Towards a unified radar field of the country (1). Federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control problems of improvement Airspace control radar field article

This problem can be solved using affordable, cost-effective and sanitary-safe means. Such means are built on the principles of semi-active radar (SAL) using accompanying illumination of transmitters communication and broadcasting networks. Today, almost all well-known developers of radar equipment are working on the problem.

The task of creating and maintaining a continuous round-the-clock duty control field airspace at extremely low altitudes (ELA) is complex and costly. The reasons for this lie in the need to consolidate the orders of radar stations (radars), the creation of an extensive communication network, the saturation of the ground space with sources of radio emissions and passive reflections, the complexity of the ornithological and meteorological situation, dense population, high intensity of use and inconsistency of regulations relating to this area.

In addition, the boundaries of responsibility of various ministries and departments when monitoring surface space are separated. All this significantly complicates the possibility of organizing radar monitoring of airspace in the WWII.

Why do we need a continuous field of surface airspace monitoring?

For what purposes is it necessary to create a continuous field for monitoring surface airspace at WWI in Peaceful time? Who will be the main consumer of the information received?

Experience of working in this direction with various departments indicates that no one is against the creation of such a field, but each interested department needs (for various reasons) its own functional unit, limited in terms of goals, objectives and spatial characteristics.

The Ministry of Defense needs to control the airspace during WWI around defended objects or in certain directions. Border Service- above the state border, and no higher than 10 meters from the ground. Unified air traffic management system - over airfields. Ministry of Internal Affairs - only aircraft preparing for takeoff or landing outside the permitted flight areas. FSB - the area around sensitive objects.

Ministry of Emergency Situations - areas of man-made or natural disasters. FSO - areas of residence of protected persons.

This situation indicates the absence of a unified approach to solving the problems and threats that await us in the low-altitude surface environment.

In 2010, the problem of controlling the use of airspace during WWI was transferred from the responsibility of the state to the responsibility of the operators themselves. aircraft(VS).

In accordance with the current Federal rules for the use of airspace, a notification procedure for the use of airspace has been established for flights in class G airspace (small aviation). From now on, flights in this class of airspace can be carried out without obtaining air traffic control clearance.

If we look at this problem through the prism of the appearance of unmanned aircraft in the air aircraft, and in the near future, passenger “flying motorcycles”, then a whole complex of problems arises related to ensuring the safety of using airspace at extremely low altitudes above settlements, industrially hazardous areas.


Who will control traffic in low-altitude airspace?

Companies in many countries around the world are developing such affordable low-altitude vehicles. For example, the Russian company Aviaton plans to create its own passenger quadcopter for flights (attention!) outside airfields by 2020. That is, where it is not prohibited.

The reaction to this problem has already manifested itself in the form of the adoption by the State Duma of the law “On Amendments to the Air Code Russian Federation regarding the use of unmanned aircraft." In accordance with this law, all unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) weighing more than 250 g are subject to registration.

In order to register a UAV, you must submit an application to the Federal Air Transport Agency in any form indicating the details of the drone and its owner. However, judging by the way things are going with the registration of manned light and ultra-light aircraft, it seems that the problems with unmanned aircraft will be the same. Now two different organizations are responsible for registering light (ultra-light) manned and unmanned aircraft, and no one is able to organize control over the rules for their use in class G airspace over the entire territory of the country. This situation contributes to an uncontrolled increase in cases of violations of the rules for the use of low-altitude airspace and, as a consequence, an increase in the threat of man-made disasters and terrorist attacks.

On the other hand, the creation and maintenance of a wide monitoring field in the PMV in peacetime by traditional means of low-altitude radar is hampered by restrictions on sanitary requirements for the electromagnetic load on the population and the compatibility of radio electronic systems. Existing legislation strictly regulates the radiation regimes of radio electronic devices, especially in populated areas. This is strictly taken into account when designing new distribution networks.

So, what's the bottom line? The need for monitoring of surface airspace at PMV objectively remains and will only increase.

However, the possibility of its implementation is limited by the high cost of creating and maintaining a field in WWI, the inconsistency of the legal framework, the absence of a single responsible body interested in a large-scale round-the-clock field, as well as restrictions imposed by supervisory organizations.

There is an urgent need to begin developing preventive measures of an organizational, legal and technical nature aimed at creating a system for continuous monitoring of WWI airspace.

The maximum height of the border of class G airspace varies up to 300 meters in the Rostov region and up to 4.5 thousand meters in the regions Eastern Siberia. IN last years V civil aviation Russia is experiencing an intensive growth in the number of registered general aviation vehicles and operators. As of 2015, over 7 thousand aircraft were registered in the State Register of Civil Aircraft of the Russian Federation. It should be taken into account that in general, no more than 20-30% of the total number of aircraft (AC) are registered in Russia. legal entities, public associations and private owners of aircraft using aircraft. The remaining 70-80% fly without an operator's license or without registering aircraft at all.

According to GLONASS NP estimates, in Russia annually sales of small unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) increase by 5-10%, and by 2025, 2.5 million of them will be purchased in the Russian Federation. It is expected that the Russian market in terms of consumer and commercial small Civilian UAS could account for about 3-5% of the global total.

Monitoring: economical, affordable, environmentally friendly

If we approach with an open mind the means of creating continuous monitoring of PMV in peacetime, then this problem can be solved by accessible, cost-effective and sanitary-safe means. Such means are built on the principles of semi-active radar (SAL) using accompanying illumination of transmitters of communication and broadcasting networks.

Today, almost all well-known developers of radar equipment are working on the problem. SNS Research has published a report, Military & Civil Aviation Passive Radar Market: 2013-2023, and expects that by 2023, both sectors will see more than 100,000 investments in the development of such radar technology. 10 billion US dollars, with annual growth in the period 2013-2023. will be almost 36%.

The simplest version of a semi-active multi-position radar is a two-position (bistatic) radar, in which the illumination transmitter and radar receiver are separated by a distance exceeding the range measurement error. A bistatic radar consists of a companion illumination transmitter and a radar receiver, spaced apart from the base.

Emissions from transmitters of communication and broadcasting stations, both ground-based and space-based, can be used as accompanying illumination. The illumination transmitter generates an omnidirectional low-altitude electromagnetic field, in which targets

With a certain effective scattering surface (ESR), they reflect electromagnetic energy, including in the direction of the radar receiver. The receiver antenna system receives a direct signal from the illumination source and a delayed echo signal from the target relative to it.

If there is a directional reception antenna, the angular coordinates of the target and the total range relative to the radar receiver are measured.

The basis for the existence of PAL is the vast coverage areas of broadcasting and communication signals. Thus, the zones of different cellular operators almost completely overlap, complementing each other. In addition to the cellular communications illumination zones, the country's territory is covered by overlapping radiation fields from terrestrial TV broadcast transmitters, VHF FM and FM satellite TV broadcasting stations, and so on.

To create a multi-position radar monitoring network in the PMV, an extensive communication network is required. Dedicated secure APN channels for transmitting packet information based on M2M telematics technology have such capabilities. Typical throughput characteristics of such channels at peak load are no worse than 20 Kb/sec, but according to application experience, they are almost always much higher.

JSC NPP KANT is conducting work to study the possibility of detecting targets in the illumination field of cellular networks. During the research, it was found that the widest coverage of the territory of the Russian Federation is provided by the communication signal of the GSM 900 standard. This communication standard provides not only sufficient energy for the illumination field, but also the technology of packet data transmission GPRS wireless communication at speeds of up to 170 Kb/sec between elements of a multi-position radar , separated by regional distances.

The work carried out as part of the R&D work showed that typical suburban territorial frequency planning of a cellular communication network makes it possible to build a low-altitude multi-position active-passive system for detecting and tracking ground and air (up to 500 meters) targets with an effective reflective surface of less than 1 square meter. m.

The high height of the suspension of base stations on antenna towers (from 70 to 100 meters) and the network configuration of cellular communication systems make it possible to solve the problem of detecting low-altitude targets made using stealthy STEALTH technology using spaced location methods.

As part of R&D for the detection of air, ground and surface targets in the field of cellular communication networks, a passive receiving module (RPM) detector of a semi-active radar station was developed and tested.

As a result of field testing of a PPM model within the boundaries of a cellular communication network of the GSM 900 standard with a distance between base stations of 4-5 km and a radiation power of 30-40 W, the ability to detect, at the designed flight range, an aircraft of the Yak-52 type, a UAV - a quadcopter of the DJI Phantom 2 type, was achieved. , moving automobile and river transport, as well as people.

During the tests, the spatial-energy detection characteristics and the capabilities of the GSM signal to resolve targets were assessed. The possibility of transmitting packet detection information and remote mapping information from the test area to a remote surveillance indicator has been demonstrated.

Thus, to create a continuous round-the-clock multi-frequency overlapping location field in the surface space on the PMV, it is necessary and possible to build a multi-position active-passive location system with the integration of information flows obtained using illumination sources of various wavelengths: from meter (analog TV, VHF FM and FM broadcasting) to short UHF (LTE, Wi-Fi). This requires the efforts of all organizations working in this direction. The necessary infrastructure and encouraging experimental data for this are available. We can safely say that the developed information base, technologies and the very principle of hidden PAL will find their way worthy place and in war time.


In the figure: “Scheme of a bistatic radar.” For example, given active zone coverage of the borders of the Southern Federal District with the signal of the cellular operator "Beeline"

To assess the scale of placement of backlight transmitters, let’s take the average Tver region as an example. It has an area of ​​84 thousand square meters. km with a population of 1 million 471 thousand people there are 43 radio broadcast transmitters broadcasting sound programs of VHF FM and FM stations with radiation power from 0.1 to 4 kW; 92 analogue television station transmitters with radiation power from 0.1 to 20 kW; 40 digital transmitters for television stations with power from 0.25 to 5 kW; 1,500 transmitting radio communication facilities of various types (mainly cellular base stations) with radiation power ranging from a few mW in an urban area to several hundred W in a suburban area. The height of the backlight transmitter suspension varies from 50 to 270 meters.


A reliable aerospace defense of the country is impossible without the creation of an effective reconnaissance and airspace control system. Low-altitude location occupies an important place in it. The reduction of radar reconnaissance units and means has led to the fact that today there are open sections of the state border over the territory of the Russian Federation and hinterland countries. OJSC NPP Kant, part of the state corporation Russian Technologies, is conducting research and development to create a prototype of a multi-position spaced semi-active radar system in the radiation field of cellular communications, radio broadcasting and television systems based on ground and space (Rubezh complex).

Today, the greatly increased accuracy of guidance of weapons systems no longer requires the massive use of air attack weapons (AEA), and the stricter requirements for electromagnetic compatibility, as well as sanitary norms and rules, do not allow “polluting” the populated areas of the country with the use of microwave radiation in peacetime. high-potential radar stations (radars). In accordance with the federal law "On the sanitary and epidemiological welfare of the population" dated March 30, 1999 No. 52-FZ, radiation standards are established that are mandatory throughout Russia. The radiation power of any of the known air defense radars exceeds these standards many times over. The problem is aggravated by the high probability of using low-flying stealth targets, which requires compacting the battle formations of the traditional radar fleet and increasing the cost of maintaining a continuous low-altitude radar field (LSRF). To create a continuous duty round-the-clock MVRLP with a height of 25 meters (the flight altitude of a cruise missile or ultralight aircraft) along a front of only 100 kilometers, at least two radars of the KASTA-2E2 (39N6) type are required, the power consumption of each of which is 23 kW. Taking into account the average cost of electricity in 2013 prices, the cost of maintaining this section of the MVRLP alone will be at least three million rubles per year. Moreover, the length of the borders of the Russian Federation is 60,900,000 kilometers.

In addition, with the outbreak of hostilities in conditions of active use of electronic jamming (ERS) by the enemy, traditional standby location systems can be significantly suppressed, since the transmitting part of the radar completely unmasks its location.

It is possible to save the expensive resource of radars, increase their capabilities in peacetime and wartime, and also increase the noise immunity of MSRLS by using semi-active location systems with a third-party illumination source.

To detect air and space targets

Research is being widely carried out abroad on the use of third-party radiation sources in semi-active location systems. Passive radar systems that analyze signals reflected from targets from TV broadcasting (terrestrial and satellite), FM radio and cellular telephony, and HF radio communications have become one of the most popular and promising areas of study over the past 20 years. It is believed that the American corporation Lockheed Martin has achieved the greatest success here with its Silent Sentry system.

Avtec Systems, Dynetics, Cassidian, Roke Manor Research, and the French space agency ONERA are developing their own versions of passive radars. Active work on this topic is being carried out in China, Australia, Italy, and the UK.

Similar work on detecting targets in the illumination field of television centers was carried out at the Military Engineering Radio Engineering Academy of Air Defense (VIRTA Air Defense) named after Govorov. However, the significant practical groundwork obtained more than a quarter of a century ago on the use of illumination of analog radiation sources to solve problems of semi-active location has turned out to be unclaimed.

With the development of digital broadcasting and communications technologies, the possibility of using semi-active location systems with third-party illumination has also appeared in Russia.

The complex of multi-position spaced semi-active radar system "Rubezh" being developed by OJSC "NPP Kant" is designed to detect air and space targets in the field of external illumination. Such an illumination field is distinguished by the cost-effectiveness of monitoring airspace in peacetime and resistance to electronic countermeasures during war.

Availability large number highly stable radiation sources (broadcasting, communications) both in space and on Earth, forming continuous electromagnetic illumination fields, makes it possible to use them as a signal source in a semi-active system for detection various types goals. In this case, there is no need to spend money on emitting your own radio signals. To receive signals reflected from targets, multi-channel receiving modules (RMs) spaced apart in the area are used, which together with radiation sources create a semi-active location complex. The passive mode of operation of the Rubezh complex makes it possible to ensure the secrecy of these means and to use the structure of the complex in wartime. Calculations show that the secrecy of a semi-active location system in terms of camouflage coefficient is at least 1.5-2 times higher than a radar with a traditional combined construction principle.

The use of more cost-effective means of locating the standby mode will significantly save the resource of expensive combat systems by saving the established resource consumption limit. In addition to the standby mode, the proposed complex can also perform tasks in wartime conditions, when all peacetime radiation sources are disabled or switched off.

In this regard, a far-sighted decision would be to create specialized omnidirectional transmitters of hidden noise radiation (100-200 W), which could be thrown or installed in threatened directions (in sectors) in order to create a field of external illumination during a special period. This will make it possible to create a hidden multi-position active-passive wartime system based on the networks of receiving modules remaining from peacetime.

There are no analogues

The Rubezh complex is not an analogue of any of the known models presented in the State Armament Program. At the same time, the transmitting part of the complex already exists in the form of a dense network of base stations (BS) for cellular communications, terrestrial and satellite transmitting centers for radio and television. Therefore, the central task for Kant was the creation of receiving modules for external illumination signals reflected from targets and a signal processing system (software and algorithmic support that implements systems for detecting, processing reflected signals and combating penetrating signals).

The current state of the electronic component base, data transmission and synchronization systems makes it possible to create compact receiving modules with small weight and dimensions. Such modules can be located on cellular masts, using the power lines of this system and, due to their low power consumption, not having any impact on its operation.

Sufficiently high probabilistic detection characteristics make it possible to use this tool as an unattended, automatic system for determining the fact of crossing (flying) a certain boundary (for example, a state border) by a low-altitude target with the subsequent issuance of preliminary target designation to specialized ground-based or space-based means about the direction and line of appearance of the intruder.

Thus, calculations show that the illumination field of base stations with a separation between the BS of 35 kilometers and a radiation power of 100 W is capable of detecting low-altitude aerodynamic targets with an ESR of 1 m2 in the “clearance zone” with a probability of correct detection of 0.7 and a probability of false alarm of 10-4 . The number of tracked targets is determined by the performance of computing facilities. The main characteristics of the system were tested by a series of practical experiments on detecting low-altitude targets, conducted by JSC NPP Kant with the assistance of JSC RTI im. Academician A.L. Mints" and the participation of employees of the VA East Kazakhstan region named after G.K. Zhukov. The test results confirmed the prospects of using low-altitude semi-active target location systems in the illumination field of BS cellular communication systems of the GSM standard. When removing the receiving module at a distance of 1.3- 2.6 kilometers from the base station with a radiation power of 40 W, a Yak-52 type target was confidently detected from various observation angles in both the front and rear hemisphere in the first resolution element.

The configuration of the existing cellular communication network makes it possible to build a flexible forefield for monitoring low-altitude air and ground space in the illumination field of the BS network of the GSM communication network in the border strip.

The system is proposed to be built in several detection lines at a depth of 50-100 kilometers, along the front in a strip of 200-300 kilometers and at an altitude of up to 1500 meters. Each detection line represents a sequential chain of detection zones located between the BS. The detection zone is formed by a single-base diversity (bistatic) Doppler radar. This fundamental solution is based on the fact that when a target is detected through the light, its effective reflective surface increases many times over, which makes it possible to detect subtle targets made using Stealth technology.

Increasing the capabilities of aerospace defense

From detection line to detection line, the number and direction of flying targets is clarified. In this case, it becomes possible to algorithmically (calculate) determine the range to the target and its height. The number of simultaneously registered targets is determined by the capacity of information transmission channels over the lines of cellular communication networks.

Information from each detection zone is sent via GSM networks to the Information Collection and Processing Center (ICPC), which can be located many hundreds of kilometers from the detection system. Identification of targets is carried out based on direction finding, frequency and time characteristics, as well as when installing video recorders - based on the image of targets.

Thus, the Rubezh complex will allow:

  • create a continuous low-altitude radar field with multiple multi-frequency overlap of radiation zones created by various illumination sources;
  • provide means of monitoring air and ground space on the state border and other territories of the country, poorly equipped with traditional radar means (the lower limit of the controlled radar field of less than 300 meters is created only around control centers major airports. Over the rest of the territory of the Russian Federation, the lower limit is determined only by the needs of escorting civil aircraft along main airlines that do not fall below 5000 meters);
  • significantly reduce installation and commissioning costs compared to any similar systems;
  • solve problems in the interests of almost all law enforcement agencies of the Russian Federation: the Ministry of Defense (increasing the duty low-altitude radar field in threatened areas), the Federal Security Service (in terms of ensuring the security of state security facilities - the complex can be located in suburban and urban areas to monitor airborne terrorist threats or control the use of ground space ), ATC (control of flights of light aircraft and unmanned vehicles at low altitudes, including air taxis - according to forecasts of the Ministry of Transport, the annual increase in small general aviation aircraft is 20 percent annually), FSB (tasks of anti-terrorist protection of strategically important facilities and protection of state borders), Ministry of Emergency Situations (fire safety monitoring, search for crashed aircraft, etc.).
The proposed means and methods for solving the problems of low-altitude radar reconnaissance in no way cancel the means and complexes created and supplied to the RF Armed Forces, but only increase their capabilities.

Help "VPK"

The Kant Research and Production Enterprise has been developing, producing and maintaining modern means of special communications and data transmission, radio monitoring and electronic warfare, information security systems and information channels for more than 28 years. The company's products are supplied to almost all law enforcement agencies of the Russian Federation and are used in solving defense and special tasks.

JSC NPP Kant has a modern laboratory and production base, a highly professional team of scientists and engineering specialists, which allows it to carry out full complex scientific and production tasks: from R&D, serial production to repair and maintenance of equipment in operation.

of these Federal Rules

144. Monitoring of compliance with the requirements of these Federal Rules is carried out Federal agency air transport, air traffic services (flight control) authorities in the zones and areas established for them.

Control over the use of the airspace of the Russian Federation in terms of identifying aircraft that violate the rules for using airspace (hereinafter referred to as violator aircraft) and aircraft that violate the rules for crossing the state border of the Russian Federation is carried out by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

145. If the air traffic services (flight control) authority identifies a violation of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation, information about this violation is immediately brought to the attention of the air defense authority and the aircraft commander, if radio communication is established with it.

146. Air defense authorities provide radar control of the airspace and provide the relevant centers of the Unified System with data on the movement of aircraft and other material objects:

a) threatening to illegally cross or illegally crossing the state border of the Russian Federation;

b) being unidentified;

c) violating the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation (until the violation ceases);

d) transmitting a "Distress" signal;

e) performing flights of letters “A” and “K”;

f) performing search and rescue flights.

147. Violations of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation include:

a) use of airspace without permission from the relevant center of the Unified System under the permitting procedure for the use of airspace, except for the cases specified in paragraph 114 of these Federal Rules;

b) failure to comply with the conditions specified by the center of the Unified System in the permit to use the airspace;

c) failure to comply with the commands of air traffic services (flight control) and the commands of the duty aircraft of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation;

d) failure to comply with the procedure for using the airspace of the border strip;

e) non-compliance with established temporary and local regimes, as well as short-term restrictions;

f) flight of a group of aircraft in a number exceeding the number specified in the aircraft flight plan;

g) use of the airspace of the prohibited zone, flight restriction zone without permission;

h) landing of an aircraft at an unscheduled (undeclared) airfield (site), except in cases forced landing, as well as cases agreed with the air traffic services authority (flight control);

i) failure by the aircraft crew to comply with the rules of vertical and horizontal separation (except for cases of an emergency on board the aircraft requiring an immediate change in the profile and flight mode);

(see text in the previous edition)

j) deviation of an aircraft beyond the boundaries of the air route, local air line and route, authorized by the air traffic services (flight control) authority, except for cases when such deviation is due to flight safety considerations (avoidance of dangerous meteorological weather phenomena, etc.);

k) entry of an aircraft into controlled airspace without permission from the air traffic services authority (flight control);

M) flight of an aircraft in class G airspace without notifying the air traffic services authority.

148. When identifying an intruder aircraft, the air defense authorities give a “Regime” signal, meaning a requirement to stop violating the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation.

Air defense authorities communicate the “Regime” signal to the relevant centers of the Unified System and begin actions to stop violations of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation.

(see text in the previous edition)

The centers of the Unified System warn the commander of the violating aircraft (if there is radio communication with him) about the “Mode” signal sent by the air defense authorities and assist him in stopping the violation of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation.

(see text in the previous edition)

149. The decision on the further use of the airspace of the Russian Federation, if the commander of the violating aircraft has stopped violating the procedure for its use, is made by:

a) the head of the duty shift of the main center of the Unified System - when performing international flights along air traffic service routes;

b) heads of duty shifts of regional and zonal centers of the Unified System - when performing domestic flights along air traffic service routes;

c) operational duty officer of the air defense agency - in other cases.

(see text in the previous edition)

150. The centers of the Unified System and the air defense authorities notify each other, as well as the user of the airspace, about the decision made in accordance with paragraph 149 of these Federal Rules.

(see text in the previous edition)

151. When illegally crossing the state border of the Russian Federation, using weapons and military equipment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation against an infringing aircraft, as well as when unidentified aircraft and other material objects appear in the airspace, in exceptional cases, air defense authorities give the “Carpet” signal. , meaning the requirement for the immediate landing or withdrawal from the relevant area of ​​all aircraft in the air, with the exception of aircraft involved in combating intruder aircraft and performing search and rescue missions.

(see text in the previous edition)

Air defense agencies communicate the “Carpet” signal, as well as the boundaries of the area of ​​coverage of the specified signal, to the corresponding centers of the Unified System.

(see text in the previous edition)

The centers of the Unified System immediately take measures to remove aircraft (their landing) from the area of ​​coverage of the "Carpet" signal.

(see text in the previous edition)

152. If the crew of the offending aircraft fails to comply with the command of the air traffic services authority (flight control) to stop violating the procedure for using airspace, such information is immediately communicated to the air defense authorities. Air defense authorities take measures against the offending aircraft in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation.

Aircraft crews are obliged to comply with the commands of duty aircraft of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, used to stop violations of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation.

In the event of a forced landing of an intruder aircraft, its landing is carried out at an airfield (heliport, landing site) suitable for landing this type of aircraft.

153. If a threat to flight safety arises, including one related to an act of unlawful interference on board an aircraft, the crew issues a “Distress” signal. On aircraft equipped with a danger alarm system, in the event of an attack on the crew, the “MTR” signal is additionally given. When receiving a “Distress” and (or) “MTR” signal from the aircraft crew, air traffic services (flight control) authorities are required to accept necessary measures to provide assistance to a crew in distress and immediately transmit data on its location and other necessary information to the centers of the Unified System, aviation search and rescue coordination centers, as well as to air defense authorities.

154. After identifying the reasons for the violation of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation, permission to further operate an international flight or a flight associated with crossing more than 2 zones of the Unified System is accepted by the head of the duty shift of the main center of the Unified System, and in other cases - by the heads of duty shifts of the zonal center of the Unified System systems.

Reliable Aerospace Defense (ASD) of the country is impossible without the creation of an effective reconnaissance and airspace control system. Low-altitude location occupies an important place in it. The reduction of radar reconnaissance units and means has led to the fact that today there are open sections of the state border and the interior of the country over the territory of the Russian Federation. OJSC NPP Kant, part of the state corporation Russian Technologies, is conducting research and development to create a prototype of a multi-position spaced semi-active radar system in the radiation field of cellular communications, radio broadcasting and television systems based on ground and space (Rubezh complex).

Today, the greatly increased accuracy of guidance of weapons systems no longer requires the massive use of air attack weapons (AEA), and the stricter requirements for electromagnetic compatibility, as well as sanitary norms and rules, do not allow “polluting” the populated areas of the country in peacetime with the use of ultra-high frequency radiation (microwave radiation) high-potential radar stations (radars). In accordance with the Federal Law “On the Sanitary and Epidemiological Welfare of the Population” dated March 30, 1999 No. 52-FZ, radiation standards are established that are mandatory throughout Russia. The radiation power of any of the known air defense radars exceeds these standards many times over. The problem is aggravated by the high probability of using low-flying stealth targets, which requires compacting the battle formations of the traditional radar fleet and increasing the cost of maintaining a continuous low-altitude radar field (LSRF). To create a continuous duty round-the-clock MVRLP with a height of 25 meters (the flight altitude of a cruise missile or ultralight aircraft) along a front of only 100 kilometers, at least two radars of the KASTA-2E2 (39N6) type are required, the power consumption of each of which is 23 kW. Taking into account the average cost of electricity in 2013 prices, the cost of maintaining this section of the MVRLP alone will be at least three million rubles per year. Moreover, the length of the borders of the Russian Federation is 60,900,000 kilometers.

In addition, with the outbreak of hostilities in conditions of active use of electronic jamming (ERS) by the enemy, traditional standby location systems can be significantly suppressed, since the transmitting part of the radar completely unmasks its location.

It is possible to save the expensive resource of radars, increase their capabilities in peacetime and wartime, and also increase the noise immunity of MSRLS by using semi-active location systems with a third-party illumination source.

To detect air and space targets

Research is being widely carried out abroad on the use of third-party radiation sources in semi-active location systems. Passive radar systems that analyze signals reflected from targets from TV broadcasting (terrestrial and satellite), FM radio and cellular telephony, and HF radio communications have become one of the most popular and promising areas of study over the past 20 years. It is believed that the American corporation Lockheed Martin has achieved the greatest success here with its Silent Sentry system.

Avtec Systems, Dynetics, Cassidian, Roke Manor Research, and the French space agency ONERA are developing their own versions of passive radars. Active work on this topic is being carried out in China, Australia, Italy, and the UK.

Hidden "Frontier" of air control

Similar work on detecting targets in the illumination field of television centers was carried out at the Military Engineering Radio Engineering Academy of Air Defense (VIRTA Air Defense) named after Govorov. However, the significant practical groundwork obtained more than a quarter of a century ago on the use of illumination of analog radiation sources to solve problems of semi-active location has turned out to be unclaimed.

With the development of digital broadcasting and communications technologies, the possibility of using semi-active location systems with third-party illumination has also appeared in Russia.

The multi-position spaced semi-active radar system "Rubezh" developed by NPP Kant OJSC is designed to detect air and space targets in the field of external illumination. This illumination field is characterized by cost-effective airspace monitoring in peacetime and resistance to electronic countermeasures during war.

The presence of a large number of highly stable radiation sources (broadcasting, communications) both in space and on Earth, forming continuous electromagnetic illumination fields, makes it possible to use them as a signal source in a semi-active system for detecting various types of targets. In this case, there is no need to spend money on emitting your own radio signals. To receive signals reflected from targets, multi-channel receiving modules (RMs) spaced apart in the area are used, which together with radiation sources create a semi-active location complex. The passive mode of operation of the Rubezh complex makes it possible to ensure the secrecy of these means and to use the structure of the complex in wartime. Calculations show that the secrecy of a semi-active location system in terms of camouflage coefficient is at least 1.5–2 times higher than a radar with a traditional combined design principle.

The use of more cost-effective means of locating the standby mode will significantly save the resource of expensive combat systems by saving the established resource consumption limit. In addition to the standby mode, the proposed complex can also perform tasks in wartime conditions, when all peacetime radiation sources are disabled or switched off.

In this regard, a far-sighted decision would be to create specialized omnidirectional transmitters of hidden noise radiation (100–200 W), which could be thrown or installed in threatened directions (in sectors) in order to create a field of external illumination during a special period. This will make it possible to create a hidden multi-position active-passive wartime system based on the networks of receiving modules remaining from peacetime.

There are no analogues

The Rubezh complex is not an analogue of any of the known models presented in the State Armament Program. At the same time, the transmitting part of the complex already exists in the form of a dense network of base stations (BS) for cellular communications, terrestrial and satellite transmitting centers for radio and television. Therefore, the central task for Kant was the creation of receiving modules for external illumination signals reflected from targets and a signal processing system (software and algorithmic support that implements systems for detecting, processing reflected signals and combating penetrating signals).

The current state of the electronic component base, data transmission and synchronization systems makes it possible to create compact receiving modules with small weight and dimensions. Such modules can be located on cellular masts, using the power lines of this system and, due to their low power consumption, not having any impact on its operation.

Sufficiently high probabilistic detection characteristics make it possible to use this tool as an unattended, automatic system for determining the fact of crossing (flying) a certain boundary (for example, a state border) by a low-altitude target with the subsequent issuance of preliminary target designation to specialized ground-based or space-based means about the direction and line of appearance of the intruder.

Thus, calculations show that the illumination field of base stations with a separation between the BS of 35 kilometers and a radiation power of 100 W is capable of detecting low-altitude aerodynamic targets with an ESR of 1 m2 in the “clearance zone” with a probability of correct detection of 0.7 and a probability of false alarm of 10–4 . The number of tracked targets is determined by the performance of computing facilities. The main characteristics of the system were tested by a series of practical experiments on detecting low-altitude targets, conducted by JSC NPP Kant with the assistance of JSC RTI im. Academician A.L. Mints" and the participation of employees of the Higher Academy of East Kazakhstan region named after. G. K. Zhukova. The test results confirmed the prospects of using low-altitude semi-active target location systems in the illumination field of BS cellular communication systems of the GSM standard. When the receiving module was removed at a distance of 1.3–2.6 kilometers from the BS with a radiation power of 40 W, a Yak-52 type target was confidently detected from various observation angles in both the front and rear hemisphere in the first resolution element.

The configuration of the existing cellular communication network makes it possible to build a flexible forefield for monitoring low-altitude air and ground space in the illumination field of the BS network of the GSM communication network in the border strip.

The system is proposed to be built in several detection lines at a depth of 50–100 kilometers, along the front in a strip of 200–300 kilometers and at an altitude of up to 1500 meters. Each detection line represents a sequential chain of detection zones located between the BS. The detection zone is formed by a single-base diversity (bistatic) Doppler radar. This fundamental solution is based on the fact that when a target is detected through the light, its effective reflective surface increases many times over, which makes it possible to detect subtle targets made using Stealth technology.

Increasing the capabilities of aerospace defense

From detection line to detection line, the number and direction of flying targets is clarified. In this case, it becomes possible to algorithmically (calculate) determine the range to the target and its height. The number of simultaneously registered targets is determined by the capacity of information transmission channels over the lines of cellular communication networks.

Information from each detection zone is sent via GSM networks to the Information Collection and Processing Center (ICPC), which can be located many hundreds of kilometers from the detection system. Identification of targets is carried out by direction finding, frequency and time characteristics, as well as when installing video recorders - by images of targets.

Thus, the Rubezh complex will allow:

  • create a continuous low-altitude radar field with multiple multi-frequency overlap of radiation zones created by various illumination sources;
  • provide means of monitoring the air and ground space of the state border and other territories of the country, poorly equipped with traditional radar means (the lower limit of the controlled radar field of less than 300 meters is created only around the control centers of large airports. Over the rest of the territory of the Russian Federation, the lower limit is determined only by the needs of escorting civil aircraft along main airlines , which do not fall below 5000 meters);
  • significantly reduce installation and commissioning costs compared to any similar systems;
  • solve problems in the interests of almost all law enforcement agencies of the Russian Federation: the Ministry of Defense (increasing the duty low-altitude radar field in threatened areas), the Federal Security Service (in terms of ensuring the security of state security facilities - the complex can be located in suburban and urban areas to monitor airborne terrorist threats or control the use of ground space ), ATC (control over the flights of light aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles at low altitudes, including air taxis - according to forecasts of the Ministry of Transport, the annual increase in small general aviation aircraft is 20 percent annually), FSB (tasks of anti-terrorist protection of strategically important facilities and protection of state borders), Ministry of Emergency Situations (fire safety monitoring, search for crashed aircraft, etc.).

The proposed means and methods for solving the problems of low-altitude radar reconnaissance in no way cancel the means and complexes created and supplied to the RF Armed Forces, but only increase their capabilities.

Reference Information:

Research and production enterprise "Kant" For more than 28 years, it has been developing, producing and maintaining modern means of special communications and data transmission, radio monitoring and electronic warfare, information security systems and information channels. The company's products are supplied to almost all law enforcement agencies of the Russian Federation and are used in solving defense and special tasks.

OJSC NPP Kant has a modern laboratory and production base, a highly professional team of scientists and engineering and technical specialists, which allows it to carry out a full range of scientific and production tasks: from R&D, serial production to repair and maintenance of equipment in operation.

Authors: Andrey Demidyuk, Executive Director of JSC NPP Kant, Doctor of Military Sciences, Associate Professor Evgeniy Demidyuk, Head of the Innovation Development Department of JSC NPP Kant, Candidate technical sciences, docen

Radar field is a region of space with a given height and lower boundary, within which the radar grouping ensures reliable detection, determination of the coordinates of air targets and their continuous tracking.

The radar field is formed from the radar visibility zones.

Visibility area(detection) is the area of ​​space around the radar within which the station can detect and track air targets with a given probability.

Each type of radar has its own visibility zone, it is determined by the design of the radar antenna and its tactical and technical characteristics (wavelength, transmitter power and other parameters).

The following important features of radar detection zones are noted, which must be taken into account when creating a grouping of reconnaissance units:

The boundaries of radar visibility zones show the target detection range depending on the target's flight altitude.

The formation of the radar direction diagram, especially in the meter and decimeter range, is significantly influenced by the earth's surface.

Consequently, the terrain will have a significant impact on the radar's visibility ranges. Moreover, the influence of the terrain in different directions from the radar station point is different. Consequently, the detection ranges of the same type of air targets at the same altitude in different directions may be different.

Detection radars are used to conduct reconnaissance of enemy air in a circular search mode. The width of the radiation pattern of such a radar in the vertical plane is limited and is usually 20-30°. This causes the presence of so-called “dead craters” in the radar visibility range, where observation of air targets is impossible.

The possibility of continuous tracking of air targets in the radar visibility zone is also influenced by reflections from local objects, as a result of which an illuminated area appears near the center of the indicator screen. Tracking targets in the area of ​​local objects is difficult. Even if the radar is deployed at a position that meets the requirements for it, in moderately rugged terrain the radius of the zone of local objects reaches 15-20 km relative to the center of the position. Turning on the passive interference protection equipment (moving target selection system) does not completely “remove” marks from local objects from the radar screens, and with a high intensity of reflections from local objects, observation of targets in this area is difficult. In addition, when the radar operates with the SDC equipment turned on, the detection range of air targets is reduced by 10-15%.



Section of the radar visibility zone in horizontal plane at a given height, it can be conditionally taken as a ring with the center at the point where the radar is located. The outer radius of the ring is determined by the maximum detection range of an air target of a given type at a given altitude. The inner radius of the ring is determined by the radius of the “dead crater” of the radar.

When creating a radar grouping in the reconnaissance system, the following requirements must be met:

The maximum possible range of confident detection in the most likely direction of enemy air raids (in front of the front edge).

A continuous radar field must cover the space above the entire territory of the operational formation of troops, at all possible flight altitudes of the enemy air force.

The probability of detecting targets at any point in a continuous field should be no lower than 0.75.

The radar field must be highly stable.

Maximum savings in radar reconnaissance resources (number of radars).

You should focus on choosing the optimal height of the lower boundary of the continuous radar field, since this is one of the most important conditions for meeting the listed requirements.

Two neighboring stations provide a continuous radar field only starting from a certain minimum height (H min), and the smaller the distance between the radars, the lower the lower boundary of the continuous field.

That is, the smaller the height of the lower boundary of the field is set, the closer the radar is required to be located, the more radar is required to create the field (which contradicts the above requirements).

In addition, the lower the height of the lower boundary of the field, the smaller the offset of the zone of confident detection at this height in front of the leading edge.

The state and trends in the development of airborne systems already at the present time require the creation of a radar field in the height range of several tens of meters (50-60 m).

However, to create a field with such a height of the lower border, you will need great amount radar equipment. Calculations show that when the height of the lower boundary of the field decreases from 500 m to 300 m, the need for the number of radars increases by 2.2 times, and when decreased from 500 m to 100 m, by 7 times.

In addition, there is no urgent need for a single continuous radar field with such a low altitude.

Currently, it is considered rational to create a continuous field in the front (army) operating zone using ground-based radars with a lower boundary height of 300-500 meters in front of the front edge and in tactical depth.

The height of the upper boundary of the radar field, as a rule, is not specified and is determined by the capabilities of the radars in service with the RTP.

To develop a general methodology for calculating the values ​​of intervals and distances between radar reconnaissance units and radar reconnaissance units in their unified grouping, we will accept the following assumptions:

1. The entire unit is armed with the same type of radar, each unit has one radar;

2. The nature of the terrain does not significantly affect the radar visibility range;

Condition: Let it be necessary to create a continuous radar field with a lower boundary height of “H min”. The radius of the visibility zone (detection range) of the radar at “H min” is known and equal to “D”.

The problem can be solved by positioning the radar in two ways:

At the tops of the squares;

At the vertices of equilateral triangles (in a checkerboard pattern).

In this case, the radar field at “Н min” will look like (Appendix 4 and 5)

The distance between the radars will be equal to:

With the first method d=D =1.41 D;

With the second d=D =1.73 D;

From a comparison of these figures, we can conclude that creating a radar field by placing radars at the vertices of equilateral triangles (in a checkerboard pattern) is more economically profitable since it requires fewer stations.

We will call a grouping of reconnaissance assets located at the corners of an equilateral triangle a grouping of type “A”.

Although beneficial from a cost-saving point of view, type A grouping does not provide other essential requirements. For example, the failure of any of the radars leads to the formation of large gaps in the radar field. Losses of air targets during piloting will be observed even if all radars are working properly, since the “dead craters” in the radar visibility areas are not blocked.

Grouping type “A” has unsatisfactory field characteristics in front of the leading edge. In areas that occupy a total of more than 20% of the width of the front strip, the extension of the reconnaissance zone in front of the front edge is 30-60% less than possible. If we also take into account the distortion of radar visibility zones due to the influence of the nature of the terrain around the positions, then in general we can conclude that a type “A” grouping can only be used in exceptional cases with an acute lack of funds and in secondary directions in the depths of the operational formation of front troops, but not along front lines

The appendix presents a grouping of radars, which we will conditionally call a grouping of type “B”. Here the radars are also located in arshins of equilateral triangles, but with sides equal to the detection range “D” at the height of the lower boundary of the field in several lines. Intervals between radars in lines d=D, and distance between lines

C= D = 0.87 D.

At any point in the field created by a type “B” grouping, the space is viewed simultaneously by three radars, and in some areas even seven. Thanks to this, high stability of the radar field and reliability of tracking air targets is achieved with a detection probability close to unity. This grouping ensures the overlap of radar “dead craters” and areas of local objects (which can only be achieved with d=D), and also eliminates possible gaps in the field due to distortion of radar visibility zones due to the influence of the terrain around the position.

To ensure the continuity of the radar field over time, each radar involved in creating the field must operate around the clock. In practice this is not feasible. Therefore, at each point, not one, but two or more radars must be deployed, which form the radar station.

Typically, each RLP is deployed by one RLR from the ortb.

To create a continuous radar field, it is advisable to place the radar field in several lines in a checkerboard pattern (at the vertices of equilateral triangles),

The intervals between posts must be selected based on the given height of the lower boundary of the radar field (H min).

It is advisable to choose the intervals between radars equal to the detection range of air targets “D” at the height “H min”, the lower boundary of the field in this area (d=D)

The distance between the radar lines should be within 0.8-0.9 of the detection range at the height of the lower boundaries of the “H min” field.

 

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