Airspace control radar field article. A method for monitoring airspace irradiated by external radiation sources, and a radar station for its implementation. There are no analogues to the Rubezh complex
Size: px
Start showing from the page:
Transcript
1 Scientific and technical problems of development of the federal reconnaissance and airspace control system Russian Federation and ways to solve them Major General A.Ya. KOBAN, Candidate of Technical Sciences Colonel D.N. SAMOTONIN, Candidate of Technical Sciences ABSTRACT. The main scientific and technical problems and directions of development of the Federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation and the country's air navigation system in the context of the creation of aerospace defense of Russia are identified. KEY WORDS: federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation, air navigation system of Russia, radio technical troops, radar support, unified automated radar system. SUMMARY. Rey scientific and technical problems and areas for developing the RF Federal system of air space reconnaissance and control and Air navigation system of the country in terms of creation of the Aerospace Defense of Russia. KEYWORDS: RF Federal system of air space reconnaissance and control, Air navigation system of Russia, Radio Technical Troops, radar support, unified automated radar system. The FEDERAL system for reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation (FSR and KVP RF) was created on the basis of Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of January 14, 1994 146, is an interdepartmental dual-use system and is intended to provide radar information about the air situation of points and control centers (CP, Central Command) of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (RF Armed Forces) in the interests of solving air defense (air defense) tasks, including tasks of protecting the state border and suppressing terrorist acts and other illegal actions in the airspace of the Russian Federation, and ensuring flights aircraft state, experimental and civil aviation, as well as for radar support of air traffic management centers of the air navigation system of the Russian Federation (ANS of Russia) through the integrated use of radar systems and equipment available in the RF Armed Forces and ANS of Russia. The information and technical basis of the FSR and KVP of the Russian Federation is the unified automated radar system (URLS). To solve the tasks assigned to the FSR and KVP, the EARLS involves the forces and means of radio technical units and divisions of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, as well as dual-use radar positions (RLP DN) of the Federal Air Transport Agency (Rosaviation). In order to develop the EARLS, in the period from 2007 to 2015, the federal target program “Improving the federal system
2 SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT OF FSR AND STOL OF THE RF AND WAYS FOR THEIR SOLUTION 15 reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation (hereinafter referred to as the Program (), approved by Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of June 2, 2006 345. Analysis of the results of the implementation of the Program ( ) shows that the goals stated in it to increase the efficiency of airspace control, reduce the overall costs of maintaining radio engineering units of the Russian Ministry of Defense and increase the safety of aviation flights have been largely achieved. At the same time, the absence of conceptual and regulatory legal documents regulating the issues of functioning, ensuring activities and. development of the FSR and STOL, changes in the conditions and factors influencing the construction and application of a unified radar system and control system for the use of the airspace of the Russian Federation, determined a number of scientific and technical problems in the development of the FSR and STOL for the period until 2025: insufficient level of automation of information and technical interaction Air Defense Control Center (PU, CP) with the operational bodies of the Unified Air Traffic Management System (US ATM) to implement effective joint processing of radar, flight and planning information about the air situation when solving problems of monitoring the use of Russian airspace; inconsistency of the principles of construction and operation of the EARLS with the requirements for its integration with the EU ATM, the formation and maintenance of a unified information space about the state of the air situation in the context of the creation of the Aerospace Defense System of the Russian Federation and the Russian Autonomous Air Force; discrepancy between the principles of development, operation and application in the control system of the Aerospace Forces (VKS) of automation equipment for monitoring the use of the airspace of the Russian Federation with the requirements placed on them in modern conditions; discrepancy between the performance characteristics of outdated radar equipment and the modern information needs of the Russian Ministry of Defense when solving the tasks assigned to them, taking into account the increasing threats to the security of the Russian Federation in the airspace. The formulated scientific and technical problems made it possible to substantiate the following main directions for the development of FSR and KVP in the context of the creation of the aerospace defense system of the Russian Federation and the ANS of Russia. First direction. Development of new and modernization of existing airspace reconnaissance (surveillance) means. Analysis of the predicted target and interference environment for the period up to 2025 necessitates a significant increase in the requirements for the radar equipment used in terms of their spatial and information capabilities. Considering that all manned aircraft, as well as many unmanned enemy aircraft, are equipped with jamming transmitters to make it easier to overcome the air defense system, the requirements for noise immunity of radio technical troops (RTV) groups are significantly increasing. In the context of a shortening time interval between the detection of targets and the delivery of a strike on them by enemy air attack means, the main way to preserve the RTV group will be maneuver by forces and means of radar reconnaissance. Consequently, the requirements for the mobility of promising radars are increasing. Considering that air defense combat duty tasks are carried out continuously (in peacetime and wartime), and the operating conditions of radar equipment in peacetime and wartime are different, then
3 16 A.Ya. KOBAN, D.N. SAMOTONIN requirements for standby radar equipment in peacetime and wartime will be different. To solve peacetime problems, relatively inexpensive radars with integrated secondary radar equipment and additional automatic dependent surveillance (ADS-V) equipment are needed. In order to reduce cost, these radar equipment can be stationary (transportable), but at the same time they must have high reliability (assigned service life of more than one hundred thousand hours, mean time between failures of thousands of hours), maintainability (block-modular design principle, built-in diagnostic and troubleshooting equipment , forecasting technical condition), low operating costs (automatic radar modules without crew participation). Taking into account the need to use information about the air situation in the interests of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport of Russia when solving ATM problems, these radar equipment must be certified in accordance with the established procedure. One of the main directions for the development of standby radar equipment that performs tasks in Peaceful time, they must be brought to the level of automatic radars. This requirement is also due to the need to recreate the radar field in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation. Based on the conditions of use in wartime, the following requirements are additionally imposed on standby radar equipment: automatic reconnaissance of types of interference and adaptation to the air and electronic environment, including the ability to concentrate energy on interference-hazardous and other important areas; high secrecy of operation ensured by the development of passive (semi-active) radar equipment; high mobility, ensured by a reduction in the time of folding (deployment), switching on and monitoring the functioning of the radar; automatic topographic reference and orientation. At the same time, standby radars intended for air defense combat duty in wartime must be multi-band, providing, at low energy costs, the required characteristics in terms of detection range and accuracy in determining the coordinates of enemy air defense systems. Taking into account the analysis of potential threats to the Russian Federation in the aerospace sphere, the relevance of detecting airborne attack systems operating at low and extremely low altitudes is increasing. Differences in the conditions and tasks of using low-altitude radars predetermine their division into duty and combat mode radars. The main requirements for promising low-altitude standby radars are: the ability to detect and track low-flying, small-sized and low-speed air targets (KR, UAVs, hang gliders, etc.) against the background of intense reflections from the ground, local objects, hydrometeorological formations, intentional passive and non-synchronous impulse noise; the presence in the radar complexes (RLC) of remote radar modules located outside the RTV units and operating in automatic mode; the possibility of placing antenna systems on high-altitude supports (in some cases on tethered balloons). Low-altitude radars in combat mode are primarily required to have high maneuverability, sufficient energy
4 SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT OF FSR AND KVP RF AND WAYS TO SOLUTION 17 technical potential with the possibility of its concentration in a given direction (sector), increased accuracy of coordinate measurement and the ability to detect targets with a small effective scattering surface (ESR). One of the main requirements for promising radars is the need to interface them with existing and future automation systems, as well as the possibility of integration into a single information space about the state of the air situation. This includes, among other things, the use of unified protocols for exchanging information about the state of the air situation, combining radar information from various sources about air objects, and exchanging this information at higher speeds using the means of the digital telecommunications network being created by the Russian Ministry of Defense. Second direction. Full-scale deployment of EARLS FSR and STOL and its comprehensive modernization in the interests of increasing the efficiency of using radar, flight and planning information received from EU ATM units to solve air defense problems. Full-scale deployment of EARLS and its comprehensive modernization include: equipping (re-equipping) radio engineering units with modern and advanced radars (RLK); modernization of route dual-use radar positions of the Federal Air Transport Agency by deploying new airborne radar systems on them, as well as reconstruction of EU ATM centers, including in the interests of improving interdepartmental information and technical interaction; creation and deployment of unified automatic software modules technical means(MPTS), providing automatic exchange of planned, radar and additional information using unified protocols for information and technical interaction of dual-use route radar positions and EC ATM centers with the control center (PU, CP) of the RF Armed Forces. To ensure information and technical interaction through digital channels and using unified protocols, Russian Ministry of Defense facilities provide for the purchase of advanced automation systems (CAS), which together will increase the efficiency of joint processing of radar, flight and planning information at command posts of radio engineering regiments. Third direction. Phased creation of an integrated radar system of the FSR and STOL in the interests of creating a unified information space about the state of the air situation using the resources of the deployed EARLS. The implementation of this direction is organized by equipping radio engineering regiments with complexes of automatic means developed within the framework of the development work (R&D) “FSR and KVP Observer”, and integrating on their basis all sources of radar information of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Federal Air Transport Agency stationed within the boundaries of the positional area of the radio engineering regiment. Fourth direction. Organization of a unified system for automated control of the use of airspace of the Russian Federation (ESKIVP) in the VKS control system. The implementation of this direction is planned to be carried out within the framework of the state armament program, which provides for the development and adoption of unified MPTS for automation of solving the problem of monitoring the use
5 18 A.Ya. KOBAN, D.N. SAMOTONIN airspace of the Russian Federation. MPTS are intended for joint use with the control center control system (PU, CP) of aerospace forces associations, air defense formations, military units of the RTV in the interests of improving the quality of solving the problem of monitoring the use of airspace based on the implementation of modern system-technical principles for the exchange and processing of information coming from the EU ATM centers and PU radio technical troops. MPTS is being developed in various configurations with an open interface for information and technical interfacing for use at all levels of management in the automated solution of the problem of monitoring the use of airspace in conjunction with existing and future automation systems. Thus, in solving the main scientific and technical problems in the period until 2025, two stages can be distinguished: comprehensive modernization of EARLS in all regions of the Russian Federation, creation of the head site for the joint use of the integrated radar system (IRLS) FSR and KVP and ESKIVP years full-scale deployment of IRLS and ESKIVP in all regions of the country. Successful implementation of the stages of development of the SDF and CVP is possible with the unconditional implementation of GPV activities and the timely development (clarification) of conceptual and regulatory legal documents regulating the issues of construction, operation, support of the activities and development of the SDF and CVP.
SURVEY TWO-COORDINATE meter range radar P-18T/TRS-2D purpose The P-18T/TRS-2D radar is a pulsed coherent meter range radar and is designed to detect
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS DECISION On approval of the Aviation Rules for the organization of radar support for state aviation flights of the Republic of Belarus October 26, 2015
PROSPECTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS AND AUTOMATED CONTROL SYSTEMS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION Evgeniy Robertovich Meichik CHIEF OF COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION Deputy
Radar at the present stage. Possible development paths are phased modernization and the creation of unified block-modular configurations. Fighting in military conflicts of the second half of the 20th century and the beginning
MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION FEDERAL AGENCY OF AIR TRANSPORT (ROSAVIATION) ORDER Moscow &Jt On approval of the Regulations on the Department of Radio Engineering Support of Flights and
Prospects for the development of the communication system and automated control system of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Head of the Main Directorate of Communications and Armed Forces N y x POWERS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDER
Three-coordinate medium and high altitude standby mode PURPOSE is designed to detect, measure three coordinates, track, determine the nationality of air objects
INTRODUCTION OF ICT INTO THE COMBAT ACTIVITIES OF THE INTERNAL TROOPS OF THE MIA OF RUSSIA CHIEF OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS AND AUTOMATION N o g o g r o m e n t a t i o n o f the military forces and the State Committee
STATE AND PROSPECTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION Chief of Communications of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Deputy Chief of the General Staff a b a C
Work to create a continuous radar field of the Russian Federation. Equipping the Russian Armed Forces with Voronezh-DM high-readiness radar stations is progressing ahead of schedule. About it
DECISION OF THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS July 31, 2017 98 On introducing amendments and additions to the resolution of the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Belarus dated August 30, 2013 88 On
64 Capabilities of the Russian military-industrial complex to create advanced missile defense fire systems Igor KOROTCHENKO Chief editor of the magazine “National Defense” The main task that the troops solve
Aerospace DEFENSE Troops RELIABLE shield of the country in the air and SPACE Alexander Valentinovich Golovko Commander of the AIR AND SPACE DEFENSE TROOPS, LIEUTENANT GENERAL Aerospace Troops
Space Forces Space Forces are a branch of the Aerospace Forces. Space Forces solve a wide range of tasks, the main of which are: - surveillance of space objects
GEOPOLITICS AND SECURITY Global monitoring of the space situation is the most important direction in ensuring the military security of the Russian Federation in the aerospace sector Colonel A.N. KALUTA ANNOTATION.
PECHORA-2TM Medium-range anti-aircraft missile system S-125-2TM "Pechora-2TM" S-125-2TM "Pechora-2TM" air defense missile system is designed to combat modern and promising air attack weapons in
MULTI-FUNCTIONAL COMPLEX OF TECHNICAL TOOLS FOR SOLVING PROBLEMS OF RADAR SUPPORT, RADIO NAVIGATION AND RADIO COUNTERMEASURES IN THE LOCAL AREA Yatskevich V. A., Special Radio Systems LLC
A.M. Mukhametzhanov¹, O.S. Ishutin² Modern approaches to the management of military medical service ¹Military Department of the Karaganda State Medical Academy. The Republic of Kazakhstan. ²Military medical
Prospects for the development of ICT in the interests of the control system of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Head of the Directorate for Orders and Deliveries of Automated Control Systems, Information Systems, and Complexes
NEW ASPECTS OF THE MILITARY-TECHNICAL POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION in modern conditions Sergei Kuzhugetovich Shoigu MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, GENERAL OF THE ARMY Currently scientific and technical
DEPARTMENT OF PRESS SERVICE AND INFORMATION OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 1 CONTENTS RUSSIA IN THE MODERN WORLD. CHALLENGES AND THREATS... 3 MANAGEMENT OF TROOPS (FORCES) AND WEAPONS. MILITARY SIMULATION
Sokolov Nikita Vyacheslavovich student of the Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution of Higher Education "St. Petersburg National Research University of Information Technologies, Mechanics and Optics" St. Petersburg Stepanenko Kirill Vasilievich
Fundamentals of the combat use of air defense Interaction of military branches Fighter aviation Radio technical troops Anti-aircraft missile forces Interaction of air defense military branches Fulfillment of combat missions for security and defense
CURRICULUM for the academic discipline "Military-technical training" in the military specialty Operation and repair of radio-technical guidance systems for anti-aircraft missile systems
Educational institution "Belarusian State University Informatics and Radioelectronics" APPROVED by the First Vice-Rector of the Educational Institution "Belarusian State University of Informatics and
Burenok V.M., Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor Moskalenko V.I., Candidate of Technical Sciences Solomenin E.A. Directions for the development of the identification system The issues of constructing a promising system are considered
S.S. Smirnov, Candidate of Technical Sciences, Associate Professor V.L. Lyaskovsky, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor D.V. Nesterov Methodology for the formation of program activities for the creation of technologies and weapons
Improving the organizational structure of the military component of the Unified Air Traffic Management System of the Russian Federation Abstract. In the article against the background of improving the organizational structure
Structure and composition of the rear control point for the troops of the National Guard of the Russian Federation. Dementyev Dmitry Nikolaevich captain, student of the 116th VNG educational department Military Academy of Material and Technical
ON THE ISSUE OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF WEAPONS, MILITARY AND SPECIAL EQUIPMENT OF THE ROCKET FORCES AND ARTILLERY OF THE GROUND FORCES IN MODERN CONDITIONS Alexander Viktorovich Kochkin Deputy CHIEF OF THE CHIEF ROCKET AND ARTILLERY
UDC 623.418.2 METHODOLOGICAL RATIONALE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A DD-SD ADAM WORKSTATION SIMULATOR FOR TRAINING SPECIALISTS IN THE OPERATION OF RADIO ENGINEERING GUIDANCE MEANS OF THE Air Force ADAM Timofeev G.G., student
25/8/03 ELEVENTH AIR NAVIGATION CONFERENCE Montreal, 22 September 3 October 2003 Agenda item 1. Agenda item 1.2. Presenting and assessing the organization's global operating concept
DECISION OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA dated February 24, 2015 65 On maintaining civil defense forces and authorities in readiness for action In accordance with Federal Law dated 12
PRIORITY DIRECTIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY SPACE ACTIVITIES OF RUSSIA IN MODERN CONDITIONS Oleg Nikolaevich Ostapenko COMMANDING THE SPACE FORCES, GENERAL L-M AYOR Modern world trends
Problems of regulatory support for the use of complexes with UAVs Department of Aviation and Aviation Rescue Technologies of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of Russia, Deputy Head of Department, Ph.D. N.N. Oltyan 1 Aviation Department
ORDER OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 150 April 30, 2007 Moscow On approval of the Federal Aviation Rules for the navigator service of state aviation In accordance with the resolution
RESEARCH TESTING CENTER OF THE CENTRAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF THE AEROSPACE DEFENSE FORCES OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION Research testing center
THE ROLE OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WEAPONS SYSTEM OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION Sergei Egorovich Pankov Head of the Administration of Advanced Interservice Research and Special Projects
Appendix 14 Main directions of interaction and ways of information and technical interface of the ASRK-RF FSUE "RFC Central Federal District" with the Unified System of Integrated Technical Control of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation
A. V. Lenshin, N. M. Tikhomirov, S. A. Popov ON-BOARD RADIO-ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS Textbook Edited by Doctor of Technical Sciences A. V. Lenshin Recommended by UMO for education in the field of operation
FEEDBACK from the official opponent to the dissertation work of Evgeniy Sergeevich Fitasov “Spatio-temporal signal processing in small-sized mobile radar systems for detecting low-flying aircraft
V.G. Naydenov Doctor of Technical Sciences, Senior Researcher E.V. Pershin Statement of the problem of determining the optimal type of equipment at the experimental testing base of the Russian Ministry of Defense training ground for
SHIP ACS: METHODOLOGY FOR CREATION OF SYSTEMS, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES, TOOLS AND COMPONENTS UDC 681.324 V.A. Ilyin, I.L. Kozlov AUTOMATION OF AIR DEFENSE CONTROL OF SHIPS. FUNCTIONAL
DECISION OF THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS July 8, 2015 79 On introducing amendments and additions to some resolutions of the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Belarus Based on paragraph
ADMINISTRATION OF THE MUNICIPAL FORMATION OF THE CITY DISTRICT "SYKTYVKAR" "SYKTYVKAR" KAR KYTSHLON MUNICIPAL YUKONSA ADMINISTRATION RESOLUTION OF SHUÖM from the city of Syktyvkar, Komi Republic On approval of the regulations
II. Abstract 1. Goals and objectives of the discipline The goal of mastering the discipline is the formation and development of teaching professional competencies that ensure their performance of primary scientific positions
INCREASING THE INTERFERENCE IMMUNITY OF A RADAR WITH AFAR DUE TO THE BUILT-IN CONTROL SYSTEM 1. Ensuring the noise immunity of the system is largely determined by the characteristics of the antenna system included in the radar, because
Registered in the National Register of Legal Acts of the Republic of Belarus on March 20, 2012 N 5/35415 DECISION OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS March 16, 2012 N 234 ON SOME IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES
PROSPECTS for the development of the electronic warfare system of the Russian Federation for the period until 2020 Mikhail Valerievich Doskalov CHIEF OF THE RA Troops of electronic warfare of the ARMED FORCES of the RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
UDC 623.76(092) Ya. V. Bezel, 2015 Stages of development of automated aviation and air defense control systems A brief overview of the work performed at NII-5 (MNIIPA) in 1923-2010 is provided. on creating and improving
Approaches to ensuring the safe use of UAS Current situation in the field of use of unmanned vehicles Rapid growth of uncontrolled unmanned vehicles in Russia and other countries
GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ORDER dated November 9, 2017 2478-r MOSCOW 1. Approve the attached action plan for the implementation of the Strategy for ensuring uniformity of measurements until 2025.
Analysis current state defense industrial complex of the Republic of Kazakhstan and prospects for its development Talgat Zhenisovich Zhanzhumenov Deputy Minister of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan, General Lm
56 Russian Aerospace Defense: history of creation and main tasks 57 Nikolay LYAKHOV Retired Colonel, Candidate of Technical Sciences, Senior Researcher, from 2003 to 2007. deputy chief
UDC 629.733.34 Technical sciences Meshkova E.V., Mitroshina E.V. 4th year students of the Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Perm National Research Polytechnic University EFFICIENCY RESEARCH
DECISION OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS August 23, 1999 N 1308 ON STATE REGULATION AND ORGANIZATION OF THE USE OF AIR SPACE OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS [Changes and additions:
GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION REGULATION dated November 18, 2014 1215 MOSCOW On the procedure for developing and applying aircraft safety management systems, as well as collecting and
In accordance with Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated May 7, 2012 603 “On the implementation of plans (programs) for the construction and development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations
UDC 623.4 M.Yu. Trubin THE NEED TO IMPROVE AUTOMATED CONTROL SYSTEMS OF SURFACE SHIPS OF THE NAVY, DEVELOPMENT TRENDS Trubin Maxim Yurievich, graduated from the Faculty of Automated Control Systems of the VMIRE named after. A.S. Popova.
UDC code: 355/359 2016 Kachalkov A.D., master's student Ural Institute of Management - branch of the Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration under the President of the Russian Federation, RANEPA, Yekaterinburg
Russian Federation Novgorod region, Moshensky district Administration of the Kalininsky rural settlement POST A N O V L E N I E dated 02/22/2013 25 d. Novy Poselok On amendments to the Regulations on
1. Basic provisions for civil defense management. 2. Control points: purpose, location, equipment, life support systems, organization of work at the control point. 3. Civil Defense Headquarters and duties assigned to it
Structure of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan Air Defense Forces Naval forces Airmobile troops Missile forces and artillery Regional commands Rear services of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan Special troops Military training
State armament program, effective methods of control and management Sergei Vladimirovich Khutortsev Director of the Department of mobilization preparation of the Russian economy and the formation of state
Possible solutions to the problem of monitoring air traffic at low altitudes Grinchenko O.T. Head of the North-West Interregional Territorial Air Transport Directorate of the Federal Agency
UDC 65.011.56 V.G. Todurov PERSPECTIVE FOR CREATION OF EXPORT SAMPLES OF COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEMS FOR SECURITY AND DEFENSE OF MARINE SPACE OF COASTAL COUNTRIES Todurov Vladimir Grigorievich, Candidate of Technical Sciences, graduated
Communication and automated control are the most important condition for managing rescue forces. Head of Information Protection and Security Management It's safe
2013 SCIENTIFIC BULLETIN OF MSTU GA 189 UDC 629.735.017.1 SELECTION OF RELIABILITY ANALYSIS METHODS FOR TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT OF THE AIR NAVIGATION SYSTEM O.V. MISHCHENKO, A.A. APANASOV The article was presented by Doctor of Technical Sciences
of these Federal Rules
144. Monitoring of compliance with the requirements of these Federal Rules is carried out Federal agency air transport, air traffic services (flight control) authorities in the zones and areas established for them.
Control over the use of the airspace of the Russian Federation in terms of identifying aircraft that violate the rules for using airspace (hereinafter referred to as violator aircraft) and aircraft that violate the rules for crossing the state border of the Russian Federation is carried out by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.
145. If the air traffic services (flight control) authority identifies a violation of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation, information about this violation is immediately brought to the attention of the air defense authority and the aircraft commander, if radio communication is established with it.
146. Air defense authorities provide radar control of the airspace and provide the relevant centers of the Unified System with data on the movement of aircraft and other material objects:
a) threatening to illegally cross or illegally crossing the state border of the Russian Federation;
b) being unidentified;
c) violating the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation (until the violation ceases);
d) transmitting a "Distress" signal;
e) performing flights of letters “A” and “K”;
f) performing search and rescue flights.
147. Violations of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation include:
a) use of airspace without permission from the relevant center of the Unified System under the permitting procedure for the use of airspace, except for the cases specified in paragraph 114 of these Federal Rules;
b) failure to comply with the conditions specified by the center of the Unified System in the permit to use the airspace;
c) failure to comply with the commands of air traffic services (flight control) and the commands of the duty aircraft of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation;
d) failure to comply with the procedure for using the airspace of the border strip;
e) non-compliance with established temporary and local regimes, as well as short-term restrictions;
f) flight of a group of aircraft in a number exceeding the number specified in the aircraft flight plan;
g) use of the airspace of a prohibited zone, a flight restriction zone without permission;
h) landing of an aircraft at an unscheduled (undeclared) airfield (site), except in cases of forced landing, as well as cases agreed with the air traffic services authority (flight control);
i) failure by the aircraft crew to comply with the rules of vertical and horizontal separation (except for cases of an emergency on board the aircraft requiring an immediate change in the profile and flight mode);
(see text in the previous edition)
j) deviation of an aircraft beyond the boundaries of the air route, local air line and route, authorized by the air traffic services (flight control) authority, except for cases when such deviation is due to flight safety considerations (avoidance of dangerous meteorological weather phenomena, etc.);
k) entry of an aircraft into controlled airspace without permission from the air traffic services authority (flight control);
M) flight of an aircraft in class G airspace without notifying the air traffic services authority.
148. When identifying an intruder aircraft, the air defense authorities give a “Mode” signal, meaning a requirement to stop violating the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation.
Air defense authorities communicate the “Regime” signal to the relevant centers of the Unified System and begin actions to stop violations of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation.
(see text in the previous edition)
The centers of the Unified System warn the commander of the violating aircraft (if there is radio communication with him) about the “Mode” signal sent by the air defense authorities and assist him in stopping the violation of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation.
(see text in the previous edition)
149. The decision on the further use of the airspace of the Russian Federation, if the commander of the violating aircraft has stopped violating the procedure for its use, is made by:
a) the head of the duty shift of the main center of the Unified System - when performing international flights along air traffic service routes;
b) heads of duty shifts of regional and zonal centers of the Unified System - when performing domestic flights along air traffic service routes;
c) operational duty officer of the air defense agency - in other cases.
(see text in the previous edition)
150. The centers of the Unified System and the air defense authorities notify each other, as well as the user of the airspace, about the decision made in accordance with paragraph 149 of these Federal Rules.
(see text in the previous edition)
151. When illegally crossing the state border of the Russian Federation, using weapons and military equipment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, aircraft- to the violator, as well as when unidentified aircraft and other material objects appear in the airspace in exceptional cases, the air defense authorities give the “Carpet” signal, meaning the requirement for the immediate landing or withdrawal from the relevant area of all aircraft in the air, with the exception of aircraft , involved in combating intruder aircraft and performing search and rescue tasks.
(see text in the previous edition)
Air defense authorities communicate the “Carpet” signal, as well as the boundaries of the area of coverage of the specified signal, to the corresponding centers of the Unified System.
(see text in the previous edition)
The centers of the Unified System immediately take measures to remove aircraft (their landing) from the area of coverage of the "Carpet" signal.
(see text in the previous edition)
152. If the crew of the offending aircraft fails to comply with the command of the air traffic services authority (flight control) to stop violating the procedure for using airspace, such information is immediately communicated to the air defense authorities. Air defense authorities take measures against the offending aircraft in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation.
Aircraft crews are obliged to comply with the commands of duty aircraft of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, used to stop violations of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation.
In the event of a forced landing of an intruder aircraft, its landing is carried out at an airfield (heliport, landing site) suitable for landing this type of aircraft.
153. If a threat to flight safety arises, including one related to an act of unlawful interference on board an aircraft, the crew issues a “Distress” signal. On aircraft equipped with a danger alarm system, in the event of an attack on the crew, the “MTR” signal is additionally given. When receiving a “Distress” and (or) “MTR” signal from the aircraft crew, air traffic services (flight control) authorities are required to accept necessary measures to provide assistance to a crew in distress and immediately transmit data on its location and other necessary information to the centers of the Unified System, aviation search and rescue coordination centers, as well as to air defense authorities.
154. After identifying the reasons for the violation of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation, permission to further operate an international flight or a flight associated with crossing more than 2 zones of the Unified System is accepted by the head of the duty shift of the main center of the Unified System, and in other cases - by the heads of duty shifts of the zonal center of the Unified System systems.
A reliable aerospace defense of the country is impossible without the creation of an effective reconnaissance and airspace control system. Low-altitude location occupies an important place in it. The reduction of radar reconnaissance units and means has led to the fact that today there are open sections of the state border over the territory of the Russian Federation and hinterland countries. OJSC NPP Kant, part of the state corporation Russian Technologies, is conducting R&D to create a prototype of a multi-position spaced semi-active radar system in the radiation field of cellular communication, radio broadcasting and television ground-based and space-based systems (Rubezh complex).
Today, the greatly increased accuracy of guidance of weapons systems no longer requires the massive use of air attack weapons (AEA), and the stricter requirements for electromagnetic compatibility, as well as sanitary norms and rules, do not allow “polluting” the populated areas of the country in peacetime with the use of ultra-high frequency radiation (microwave radiation) high-potential radar stations (radars). In accordance with the Federal Law “On the Sanitary and Epidemiological Welfare of the Population” dated March 30, 1999 No. 52-FZ, radiation standards are established that are mandatory throughout Russia. The radiation power of any of the known air defense radars exceeds these standards many times over. The problem is aggravated by the high probability of using low-flying stealth targets, which requires consolidation of the combat formations of the traditional radar fleet and an increase in the cost of maintaining a continuous low-altitude radar field (LSRF). To create a continuous duty round-the-clock MVRLP with a height of 25 meters (the flight altitude of a cruise missile or ultralight aircraft) along a front of only 100 kilometers, at least two radars of the KASTA-2E2 (39N6) type are required, the power consumption of each of which is 23 kW. Taking into account the average cost of electricity in 2013 prices, the cost of maintaining this section of the MVRLP alone will be at least three million rubles per year. Moreover, the length of the borders of the Russian Federation is 60,900,000 kilometers.
In addition, with the outbreak of hostilities in conditions of active use of electronic jamming (ERS) by the enemy, traditional standby location systems can be significantly suppressed, since the transmitting part of the radar completely unmasks its location.
It is possible to save the expensive resource of radars, increase their capabilities in peacetime and wartime, and also increase the noise immunity of MSRLS by using semi-active location systems with a third-party illumination source.
To detect air and space targets
Research is being widely carried out abroad on the use of third-party radiation sources in semi-active location systems. Passive radar systems that analyze signals reflected from targets from TV broadcasting (terrestrial and satellite), FM radio and cellular telephony, and HF radio communications have become one of the most popular and promising areas of study over the past 20 years. It is believed that the American corporation Lockheed Martin has achieved the greatest success here with its Silent Sentry system.
Avtec Systems, Dynetics, Cassidian, Roke Manor Research, and the French space agency ONERA are developing their own versions of passive radars. Active work on this topic is being carried out in China, Australia, Italy, and the UK.
Similar work on detecting targets in the illumination field of television centers was carried out at the Military Engineering Radio Engineering Academy of Air Defense (VIRTA Air Defense) named after Govorov. However, the significant practical groundwork obtained more than a quarter of a century ago on the use of illumination of analog radiation sources to solve problems of semi-active location has turned out to be unclaimed.
With the development of digital broadcasting and communications technologies, the possibility of using semi-active location systems with third-party illumination has also appeared in Russia.
The complex of multi-position spaced semi-active radar system "Rubezh" developed by NPP Kant OJSC is designed to detect air and space targets in the field of external illumination. This illumination field is characterized by cost-effective airspace monitoring in peacetime and resistance to electronic countermeasures during war.
Availability large number highly stable radiation sources (broadcasting, communications) both in space and on Earth, forming continuous electromagnetic illumination fields, makes it possible to use them as a signal source in a semi-active system for detecting various types of targets. In this case, there is no need to spend money on emitting your own radio signals. To receive signals reflected from targets, multi-channel receiving modules (RMs) spaced apart in the area are used, which together with radiation sources create a semi-active location complex. The passive mode of operation of the Rubezh complex makes it possible to ensure the secrecy of these means and to use the structure of the complex in wartime. Calculations show that the secrecy of a semi-active location system in terms of camouflage coefficient is at least 1.5–2 times higher than a radar with a traditional combined construction principle.
The use of more cost-effective means of locating the standby mode will significantly save the resource of expensive combat systems by saving the established resource consumption limit. In addition to the standby mode, the proposed complex can also perform tasks in wartime conditions, when all peacetime radiation sources are disabled or switched off.
In this regard, a far-sighted decision would be to create specialized omnidirectional transmitters of hidden noise radiation (100–200 W), which could be thrown or installed in threatened directions (in sectors) in order to create a field of external illumination during a special period. This will make it possible to create a hidden multi-position active-passive wartime system based on the networks of receiving modules remaining from peacetime.
There are no analogues
The Rubezh complex is not an analogue of any of the known models presented in the State Armament Program. At the same time, the transmitting part of the complex already exists in the form of a dense network of base stations (BS) for cellular communications, terrestrial and satellite transmitting centers for radio and television. Therefore, the central task for Kant was the creation of receiving modules for external illumination signals reflected from targets and a signal processing system (software and algorithmic support that implements systems for detecting, processing reflected signals and combating penetrating signals).
The current state of the electronic component base, data transmission and synchronization systems makes it possible to create compact receiving modules with small weight and dimensions. Such modules can be located on cellular communication masts, using the power lines of this system and, due to their low power consumption, not having any impact on its operation.
Sufficiently high probabilistic detection characteristics make it possible to use this tool as an unattended, automatic system for determining the fact of crossing (flying) a certain boundary (for example, a state border) by a low-altitude target with the subsequent issuance of preliminary target designation to specialized ground-based or space-based means about the direction and line of appearance of the intruder.
Thus, calculations show that the illumination field of base stations with a separation between the BS of 35 kilometers and a radiation power of 100 W is capable of detecting low-altitude aerodynamic targets with an ESR of 1 m2 in the “clearance zone” with a probability of correct detection of 0.7 and a probability of false alarm of 10-4 . The number of tracked targets is determined by the performance of computing facilities. The main characteristics of the system were tested by a series of practical experiments on detecting low-altitude targets, conducted by JSC NPP Kant with the assistance of JSC RTI im. Academician A.L. Mints" and the participation of employees of the Higher Academy of East Kazakhstan region named after. G. K. Zhukova. The test results confirmed the prospects of using low-altitude semi-active target location systems in the illumination field of BS cellular communication systems of the GSM standard. When the receiving module was removed at a distance of 1.3–2.6 kilometers from the BS with a radiation power of 40 W, a Yak-52 type target was confidently detected from various observation angles in both the front and rear hemisphere in the first resolution element.
The configuration of the existing cellular communication network makes it possible to build a flexible forefield for monitoring low-altitude air and ground space in the illumination field of the BS network of the GSM communication network in the border strip.
The system is proposed to be built in several detection lines at a depth of 50–100 kilometers, along the front in a strip of 200–300 kilometers and at an altitude of up to 1500 meters. Each detection line represents a sequential chain of detection zones located between the BS. The detection zone is formed by a single-base diversity (bistatic) Doppler radar. This fundamental solution is based on the fact that when a target is detected through the light, its effective reflective surface increases many times over, which makes it possible to detect subtle targets made using Stealth technology.
Increasing the capabilities of aerospace defense
From detection line to detection line, the number and direction of flying targets is clarified. In this case, it becomes possible to algorithmically (calculate) determine the range to the target and its height. The number of simultaneously registered targets is determined by the capacity of information transmission channels over the lines of cellular communication networks.
Information from each detection zone is sent via GSM networks to the Information Collection and Processing Center (ICPC), which can be located many hundreds of kilometers from the detection system. Identification of targets is carried out by direction finding, frequency and time characteristics, as well as when installing video recorders - by images of targets.
Thus, the Rubezh complex will allow:
- create a continuous low-altitude radar field with multiple multi-frequency overlap of radiation zones created by various illumination sources;
- provide means of monitoring air and ground space on the state border and other territories of the country, poorly equipped with traditional radar means (the lower limit of the controlled radar field of less than 300 meters is created only around control centers major airports. Over the rest of the territory of the Russian Federation, the lower limit is determined only by the needs of escorting civil aircraft along main airlines that do not fall below 5000 meters);
- significantly reduce installation and commissioning costs compared to any similar systems;
- solve problems in the interests of almost all law enforcement agencies of the Russian Federation: the Ministry of Defense (increasing the duty low-altitude radar field in threatened areas), the Federal Security Service (in terms of ensuring the security of state security facilities - the complex can be located in suburban and urban areas to monitor airborne terrorist threats or control the use of ground space ), ATC (light flight control aircraft and unmanned vehicles at low altitudes, including air taxis - according to forecasts of the Ministry of Transport, the annual increase in small general aviation aircraft is 20 percent annually), the FSB (tasks of anti-terrorist protection of strategically important objects and the protection of the state border), the Ministry of Emergency Situations (monitoring fire safety, search crashed aircraft, etc.).
Ashuluk training ground. Radar station "Sky-UE". This three-dimensional radar has no foreign analogues. Photo: Georgy DANILOV Improving the federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control: history, reality, prospects
At the end of the 20th century, the issue of creating a unified radar field for the country was quite acute. Multi-departmental radar systems and equipment, often duplicating each other and consuming colossal budget funds, did not meet the requirements of the country's leadership and the Armed Forces. The need to expand work in this area was obvious.
Ending. Beginning in No. 2, 2012
At the same time, due to limited spatial and functional capabilities, the current FSR and KVP do not provide a sufficient level of integration of departmental radar systems and are unable to fulfill the full scope of the tasks assigned to it.
The limitations and disadvantages of the created FSR and KVP can be briefly defined as follows:
SITV TC EC ATM with air defense control units are not deployed throughout the country, but only in the Central, Eastern and partially North-Western and Caucasian-Ural zones of responsibility for air defense (56% of what is required for the full-scale deployment of FSR and STOL);
less than 40% of the RLP DN of the Ministry of Transport of Russia were modernized in order to perform dual-use functions, while the RLP DN of the Ministry of Defense of Russia ceased to be system-forming in the unified radar system of the FSR and KVP;
Information about the air situation on spatial, qualitative and probabilistic-temporal characteristics issued by the EC EC ATM and RLP often does not meet the modern requirements of the air defense control authorities (ADO);
radar, flight and planning information received from the EU ATM control center is used in solving air defense (aerospace defense) problems ineffectively due to low level equipping the air defense command post (VKO) with adapted automation systems;
joint automated processing of data from various sources of information from the RF Armed Forces and the ATM EU is not provided, which significantly reduces the reliability of recognition and identification of air objects in peacetime;
the level of equipment of FSR and STOL facilities with high-speed digital means and communication and data transmission systems does not meet modern requirements for the efficiency and reliability of the exchange of radar, flight and planning information;
there are shortcomings in the implementation of a unified technical policy in the creation, production, supply and operation of dual-use equipment used in the FSR and KVP;
the coordination of measures for the technical equipment of facilities allocated to the FSR and KVP is not carried out effectively enough within the framework of various federal targeted programs, including the modernization of the ATM system and the improvement of control and communication systems of the RF Armed Forces;
existing regulatory legal documents do not fully reflect the issues of using SITV, RTP DN of the Russian Ministry of Defense, involved in radar support of EU ATM centers, as well as the use of state identification means of the EU GRLO installed on the RLP of DN of the Ministry of Transport of Russia;
the possibilities of zonal interdepartmental commissions on the use and air defense systems for coordinating the activities of territorial bodies of the Russian Ministry of Transport and the Russian Ministry of Defense on the use and operation of technical means of the FSR and air defense systems in areas of responsibility for air defense are practically not realized.
Mobile altimeter type PRV-13
Photo: Georgy DANILOV
To eliminate these shortcomings and realize the national interests of the Russian Federation in the field of use and STOL, full-scale deployment of FSR and STOL is necessary in all regions of Russia, further integration with the EU ATM based on the use of basic information technologies for surveillance and STOL, modernized and promising radar, automation and communication equipment primarily dual-use.
The strategic goal of the development of the FSR and STOL is to ensure the required efficiency of reconnaissance and STOL in the interests of solving air defense (VKO) problems, protecting the state border of the Russian Federation in the airspace, suppressing terrorist acts and other illegal actions in the airspace, ensuring air traffic safety based on integrated use radar systems and equipment of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Transport in the context of a reduction in the total composition of forces, equipment and resources.
In the weekly “Military-Industrial Courier” (No. 5 dated 02/08/2012), the commander of the East Kazakhstan region, Lieutenant General Oleg Ostapenko, drew public attention to the fact that the current state of the low-altitude radar field within the Russian Federation is not the best configuration.
Therefore, customers and performers are full of enthusiasm and find mutually acceptable solutions in the most difficult situations and the casuistry of modern legislation in the interests of implementing the Federal Target Program.
Based on the results of stage II of the Federal Target Program, a significant increase in the efficiency and quality of solving problems of air defense, protection of the state border in the airspace, radar support for aviation flights and air traffic management in important air directions should be ensured with a limited composition of forces, means and resources of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.
In accordance with the Aerospace Defense Concept for the period up to 2016 and beyond, approved by the President of the Russian Federation in April 2006, one of the main directions for building the East Kazakhstan region is currently the full-scale deployment of the FSR and KVP throughout the country.
To ensure full integration of departmental radar systems of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Transport and the formation on this basis of a single information space about the state of the air situation as one of the main areas of concentration of efforts in building the country's aerospace defense further development It is advisable to conduct FSR and KVP in the following stages:
Stage III – short term (2011–2015);
Stage IV – medium term (2016–2020);
Stage V – long-term perspective (after 2020).
The main task of developing the FSR and KVP for the short term is the deployment of the FSR and KVP in all regions of Russia. At the same time, during this period, it is necessary to carry out a comprehensive modernization of the EA radar in the interests of increasing the efficiency of using radar, flight and planning information received from the EU ATM bodies of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation to solve air defense (VKO) problems and to increase the area of controlled airspace.
Radar station 22Zh6 "Desna"
Photo: Georgy DANILOV
To create a radar field with improved parameters, a decision was required to continue work within the framework of the Federal Targeted Program “Improving the FSR and KVP (2007–2010)” for the period until 2015. The matter, which is necessary for the country’s defense capability, was not “chuckled out” in the authorities, as is often the case , it received a logical continuation - the Federal Target Program was extended until 2015 in accordance with Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of February 2011 No. 98.
the main task development of the FSR and KVP for the medium term (after 2016) and long-term (after 2020) - the creation of a promising integrated dual-use radar system (IDLS DN) of the FSR and KVP in the interests of forming a unified information space on the state of the air situation for air defense control authorities (VKO) and EU ATM.
For the timely completion of the full-scale deployment of the FSR and KVP, it is necessary, first of all, not to miss the organizational and technical issues:
creation of a permanent interdepartmental working group of representatives of interested ministries and departments, scientific organizations and industrial enterprises under the Interdepartmental Internal Affairs Committee of the IVP and KVP for the purpose of promptly resolving problematic issues and preparing proposals on current issues;
preparation of proposals for the formation of a specialized department in the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, as well as the formation of a new 136 KNO FSR and KVP Air Force to coordinate work to improve the federal system on the part of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.
Implementation of the concept by 2016 should allow:
carry out the full-scale deployment of the FSR and KVP based on the creation of fragments of the EA radar in all regions of the country and thereby provide the prerequisites for the deployment of an reconnaissance and warning system for an aerospace attack;
improve the quality of solving problems of ensuring national security, defense capability and the economy of the state in the field of use and air defense of the Russian Federation;
bring regulatory legal documents in the field of use and control of airspace into compliance with the current legislation of the Russian Federation, taking into account the reform of the RF Armed Forces, the creation and development of the Air Navigation System (ANS) of Russia;
to ensure the implementation of a unified technical policy in the development, production, deployment, operation and use of dual-use systems and equipment in the field of use and air defense;
create conditions for the rapid development of domestic science and technology in the field of exploration and surface-to-air missions;
reduce the total state costs for the maintenance and development of radar systems of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Transport.
In addition, the implementation of the concept until 2016 will ensure compliance with ICAO requirements for the level of air traffic safety (according to the criterion of disaster risk).
In the near future (until 2016), priority activities for the development of the FSR and KVP, in addition to work within the framework of the Federal Target Program “Improving the FSR and KVP (2007–2015)”, as well as scientific and technical support for the FTP activities, should be carried out in the following areas :
Research work commissioned by the Russian Ministry of Defense, aimed at conducting advanced systemic research on the modernization and development of the FSR and KVP;
R&D commissioned by the Russian Ministry of Defense, aimed at the practical implementation of the main provisions of this concept in two main areas: comprehensive modernization of the EA radar and the creation of the head section of the promising IR DN radar;
serial deliveries of new equipment, including dual-use equipment, to FSR and KVP facilities that are part of the RF Armed Forces.
Federal Target Program “Modernization of the EU ATM (2009–2015)”.
With such a distribution of activities for each area of work, the implementation of its specific, but interconnected tasks with other work is ensured, and duplication between them is eliminated. In addition, it seems necessary to also organize:
introduction of new means and technologies for identifying and identifying air objects, taking into account modern conditions for airspace control in peacetime;
improvement of interspecific interaction of surveillance and control systems of air and surface space based on the use of over-the-horizon radar (OG radar), automatic dependent surveillance (ADS) systems and promising sources of information;
implementation of integrated digital communication systems based on advanced telecommunication technologies for prompt and sustainable exchange of information between objects.
Solution to the problem of automatic remote delivery of key information for equipment for determining nationality using a hardware-software method using existing communication channels intended for issuing radar information.
Implementation of the concept in the medium and long term (after 2016) will allow:
achieve the strategic goal of the development of the FSR and STOL - to ensure the required efficiency of reconnaissance and STOL in the interests of solving air defense (VKO) tasks, protecting the state border of the Russian Federation in the airspace, suppressing terrorist acts and other illegal actions in the airspace, as well as the required level of air traffic safety in the context of a reduction in the total composition of forces, means and resources;
create an air traffic control system and form on its basis a unified information space about the state of the air situation in the interests of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Russian Ministry of Transport and other ministries and departments;
ensure the introduction of promising means and technologies for identifying air defenses and automatically identifying the degree of their danger;
significantly reduce the cost of operating dual-use surveillance and control equipment due to their operation in automatic mode.
The implementation of the concept will also contribute to the integration of the Russian ANS into the Eurasian and global air navigation systems.
The goal of the development of the FSR and KVP after the completion of the main stages of development, it seems, may be the creation on the basis of the EA radar of a promising IR DN, ensuring the unification of departmental radar systems of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Transport and the formation on this basis of a single information space about the state of the air situation in the interests of the Ministry of Defense Russia, the Ministry of Transport of Russia and other ministries and departments.
The creation of IRLS DN will eliminate departmental and systemic contradictions through the introduction of basic information technologies for surveillance and STOL, the use of modernized and promising radar, automation and communications equipment, primarily dual-use, as well as the implementation of a unified technical policy in the field of use and STOL.
A promising IRLS should include:
network of unified dual-use information sources (UII DN), providing mining, pre-treatment and issuing information about the air situation in accordance with the requirements of consumers of various departments;
a network of territorial centers for joint information processing (TC SOI) about the air situation;
integrated digital telecommunications network (IDTN).
The main consumers of the information provided by the Air Traffic Control System are the Air Defense Command Center (VKO) and the EC ATM Center.
The DN IRLS should be built on a network principle, which will provide access to any information consumer to any DN UII or SOI TC (subject to restrictions on access rights).
The composition of the technical means of all DN IUIs must be unified and include the following information, processing and communication components (modules):
primary radars (PRL);
secondary radars (SSR), ensuring the receipt of information from the aircraft in all current request-response modes;
ground-based radar means of state identification of the EU GRLO (NRZ);
ADS system receiving devices;
devices for automatic processing and integration of information from the above sources;
terminal devices for interfacing with an integrated digital telecommunications network in order to provide various types of communication (data, voice, video, etc.).
Means of obtaining information about the air situation (PRL, VRL, NRZ, ADS) can be integrated in various versions.
UII DN should be created on the basis of existing dual-use information elements of three types:
RTP DN of the Russian Ministry of Defense (RF Armed Forces);
RTP DN of the Russian Ministry of Defense (RF Armed Forces), solving the tasks of stolport and ensuring aviation flights (flights) in peacetime;
RLP DN of the Ministry of Transport of Russia (EU ATM).
Moreover, in the period 2016–2020. the head section of the IR DN should be created in one of the regions of Russia, and subsequently the deployment of IRLS DN should be ensured in all regions of the country. It is advisable to identify the most developed fragment of the federal system in the north-west of the country as the head section of the DN IRLS.
Within the framework of the head section of the GU IRLS DN, it is necessary to use the existing systems and means of the EA radar, ensuring information and technical interaction between air defense control bodies (VKO) and the EC EC ATM, as well as to deploy promising radar, automation and communication tools that implement new technologies for surveillance and STOL and ensuring the construction of UII DN and SOI TC.
Of course, it is highly desirable that plans are carried out. But the question naturally arises: how effective is the airspace reconnaissance and control system as a reconnaissance and warning subsystem of an aerospace attack of the Russian aerospace defense system?
Restore system radar control airspace, which the mighty USSR once had, makes no sense today. Modern-level air defense systems must ensure the solution of assigned combat missions without pushing the “forefield” to the limit. As a last resort, highly mobile long-range radar detection and control systems should operate.
In his article on national security issues, published on February 20, 2012 in Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Vladimir Putin drew attention to the fact that in modern conditions our country cannot rely only on diplomatic and economic methods of resolving contradictions and resolving conflicts.
Russia faces the task of developing its military potential within the framework of a containment strategy and at the level of defense sufficiency. The Armed Forces, intelligence services and other security agencies must be prepared to quickly and effectively respond to new challenges. This is a necessary condition for Russia to feel secure, and for our country’s arguments to be accepted by partners in various international formats.
The joint efforts of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Russian Ministry of Transport and the military-industrial complex to improve the FSR and KVP will significantly improve the spatial and information capabilities of the East Kazakhstan region and the Air Force.
Already today, operational-strategic commands formed throughout the country can and should make maximum effective use of the spatial potential of the unified radar system of the FSR and KVP. Do they actually use and how do they improve the methods of combat operations of active branches of the armed forces, having such a system?
During the exercises, do air defense forces on duty practice their actions aimed at suppressing airspace violations in those regions where today, through the reconstruction of the TRLP DN of the Ministry of Transport of Russia and the reconstruction of the EU ATM centers of the Ministry of Transport of Russia, equipping them with air defense control systems, the information capabilities of the lost in 1990s radar field? Have the issues of determining the nationality of air objects been resolved on the principle of “friend or foe”?
Probably, the widest circles of the Russian public and the country's expert community would be interested in knowing how effectively the created unified FSR and KVP radar system works within the current boundaries of responsibility for air defense. We should not be tormented today and in the historically foreseeable future by the question: is Russia in danger of radar blindness?
Sergey Vasilievich SERGEEV
deputy general director– Head of SPKB OJSC NPO LEMZ
Alexander Evgenievich KISLUKHA
Candidate of Technical Sciences, Advisor for FSR and KVP to the Deputy General Director - Head of the Special Design Bureau of JSC NPO LEMZ, Colonel
MILITARY THOUGHT No. 3(5-6)/1997
On some problems of monitoring compliance with the rules for using airspace
Colonel GeneralV.F.MIGUNOV,
candidate of military sciences
Colonel A.A.GORYACHEV
THE STATE has full and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory and territorial waters. The use of the airspace of the Russian Federation is regulated by laws consistent with international standards, as well as regulatory documents of the Government and individual departments within their competence.
To organize the rational use of the country's airspace, air traffic control, ensure flight safety, and monitor compliance with the procedure for its use, the Unified Air Traffic Control System (US ATC) was created. Formations and units of the Air Defense Forces, as users of airspace, are part of the control objects of this system and in their activities are guided by the same regulatory documents for all. At the same time, readiness to repel a surprise enemy air attack is ensured not only by the continuous study by the crews of the command posts of the Air Defense Forces of the developing situation, but also by monitoring the use of airspace. A legitimate question is: is there any duplication of functions here?
Historically, in our country, the radar systems of the EU ATC and Air Defense Forces arose and developed to a large extent independently of one another. Some of the reasons for this include differences in the needs of defense and the national economy, the volume of their financing, the significant size of the territory, and departmental disunity.
Air traffic data in the ATC system is used to develop commands transmitted to aircraft and ensure their safe flight along a pre-planned route. In the air defense system, they serve to identify aircraft that have violated the state border, control troops (forces) intended to destroy an air enemy, direct weapons and electronic warfare at air targets.
Therefore, the principles of constructing these systems, and therefore their capabilities, differ significantly. It is significant that the positions of the ES ATC radar facilities are located along air routes and in the areas of airfields, creating a control field with a lower boundary height of about 3000 m. Air defense radio units are located primarily along the state border, and the lower edge of the radar field they create does not exceed the minimum height flight of potential enemy aircraft.
The system of control of the Air Defense Forces over the use of airspace was developed in the 60s. Its base is made up of radio-technical air defense troops, intelligence and information centers (RIC) of command posts of formations, associations and the Central Command Post of the Air Defense Forces. In the process of control, the following tasks are solved: providing command posts of air defense units, formations and formations with data on the air situation in their areas of responsibility; timely detection of aircraft whose identity has not been established, as well as foreign aircraft violating the state border; identification of aircraft violating the rules of use of airspace; ensuring the safety of air defense aviation flights; assistance to EU ATC authorities in providing assistance to aircraft caught in force majeure circumstances, as well as search and rescue services.
Monitoring the use of airspace is carried out on the basis of radar and dispatch control: radar consists of escorting aircraft, establishing their nationality and other characteristics using radar equipment; dispatcher - in determining the estimated location of aircraft based on the plan (flight requests, traffic schedules) and reports on actual flights. arriving at the command posts of the Air Defense Forces from the EU ATC bodies and departmental control posts in accordance with the requirements of the Regulations on the procedure for using airspace.
If radar and air traffic control data are available for the aircraft, they are identified, i.e. an unambiguous connection is established between the information obtained instrumentally (coordinates, movement parameters, radar identification data) and the information contained in the flight notification of the given object (flight or application number, tail number, initial, intermediate and final points of the route, etc.) . If it is not possible to identify the radar information with the planning and dispatch information, then the detected aircraft is classified as a violator of the rules for using airspace, data about it is immediately transmitted to the interacting ATC unit and measures adequate to the situation are taken. In the absence of communication with the intruder or when the aircraft commander does not comply with the dispatcher's orders, air defense fighters intercept him and escort him to the designated airfield.
Among the problems that have the strongest impact on the quality of functioning of the control system, one should first of all mention the insufficient development of the regulatory framework regulating the use of airspace. Thus, the process of determining the status of Russia’s border with Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in the airspace and the procedure for controlling its crossing has been unjustifiably delayed. As a result of the uncertainty that has arisen, determining the ownership of an aircraft flying from the indicated states ends when it is already deep in Russian territory. At the same time, in accordance with the current instructions, part of the air defense forces on duty is put on alert No. 1, additional forces and means are included in the work, i.e. material resources are wasted unjustifiably and excessive psychological tension is created among combat crews, which is fraught with the most serious consequences. This problem is partially solved by organizing joint combat duty with the air defense forces of Belarus and Kazakhstan. However, its complete solution is possible only by replacing the current Regulations on the procedure for using airspace with a new one that takes into account the current situation.
Since the beginning of the 90s, the conditions for fulfilling the task of monitoring the use of airspace have been steadily deteriorating. This is due to a reduction in the number of radio technical troops and, as a consequence, the number of units, and first of all, those of them whose maintenance and provision of combat duty required large material costs were disbanded. But it was precisely these units, located on the sea coast, on islands, hills and in the mountains, that had the greatest tactical significance. In addition, the insufficient level of material support has led to the fact that the remaining units, much more often than before, lose combat effectiveness due to lack of fuel, spare parts, etc. As a result, the RTV’s ability to carry out radar control at low altitudes along the Russian borders has significantly decreased.
In recent years, the number of airfields (landing sites) that have a direct connection with the nearest command posts of the Air Defense Forces has noticeably decreased. Therefore, messages about actual flights arrive via bypass communication channels with long delays or do not arrive at all, which sharply reduces the reliability of dispatch control, complicates the identification of radar and planning dispatch information, and does not allow the effective use of automation tools.
Additional problems arose in connection with the formation of numerous aviation enterprises and the emergence of aviation equipment in the private ownership of individuals. There are known facts when flights are carried out not only without notifying the Air Defense Forces, but also without permission from air traffic control authorities. At the regional level, there is disunity between enterprises regarding the use of airspace. The commercialization of airlines' activities even affects their presentation of aircraft schedules. A typical situation has become when they demand payment, but the troops do not have the funds for these purposes. The problem is solved by producing unofficial statements that are not updated in a timely manner. Naturally, the quality of control over compliance with the established procedure for using airspace is reduced.
Changes in the structure of air traffic had a certain impact on the quality of functioning of the control system. Currently, there is a tendency to increase international flights and unscheduled flights, and consequently, the congestion of the corresponding communication lines. If we take into account that the main terminal device of communication channels at the air defense control post are outdated telegraph devices, it becomes obvious why the number of errors has sharply increased when receiving notices of planned flights, messages about departures, etc.
It is assumed that the listed problems will be partially resolved as the Federal System of Reconnaissance and Airspace Control develops, and especially during the transition to the Unified Automated Radar System (EARLS). As a result of the unification of departmental radar systems, for the first time it will be possible to use a common air traffic information model by all bodies connected to the EARLS as consumers of air situation data, including command posts of the Air Defense Forces, Air Defense Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy, EU ATC centers, others departmental air traffic control points.
In the process of theoretical study of options for using EARLS, the question arose about the advisability of further entrusting the Air Defense Forces with the task of monitoring the use of airspace. After all, the EC ATC authorities will have the same information about the air situation as the crews of the command posts of the Air Defense Forces, and at first glance, it is sufficient to carry out control only by the EC ATC centers, which, having direct communication with aircraft, are able to quickly understand the situation. In this case, there is no need to transmit a large volume of planning and dispatch information to the command posts of the Air Defense Forces and further identify them with radar information and calculated data on the location of aircraft.
However, the Air Defense Forces, while guarding the air borders of the state, cannot rely solely on the ES ATC in identifying aircraft violating the state border. The parallel solution of this task at the command posts of the Air Defense Forces and at the EU ATC centers minimizes the likelihood of error and ensures the stability of the control system during the transition from a peaceful situation to a military one.
There is another argument in favor of maintaining the existing order for the long term: the disciplining influence of the Air Defense Forces control system on the EU ATC bodies. The fact is that the daily flight plan is monitored not only by the zonal center of the EU ATC, but also by the control team of the corresponding command post of the Air Defense Forces. This also applies to many other issues related to aircraft flights. Such an organization facilitates the prompt identification of violations of the rules for the use of airspace and their timely elimination. It is difficult to quantify the impact of the Air Defense Forces control system on flight safety, but practice shows a direct connection between the reliability of control and the level of safety.
In the process of reforming the Armed Forces, there is objectively a danger of destruction of previously created and sufficiently well-functioning systems. The problems discussed in the article are very specific, but they are closely related to such major government tasks as border security and air traffic management, which will be relevant in the foreseeable future. Therefore, maintaining the combat effectiveness of the radio technical troops, which form the basis of the Federal reconnaissance and airspace control system, should be a problem not only for the Air Defense Forces, but also for other interested departments.
To comment you must register on the site.
It might be useful to read:
- How to get on an excursion to Antarctica?;
- Czech Republic Troy Castle. Troja Castle in Prague. Ancient winery and museum;
- Böcklin and his “island of the dead” A cultural phenomenon of its time;
- Air tickets to Crimea Air tickets to Crimea will become cheaper;
- What you can and cannot take with you;
- Open left menu Heviz How to get from Budapest to Lake Heviz;
- Cable car in Nha Trang (Vinpearl) The longest cable car in the world Vietnam;
- Kamenets-Podolsk fortress - a historical monument of Ukraine Life outside the walls of the Kamenets-Podolsk fortress;