction between tank and infantry units. In particular, the “Greater Germany” division (W. Heyerlein, 129 tanks (of which 15 Pz.VI tanks), 73 self-propelled guns) and the 10 armored brigade attached to it (K. Decker, 192 combat and 8 Pz.V command tanks) in the current conditions The battle turned out to be clumsy and unbalanced formations. As a result, throughout the first half of the day, the bulk of the tanks were crowded in narrow “corridors” in front of engineering barriers (it was especially difficult to overcome the swampy anti-tank ditch south of Cherkasy), and came under a combined attack Soviet aviation(2nd VA) and artillery - from PTOP No. 6 and No. 7, 138 Guards Ap (Lieutenant Colonel M.I. Kirdyanov) and two regiments of the 33rd detachment (Colonel Stein), suffered losses (especially among officers), and not was able to deploy in accordance with the offensive schedule on tank-accessible terrain at the Korovino-Cherkasskoye line for a further attack in the direction of the northern outskirts of Cherkassy. At the same time, infantry units that had overcome anti-tank barriers in the first half of the day had to rely mainly on their own firepower. So, for example, the combat group of the 3rd battalion of the Fusilier Regiment, which was at the forefront of the attack of the VG division, at the time of the first attack found itself without tank support at all and suffered significant losses. Possessing huge armored forces, the VG division was actually unable to bring them into battle for a long time.

The resulting congestion on the advance routes also resulted in the untimely concentration of artillery units of the 48th Tank Corps in firing positions, which affected the results of artillery preparation before the start of the attack.

It should be noted that the commander of the 48th Tank Tank became hostage to a number of erroneous decisions of his superiors. Knobelsdorff's lack of an operational reserve had a particularly negative impact - all divisions of the corps were brought into battle almost simultaneously on the morning of July 5, after which they were drawn into active hostilities for a long time.

The development of the offensive of the 48th Tank Corps on the day of July 5 was greatly facilitated by: active actions of engineer-assault units, aviation support (more than 830 sorties) and overwhelming quantitative superiority in armored vehicles. It is also necessary to note the proactive actions of units of the 11th TD (I. Mikl) and 911th department. division of assault guns (overcoming a strip of engineering obstacles and reaching the eastern outskirts of Cherkassy with a mechanized group of infantry and sappers with the support of assault guns).

An important factor in the success of German tank units was the qualitative leap in the combat characteristics of German armored vehicles that occurred by the summer. Already during the first day of the defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge, the insufficient power of anti-tank weapons in service with the Soviet units was revealed when fighting both the new German tanks Pz.V and Pz.VI, and modernized tanks of older brands (about half of the Soviet anti-tank tanks were armed with 45-mm guns, the power of 76-mm Soviet field and American tank guns made it possible to effectively destroy modern or modernized enemy tanks at distances two to three times less than the effective firing range of the latter; heavy tank and self-propelled units at that time were practically absent not only in the combined arms 6th Guards A, but also in the 1st Tank Army of M.E. Katukov, which occupied the second line of defense behind it).

Only after the bulk of the tanks had overcome the anti-tank barriers south of Cherkassy in the afternoon, repelling a number of counterattacks by Soviet units, the units of the VG division and 11th Panzer Division were able to cling to the southeastern and southwestern outskirts of the village, after which the fighting moved into the street phase. At about 21:00, Divisional Commander A.I. Baksov gave the order to withdraw units of the 196th Guards Regiment to new positions to the north and northeast of Cherkassy, as well as to the center of the village. When units of the 196th Guards Regiment retreated, minefields were laid. At about 21:20, a combat group of grenadiers from the VG division, with the support of the Panthers of the 10th brigade, broke into the village of Yarki (north of Cherkassy). A little later, the 3rd Wehrmacht TD managed to capture the village of Krasny Pochinok (north of Korovino). Thus, the result of the day for the 48th Tank Tank of the Wehrmacht was a wedge into the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. And at 6 km, which can actually be considered a failure, especially against the backdrop of the results achieved by the evening of July 5 by the troops of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (operating to the east parallel to the 48th Tank Corps), which was less saturated with armored vehicles, which managed to break through the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. A.

Organized resistance in the village of Cherkasskoe was suppressed around midnight on July 5. However, German units were able to establish complete control over the village only by the morning of July 6, that is, when, according to the offensive plan, the corps was already supposed to approach Oboyan.

Thus, the 71st Guards SD and 67th Guards SD, not possessing large tank formations (at their disposal were only 39 American tanks of various modifications and 20 self-propelled guns from the 245th detachment and 1440 glanders) held in the area of the villages of Korovino and Cherkasskoe five for about a day enemy divisions (three of them are tank divisions). In the battle of July 5 in the Cherkassy region, the soldiers and commanders of the 196th and 199th Guards particularly distinguished themselves. rifle regiments of the 67th Guards. divisions. Competent and truly heroic actions of the soldiers and commanders of the 71st Guards SD and 67th Guards SD allowed the command of the 6th Guards. And in a timely manner, pull up army reserves to the place where units of the 48th Tank Corps are wedged at the junction of the 71st Guards SD and 67th Guards SD and prevent a general collapse of the defense of the Soviet troops in this area in the subsequent days of the defensive operation.

As a result of the hostilities described above, the village of Cherkasskoe virtually ceased to exist (according to post-war eyewitness accounts: “it was a lunar landscape”).

The heroic defense of the village of Cherkassk on July 5 - one of the most successful moments of the Battle of Kursk for the Soviet troops - unfortunately, is one of the undeservedly forgotten episodes of the Great Patriotic War.

July 6, 1943 Day two. First counterattacks.

By the end of the first day of the offensive, the 4th TA penetrated the defense of the 6th Guards. And to a depth of 5-6 km in the offensive sector of 48 TK (in the area of the village of Cherkasskoe) and at 12-13 km in the section of 2 TK SS (in the Bykovka - Kozmo-Demyanovka area). At the same time, the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (Obergruppenführer P. Hausser) managed to break through the entire depth of the first line of defense of the Soviet troops, pushing back units of the 52nd Guards SD (Colonel I.M. Nekrasov), and approached the front 5-6 km directly to the second line of defense occupied by the 51st Guards Rifle Division (Major General N. T. Tavartkeladze), entering into battle with its advanced units.

However, the right neighbor of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps - AG "Kempf" (W. Kempf) - did not complete the task of the day on July 5, encountering stubborn resistance from units of the 7th Guards. And, thereby exposing the right flank of the 4th Tank Army that had advanced forward. As a result, Hausser was forced from July 6 to July 8 to use a third of the forces of his corps, namely the Death's Head infantry division, to cover his right flank against the 375th Infantry Division (Colonel P. D. Govorunenko), whose units performed brilliantly in the battles of July 5 .

Nevertheless, the success achieved by the Leibstandarte divisions and especially Das Reich forced the command of the Voronezh Front, in conditions of not complete clarity of the situation, to take hasty retaliatory measures to plug the breakthrough that had formed in the second line of defense of the front. After the report of the commander of the 6th Guards. And Chistyakova about the state of affairs on the left flank of the army, Vatutin with his order transfers the 5th Guards. Stalingrad Tank (Major General A. G. Kravchenko, 213 tanks, of which 106 are T-34 and 21 are Mk.IV “Churchill”) and 2 Guards. Tatsinsky Tank Corps (Colonel A.S. Burdeyny, 166 combat-ready tanks, of which 90 are T-34 and 17 are Mk.IV Churchill) subordinate to the commander of the 6th Guards. And he approves of his proposal to launch counterattacks on the German tanks that broke through the positions of the 51st Guards SD with the forces of the 5th Guards. Stk and under the base of the entire advancing wedge 2 tk SS forces of 2 guards. Ttk (directly through the battle formations of the 375th Infantry Division). In particular, on the afternoon of July 6, I.M. Chistyakov assigned the commander of the 5th Guards. CT to Major General A. G. Kravchenko the task of withdrawing from the defensive area he occupied (in which the corps was already ready to meet the enemy using the tactics of ambushes and anti-tank strong points) the main part of the corps (two of three brigades and a heavy breakthrough tank regiment), and a counterattack by these forces on the flank of the Leibstandarte MD. Having received the order, the commander and headquarters of the 5th Guards. Stk, already knowing about the capture of the village. Lucky tanks from the Das Reich division, and more correctly assessing the situation, tried to challenge the execution of this order. However, under the threat of arrest and execution, they were forced to begin implementing it. The attack by the corps brigades was launched at 15:10.

Sufficient own artillery assets of the 5th Guards. The Stk did not have it, and the order did not leave time for coordinating the actions of the corps with its neighbors or aviation. Therefore, the attack of tank brigades was carried out without artillery preparation, without air support, on flat terrain and with practically open flanks. The blow fell directly on the forehead of the Das Reich MD, which regrouped, setting up tanks as an anti-tank barrier and, calling in aviation, inflicted a significant fire defeat on the brigades of the Stalingrad Corps, forcing them to stop the attack and go on the defensive. After this, having brought up anti-tank artillery and organized flank maneuvers, units of the Das Reich MD between 17 and 19 hours managed to reach the communications of the defending tank brigades in the area of the Kalinin farm, which was defended by 1696 zenaps (Major Savchenko) and 464 Guards Artillery, which had withdrawn from the village of Luchki. .division and 460 guards. mortar battalion 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade. By 19:00, units of the Das Reich MD actually managed to encircle most of the 5th Guards. Stk between the village. Luchki and the Kalinin farm, after which, building on the success, the command of the German division of part of the forces, acting in the direction of the station. Prokhorovka, tried to capture the Belenikhino crossing. However, thanks to the proactive actions of the commander and battalion commanders, the 20th Tank Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel P.F. Okhrimenko) remaining outside the encirclement of the 5th Guards. Stk, who managed to quickly create a tough defense around Belenikhino from various corps units that were at hand, managed to stop the offensive of the Das Reich MD, and even forced the German units to return back to x. Kalinin. Being without contact with corps headquarters, on the night of July 7, surrounded units of the 5th Guards. The Stk organized a breakthrough, as a result of which part of the forces managed to escape from the encirclement and linked up with units of the 20th Tank Brigade. During July 6, parts of the 5th Guards. Stk 119 tanks were irretrievably lost for combat reasons, another 9 tanks were lost for technical or unknown reasons, and 19 were sent for repairs. Not a single tank corps had such significant losses in one day during the entire defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge (the losses of the 5th Guards Stk on July 6 even exceeded the losses of 29 tanks during the attack on July 12 at the Oktyabrsky storage farm).

After being surrounded by 5th Guards. Stk, continuing the development of success in the northern direction, another detachment of the tank regiment MD "Das Reich", taking advantage of the confusion during the withdrawal of Soviet units, managed to reach the third (rear) line of the army defense, occupied by units 69A (Lieutenant General V.D. Kryuchenkin) , near the village of Teterevino, and for a short time wedged itself into the defense of the 285th infantry regiment of the 183rd infantry division, but due to the obvious insufficient strength, having lost several tanks, it was forced to retreat. The entry of German tanks to the third line of defense of the Voronezh Front on the second day of the offensive was regarded by the Soviet command as an emergency.

Battle of Prokhorovka

Belfry in memory of those killed on the Prokhorovsky field

Results of the defensive phase of the battle

The central front, involved in the battle in the north of the arc, suffered losses of 33,897 people from July 5-11, 1943, of which 15,336 were irrevocable, its enemy - Model’s 9th Army - lost 20,720 people during the same period. which gives a loss ratio of 1.64:1. The Voronezh and Steppe fronts, which took part in the battle on the southern front of the arc, lost from July 5-23, 1943, according to modern official estimates (2002), 143,950 people, of which 54,996 were irrevocable. Including the Voronezh Front alone - 73,892 total losses. However, the chief of staff of the Voronezh Front, Lieutenant General Ivanov, and the head of the operational department of the front headquarters, Major General Teteshkin, thought differently: they believed that the losses of their front were 100,932 people, of which 46,500 were irrevocable. If, contrary to Soviet documents from the war period, the official numbers are considered correct, then taking into account the German losses on the southern front of 29,102 people, the ratio of losses of the Soviet and German sides here is 4.95: 1.

During the period from July 5 to July 12, 1943, the Central Front consumed 1,079 wagons of ammunition, and the Voronezh Front used 417 wagons, almost two and a half times less.

The reason that the losses of the Voronezh Front so sharply exceeded the losses of the Central Front was due to the smaller massing of forces and assets in the direction of the German attack, which allowed the Germans to actually achieve an operational breakthrough on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge. Although the breakthrough was closed by the forces of the Steppe Front, it allowed the attackers to achieve favorable tactical conditions for their troops. It should be noted that only the absence of homogeneous independent tank formations did not give the German command the opportunity to concentrate its armored forces in the direction of the breakthrough and develop it in depth.

On the southern front, the counter-offensive by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began on August 3. On August 5, at approximately 18-00, Belgorod was liberated, on August 7 - Bogodukhov. Developing the offensive, Soviet troops cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway on August 11, and captured Kharkov on August 23. The German counterattacks were unsuccessful.

After the end of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the German command lost the opportunity to conduct strategic offensive operations. Local massive offensives such as "

From Kursk and Orel

The war has brought us

to the very enemy gates,

That's how things are, brother.

Someday we will remember this

And I won’t believe it myself,

And now we need one victory, One for all, we will not stand behind the price!

(lyrics from the movie "Belorussky Station")

TO at The Russian Battle, according to historians, was a turning point inGreat Patriotic War . More than six thousand tanks took part in the battles on the Kursk Bulge. This has never happened in world history, and probably never will happen again. The actions of the Soviet fronts on the Kursk Bulge were led by Marshals Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov and Vasilevsky.

Zhukov G.K. Vasilevsky A.M.

If the Battle of Stalingrad forced Berlin to plunge into mournful tones for the first time, then Battle of Kursk finally announced to the world that now the German soldier would only retreat. Not a single piece of native land will be given to the enemy! It is not for nothing that all historians, both civilian and military, agree on the same opinion - Battle of Kursk finally predetermined the outcome of the Great Patriotic War, and with it the outcome of the Second World War.

From a radio speech by the British Prime Minister W. Churchill : “I readily admit that most of the Allied military operations in the West in 1943 could not have been carried out in the form and time in which they were carried out, if not forheroic, magnificent exploits and victories of the Russian army , who defends her native land, subjected to a cowardly, unprovoked attack, with unprecedented energy, skill and devotion, protects at a terrible price - the price of Russian blood.

No government in the history of mankind would have been able to survive such severe and cruel wounds that Hitler inflicted on Russia...Russia not only survived and recovered from these terrible wounds, but also inflicted military vehicle fatal damage. No other power in the world could do this.”

Historical parallels

The Kursk confrontation took place 07/05/1943 - 08/23/1943 on the primordially Russian Land, over which the great noble prince Alexander Nevsky once held his shield. His prophetic warning to the Western conquerors (who came to us with a sword) about imminent death from the onslaught of the Russian sword that met them once again took effect. It is characteristic that the Kursk Bulge was somewhat similar to the battle fought by Prince Alexander the Teutonic Knights on Lake Peipsi on April 5, 1242. Of course, the armament of the armies, the scale and time of these two battles are incommensurable. But the scenario of both battles is somewhat similar: the Germans tried with their main forces to break through the Russian battle formation in the center, but were crushed by the offensive actions of the flanks. If we pragmatically try to say what makes the Kursk Bulge unique, a brief summary will be as follows: unprecedented in history (before and after) operational-tactical density on 1 km of front. - Read more at

The Battle of Kursk is the beginning.

“...On the eve of the Battle of Kursk, we were transferred to the city of Orel as part of the 125th special communications battalion. By that time there was nothing left of the city; I remember only two surviving buildings - a church and a train station. In some places on the outskirts some sheds have been preserved. Piles of broken bricks, not a single tree in the whole huge city, constant shelling and bombing. At the temple there was a priest and several female singers who remained with him. In the evening, our entire battalion, together with its commanders, gathered in the church, and the priest began to serve a prayer service. We knew that we had to attack the next day. Remembering their relatives, many cried. Scary…

There were three of us radio operator girls. The rest of the men: signalmen, reel-to-reel operators. Our task is to establish the most important thing - communication, without communication it’s the end. I can’t say how many of us were alive; at night we were scattered along the entire front, but I think it was not many. Our losses were very large. The Lord has preserved me..." ( Osharina Ekaterina Mikhailovna (Mother Sofia))

This is where it all began! The morning of July 5, 1943, the silence over the steppes is living out the last moments, someone is praying, someone is writing the last lines of a letter to their beloved, someone is simply enjoying another moment of life. A few hours before the German offensive, a wall of lead and fire collapsed on the Wehrmacht positions.Operation Citadelreceived the first hole. An artillery strike was carried out along the entire front line on German positions. The essence of this warning strike was not so much in causing damage to the enemy, but in psychology. Psychologically broken German troops went on the attack. The original plan was no longer working. In a day of stubborn fighting, the Germans were able to advance 5-6 kilometers! And these are unsurpassed tacticians and strategists, whose savvy boots trampled European soil! Five kilometers! Every meter, every centimeter of Soviet land was given to the aggressor with incredible losses, with inhuman labor.

(Volynkin Alexander Stepanovich)

The main blow of the German troops fell in the direction of Maloarkhangelsk - Olkhovatka - Gnilets. The German command sought to get to Kursk along the shortest route. However, it was not possible to break the 13th Soviet Army. The Germans threw up to 500 tanks into battle, including a new development, the Tiger heavy tank. It was not possible to disorient the Soviet troops with a wide offensive front. The retreat was well organized, the lessons of the first months of the war were taken into account, and besides, the German command was unable to offer anything new in offensive operations. And it was no longer possible to count on the high morale of the Nazis. Soviet soldiers defended their country, and the warrior-heroes were simply invincible. How can we not remember the Prussian king Frederick II, who was the first to say that a Russian soldier can be killed, but impossible to defeat! Maybe if the Germans had listened to their great ancestor, this catastrophe called the World War would not have happened.

Lasted only six days Operation Citadel, for six days the German units tried to move forward, and all these six days the steadfastness and courage of an ordinary Soviet soldier thwarted all the enemy’s plans.

July, 12 Kursk Bulge found a new, full-fledged owner. Troops of two Soviet fronts, Bryansk and Western, began an offensive operation against German positions. This date can be taken as the beginning of the end of the Third Reich. From that day until the end of the war, German weapons no longer knew the joy of victory. Now the Soviet army was fighting an offensive war, a war of liberation. During the offensive, the cities were liberated: Orel, Belgorod, Kharkov. German attempts to counterattack had no success. It was no longer the power of weapons that determined the outcome of the war, but its spirituality, its purpose. Soviet heroes liberated their land, and nothing could stop this force; it seemed that the land itself was helping the soldiers, going and going, liberating city after city, village after village.

The Battle of Kursk is the greatest tank battle.

Neither before nor after, the world has known such a battle. More than 1,500 tanks on both sides throughout the entire day of July 12, 1943, fought the hardest battles on a narrow patch of land near the village of Prokhorovka. Initially, inferior to the Germans in the quality of tanks and in quantity, Soviet tankers covered their names with endless glory! People burned in tanks, were blown up by mines, the armor could not withstand German shells, but the battle continued. At that moment nothing else existed, neither tomorrow nor yesterday! The dedication of the Soviet soldier, who once again surprised the world, did not allow the Germans to either win the battle itself or strategically improve their positions.

“...We suffered at the Kursk Bulge. Our 518th Fighter Regiment was defeated. The pilots died, and those who survived were sent to reformation. That’s how we ended up in aircraft workshops and began repairing airplanes. We repaired them in the field, and during bombing, and during shelling. And so on until we were mobilized..."( Kustova Agrippina Ivanovna)

“...Our artillery guards anti-tank fighter division under the command of Captain Leshchin has been in formation and combat exercises since April 1943 near Belgrade, Kursk region, to master new military equipment - 76-caliber anti-tank guns.

I took part in the battles on the Kursk Bulge as the head of the division's radio, which ensured communication between the command and the batteries. The division command ordered me and other artillerymen to remove the remaining damaged equipment, as well as wounded and killed soldiers, from the battlefield at night. For this feat, all survivors were awarded high Government awards; those who died were awarded posthumously.

I remember well, on the night of July 20-21, 1943, on a combat alert, we quickly set out on the road to the village of Ponyri and began to take up firing positions in order to delay the fascist tank column. The density of anti-tank weapons was the highest - 94 guns and mortars. The Soviet command, having quite accurately determined the direction of the German attacks, was able to concentrate a large amount of anti-tank artillery on them. At 4.00 a rocket signal was given and artillery preparation began, which lasted about 30 minutes. German tanks T-4 "Panther", T-6 "Tiger", self-propelled guns "Ferdinand" and other artillery mortar guns in the amount of more than 60 barrels rushed to our combat positions. An unequal battle ensued, and our division also took part in it, destroying 13 fascist tanks, but all 12 guns and crew were crushed under the tracks of German tanks.

Of my fellow soldiers, I remember the most from the Guard, Senior Lieutenant Alexei Azarov - he knocked out 9 enemy tanks, for which he was awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The commander of the second battery, guard Lieutenant Kardybaylo, knocked out 4 enemy tanks and was awarded the Order of Lenin.

The Battle of Kursk was won. In the very convenient location For the offensive, the German army was waiting for a trap that was capable of crushing the armored fist of the fascist divisions. There was no doubt about victory; even before the start of the defensive operation, Soviet military leaders were planning a further offensive..."

(Sokolov Anatoly Mikhailovich)

The role of intelligence

From the beginning of 1943, in interceptions of secret messages from the High Command of Hitler's army and secret directives of A. Hitler increasingly mentioned Operation Citadel. According to the memoirs of A. Mikoyan, back on March 27 he was informed in general details. V. Stalin on German plans. On April 12, the exact text of Directive No. 6, translated from German, “On the plan for Operation Citadel” of the German High Command, endorsed by all Wehrmacht services, but not yet signed by Hitler, who signed it only three days later, was placed on Stalin’s desk.

There are several versions regarding the sources of information.

Central Front

The Central Command inspects damaged German equipment. Front commander in the centerK.K. Rokossovsky and commander 16th VA S. I. Rudenko. July 1943.

V.I. Kazakov, commander of the artillery of the Central Front, speaking about counter-artillery preparation, noted that it:

was an integral and, in essence, the dominant part of the general counter-preparation, which pursued the goal of disrupting the enemy’s offensive.

In the TF zone (13A), the main efforts were concentrated on suppressing the enemy artillery group and observation points (OP), including artillery ones. This group of objects accounted for more than 80% of the planned targets. This choice was explained by the presence in the army of powerful means of combating enemy artillery, more reliable data on the position of its artillery group, the relatively small width of the expected strike zone (30-40 km), as well as the high density of battle formations of the divisions of the first echelon of the Central Front troops, which determined their greater sensitivity (vulnerability) to artillery strikes. By delivering a powerful fire strike on German artillery positions and OP, it was possible to significantly weaken and disorganize the enemy’s artillery preparation and ensure the survivability of the army’s first echelon troops to repel the attacking tanks and infantry.

Voronezh Front

In the VF zone (6th Guards A and 7th Guards A), the main efforts were aimed at suppressing infantry and tanks in the areas where they were likely to be located, which accounted for about 80% of all targets hit. This was due to a wider range of probable enemy strikes (up to 100 km), greater sensitivity of the defense of the first echelon troops to tank attacks, and fewer means of combating enemy artillery in the VF armies. It was also possible that on the night of July 5, part of the enemy artillery would change their firing positions during the withdrawal of the combat outposts of the 71st and 67th Guards. sd. Thus, the VF artillerymen primarily sought to inflict damage on tanks and infantry, that is, the main force of the German attack, and suppress only the most active enemy batteries (reliably reconnoitered).

“We will stand like Panfilov’s men”

On August 17, 1943, the armies of the Steppe Front (SF) approached Kharkov, starting a battle on its outskirts. 53 A Managarova I.M. acted energetically, and especially her 89 Guards. SD Colonel M.P. Seryugin and 305th SD Colonel A.F. Vasiliev. Marshal G.K. Zhukov in his book “Memories and Reflections” wrote:

“...The most fierce battle took place over height 201.7 in the Polevoy area, which was captured by a combined company of the 299th Infantry Division consisting of 16 people under the command of Senior Lieutenant V.P. Petrishchev.

When only seven people remained alive, the commander, turning to the soldiers, said: “Comrades, we will stand at the height as Panfilov’s men stood at Dubosekov.” We will die, but we will not retreat!

And they didn’t back down. The heroic fighters held the height until the division units arrived. For courage and heroism, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, senior lieutenant V.P. Petrishchev, junior lieutenant V.V. Zhenchenko, senior sergeant G.P. Polikanov and sergeant V.E. Breusov were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The rest were awarded orders."

- Zhukov GK. Memories and reflections.

Progress of the battle. Defense

The closer the start date for Operation Citadel approached, the more difficult it was to hide its preparations. Already a few days before the start of the offensive, the Soviet command received a signal that it would begin on July 5th. From intelligence reports it became known that the enemy attack was scheduled for 3 o'clock. The headquarters of the Central (commander K. Rokossovsky) and Voronezh (commander N. Vatutin) fronts decided to fire artillery on the night of July 5 counter-preparation. It started at 1 o'clock. 10 min . After the roar of the cannonade subsided, the Germans could not come to their senses for a long time. As a result of the artillery shelling carried out in advance counter-preparations in areas where enemy strike forces were concentrated, German troops suffered losses and began the offensive 2.5-3 hours later planned time Only after some time were German troops able to begin their own artillery and aviation training. The attack by German tanks and infantry formations began at about half past six in the morning.

The German command pursued the goal of breaking through the defenses of Soviet troops with a ramming attack and reaching Kursk. In the Central Front, the main enemy attack was taken by the troops of the 13th Army. On the very first day, the Germans brought up to 500 tanks into battle here. On the second day, the command of the Central Front troops launched a counterattack against the advancing group with part of the forces of the 13th and 2nd Tank Armies and the 19th Tank Corps. The German offensive here was delayed, and on July 10 it was finally thwarted. In six days of fighting, the enemy penetrated the defenses of the Central Front only 10-12 km.

“...Our unit was located in the deserted village of Novolipitsy, 10 - 12 km from the forward positions, and began active combat training and construction of defensive lines. The proximity of the front was felt: artillery thundered in the west, flares flashed at night. There were often air battles above us, and downed planes fell. Soon our division, like our neighboring formations, staffed mainly by cadets from military schools, turned into a well-trained “guards” combat unit.

When Hitler’s offensive began in the direction of Kursk on July 5, we were transferred closer to the front line to reserve positions in order to be ready to repel the enemy’s onslaught. But we didn't have to defend ourselves. On the night of July 11, we replaced the thinned out units in need of rest at one of the bridgeheads on the western bank of Zushi near the village of Vyazhi. On the morning of July 12, after a powerful artillery barrage, an attack on the city of Orel began (at the site of this breakthrough, near the village of Vyazhi, 8 km from Novosil, a monument was built after the war).

The memory has preserved many episodes of heavy battles that took place on the ground and in the air...

On command, we quickly jump out of the trenches and shout “Hurray!” We attack enemy positions. The first losses were from enemy bullets and in minefields. Now we are already in well-equipped enemy trenches, using machine guns and grenades. The first killed German is a red-haired guy, with a machine gun in one hand and a coil of telephone wire in the other... Having quickly overcome several lines of trenches, we liberate the first village. There was some kind of enemy headquarters, ammunition depots... In the field kitchens there was still a warm breakfast for German soldiers. Following the infantry, which had done its job, tanks entered the breakthrough, firing on the move and dashing forward past us.

In the following days the fighting took place almost continuously; our troops, despite enemy counterattacks, stubbornly advanced towards the goal. Before our eyes even now are the fields of tank battles, where sometimes even at night there was light from dozens of flaming vehicles. The battles of our fighter pilots are unforgettable - there were few of them, but they bravely attacked the Junkers wedges that were trying to bomb our troops. I remember the deafening crack of exploding shells and mines, fires, mutilated earth, corpses of people and animals, the persistent smell of gunpowder and burning, constant nervous tension, from which a short sleep could not save.

In battle, a person’s fate and his life depend on many accidents. In those days of fierce battles for Orel, it was pure chance that saved me several times.

During one of the marches, our marching column came under intense artillery fire. On command, we rushed to cover, a roadside ditch, lay down, and suddenly, two or three meters from me, a shell pierced the ground, but did not explode, but only showered me with earth. Another case: on a hot day, already on the approaches to Orel, our battery provides active support to the advancing infantry. All mines have been used up. People are very tired and very thirsty. A well crane sticks out about three hundred meters from us. The sergeant major orders me and another soldier to collect our pots and go get water. Before we had time to crawl 100 meters, a barrage of fire fell on our positions - mines from heavy six-barreled German mortars were exploding. The enemy's aim was accurate! After the raid, many of my comrades died, many were wounded or shell-shocked, and some of the mortars were out of action. It looks like this “water outfit” saved my life.

A few days later, having suffered heavy losses in manpower and equipment, our unit was withdrawn from the combat area and settled in the forest, east of the city Karachev, for rest and reformation. Here, many soldiers and officers received government awards for their participation in the fighting near Orel and the liberation of the city. I was awarded the medal "For Courage".

The defeat of the German troops on the Kursk Bulge and the high appreciation of this military feat made us very happy, but we could not and cannot forget our comrades in arms who are no longer with us. Let us always remember the soldiers who gave their lives in the national Patriotic War, fighting for the freedom and independence of our Fatherland!..” (Sluka Alexander Evgenievich)

The first surprise for the German command on both the southern and northern flanks of the Kursk salient was that the Soviet soldiers were not afraid of the appearance of new German Tiger and Panther tanks on the battlefield. Moreover, the Soviet anti-tank artillery and tank guns buried in the ground opened effective fire on German armored vehicles. And yet, the thick armor of German tanks allowed them to break through the Soviet defenses in some areas and penetrate the battle formations of the Red Army units. However, there was no quick breakthrough. Having overcome the first defensive line, the German tank units were forced to turn to sappers for help: all the spaces between the positions were densely mined, and the passages in the minefields were well shot through artillery. While the German tank crews were waiting for the sappers, their combat vehicles were subjected to massive fire. Soviet aviation managed to maintain air supremacy. More and more often, Soviet attack aircraft – the famous Il-2 – appeared over the battlefield.

“...The heat was very intense and dry. There is nowhere to hide from the heat. And during the battles the ground stood on end. The tanks are advancing, the artillery is showering with heavy fire, and the Junkers and Messerschmitts are attacking from the sky. I still cannot forget the terrible dust that stood in the air and seemed to penetrate into all the cells of the body. Yes, plus smoke, fumes, soot. On the Kursk Bulge, the Nazis threw new, more powerful and heavier tanks and self-propelled guns - “tigers” and “Ferdinands” - against our army. The shells of our guns ricocheted off the armor of these vehicles. We had to use more powerful artillery pieces and cannons. We already had new 57-mm ZIS-2 anti-tank guns and improved artillery pieces.

It must be said that even before the battle, during tactical exercises, we were told about these new Hitler machines and shown their weak, vulnerable spots. And in battle I had to undergo practice. The attacks were so powerful and strong that our guns became hot and had to be cooled with wet rags.

It happened that it was impossible to stick my head out of the shelter. But, despite the constant attacks and incessant battles, we found strength, endurance, patience and fought back the enemy. Only the price was very expensive. How many soldier died - no one can count. Very few survived.And every survivor deserves a reward..."

(Tishkov Vasily Ivanovich)

In the first day of fighting alone, Model's group, operating on the northern flank of the Kursk salient, lost up to 2/3 of the 300 tanks that took part in the first strike. Soviet losses were also high: only two companies of German “Tigers” advancing against the forces of the Central Front destroyed 111 T-34 tanks during the period July 5–6. By July 7, the Germans, having advanced several kilometers forward, approached the large settlement of Ponyri, where a powerful battle ensued between the shock units 20, 2 And 9- thGermantankdivisionsWithconnectionsSoviet 2- thtankAnd 13- tharmies. Bottom linethisbattlesbecameextremelyunexpectedForGermancommand. Having lostbefore 50 thousand. HumanAndnear 400 tanks, northernpercussiongroupingwasforcedstay. Having advancedforwardTotalon 10 – 15 km, ModelVin the endlostpercussionpowertheirtankpartsAndlostpossibilitiescontinueoffensive. ThemtimeonsouthernwingKurskledgeeventsdevelopedByto anotherscript. TO 8 JulydrumsdivisionsGermanicmotorizedconnections« GreatGermany» , « Reich» , « Deadhead» , Leibstandarte« AdolfHitler» , severaltankdivisions 4- thtankarmyGothaAndgroups« Kempf» managedwedge inVSovietdefensebefore 20 Andmorekm. OffensiveoriginallywentVdirectionpopulatedpointOboyan, Butthen, due tostrongcounteractionSoviet 1- thtankarmy, 6- thGuardsarmyAndothersassociationsonthisarea, commandinggrouparmies« South» backgroundMansteinacceptedsolutionhitto the east– VdirectionProkhorovka. ExactlyatthispopulatedpointAndstartedthe mostbigtankbattleSecondworldwars, VwhichWithbothpartiesacceptedparticipationbeforeTHOUSANDSTWO HUNDREDTANKSAndself-propelledguns.

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“... A policeman rounded us up, 10 teenagers, with shovels and took us to Big Oak. When they arrived at the place, they saw a terrible picture: between the burnt hut and the barn, people were lying shot. Many had their faces and clothes burned. They were doused with gasoline before being burned. Two female corpses lay to the side. They clutched their children to their chests. One of them hugged the child, wrapping the little one in the hollow of her fur coat...”(Arbuzov Pavel Ivanovich)

Of all the victories of 1943, it was decisive in ensuring a radical turning point during the Great Patriotic War and the 2nd World War, which ended with the liberation of Left Bank Ukraine and the destruction of enemy defenses on the Dnieper at the end of 1943. The fascist German command was forced to abandon the offensive strategy and go on the defensive along the entire front. He had to transfer troops and aircraft from the Mediterranean theater of operations to the Eastern Front, which facilitated the landing of Anglo-American troops in Sicily and Italy. The Battle of Kursk was a triumph of Soviet military art.

In the 50-day Battle of Kursk, up to 30 enemy divisions were defeated, including 7 tank divisions. The total losses of the Nazi troops in killed, seriously wounded and missing amounted to over 500 thousand people. The Soviet Air Force finally gained air supremacy. The successful completion of the Battle of Kursk was facilitated by the active actions of the partisans on the eve of and during the Battle of Kursk. Striking the enemy's rear, they pinned down up to 100 thousand enemy soldiers and officers. The partisans carried out 1,460 raids on the railway line, disabled over 1,000 locomotives and destroyed over 400 military trains.

Memoirs of the participants of the Kursk Bulge

Ryzhikov Grigory Afanasyevich:

“We thought that we would win anyway!”

Grigory Afanasyevich was born in the Ivanovo region, at the age of 18 he was drafted into the Red Army in 1942. Among 25 thousand recruits, he was sent to Kostroma to the 22nd training brigade to study “military science”. With the rank of junior sergeant, he went to the front in the ranks of the 17th Motorized Rifle Guards Red Banner Brigade

“They brought us to the front,” recalls Grigory Afanasyevich, “and unloaded us. Railway, apparently, was far from the front line, so we walked for a day, we were fed only once with hot food. We walked day and night, we didn’t know that we were going to Kursk. They knew that they were going to war, to the front, but they didn’t know where exactly. We saw a lot of equipment coming: cars, motorcycles, tanks. The German fought very well. It would seem that he is in a hopeless situation, but he still does not give up! In one place the Germans took a fancy to a house; they even had garden beds with cucumbers and tobacco; apparently they planned to stay there for a long time. But we didn't intend to give them ours native land and fought hot battles all day long. The Nazis stubbornly resisted, but we moved forward: sometimes we won’t move in a whole day, and sometimes we’ll win back half a kilometer. When they went on the attack, they shouted: “Hurray! For the Motherland! For Stalin!" It helped our morale."

Near Kursk, Grigory Afanasyevich was the commander of a machine gun squad; one day he had to position himself with a machine gun in the rye. In July it is flat, high, and so reminiscent of peaceful life, home comfort and hot bread with a golden brown crust... But the wonderful memories were crossed out by the war with the terrible death of people, burning tanks, blazing villages. So we had to trample the rye under soldiers’ boots, drive over it with the heavy wheels of cars, and mercilessly tear off its ears that were wound around a machine gun. On July 27, Grigory Afanasyevich was wounded in his right arm and was sent to the hospital. After recovery, he fought near Yelnya, then in Belarus, and was wounded twice more.

The news of the victory was already received in Czechoslovakia. Our soldiers celebrated, sang to the accordion, and whole columns of captured Germans walked past.

Junior Sergeant Ryzhikov was demobilized from Romania in the fall of 1945. He returned to his native village, worked on a collective farm, and started a family. Then he went to work on the construction of the Gorky hydroelectric power station, from where he already came to build the Votkinsk hydroelectric power station.

Now Grigory Afanasyevich already has 4 grandchildren and a great-granddaughter. He loves to work on garden plot, if his health allows, he is keenly interested in what is happening in the country and the world, and worries that “our people are not very lucky” at the Olympics. Grigory Afanasyevich modestly assesses his role in the war, says that he served “like everyone else,” but thanks to people like him, our country won a great victory so that the next generations could live in a free and peaceful country.

Telenev Yuri Vasilievich:

“Back then we didn’t even think about awards”

Yuri Vasilyevich lived his entire pre-war life in the Urals. In the summer of 1942, at 18 years old, he was drafted into the army. In the spring of 1943, having completed a crash course at the 2nd Leningrad Military Infantry School, evacuatedThen in the city of Glazov, junior lieutenant Yuri Telenev was appointed commander of a platoon of anti-tank guns and sent to the Kursk Bulge.

“On the sector of the front where the battle was to take place, the Germans were on high ground, and we were on low ground, in plain sight. They tried to bomb us - the strongest artillery attack lasted approx.for about an hour, there was a terrible roar all around, no voices could be heard, so I had to scream. But we did not give up and responded in kind: on the German side, shells exploded, tanks burned, everythingcovered in smoke. Then our shock army went on the attack, we were in the trenches, they stepped over us, then we followed them. The crossing of the Oka River began, only the
infantry. The Germans began to shoot at the crossing, but since they were suppressed and paralyzed by our resistance, they shot randomly and without aim. Having crossed the river, we joined the fightingReleased settlements, where the Nazis still remained"

Yuri Vasilyevich proudly says that after the Battle of Stalingrad, the Soviet soldiers were only in the mood for victory, no one doubted that we would defeat the Germans anyway, and the victory in the Battle of Kursk was another proof of this.

On the Kursk Bulge, junior lieutenant Telenev, using an anti-tank rifle, shot down an enemy aircraft "Henkel-113", popularly called a "crutch", for which, after the victory, he was awarded the Order of the Great Patriotic War. “During the war, we didn’t even think about awards, and there was no such fashion,” recalls Yuri Vasilyevich. In general, he considers himself a lucky man, because he was wounded near Kursk. If it was wounded and not killed, it is already a great happiness for the infantry. After the battles, there were no entire regiments left - a company or a platoon.“They were young,” says Yuri Vasilyevich, “reckless,at 19 years old we were not afraid of anything, got used to danger. Yes, you can’t protect yourself from a bullet if it’s yours.” . After being wounded, he was sent to a Kirov hospital, and when he recovered, he went to the front again, and until the end of 1944 he fought on the 2nd Belorussian Front.

Before the New Year 1945, Lieutenant Telenev was demobilized due to a severe arm wound. Therefore, I met victory in the rear, in Omsk. There he worked as a military instructor at a school and studied at a music school. A few years later, he moved with his wife and children to Votkinsk, and later to the very young Tchaikovsky, where he taught at a music school and was an instrument tuner.

Volodin Semyon Fedorovich

The events of those days will be remembered for a long time when the fate of the war was decided on the Kursk Bulge, when Lieutenant Volodin’s company held a small piece of land between a birch hill and the stadium in the village of Solomki. From what I had to go through to the young commander on the first day of the Battle of Kursk, the most memorable thing was the retreat: not the very moment when the company, which had repulsed six tank attacks, left the trench, but another night road. He walked at the head of his “company” - twenty surviving soldiers, remembering all the details...

For about an hour, the Junkers continuously bombed the village, as soon as one batch flew away, another appeared in the sky, and everything was repeated all over again - the deafening roar of exploding bombs, the whistling of fragments and thick, choking dust. The fighters were chasing the fighters, and the roar of their engines, like a groan, layered above the ground, when the German artillery began to fire and at the edge of the forest, in front of the buckwheat field, a black tank diamond appeared again.

A heavy and smoky military dawn was rising ahead: in an hour the battalion would take up defense on the high-rises, and in another hour everything would start all over again: an air raid, artillery cannonade, rapidly approaching boxes of tanks; everything will repeat itself - the whole battle, but with great ferocity, with an irresistible thirst for victory.

Within seven days they were to see other crossings, other gatherings along the banks of Russian rivers - accumulations of wrecked German vehicles, corpses of German soldiers, and he, Lieutenant Volodin, would say that this was fair retribution that the Nazis deserved.

Volynkin Alexander Stepanovich

In August 1942, a 17-year-old boy was drafted into the Red Army. He was sent to study at the Omsk Infantry School, but Sasha could not graduate. He signed up as a volunteer and received baptism of fire near Vyazma, Smolensk region. The smart guy was immediately noticed. How can you not notice a young fighter who has a sure eye and a steady hand. This is how Alexander Stepanovich became a sniper.

“- It’s impossible to remember the battle on the Kursk Bulge without shuddering - it’s terrible! The sky was filled with smoke, houses, fields, tanks, and combat positions were burning. The thunder of cannonade on both sides. And in such heavy fire,” the veteran recalled, “fate protected me. I remember this incident: we, three snipers, chose positions on the slope of the ravine, began to dig trenches, and suddenly there was a barrage of fire. We quickly fell into one half-dug trench. The owner of the trench was below, I fell on him, and my neighbor fell on me. a burst from a large-caliber machine gun at our shelter... The owner of the trench was immediately killed, the soldier who was above me was wounded, but I remained unharmed. Apparently fate..."

Alexander Stepanovich received a medal for the battle on the Kursk Bulge“For Courage” is an award most revered among front-line soldiers.

Osharina Ekaterina Mikhailovna (Mother Sofia)

Smetanin Alexander

“...For me, this battle began with a retreat. We retreated for several days. And before the decisive battle, breakfast was brought to our crew. For some reason I remember it well - four crackers and two unripe watermelons, they were still white. Back then they couldn’t provide us with anything better. At dawn, huge black clouds of smoke appeared on the horizon from the Germans. We stood motionless. Nobody knew anything - neither the company commander nor the platoon commander. We just stood there. I am a machine gunner and I saw the world through a two and a half centimeter hole. But I saw only dust and smoke. And then the tank commander commands: “Sour cream, fire.” I started shooting. For whom, where - I don’t know. At about 11 o'clock in the morning we were ordered "forward". We rushed forward, shooting as we went. Then there was a stop, they brought us shells. And again forward. The roar, the gunfire, the smoke - that's all my memories. I would be lying if I said that everything was clear to me then - the scale and significance of the battle. Well, the next day, July 13, a shell hit us on the starboard side. I received 22 shrapnel in my leg. This is what my Battle of Kursk was like..."

Oh, Russia! A country with a difficult fate.

I have you, Russia, like my heart, alone.

I will tell a friend, I will tell an enemy too -

Without you it's like without a heart, I can't live!

(Yulia Drunina)

The Battle of Kursk (Battle of the Kursk Bulge), which lasted from July 5 to August 23, 1943, is one of the key battles of the Great Patriotic War. In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide the battle into three parts: the Kursk defensive operation (July 5-23); Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive.

During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine, a protrusion up to 150 kilometers deep and up to 200 kilometers wide, facing west (the so-called “Kursk Bulge”), formed in the center of the Soviet-German front. The German command decided to conduct a strategic operation on the Kursk salient. For this purpose, a military operation codenamed “Citadel” was developed and approved in April 1943. Having information about the preparation of the Nazi troops for an offensive, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to temporarily go on the defensive on the Kursk Bulge and, during the defensive battle, bleed the enemy’s strike forces and thereby create favorable conditions for the Soviet troops to launch a counteroffensive, and then a general strategic offensive .

To carry out Operation Citadel, the German command concentrated 50 divisions in the sector, including 18 tank and motorized divisions. The enemy group, according to Soviet sources, numbered about 900 thousand people, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars, about 2.7 thousand tanks and more than 2 thousand aircraft. Air support for the German troops was provided by the forces of the 4th and 6th air fleets.

By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Supreme High Command headquarters had created a grouping (Central and Voronezh fronts) with more than 1.3 million people, up to 20 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3,300 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,650 aircraft. The troops of the Central Front (commander - General of the Army Konstantin Rokossovsky) defended the northern front of the Kursk ledge, and the troops of the Voronezh Front (commander - General of the Army Nikolai Vatutin) - the southern front. The troops occupying the ledge relied on the Steppe Front, consisting of rifle, 3 tank, 3 motorized and 3 cavalry corps (commanded by Colonel General Ivan Konev). The coordination of the actions of the fronts was carried out by representatives of the Headquarters Marshals of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky.

On July 5, 1943, German attack groups, according to the Operation Citadel plan, launched an attack on Kursk from the Orel and Belgorod areas. From Orel, a group under the command of Field Marshal Gunther Hans von Kluge (Army Group Center) was advancing, and from Belgorod, a group under the command of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein (Operational Group Kempf, Army Group South).

The task of repelling the attack from Orel was entrusted to the troops of the Central Front, and from Belgorod - the Voronezh Front.

On July 12, in the area of the Prokhorovka railway station, 56 kilometers north of Belgorod, the largest oncoming tank battle of the Second World War took place - a battle between the advancing enemy tank group (Task Force Kempf) and the counterattacking Soviet troops. On both sides, up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part in the battle. The fierce battle lasted all day; by evening, tank crews and infantry were fighting hand-to-hand. In one day, the enemy lost about 10 thousand people and 400 tanks and was forced to go on the defensive.

On the same day, the troops of the Bryansk, Central and left wings of the Western Front began Operation Kutuzov, which had the goal of defeating the enemy’s Oryol group. On July 13, troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts broke through the enemy’s defenses in the Bolkhov, Khotynets and Oryol directions and advanced to a depth of 8 to 25 km. On July 16, the troops of the Bryansk Front reached the line of the Oleshnya River, after which the German command began to withdraw its main forces to their original positions. By July 18, the troops of the right wing of the Central Front had completely eliminated the enemy wedge in the Kursk direction. On the same day, troops of the Steppe Front were brought into the battle and began pursuing the retreating enemy.

Developing the offensive, the Soviets ground troops, supported by air strikes from the 2nd and 17th Air Armies, as well as long-range aviation, by August 23, 1943, pushed the enemy back 140-150 km to the west, liberating Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov. According to Soviet sources, the Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including 7 tank divisions, over 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns. Soviet losses exceeded German losses; they amounted to 863 thousand people. Near Kursk, the Red Army lost about 6 thousand tanks.

In the summer of 1943, one of the most grandiose and important battles of the Great Patriotic War took place - the Battle of Kursk. The Nazis’ dream of revenge for Stalingrad, for the defeat near Moscow, resulted in one of the most key battles, on which the outcome of the war depended.

Total mobilization - selected generals, the best soldiers and officers, the latest weapons, guns, tanks, airplanes - this was Adolf Hitler's order - to prepare for the most important battle and not just win, but do it spectacularly, demonstrably, taking revenge for all previous lost battles . A matter of prestige.

(In addition, it was precisely as a result of the successful Operation Citadel that Hitler assumed the opportunity to negotiate a truce from the Soviet side. German generals repeatedly stated this.)

It was for the Battle of Kursk that the Germans prepared a military gift for Soviet military designers - a powerful and invulnerable Tiger tank, which there was simply nothing to resist. Its impenetrable armor was no match for Soviet-designed anti-tank guns, and new anti-tank guns had not yet been developed. During meetings with Stalin, Marshal of Artillery Voronov said literally the following: “We do not have guns capable of successfully fighting these tanks.”

The Battle of Kursk began on July 5 and ended on August 23, 1943. Every year on August 23, Russia celebrates the “Day of Military Glory of Russia - the Day of Victory of Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk.”

Moiarussia has collected the most Interesting Facts about this great confrontation:

Operation Citadel

In April 1943, Hitler approved a military operation codenamed Zitadelle (“Citadel”). To carry it out, a total of 50 divisions were involved, including 16 tank and motorized divisions; more than 900 thousand German soldiers, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, 2 thousand 245 tanks and assault guns, 1 thousand 781 aircraft. The location of the operation is the Kursk salient.

German sources wrote: “The Kursk ledge seemed especially suitable place to deliver such a blow. As a result of the simultaneous offensive of German troops from the north and south, a powerful group of Russian troops will be cut off. They also hoped to destroy those operational reserves that the enemy would bring into battle. In addition, the elimination of this ledge will significantly shorten the front line... True, some even then argued that the enemy was expecting a German offensive in this area and... that therefore there was a danger of losing more of their forces than inflicting losses on the Russians... However, it was impossible to convince Hitler , and he believed that Operation Citadel would be a success if undertaken soon."

The Germans prepared for the Battle of Kursk for a long time. Its start was postponed twice: the guns were not ready, the new tanks were not delivered, and the new aircraft did not have time to pass tests. On top of that, Hitler feared that Italy was about to leave the war. Convinced that Mussolini was not going to give up, Hitler decided to stick to the original plan. The fanatical Hitler believed that if you strike in the place where the Red Army was strongest and crush the enemy in this battle, then

“The victory at Kursk,” he said, “will capture the imagination of the whole world.”

Hitler knew that it was here, on the Kursk salient, that the Soviet troops numbered more than 1.9 million people, more than 26 thousand guns and mortars, over 4.9 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units, and about 2.9 thousand aircraft. He knew that in terms of the number of soldiers and equipment involved in the operation, he would lose this battle, but thanks to the ambitious strategically correct plan developed and the latest weapons, which, according to military experts, Soviet army It will be difficult to resist, this numerical superiority will be absolutely vulnerable and useless.

Meanwhile, the Soviet command did not waste time. The Supreme High Command considered two options: attack first or wait? The first option was promoted by the commander of the Voronezh Front Nikolay Vatutin. The commander of the Central Front insisted on the second . Despite Stalin’s initial support for Vatutin’s plan, they approved Rokossovsky’s safer plan - “to wait, wear down and go on a counteroffensive.” Rokossovsky was supported by the majority of the military command and primarily by Zhukov.

However, later Stalin doubted the correctness of the decision - the Germans were too passive, who, as mentioned above, had already postponed their offensive twice.

(Photo by: Sovfoto/UIG via Getty Images)

Having waited for the latest equipment - Tiger and Panther tanks, the Germans began their offensive on the night of July 5, 1943.

That same night, Rokossovsky had a telephone conversation with Stalin:

- Comrade Stalin! The Germans have launched an offensive!

-What are you happy about? - asked the surprised leader.

– Now victory will be ours, Comrade Stalin! - answered the commander.

Rokossovsky was not mistaken.

Agent "Werther"

On April 12, 1943, three days before Hitler approved Operation Citadel, the exact text of Directive No. 6 “On the plan for Operation Citadel” of the German High Command, translated from German, appeared on Stalin’s desk, endorsed by all services of the Wehrmacht. The only thing that was not on the document was Hitler’s own visa. He staged it three days after the Soviet leader got acquainted with it. The Fuhrer, of course, did not know about this.

Nothing is known about the person who obtained this document for the Soviet command except his code name - “Werther”. Various researchers have put forward different versions of who "Werther" really was - some believe that Hitler's personal photographer was a Soviet agent.

Agent "Werther" (German: Werther) - the code name of an alleged Soviet agent in the leadership of the Wehrmacht or even as part of the top of the Third Reich during World War II, one of the prototypes of Stirlitz. During the entire time he worked for Soviet intelligence, he did not make a single misfire. It was considered the most reliable source in wartime.

Hitler’s personal translator, Paul Karel, wrote about him in his book: “The leaders of Soviet intelligence addressed the Swiss station as if they were requesting information from some information desk. And they got everything they were interested in. Even a superficial analysis of radio interception data shows that during all phases of the war in Russia, agents of the Soviet General Staff worked first-class. Some of the information transmitted could only have been obtained from the highest German military circles

- it seems that the Soviet agents in Geneva and Lausanne were dictated to the key directly from the Fuhrer Headquarters.”

The largest tank battle

"Kursk Bulge": T-34 tank against "Tigers" and "Panthers"

The key moment of the Battle of Kursk is considered to be the largest tank battle in the history of the war near the village of Prokhorovka, which began on July 12.

Surprisingly, this large-scale clash of armored vehicles of the opposing sides still causes fierce debate among historians.

Classic Soviet historiography reported 800 tanks for the Red Army and 700 for the Wehrmacht. Modern historians tend to increase the number of Soviet tanks and reduce the number of German ones.

Neither side managed to achieve the goals set for July 12: the Germans failed to capture Prokhorovka, break through the defenses of Soviet troops and gain operational space, and Soviet troops failed to encircle the enemy group.

Based on the memoirs of German generals (E. von Manstein, G. Guderian, F. von Mellenthin, etc.), about 700 Soviet tanks took part in the battle (some probably fell behind on the march - “on paper” the army had more than a thousand vehicles ), of which about 270 were shot down (meaning only the morning battle on July 12).

Also preserved is the version of Rudolf von Ribbentrop, the son of Joachim von Ribbentrop, commander of a tank company and a direct participant in the battle:

According to the published memoirs of Rudolf von Ribbentrop, Operation Citadel pursued not strategic, but purely operational goals: to cut off the Kursk ledge, destroy the Russian troops involved in it and straighten the front. Hitler hoped to achieve military success during the front-line operation in order to try to enter into negotiations with the Russians on an armistice.

In his memoirs, Ribbentrop gives detailed description disposition of the battle, its course and result:

“In the early morning of July 12, the Germans needed to take Prokhorovka, an important point on the way to Kursk. However, suddenly units of the 5th Soviet Guards Tank Army intervened in the battle.

The unexpected attack on the deeply advanced spearhead of the German offensive - by units of the 5th Guards Tank Army, deployed overnight - was undertaken by the Russian command in a completely incomprehensible manner. The Russians inevitably had to go into their own anti-tank ditch, which was clearly shown even on the maps we captured.

The Russians drove, if they managed to get that far at all, into their own anti-tank ditch, where they naturally became easy prey for our defenses. Burning diesel fuel spread a thick black fume - Russian tanks were burning everywhere, some of them had run over each other, Russian infantrymen had jumped between them, desperately trying to get their bearings and easily turning into victims of our grenadiers and artillerymen, who were also standing on this battlefield.

The attacking Russian tanks - there must have been more than a hundred of them - were completely destroyed."

As a result of the counterattack, by noon on July 12, the Germans “with surprisingly small losses” occupied “almost completely” their previous positions.

The Germans were stunned by the wastefulness of the Russian command, which abandoned hundreds of tanks with infantrymen on their armor to certain death. This circumstance forced the German command to think deeply about the power of the Russian offensive.

“Stalin allegedly wanted to put on trial the commander of the 5th Soviet Guards Tank Army, General Rotmistrov, who attacked us. In our opinion, he had good reasons for this. Russian descriptions of the battle - "the grave of German tank weapons" - have nothing to do with reality. We, however, felt unmistakably that the offensive had run out of steam. We did not see a chance for ourselves to continue the offensive against superior enemy forces, unless significant reinforcements were added. However, there were none.”

It is no coincidence that after the victory at Kursk, Army Commander Rotmistrov was not even awarded - as he had not lived up to the high hopes placed on him by Headquarters.

One way or another, Nazi tanks were stopped on the field near Prokhorovka, which actually meant the disruption of plans for the German summer offensive.

It is believed that Hitler himself gave the order to end the Citadel plan on July 13, when he learned that the Western allies of the USSR had landed in Sicily on July 10, and the Italians had failed to defend Sicily during the fighting and the need to send German reinforcements to Italy loomed.

"Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev"

Diorama dedicated to the Battle of Kursk. Author oleg95

When people talk about the Battle of Kursk, they often mention Operation Citadel, the German offensive plan. Meanwhile, after the Wehrmacht onslaught was repulsed, the Soviet troops carried out two of their offensive operations, which ended in brilliant successes. The names of these operations are much less known than “Citadel”.

On July 12, 1943, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive in the Oryol direction. Three days later, the Central Front began its offensive. This operation was codenamed "Kutuzov". During it, a major defeat was inflicted on the German Army Group Center, whose retreat stopped only on August 18 at the Hagen defensive line east of Bryansk. Thanks to “Kutuzov”, the cities of Karachev, Zhizdra, Mtsensk, Bolkhov were liberated, and on the morning of August 5, 1943, Soviet troops entered Orel.

On August 3, 1943, troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began an offensive operation "Rumyantsev", named after another Russian commander. On August 5, Soviet troops captured Belgorod and then began to liberate the territory of Left Bank Ukraine. During the 20-day operation, they defeated the opposing Nazi forces and reached Kharkov. On August 23, 1943, at 2 a.m., troops of the Steppe Front launched a night assault on the city, which ended in success by dawn.

“Kutuzov” and “Rumyantsev” became the reason for the first victorious salute during the war years - on August 5, 1943, it was held in Moscow to commemorate the liberation of Orel and Belgorod.

Maresyev's feat

Maresyev (second from right) on the set of a film about himself. Painting “The Tale of a Real Man.” Photo: Kommersant

The book of the writer Boris Polevoy “The Tale of a Real Man,” which was based on the life of a real military pilot Alexei Maresyev, was known to almost everyone in the Soviet Union.

But not everyone knows that the fame of Maresyev, who returned to combat aviation after the amputation of both legs, arose precisely during the Battle of Kursk.

Senior Lieutenant Maresyev, who arrived in the 63rd Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment on the eve of the Battle of Kursk, was faced with distrust. The pilots did not want to fly with him, fearing that a pilot with prosthetics would not be able to cope in difficult times. The regiment commander did not let him into battle either.

Squadron commander Alexander Chislov took him as his partner. Maresyev coped with the task, and at the height of the battles on the Kursk Bulge he carried out combat missions along with everyone else.

On July 20, 1943, during a battle with superior enemy forces, Alexey Maresyev saved the lives of two of his comrades and personally destroyed two enemy Focke-Wulf 190 fighters.

This story immediately became known throughout the front, after which the writer Boris Polevoy appeared in the regiment, immortalizing the name of the hero in his book. On August 24, 1943, Maresyev was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

It is interesting that during his participation in battles, fighter pilot Alexei Maresyev personally shot down 11 enemy aircraft: four before being wounded and seven after returning to duty after amputation of both legs.

Battle of Kursk - losses of both sides

The Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including seven tank divisions, over 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns. The losses of the Soviet troops exceeded the German ones - they amounted to 863 thousand people, including 254 thousand irrevocable. Near Kursk, the Red Army lost about six thousand tanks.

After the Battle of Kursk, the balance of forces at the front changed sharply in favor of the Red Army, which provided it with favorable conditions for the deployment of a general strategic offensive.

In memory of the heroic victory of Soviet soldiers in this battle and in memory of those who died, the Day of Military Glory was established in Russia, and in Kursk there is Memorial Complex“Kursk Bulge”, dedicated to one of the key battles of the Great Patriotic War.

Memorial complex "Kursk Bulge"

Hitler's revenge did not take place. The last attempt to sit down at the negotiating table was destroyed.

August 23, 1943 is rightfully considered one of the most significant days in the Great Patriotic War. After the defeat in this battle, the German army began one of the most extensive and long routes of retreat on all fronts. The outcome of the war was a foregone conclusion.

As a result of the victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk, the greatness and steadfastness of the Soviet soldier was demonstrated to the whole world. Our allies have no doubts or hesitations left in making the right choice sides in this war. And the thoughts that let the Russians and Germans destroy each other, and we look at it from the outside, faded into the background. The foresight and foresight of our allies prompted them to intensify their support for the Soviet Union. Otherwise, the winner will be only one state, which will receive vast territories at the end of the war. However, that's another story...

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