Battles for Donetsk airport chronology. Donetsk airport, as it was (photo). Was it necessary to fight?

Two years ago, parts of the Ukrainian troops abandoned the Donetsk airport, which was held by units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces for 242 days and became one of the symbols of the war in eastern Ukraine.

The last defenders Donetsk airport there were soldiers of the 81st Airborne Brigade, they were the ones who left the airport with losses at the end of January 2015, when all that was left of the airport buildings were piles of glass, concrete and reinforcement - the airport buildings were destroyed by the “DPR” separatists with the help of two powerful explosions.

Below the cut is a story about Donetsk airport.

02. First, let's look at a map with key objects marked in the Donetsk airport area. To the north-west is the control tower (with a very recognizable silhouette), to the east is the fire station. In the southwest there is an old cemetery, in the center of the map there are buildings of two terminals, Old and New.

03. DPR militants entered the airport on the night of May 25-26, 2014. Just two days later, units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces recaptured the airport and took up defensive positions inside the terminals.

04. Ukrainian soldiers inside the airport coruses. The building was defended mainly by airborne brigades, as well as special forces units - which can be seen from the autographs on the wall of the room.

05. Throughout the summer and autumn of 2014, heavy fighting continued in the area of ​​the airport with varying success; it often happened that one floor of the terminal was occupied by units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and the other by separatists.

06. Heavy fighting also took place in the settlements closest to the airport - Peski and Opytnoye. Through them, cargo was delivered to the airport area. Ukrainian units in Piski:

07. Experienced:

08. The airport buildings were constantly shelled; after several months of constant hostilities, all that remained of the buildings were, in fact, reinforced concrete skeletons, cut by shrapnel.

09. Burnt tanks on the runway.

10. Post-apocalyptic landscape of the neighborhoods adjacent to the airport.

11. And this is what the fighting at the airport looked like from Donetsk.

12. Christmas tree paratroopers of the 93rd airmobile brigade. By the way, it was during the New Year that the situation at the airport began to escalate; the DPR militants (despite the ceasefire) went on an active offensive.

13. The separatists managed to block parts of the Ukrainian Armed Forces inside the buildings, leaving them without food and water supplies, but a small group of “cyborgs” (as the airport defenders were nicknamed) continued to defend the remains of the New Terminal. As eyewitnesses of the battles write, the enemy’s armor-piercing bullets pierced 3-4 thin walls inside the airport premises at a time.

14. It was not possible to storm the airport building; the separatists decided to simply blow up all the buildings at the Donetsk airport. The first explosion occurred on January 19 - it brought down all the floors of the building down to the basement and destroyed almost all barricades and shelters with a blast wave. The second explosion occurred on January 20 and destroyed the remains of buildings.

Photo: Sergey Loiko, Nur Photo, Anadolu Agency, Pierre Corm,

According to Ukrainian soldiers, the separatists managed to capture the airport only because no one initially considered it as a defense base:

“The most important question that concerns me regarding the DAP is: why was Donetsk airport not initially considered as a defense springboard?
After the first battle on May 26, 2014, no one improved the engineering barriers in it. Only in November we began to strengthen it - we brought sand in bags. It would have been possible to strengthen the DAP earlier, dig in in places, and bring concrete blocks. And in November, neither them nor the crane could be delivered.
It's hard to defend a glass building. Plasterboard crumbled, bullets flew through, columns ricocheted. We brought in sand until our dump truck was hit. For the militants, the DAP was a training ground; they trained there. And we defended every piece of land at the airport. This is why he was important to us. I think if there were no Donetsk airport, we would not be in Avdeevka, Kramatorsk and Slavyansk now.»

Call sign "Mike", commander of the 1st Battalion, 79th Brigade.

Donetsk International Airport named after Sergei Prokofiev was founded in 1933, in the same year the first Aeroflot flight was organized on the route Stalino - Starobelsk. In 1952, a squadron of Li-2 heavy aircraft was organized at the airport. In January 1957, a new air terminal designed by architect V. Solovyov, with a capacity of 100 passengers/hour, opened its doors to passengers.

The rapid development of the airline occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the operation of the An-24, An-10, and Il-18 aircraft began. In 1982, the Donetsk Aviation Enterprise began flight operation of the 3rd generation Yak-42 aircraft, which were successfully mastered by the flight and engineering staff, and since 1983, they were the first in the USSR to begin performing international air transportation on this type of aircraft.

In 1988-1989, the flight and engineering staff of the airline took an active part in providing assistance to victims of the Spitak earthquake, for which particularly distinguished employees were awarded the Aeroflot Excellence Badge and certificates of honor from the Ministry civil aviation. On October 11, 1991, the Donetsk United Aviation Squadron was renamed the Donetsk Aviation Enterprise. In 1992, on the basis of the airline, with the help of trained engineering and technical staff, the repair of Yak-42 aircraft, which had flown 10,000 flight hours, began.

In 2002, the airline took first place in a regional competition to ensure labor safety for airline workers.

In 2003, the enterprise was reorganized by dividing the airline (Donbassaero) and the airport, on the basis of which the municipal enterprise Donetsk International Airport was formed, and in 2012 the airport was named after the famous composer Sergei Prokofiev.

Yana Sedova Saturday, January 21, 2017, 11:00

After 242 days of defense, the last Ukrainian fighters left Donetsk airport on January 21, 2015 Photo: EPA/UPG

242 days. About a thousand fighters. Dozens of wounded and killed Ukrainian soldiers. Donetsk airport, DAP, became a symbol of resilience, and its defenders began to be called cyborgs for holding the line surrounded by the enemy for many months, in heat and cold, sometimes without water and food, relying on willpower and adrenaline.

During one of the trips to the ATO zone, the Apostrophe correspondent managed to look at the remains of the airport from Zenit, the extreme position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. From a shelter on one of the hills, the remains of a once beautiful airport could be seen behind the haze. The shell of the terminal with the tattered walls hanging on it was as ghostly as this haze. It seemed that at the first noticeable gust of wind the frame would begin to collapse like a house of cards.

The last defenders of the ATO forces left the DAP on January 21, 2015. Shortly before this, on January 13, the control tower, the “eyes” of Ukrainian military personnel, collapsed. After this, many servicemen who were in the DAP believe, holding the defense became pointless. But some remained there until the very end, and for some, the airport became a grave after the separatists blew up the ceilings in the new terminal. Others who survived the heat of battle still have difficulty coping with post-traumatic syndrome and refuse interviews for fear of falling back into binge drinking.

But there are also those who are ready to talk. They told "Apostrophe" about how the most protracted and brutal battle of this war began, how the runway was watered with "Grads", and shells bounced off the solid concrete like ping-pong balls, how they fought off attacks and tried to save their wounded comrades, how they literally crawled out of the destroyed terminal with broken legs, miraculously emerging from the rubble on the last day, when they had to retreat and leave the remains of the airport behind.

Story 1. From Donetsk - with love and celox

Small and thin Natalya is one of those Donetsk volunteers who rushed to help the Ukrainian Armed Forces fighters in the DAP and carried cargo for them directly from Donetsk, when Russian soldiers were already walking on the streets of the city, and armed “persons of Caucasian nationality” were preparing to storm the terminals.

Natalya soon took her family away from Donetsk, but may return there, so for security reasons her last name is not indicated here. She ended up in the DAP when no one suspected that heavy fighting lay ahead, as a result of which the entire airport would turn into ruins. Now it’s hard to imagine that the Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers received help directly from Donetsk, and that it was carried by desperate volunteers through separatist checkpoints.

Volunteer Natalia

It seems that on May 3, I went with my child to the DAP (we held a flash mob - a performance of “Ode to Joy”), there were already military men there, but I didn’t really understand that these were no longer DAP employees, not border guards, but special forces who were guarding the airport. On May 3 everything was still intact. On one side of the city, for example, in Auchan, Russian soldiers were walking, and in Metro, near the DAP, they were buying our dumplings.

Then the old terminal was completely intact and empty. I was sure that hundreds of special forces were somewhere in the basements. But then we found out that in fact there are a little more than 20 soldiers in the DAP from the 3rd Special Forces Regiment (whose commander I met by phone, and we kept in touch), and in the new terminal there are several dozen soldiers of the 72nd Brigade.

We had a secret group in Donetsk, several dozen people. We started collecting funds for radios for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Then we were asked to help with water for the guys who were standing at the Zenit position; they were blocked, and it was only possible to get there from Donetsk through 2-3 checkpoints. I gathered several people I barely knew, and we went to Zenit. Once we met with the guys from DAP, who arrived through a mined field at Zenit, unloaded almost everything we brought - water, bread and a lot of fresh vegetables. At this meeting, my phone number was given to the soldiers from the airport. I remember that their relatives sent Kevlar helmets and various things to Donetsk by Nova Poshta.

In the 20th of May, bearded militants arrived in Donetsk, so they immediately decided that they had to go into battle - they were sent to the DAP, as to the nearest point where there were Ukrainian military personnel.

Dozens of foreign journalists worked in Donetsk, while my daughter was dancing in that area, I escorted the French and someone else closer to the DAP. On May 26 there was an attack on ours, they repulsed it without losses. Trucks with wounded and survivors were speeding away from the DAP at full speed. The Ukrainian Armed Forces called in aviation for reinforcements, and fighter jets flew over the city for three days. The separatists tried to shoot them down. There was a continuous roar.

Then the day was like a month, so I won’t say exactly how long we were transmitting parcels like this, but in the end the commander insisted that the anti-aircraft gunners bring us to the DAP, this was at the end of June - beginning of July. In general, we were definitely the first to get there (after the start of active hostilities): we rode in an anti-aircraft gun, with machine guns and body armor, just like the military. We were accompanied by a car with the sign “Airport” on it, and on the checkerboard there was a Darth Vader mask. It turned out that the military was joking: they found and put this mask on the car, but the driver did not notice and drove like that for several days.

From Donetsk we began to transmit (to the Ukrainian Armed Forces) all information about the movement of equipment. We rode around the city, closer to the waste heaps, and hooked a phone to the sun visor, which filmed everything. In general, we became strong friends. We watched as the commander, practically with one glance, placed his guys in positions. The military from Zenit also began to go to the DAP, where they were taught a lot, and both of these positions became a powerful cover for each other. We carried night vision devices, tactical goggles, batteries, celox, the first tablets with maps and sights, sleeping bags and sleeping mats, food, and once we even brought a Georgian who cooked barbecue for the military.

They carried the plates to the armor plates under the car seat, and wrapped the covers in hammocks. I hid my glasses in my sleeping bags. Then I went with a kind-looking uncle, his name was Konstantin. I met him during secret meetings related to the organization of rallies in Donetsk. I remembered him when I had to go on my first trip. And I was not mistaken - they always let us through and did not check us.

At the checkpoints in this direction there were then locals, we had a legend for them - in Opytny we either have a recreation center for fishermen, or we accept refugees there. A night vision device was once transported in a bag of chicken feed. It seemed like they were going to visit grandma. And soon we got a car with a double bottom. Our “fairy tales” passed. But then one day we were driving through Donetsk, we stopped, I went to the supermarket, and the separatists took the car.

Somehow no help was delivered - the day before the railway bridge was destroyed. But we didn’t know how much so we went to him so that we could pass through at least one less checkpoint. There, for the first time, a sniper started shooting at us. We put the car in reverse and sped away. That day we returned to the city, and the next day we went again, but in a completely different car.

Natalya (left) during a trip to Opytnoye and Peski (Donetsk region)

The problem of the first "Dapists" was that they were in almost complete confinement in a closed space for about 4-5 months. The special forces somehow dealt with this, but the 72nd did much worse. When I first met them, I was afraid to even move. They were ready to shoot us as saboteurs. The guys were clearly going crazy.

I remember the refrigerators in which the bodies of two of our dead were stored until it was possible to take them out. I remember the plan for the parade in DAP on August 24, 2014. It never took place - the commander found out about the guys who had previously survived in the DAP who died at Saur-Mogila, and he was taken to the hospital. My heart couldn't stand it.

The beginning of September was very difficult, the guys said goodbye every day. We transferred a lot of medicine through the reconnaissance commander of the 93rd brigade. By the end of autumn and beginning of winter, we were at the airport several more times. Then they were already carrying warm boots, uniforms, sleeping bags, camping burners and cylinders.

The last time I was in DAP was at the beginning of December 2014, running, military vehicle, from which they only managed to look out for a couple of minutes and be horrified by the ruins. December 2014 was quite quiet, but in the old terminal there were separatists moving along the elevator shaft. They were already there and on the top floor.

For me, DAP is, first of all, the people who were there, many of whom became family. Some friends died there, one of them was a volunteer.

Airport like local residents, was our great hope. Every morning began with calls and news about him. The DAP defenders and I had a common dream - for the war to end and to be able to return home.

Story 2. Building the country that the dead dreamed of

Vitaly Gorkun fought as part of the 79th airmobile brigade. On September 25, 2014, he went on vacation for 10 days. At that time, the first company occupied the line in Sands - the soldiers spent the night in Sands and at about 5 am they began to enter the DAP. Two armored personnel carriers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces were shot down, killing 13 people. On September 26, Vitaly’s birthday, his commander called him and said that his vacation was ending because they would be entering the DAP. Vitaly returned to the unit and already on October 2 his unit was at the airport. Apart from shell shock, he had no injuries - he was lucky.

Today Vitaly Gorkun is the head of the Mariupol Patrol Police.

Vitaly Gorkun (left)

I went with my platoon to the old terminal, we were there for 10 days, after which we left and began escorting, delivering ammunition and water to Sands.

On November 7, my company returned to the old terminal for another 10 days. Then our brigade was withdrawn from the ATO to the Zaporozhye region, closer to Mariupol. We had a lot of wounded; about 80 people remained from the battalion. At that time, the Shirokino operation had already begun. Near Mariupol we met New Year. After that, we were transferred to Nikolaev to restore combat effectiveness. When the terminal was blown up in January, we were put on alert and rushed to the airport.

There were two attempts to get us there by plane, but when that didn’t work out, we went by bus to Solntsevo and from there moved on to Vodyanoye.

What I remember most during my rotations at DAP was Putin’s birthday – October 7th. From October 4 to October 6, there were continuous battles for two days, infantry marched, tanks came out. When we first arrived, they immediately began to cover us, everything they had worked on us, and our armored personnel carriers burned down after they knocked out our tank. So on October 4 there were a lot of wounded, because the (enemy) tank rolled out and fired directly at us. And at dawn I realized how difficult it would be, because at night nothing was visible. In the first two days, we had two people in the 200s, and 17 people in the 300s; there was a moment when we thought that we were screwed here. But on October 6 we knocked out their tank.

Back in October, the airport was of strategic importance, but then there was no point in sitting and defending in one room, which was subjected to tank and artillery shelling every day.

Those lives that the DAP later took, I think, should have been saved and used elsewhere, to act more decisively, not in a targeted and local way, but in a front-line manner. Maybe try to close the ring along the border, although, of course, I’m not a general. Probably the generals were simply afraid to report on the real picture of what was happening around us. The DAP was surrounded, every convoy (AFU) that entered there was under fire.

It wasn’t so scary to sit there as to drive in and out, it’s three kilometers of road that is constantly under fire, and it was a lottery - whether you’ll get hit or not. And considering that in one armored personnel carrier or infantry fighting vehicle there were 12 people in the airborne squad, even if one grenade had hit, everyone would have burned alive, because no one would have been able to get out of there quickly.

I personally had four such raids - when they entered the DAP and left it. And the mechanics, drivers, machine gun gunners - they drove along this route every day or every other day. They took out ammunition and the wounded.

We got used to it psychologically, of course. During the war I realized that we get used to everything. In the cold, damp, without water, we sat for ten days - and there was nothing terrible, and we didn’t want to eat. We probably don’t know our capabilities ourselves. To say that there were professional military men there is no, we all gained the same experience. It’s one thing to learn war from books, and quite another to lead and give orders, as a result of which the guys could die. We studied shoulder to shoulder.

The war will end for us when we liberate our territories and build a high moor throughout the eastern cordon. How long this will last depends on how we ourselves treat the situation in the country.

Vitaly Gorkun (left), in the photo on the right - Vitaly at Donetsk airport

Now I head the Patrol Police in Mariupol. In war, you understood who the enemy was. And here we come across people who want changes, but, let’s say, they break the rules on the roads, and if you make a remark, they will say - it would be better if you went to war.

Some people think that the boys there are dying for territory, others think: let Poroshenko sell Roshen, then I will drive by the rules. I always say that everyone should start with themselves. It so happened that our generation experienced such events, but also a chance to build a normal society where money will not decide everything. Many are used to it, do not want to give up their comfort zone and are not ready to sacrifice it, but someone gave their life. If my hands give up, then I will betray all those who gave their lives. I had an acquaintance, Bogdan, who died. When I arrived at his home in the Lviv region, his mother said - you survived, boys, to build the country that Bogdan dreamed of. I will fight to the end now that I am back.

Story 3. Two Hour War

Alexey Sokolovsky volunteered for the Donbass battalion at the end of August 2014. He spent most of the time until January 2015 at the training ground in locality Cherkasskoe (Dnepropetrovsk region), was a reservist, and on November 5, 2014 he signed a contract with the Ukrainian Armed Forces and went to serve as part of the 93rd separate mechanized brigade (OMBR).

For Sokolovsky, the war began and ended on January 17, 2015. In the first battle he received a mine-shrapnel wound. Last September, doctors gave up trying to repair the ankle joint and removed it completely. In the next five months, Alexey will have to spend time with the Ilizarov apparatus, which fixes the bones in the correct position. “Unfortunately, I’m still recovering,” he tells Apostrophe. His war only lasted a couple of hours. However, he says he has no regrets.

Alexey Sokolovsky

We arrived in the ATO zone on January 13, 2015. I was an assistant machine gunner for my cousin, Alexander. And on January 17, the assault on the monastery on the territory of the Donetsk airport began with the goal of breaking through a corridor for the withdrawal of fighters from the terminal. During this assault, two of our infantry fighting vehicles were lost in the fog, and communication was lost. There was heavy shelling, the vehicles stalled, the gun on one BMP was jammed, and the turret on another was jammed. Then we managed to start the cars, but after about thirty meters our group was hit by several 120-mm mines, and movement became impossible.

I was wounded by mine fragments in the abdomen and right shin. Then 26 people were wounded, 15 in our group alone; two died. All these guys started with the Donbass battalion in August-September 2014.

Brother Alexander also received severe mine-shrapnel wounds to his limbs that day.

We were there (in the DAP area) for about half an hour, it was my first and last Stand. I remember when I was wounded and the cartridges ran out, I picked up a grenade. There were different thoughts, the main one was not to be captured. But, in the end, their own people arrived and pulled us out.

Alexey Sokolovsky

Yes, it turns out I didn’t have time to fight. But I don't regret it. During our offensive, more than 80 people were taken out of DAP. After being wounded, my brother ended up in Selidovo, then in the Dnieper and Odessa. I went to Krasnoarmeysk, then also to the Dnieper, and then to Kyiv.

When I hear about the DAP, I remember first of all our soldiers who died there. The war has actually lasted three years. I don’t have a question about whether it was worth dying there, but I constantly hear this question from others, for some reason from those who have not been there and never will be. I would go this route again. If there was an opportunity, I would go back, but it would be uncomfortable with the Ilizarov apparatus and on crutches, and they wouldn’t take me.

Whether it was worth the children dying there will be shown by the development of our country.

Story 4. Surviving cyborgs

Evgeniy Kovtun served in the 93rd Separate Infantry Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces as an artillery fire spotter, and was in the DAP from January 6, 2015 to the 20th. With a group, leaving behind the destroyed terminal, he made his way to the positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the night of January 21.

After the ceilings of the new terminal were blown up, Evgeniy found himself under the rubble, fortunately, his comrades were able to get him. He was lucky more than once later - under the cover of fog, the group made its way to the weather tower, which was controlled by the Ukrainian military. Eugene, exhausted due to wounds, insomnia, thirst and hunger, fell behind, but his comrade returned for him and led him to his own. Yevgeny Kovtun was among the last surviving “cyborgs” of the Donetsk airport. “I’m currently undergoing maintenance,” he jokes in a conversation with Apostrophe. Treatment for the wounds and concussions received will still take a lot of time.

Evgeniy Kovtun

We have been in Peski since the end of autumn, holding the defense there. We had a rotation: one company was in Peski, another was holding the defense in DAP, another company controlled nearby territories.

Our first day at DAP was quite calm, there was the so-called green corridor, day of silence. Heavy fighting began on the 10th.

When I got to DAP, the only thing I thought about was how to keep warm. There was a small diesel burner, it served us for a couple of days. There was a small potbelly stove that provided some heat, but the separatists hit it with an RPG.

Before the ceilings were blown up, I was wounded, and the terminal explosion also added to it.

It was hard there all the time. I remember that on January 9, a paratrooper was seriously wounded, and we could not take him out, because this supposed truce with the green corridors meant that once a week, by agreement, equipment entered the airport, the guys went on rotation. And here the person needs to be urgently evacuated, and here new agreements are needed. And he died before our eyes. In the end, they allowed him to be taken to the enemy checkpoint, where an ambulance was waiting. But the fighter did not survive.

The guys fought, it was important for them to know that if something happened, they would be picked up, saved, and taken to the hospital. It is right for soldiers to believe in such things. And then it turned out that we couldn’t do anything. The medic could only maintain a seriously wounded man in this condition and fought for his life...

I remember the gas attacks. In this war, probably, no one has ever been smoked out like we were. Both those who were intact and the wounded. You couldn't go outside. During my stay in DAP there were gas attacks six times; they hounded us for hours as soon as the wind blew in a way that suited them. The temperature was minus, the air was almost still, and they could throw these action gas grenades one after another. We were choking, coughing, and our eyes were watering.

I am still undergoing treatment, and I had concussions, and on the 17th I was also wounded. Three ribs were broken, but I was still in fairly normal condition, all my body parts remained with me.

The first explosion was on January 19, he knocked down all the walls for us. After this there was a heavy attack, which we repulsed. We were already squeezed, surrounded. The next day they blew it up a second time, the floor was underneath us, and we actually fell to the floor below, we were buried in the upper floors. There were paratroopers, guys from the 90th Battalion, they helped get those who were overwhelmed, they got me too.

The command and I could not really communicate; there had been no communication for several days; they could not get through to us for the wounded.

We still had some ammunition left, so we decided in a group of about 13 people to make our way to our own. They asked if I would go. After the rubble, I no longer stood, I lay down. They helped me up, threw me over the parapet, I realized that if I fell, I wouldn’t get up. It took us a long time to get out, but we reached the weather tower. Our people had already evacuated us there.

A couple of people were left wounded and dead.

One of our group didn't make it. He and I are far behind. One fighter came back for me. The fog was heavy. He saved us. But the second one was never found; he was later taken prisoner. But then, fortunately, they released me. It was he who woke me up, helped me throw me over the parapet and told me that I had to leave.

Evgeniy Kovtun

When we got out to our people, the first thought was to drink. Before this there were severe Epiphany frosts, everything was frozen, all the water bottles. And even this ice then ended. We didn’t sleep for many days, without water, without food, so to already have liquid water was such a blessing. The guys brought us water every now and then, but we couldn’t get drunk.

And we urgently had to find a phone to tell our relatives that we were still alive, that we were fighting. The guys let us sleep for a couple of hours, then transferred us to Vodyanoye, where an ambulance was waiting.

We didn’t know then whether they would storm the tower. All we knew was that the terminal had fallen early in the morning. A group went for the wounded, Rahman went, but this help never arrived, they were waiting for them, the rest had already been taken prisoner (the cyborg Rahman was later exchanged - “Apostrophe”).

The situation that led to this was in itself deplorable. I wish it were not us, but us who took them like that. Since January 13, after the control tower fell, there was nothing to do there. But no one wanted to make a decision and understand that the era of the airport had to end, since it had lost its strategic importance. The tower fell and we went blind. We had weapons and ammunition back then; we would have come out, even with a fight, but we would not have lost the people who were blown up. And the rest would not have been taken prisoner.

But maybe the heroism of some is the shortcoming of others.

Yana Sedova

Found an error - highlight and click Ctrl+Enter

Original taken from u_96 in Battles for Donetsk airport or “There is nothing left to defend!..” (c)

A view from Kyiv:

Yuri Butusov.

BATTLE FOR DONETSK AIRPORT. WHAT HAPPENED, REASONS AND RESULTS

So, the heroic defense of the new and old terminals of Donetsk airport ended after 242 days. There is nothing left to defend. The $200 million terminal remains in tattered ruins. The remaining wounded defenders were captured. According to Censor.Net, in the battles for the airport in the new terminal and in the vicinity of the airport on January 16-22, the death of 23 Ukrainian soldiers, including one Georgian citizen, was reliably confirmed - their bodies were taken to morgues. 16 servicemen were captured. The fate of at least 11 fighters has not been established - participants in the battle say that he could have remained under the rubble of the last fortifications of the new terminal. Volunteers are trying to organize the search for bodies. It is possible that the list of losses is not final.

What happened? Censor.Net analyzed the situation from the point of view of military tactics and the circumstances known to us.

Tactical situation

First of all, you need to understand what positions at the airport are. This is a completely open area where you can only take observation positions in individual buildings. These buildings cannot be held by large forces, since with the concentration of forces they become a convenient target for artillery and tanks, and large losses are inevitable. Therefore, initially the defense of the airport was a chain of separate observation posts that called for fire support if necessary. Our forces in the airport buildings never amounted to more than 100-120 fighters scattered across points. But most importantly, these observation posts adjusted artillery fire. It was the artillery that made it possible to confidently hold the airport observation posts. The second important factor was armored vehicles. A great threat to the airport defenders was posed by attacks from enemy tanks, which struck with precise direct fire. The tank is mobile, it is difficult to cover it with artillery. Therefore, 2 tanks and several infantry fighting vehicles for anti-tank defense were concentrated at the airport. After the enemy began hitting our armored vehicles in the new terminal with new anti-tank guided missiles, our command changed the support scheme. A tank unit was stationed in Sands, which always kept 3-4 tanks in constant readiness. To suppress enemy firing points and observation points, and to repel tank attacks, our tanks quickly moved out of Sand.
From the outskirts of Peski to the new terminal is approximately 2 kilometers. This is the shortest way. But ours could also provide support from the base in Opytny - this is about 3 kilometers away. The distance is small. But the problem is that both the path from Peski and the path from Opytnyy were well controlled by the enemy. For direct fire from a tank, 2 kilometers is not a problem.
Thus, we held our position at the airport primarily due to the interaction of artillery and armored vehicles with the defenders of the airport buildings, and due to the ability to immediately provide support with reserves. But complicating factors were pressure from the flanks.

Autumn assaults

Beginning in September, the main losses of the airport defenders came from artillery shelling of our support forces in Peski, and from the columns that broke through to the new terminal.
Russian troops tried to attack the airport head-on, but the actions of the assault groups did not bring success to the enemy. The control tower and new terminal dominated the area, and our spotters immediately called in fire as small groups were cut down time after time by the terminal's defenders. It was impossible to hide in open areas; finding an assault group in open areas meant its destruction. The attacks stopped in October, as all the assault troops of the Russian mercenaries were gradually knocked out.
A big role was played by the fact that the defense in September-October was led by the officer of the 3rd special forces regiment, Colonel T., and the backbone of the defense were 30 professional special forces. The 3rd Regiment defended the airport from the very beginning, since May, and thoroughly knew the terrain and infrastructure of the airport, which gave great advantages over the enemy.
Since our units were not reinforced, we had to leave the buildings that stood near the new terminal - the hotel, the old terminal, and the new terminal became the advanced one.

It is more convenient to attack from Donetsk and the suburbs of Veseloye and Spartak airport than from Peski and Opytnoye. Enemy observation posts are equipped in high-rise buildings; it is possible to reach the attack line, hiding behind green spaces among private houses. Therefore, gradually closer to Vesyoly separate buildings our units began to leave - it was impossible to hold them, since the flanks were open. But it was then impossible to transfer additional infantry forces to the airport.
The Ukrainian command chose a more passive tactic of action - it was decided to abandon active operations and simply hold the wing of the new terminal, the control tower and a number of other observation points. Despite the fact that in November the reserves were restored and it became possible to strengthen our positions in the airport area, the ATO command did not take any measures. The political factor of “truces” and “ceasefire” constantly constrained the initiative of the Ukrainian command at the operational-tactical level, and constantly had a negative impact on tactics. It is obvious that the ATO command did not adequately assess the situation.
As a result, in October the enemy began to change tactics. The enemy began advancing on the flanks. Russian forward posts were deployed in the area of ​​the monastery near Pesok and in the village of Spartak. Russian troops began to reinforce these positions with tanks and anti-tank weapons. At the same time, in November, the enemy abandoned the assaults, and trench warfare began at the airport. The Russians occupied individual buildings, and instead of attacking, they began to try to infiltrate the buildings around the new terminal, and then into the new terminal itself, waging a war of snipers and spotters, short raids and shelling from tanks.
Many Ukrainian officers and analysts pointed out to the Ukrainian command the danger of the developing situation at the airport. It was obvious that a threatening situation was developing. It was possible to hold the airport only if we could strengthen our units in the new terminal and protect the new terminal from enemy penetration, and - most importantly, if the flank positions and buildings from which the enemy was conducting observation and direct fire on the columns that were moving forward were taken under control from Pesky and Experienced. But the Ukrainian command did not take any measures.

Muzhenko's intrigues and disorganization of battle management

The defense of the airport in September was carried out under the command of the commander of the operational command “South” and sector “B” Ruslan Khomchak. However, on September 15, the General Staff removed Khomchak from direct control and appointed General Dovgan, Khomchak’s deputy, as sector commander. At the same time, Khomchak’s headquarters, which was created from experienced personnel qualified officers back in Peaceful time, and controlled the situation in the DA from the very beginning of hostilities, continued to manage operations in the airport area. But in December, Muzhenko decided for some reason (why? obviously out of jealousy of Khomchak) to completely remove OK “Yug” from command and disband it. And at the beginning of January, all the officers who had led the battles at the airport since July were removed and were assigned to form new mobilized units. The General Staff formed the new headquarters of sector “B” as a combined team that does not have coherence and does not have so much experience.
But even this improvised headquarters... removed Muzhenko from command of operations at the Donetsk airport right before the start of the attack on January 17! This seems absurd, but it is true.
On January 16, Chief of the General Staff Viktor Muzhenko personally took over the leadership of the operation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to defend Donetsk airport. Muzhenko removed the head of sector “B”, General Dovgan, from commanding troops in the area of ​​the airport. The Chief of the General Staff did not issue a written order, but his decision can easily be confirmed by all participants in the events.
The headquarters of OK "Yug" controlled all actions for the defense of Donetsk airport from April to December 2014, and in these battles our troops were able to repel attacks even in difficult conditions in September-October. The removal of the most experienced senior officers of the OK "South" to control the artillery had especially grave consequences.
On January 18 I wrote https://www.facebook.com/butusov.yuriy/posts/915147548525542?pnref=story :

“Petro Poroshenko, stop showing off, take Muzhenko from the airport, don’t interfere with the headquarters doing their job!
Since the Supreme Commander-in-Chief gave the order to hold the airport, the leadership of the operation at the airport was personally taken over by... Chief of the General Staff Muzhenko. Other officials rushed there after him. What a circus this is... The Chief of the General Staff is an absolutely unnecessary person at the command post at this moment. The sector headquarters is working, the headquarters of two brigades are working - why are you trying to command? Well, you’re superfluous there, you’re only getting in the way of managing the battle, you’re just asking unnecessary stupid questions. You don’t really know the people or the situation, you’ve never been to Sands, why, why, in the midst of a battle, confuse control and interfere with work?
And all for the sake of personally reporting to “First”!
And Pyotr Alekseevich does not see anything strange that the Chief of the General Staff, under whose command there are 220 thousand military personnel, and all the armed forces, carries out the tasks of the brigade commander - or rather, prevents the brigade commanders from completing their tasks. What can Muzhenko do there that the brigade commander of the 93rd Mikats, who has been fighting at the airport for SIX months without a break, has not thought through a hundred times already?
Mr. President, it was because of Muzhenko’s inaction that the situation at the airport became critical. It was the Chief of the General Staff, instead of adequately responding to the advance of Russian troops, who forbade the troops from any maneuvers. It was he who gave the order to go on rotation through the Motorola checkpoint. It was he who waited for two days for the next push to allow the troops to act.
The commander-in-chief again looks like a man who only needs PR, not results. The responsibilities of the National General Staff do not include solving tactical problems. But it includes solving operational issues - preparing mobilization, sending reserves, actions in the other four sectors of the front. But Muzhenko again blamed all these uninteresting strategic issues on someone else, and ran off to command not the army, but companies and batteries.
The person who, together with Nazarov and Pushnyakov, must be responsible by law for Il-76, for the Girkin corridor in Slavyansk, for sector “D”, Ilovaisk, for the 32nd checkpoint, must plow and fulfill his duties, and not give up everything , abandon the completely ill-considered mobilization, and again try to get in with a joyful report to “First”.
Petr Alekseevich, either put the fool in his place, or stop commenting on the situation at the airport - such “soviet” PR hinders the army and discredits the command in front of the officers. at least take him to Kyiv - so that he stops distracting him, at least help him with this.
I am very afraid that a man who curries favor with the president and tries to constantly report on his fictitious achievements is again bossing people around. Wonderful people who, with their heroism and skill, compensate for the complete inadequacy of the Chief of the General Staff.”

January assault. Repetition of the tragedy of the 32nd checkpoint

The battle for the new terminal was lost by the ATO command even before the assault began. We kept the new terminal completely surrounded only thanks to the heroism of the soldiers and commanders. I wrote about this on January 8 and warned about the threat:

https://www.facebook.com/butusov.yuriy/posts/909950945711869
"...The ATO command did not plan or take any active actions. Even when the 79th and 95th brigades were transferred to the airport, and there were already quite enough forces in the Sand area, the order to expand the corridor was not received. The enemy held observation of a section of the road that our troops did not control (although there were plenty of forces in that area), and simply brazenly and boldly violated the terms of the peace agreements, moving to a position in our rear. This situation was even obvious by analogy with the 32nd block. post, but there was no reaction from the command.

Under the cover of a “truce,” the enemy, taking advantage of the indecisiveness of the Ukrainian command, achieved serious tactical success - they intercepted our communications, and if the situation escalates, the enemy received a serious tactical advantage, now our units at the airport are threatened with real complete encirclement.”

No action was taken.

After the enemy took control of the flanks, Russian troops entrenched themselves in the Peski area in the monastery, from where the road from the village to the terminal was clearly visible. And the enemy controlled the road from Opytnye from Spartak. Enemy units, taking advantage of the ceasefire, took positions in the wing of the new terminal and in the old terminal, and entrenched themselves. This made it possible to control the supply of reinforcements to the new terminal, and allowed the enemy to avoid risk when advancing to the attack line. Our artillery could not hit the enemy, who was in the same building as our units.

Unfortunately, the enemy’s tactics of destroying our 32nd checkpoint were completely repeated. During the “truce”, the enemy carried out envelopment from the flanks, and after carrying out the maneuver, provoked hostilities in an area convenient for him. The enemy then concentrated fire to destroy our observation posts. The complete destruction of the airport control tower was key. This tower provided the Ukrainian troops with an important tactical advantage - it allowed them to visually control the entire road from Peski to the new terminal. The destruction of the tower now gave an advantage to the Russian troops, who, during the truce, had set up an observation post in the monastery near Peski, and now its belfry became the highest-altitude object in this zone, allowing the enemy to control the situation.

As soon as the operation to encircle the new terminal was completed, on January 15 the enemy immediately provoked military clashes and began an attack on the new terminal.

Since the enemy took advantageous positions, it was impossible to hold the new terminal. It was no longer possible to think about whether it was worth carrying out the operation or not. It was necessary to act immediately - either immediately withdraw our units from the new terminal, or attack the enemy in the area of ​​​​the monastery near Peski and in Spartak in order to secure the flanks.

Alas, the actions of the ATO command and the General Staff, especially starting from January 16, when Muzhenko, for political reasons, took personal control of the battle, were a continuous series of mistakes and misunderstandings. Having a large group of forces in the airport area, which was not only not inferior, but even superior to the opposing enemy forces, Muzhenko did not take any serious measures to correct the threatening situation.

Having taken command personally and having completely removed the commander of sector “B” and all officers of OK “South” from control, the Chief of the General Staff simply did not have the opportunity to adequately assess the situation. Muzhenko did not even try to find out what the real capabilities of the specific units and units that he planned to throw into battle were.

Despite the long “truce,” the General Staff did not even prepare a plan for an attack on Spartak and the monastery. The attack on January 17 was a complete improvisation - and poorly prepared.

For some reason, Muzhenko did not involve trained reserves in offensive operations - the 1st and 13th battalions of the 95th brigade, the 79th brigade, and other proven units. The strike groups for the attack on January 17 were put together in a hurry, literally within 24 hours. The 2nd battalion-tactical group of the 93rd mechanized brigade, the 90th battalion of the 95th brigade, small units of the 81st, 80th, airmobile and 17th tank brigades, the 74th reconnaissance battalion, the 3rd regiment were involved special forces, engineering regiment. Most of the tactical reconnaissance tasks in Spartak and in the Peski area in the interests of the 93rd brigade were carried out by reconnaissance groups of the Right Sector - this indicates the level of organization of military reconnaissance in ground forces, which depends entirely on the initiative of volunteers.

The Chief of the General Staff grossly violated the requirements of the “Manual on the operational work of military command and control bodies” because he did not issue written orders that would indicate the intent and plan of the operation. This made it impossible to establish effective coordination of troops.

And this is a crime for the suspect Muzhenko.

The most serious consequences were that Muzhenko had no idea about the real fighting qualities of the troops.

It should be noted here that since the General Staff is not seriously involved in combat training of troops, and is not involved in putting together strike units of constant readiness, the fighting qualities of different units are very different, and in the same brigade, and even in the same company, there can be subunits and groups of fighters with high combat effectiveness, and completely incapacitated. There are people who will complete a task at any cost, there are people who are poorly prepared and can complete tasks only if events develop favorably, and there are people who are not motivated and can disrupt the task. A commander who understands this, when setting a combat mission, personally determines the composition of the unit to which he entrusts combat work. To make sure everyone doesn't flinch.

Given the severity of the crisis, the General Staff was obliged to bring up large forces and the best strike units to relieve the airport blockade - for this Muzhenko had at least two weeks!

The entire brigade is in reserve at the General Staff, but it was not even redeployed to the airport from the rear.

Detail - the 90th battalion of the 95th brigade, which fought bravely at the airport, was formed from volunteers, motivated people, but got to the front only during a calm period, and did not have time to gain serious combat experience. In the 93rd mechanized brigade, a tank battalion, which had several excellent tank crews who were well familiar with the situation and had extensive combat experience, was sent to Kharkov for replenishment literally on the eve of the aggravation of the situation.

The officers told Censor.Net how the meeting took place, where Muzhenko set the task for the troops. Everything was very short. The NGSH pointed its finger at the map, which milestones need to be reached, and who should perform. He did not ask the opinions of the officers, he did not inquire about the real fighting qualities of the troops.

No attention was paid to the interaction of the units, nor to the procedure to be followed in the event of Russian troops interfering with our communications, which regularly happened at the airport - significant forces of Russian electronic warfare units are concentrated there.

So, on January 17, the task was set - one group had to take the monastery near Peski. And then, advance to the hotel on the airport grounds, and thus cut off the enemy from the new terminal. The second group is to make a deep bypass of the microdistrict where Donspetsstroy is located, and going out to the Volvo auto center, enter the suburbs of Donetsk in order to cut off the transfer of enemy reserves. The third is to hit the village of Spartak from Avdeevka, and go to the Putilov interchange - the main communication hub and the gate to the Donetsk airport for armored vehicles.

The concept of the operation contained deep errors; the plan simply did not take into account the real situation and the capabilities of the troops. Muzhenko doesn’t know the troops. He personally communicates only with those commanders whom he likes, but in general he has a very poor understanding of the real state of the armed forces. Therefore, having set the task of moving to the attack area, he did not inquire about how many fighters the commanders could actually gather for an attack, how many combat vehicles they actually had that could support the attack? And for the Ukrainian army with old equipment and large quantity hastily mobilized people are important issues. The answers to which the commander must know BEFORE the battle. The head of the General Staff had a lot of time to put together fully combat-ready groups near the airport, in view of the threatening actions of the enemy. But none of this was done.

First of all, Muzhenko did not create serious strike groups to carry out an operation with such broad goals. The attack on the monastery was carried out by a company-tactical group based on the 6th company of the 93rd brigade, which consisted entirely of volunteers, most of whom were former Donbass fighters. The company was reinforced by 8 tanks and 8 infantry fighting vehicles, which had never interacted with the company before and only became acquainted before the attack.

The same small forces were concentrated in other directions. Commanding 230 thousand military personnel, the Chief of the General Staff on all three directions of attack on January 17 concentrated a group for the relief of the blockade, which did not exceed 500 fighters hastily assembled from different units.

At the same time, these groups were again drawn from different units, had poorly trained and poorly motivated crews and units, and were not provided with intelligence data. The task was set completely inadequately.

Yes, there were problems with armored vehicles on the day of the attack, yes, technical condition leaves much to be desired. But wasn't this known before the operation began? Was there anything that prevented the General Staff from concentrating the required amount of military equipment and ensuring overwhelming superiority in forces?

Muzhenko’s biggest mistake was that he did not concentrate reserves to develop success, consolidate, and support shock units.

The most egregious thing in the activities of the Chief of the General Staff was that he once again completely ignored intelligence data. A drone of the SOS Army volunteer movement operated at the airport, but due to the fact that these volunteers criticized the General Staff for incompetence, reconnaissance data from the drone was simply not taken into account and was not used throughout the entire period of the battle.

However, there could be no grounds for such a superficial underestimation of the enemy. The Russian detachments at the airport had fully combat-ready units, including armored vehicles and artillery, electronic warfare and electronic warfare equipment. The Kremlin detachments were inferior to the Ukrainian group in numbers and the amount of military equipment, but they maneuvered freely and had significant firepower.

Russian units took the new terminal into the fire bag. At the same time, an attack began in the terminal itself - the enemy began to widely use sappers and undermine the walls in the terminal one after another. Massive fire and demolition charges destroyed the mines and barricades installed by our soldiers. And the enemy moved forward. Considering that the approaches to our wing of the airport were visually controlled and shot at, and enemy tanks were directly firing at our observation posts and firing points, and the delivery of reinforcements was difficult, the terminal defenders could not hold out for long. The walls have their strength - but people have withstood even more.

The attack on January 17 was risky. This was not an offensive - it was an attack at random, blindly. The fact is that the monastery was located in an open area. And to capture it, it would be convenient to act either at night or under the cover of a smoke screen. But even taking into account the urgency - anything can happen in war - large forces had to be concentrated to capture. The enemy did not concentrate large forces in the monastery itself, but it was used as a correction point, and it was supported by tanks, mortars, and other fire weapons.

Ukrainian artillery carried out preparations. However, our command forbade striking the monastery... for political reasons. Therefore, throughout the battle, the enemy could adjust the fire from the monastery with impunity.

6th company of floor volunteers to attack. The enemy put up fierce resistance. The soldiers advanced successfully, despite the fire, but unfortunately, after tanks and anti-tank weapons fired at our armored vehicles, our tanks abandoned the infantry and left the battle. The volunteers fought for 5 hours and reached the monastery. But to develop success, reserves were needed. And it was necessary to adjust artillery fire at the identified firing points, and there was a need for several tank crews who had combat experience and knew how to work with infantry.

However, Muzhenko did not provide for reserves. And the communication was jammed by Russian electronic warfare; no backup communication channels were provided. Therefore, after expending its ammunition, the 6th company had to retreat, losing 3 soldiers killed and more than 20 wounded. Attacks on the monastery by other units were also unsuccessful.

The maneuver of units of the 93rd brigade to the area of ​​the Volvo auto center initially could only be of a demonstrative nature. Muzhenko personally sent brigade commander of the 93rd Oleg Mikats to enter Donetsk with one incomplete battalion. But it was clearly impossible to capture the suburb along Stratonauts Street with such forces. And it didn't make sense. It was much more logical to entrust Mikatsu himself with the operation to capture the monastery and concentrate all available forces to clear the road from Peski to the new terminal from the enemy. Instead, Muzhenko dispersed his troops and was unable to complete a single task.

An interesting event of the day was the attack of Spartak. A small unit of the 17th Panzer and attached units attacked the village and very quickly became convinced that the enemy forces there were very insignificant. Ours passed through almost all of Spartak without resistance and were stopped, having successfully reached the goal of the operation - the Putilov interchange. A battle broke out in this area - at least one tank of the Russian mercenaries was destroyed, and ours also lost at least one vehicle. Our units stopped at the junction. After this, they were attacked by enemy reserves - up to 10-15 units of armored vehicles. Russian crews have a good level of training, but do not show much zeal. However, faced with an unfamiliar situation, without communication, and without receiving the help of reserves to consolidate at the line, our units left Spartak.

The General Staff attributed the failure of weak and uncoordinated attacks to the enemy's strong "fortified areas". But the analysis of military operations does not confirm this. Yes, there are separate shelters, yes, there are observation posts, yes, the Russians have organized a fire control scheme. But the key role in repelling weak attacks with small forces on different directions They were simply redeployed small enemy reserves, which also did not show resilience in battle. However, enemy command at the tactical level demonstrates greater flexibility. Faced with a change in the situation and lacking communication, our units stop, stop maneuvering, and do not conduct independent reconnaissance. The enemy uses the stopping time to assess the situation, conduct additional reconnaissance, and concentrate his units for a strike in a convenient place.

At this time, the initiative of the Ukrainian units is completely constrained by the high command. If the Chief of the General Staff himself commands companies, then one cannot expect a quick reaction from him. Because it is not companies that fight, but brigades and formations. If Muzhenko had been involved in management at the operational level, and freed the initiative to tactical commanders, combat operations would have had a fundamentally different character.

The fact is that the enemy did not have sufficient forces and means to repel a coordinated attack on the monastery and Spartak.

And we were quite able to fully complete the combat mission. We were stopped simply by illiterate command, an illiterate assessment of the situation, an inability to react to changes in the situation, and an inability to manage available forces.

The attacks on January 17 distracted the enemy and provided a respite for the terminal, where fierce close-range fighting continued. The wounded and dead were evacuated, and reinforcements were delivered.

But the situation has not changed. And it became clear that if forces were not gathered to repeat the attack on the same directions, the terminal would be lost very quickly.

For the fate of the terminal, January 17 was as desperate and poorly thought out a rescue operation as the attempt to deliver the convoy on October 15 to the 32nd checkpoint.

IN last days thick fog appeared. This change in weather conditions was predicted by weather forecasters, but Muzhenko did not react to this forecast. The fog meant that either we or the enemy would use it for active actions. The fog made it difficult to adjust artillery fire using ATGMs, and now the maneuver of mechanized units in the airport area could be carried out more covertly. The concentration of well-coordinated and trained troops, equipped with thermal imagers and secure communications, could lead to the occupation of key positions around the airport in the event of an attack. But Muzhenko did not develop such an operation. It became clear that if we were passive, the enemy would take advantage of the fog. Because the fog allowed the enemy to approach the new terminal.

The coincidence with the 32nd checkpoint became even greater when our small unit was sent by order of Muzhenko in complete fog to the new terminal, but was not provided with thermal imagers or even a basic navigator. Having lost orientation in the dense fog, our soldiers drove deeper into
enemy positions. 7 soldiers were killed, 8 were captured.

Starting from January 17, the new terminal held up only thanks to the incredible heroism of the defenders and the enthusiasm of volunteers.

And thanks to Ukrainian artillery, which the enemy is truly afraid of.

After the failure of the relief blockade on January 17, Muzhenko was obliged to either evacuate the fighters from the new terminal or immediately organize a new attack. But instead, as always, when the General Staff drove our units into another cauldron, except for the order “Hold on!” Muzhenko made no decisions.

After the enemy blew up the last room at the airport and the fall of the last wall, in the early morning of January 22, the last small group of our fighters left the ruins of the terminal, in which there were no longer any walls left that could be defended. They could not carry 8 seriously wounded with them, and take away the bodies of the dead and those remaining under the rubble.

For Ukraine, the defense of the airport is of the same importance as the Battle of Valmy was for France in 1792. Different countries, different situations, different revolutions. But there is only one meaning - it is proof of the defense capability and vitality of the new free nation.
And all this is not in vain - not a single drop of blood. The war continues. And the fact that we left the ruins of the new terminal does not change anything at all in the military strategy. The fight continues, and for the sake of the memory of those who fought to the end in the new terminal, we will fight and we will win.
But we must finally work on the mistakes. Because in the spring the steppes of Donbass will be covered with greenery, opportunities for covert movement and maneuver will appear, and hostilities will continue.
We need to build the army - as a system, as an institution, as a mechanism. And when we build an army, the time for victories will come. I’m telling you this not as a journalist, but as an amateur military history- this has happened more than once.
War is a clash of systems. We have many magnificent people bringing victory closer at the front and in the rear, there are millions of us, and every day we fight for freedom more consistently and systematically.
The Ukrainian army has learned to fight - now it’s time for us to learn to win.
But it was soldiers, not generals, who learned to fight, and we pay for this science with a lot of blood and great grief. We must honor the memory of the heroes and never repeat the mistakes. We must make sure that we no longer have to give the lives of our best patriots and wonderful people for these lessons...

I ask all politicians, volunteers, citizens to unite in their demands to President Poroshenko and the Verkhovna Rada - to finally establish a competent system of military command, immediately remove those responsible for the losses of the generals - Chief of the General Staff Muzhenko, as well as other persons responsible for the operation, and immediately conduct an investigation. The tragedies of the new terminal of the Donetsk airport, the 32nd checkpoint, the 31st checkpoint occur only because no one has yet been convicted and the responsibility of the leadership of the General Staff and the ATO command for the death of the Il-76, for sector “D” has not been determined, Ilovaisk. We must force the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to either restore order and responsibility in the command of the ATO and the General Staff, or resign. Mediocrity and incompetence are the main problem of the army. And it is impossible, dear Yuri Biryukov, for volunteers to deal only with supply issues - because now we are losing lives not because of the lack of body armor, fuel and water, but because of the complete inadequacy of primitive bureaucrats for their positions, who bought themselves the shoulder straps of a colonel general with hypocrisy and deception.
The management structure, the entire useless feudal-bureaucratic structure of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, needs radical restructuring. Those people who spent 23 years making a career, and at the same time did not speak out against the collapse and sale of the army, are not able to think adequately and make decisions. Ordinary volunteers who have never encountered the army solve any issues a thousand times more effectively than the stupid and incompetent bureaucratic mafia in the defense department. We need to promote to command positions in the army those people who are not associated with the Muzhenko clan and who know how to act competently and competently. We need commanders who do not turn bronze and remain human and professional. And who are responsible for people's lives.

UPDATE: on the events of January 15-22 at the airport, Censor.Net is preparing a more detailed publication, we will write more, please clarify the details of the events from the participants in this operation, I will write in detail.

All events are described from the point of view of a direct participant entirely without edits, as it came. All conclusions and arguments that will be presented below are based on personal communication with direct participants in the events described. Some evidence contradicted each other in details and diverged in numbers, but nevertheless made it possible to reconstruct a holistic overall picture of a number of tragic militia operations on the territory of the DPR. Some things, for certain reasons, will not be called by their proper names. Knowledgeable people- they will understand.

The surviving militia fighters had little time to take photos and videos in combat conditions, so the accompanying illustrative material was borrowed from open sources. Initially, the goal was to investigate the operation to storm the Donetsk airport on May 26, 2014, which resulted in the death of more than 50 militiamen (not counting the losses of the relief detachments), most of whom were volunteers from the Russian Federation. This fact has already received official recognition by the leadership of the DPR, so there is no point in hiding it, including the presence of Russian volunteers.
This operation can be considered the most disastrous of all those carried out by the DPR militia, both in terms of the results achieved and the losses incurred. The next battle, the leadership and planning of which was carried out by Khodakovsky, was the battle near the Marinovka checkpoint, as a result of which the militia suffered losses in manpower and equipment and did not complete the assigned task. The abundance of commanders and leaders in Donetsk and the lack of a single headquarters have a negative impact on the organization of the defense of Donetsk itself. The city is completely unprepared for all-round defense. What is being done is completely insufficient to hold Donetsk in the event of a full-scale assault with the massive use of armored vehicles, which are now being actively reactivated in Kharkov at the Malyshev plant, artillery and aviation.
Russian volunteers.
The militia formations of the South-East include a significant number of volunteers from the Russian Federation, fighting there according to their personal convictions. Many of them have combat experience in Afghanistan, Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, and two Chechen campaigns. The detachment, which suffered heavy losses during the breakthrough from the Donetsk airport, began to gather in mid-May 2014 in the Rostov region. The collection of volunteers took place through social media and personal contacts, on-site assistance was provided by one of public organizations. Its Rostov branch was headed by a certain person, let's call him “Sergei Ivanovich”. Soon 3 groups were formed, the senior ones of which were commanders with the call signs “Granit”, “North” and “Old”. By the decision of “Sergei Ivanovich”, “Iskra” was appointed commander of the detachment (he died during the breakthrough). “Iskra” was a former riot police officer and did not have sufficient combat, let alone command, experience, or the intellectual level to manage a detachment. He was prone to making rash decisions, which was already revealed in a combat situation. To 3 groups in the Rostov region. Volunteers from Crimea and Chechnya were added. The total number of the combined detachment was 120 people. The command of the detachment, at the insistence of “Sergei Ivanovich”, was carried out by former officer Boris Sysenko, who in a critical situation removed himself from command of the detachment. On the night of May 24-25, the combined detachment moved towards Donetsk in 5 KAMAZ vehicles. The detachment was supposed to join the Vostok battalion and come under the command of Khodakovsky.

Due to the lack of proper counterintelligence cover within the detachment, it is already Russian territory At least one enemy scout entered. It turned out to be, as it turned out later, a fighter with the call sign “Schumacher”. This means that even on Russian territory the enemy seeks to conduct active intelligence work, introducing spies into groups of volunteers. This man came along with the Crimean militias; he himself, in his words, comes from the Nikolaev region. He said that he did not serve in the military anywhere, but is on the territory of Ukraine under criminal investigation by order of the current Ukrainian government. I applied for the position of driver. Subsequently, in his backpack, which was accidentally opened (after the battle for the airport on May 26), the following characteristic items were found: 1) a walkie-talkie for communication with aviation, 2) an ICOM scanner, 3) an AK magazine, filled with tracers at one end (one of the methods “illuminate” the target in battle - with tracers), 4) a 32GB flash drive, on which in electronic format there were special instructions on conducting sabotage operations behind enemy lines, including instructions on adjusting artillery and aviation fire. The presence of instructions and reference materials suggests that the enemy is conducting mass training of agents in connection with the developments in Novorossiya. A professional intelligence officer would not have had such clearly compromising documents with him. Moreover, in a civil war it is much easier to create a network of spies and informants. "Schumacher", according to our information, was not detained and interrogated. Details are below. Perhaps he is still one of the “fighters” of the DPR militia and continues to conduct intelligence activities in the interests of the SBU. Close to “Schumacher” was a militiaman with the call sign “Odessa”, who may also be an agent of the SBU. Compared to the chloropicrin in DOGA toilets, which sickened militia members and employees, the activities of such spies cost human lives.
The first strange things.
The group was met by Khodakovsky's people. On the territory of Ukraine, one of the KAMAZ trucks, which was entirely loaded with ammunition and weapons (from the warehouses of the Ukrainian Armed Forces), “suddenly” could not crawl up the mountain. 20 minutes. KAMAZ desperately pushed, delaying the movement of the detachment. After which it was abandoned so as not to interfere with the advance to its destination. We don’t know where KAMAZ itself and its cargo went. The militia were informed that it never climbed the mountain, so it was blown up along with its contents in order to avoid capture by the Ukrainian military. Neither the inevitable strong explosion nor the bright night flash was heard or seen. Most likely, the weapons and ammunition were stolen and sold, since the demand for this business in the Southeast is now very high. On May 25, the arriving militia detachment took part in an impromptu parade at a rally in front of the DOGA building, where it was medially included in the Vostok bloc. Formally, they were not part of Vostok, but obeyed the orders of Khodakovsky and Sysenko. The latter was called “General” by the soldiers; in the past, he most likely served as a senior officer before retiring.
The operation to “capture” the Donetsk airport.
The operation to seize the Donetsk airport was initially a crime because it contradicted the fundamentals of tactical operations. Its organization and planning was carried out by Khodakovsky, who declaratively prioritized the existence of certain informal agreements with representatives of the SBU and the command of a unit of the 3rd Special Forces Regiment (Kirovograd) guarding the airport. He tried his best to convince B. Sysenko and the group commanders that these “agreements” existed. On the evening of May 25, a group of scouts advanced to Airport area Donetsk. “Granit” and “Stary”, on the basis of agreements reached by Khodakovsky, met with the SBU officer who headed the SSB of the international airport. The latter informed them of the situation in the airport area and showed them a diagram of the new terminal. Upon arrival at the headquarters, “Granit” and “Stary” went to a meeting, which was attended by Khodakovsky, Sysenko and other officers. This group of people, while planning an operation to seize a complex infrastructure facility, drank alcoholic beverages. The report of the group commanders who carried out reconnaissance of the area was not heard to the end. Their arguments that observation and reconnaissance of an object before its capture should last at least 3 days in order to compile a complete picture of the situation at the airport and in its environs were not heard. The scouts were ordered to leave the meeting. At the same time, the group commanders were given only a diagram of the building of the new airport terminal; they did not have general scheme airport, plans of other buildings, as well as a diagram of underground communications of the new terminal, in which the detachment soon found itself in a fire trap. The planning of the operation was based on dubious information, the validity of which Khodakovsky tried to convince the commanders. Firstly, he tried to convince everyone that the Kirovograd special forces, located in the area of ​​the airport, due to certain “agreements” reached, would not open fire on the militias. Making the success of an operation dependent on agreements with the enemy is a sign of either betrayal or dementia. Secondly, by order of Khodakovsky, the groups that moved to the airport area did not take with them the MANPADS that were available. As he would later say in an interview with RIA-Novosti, “the militias had MANPADS. But no one could have imagined that the Ukrainian army would dare to launch an air strike on the airport, on the reconstruction of which so much money was spent in 2012,” so he ordered the MANPADS with him do not take. http://ria.ru/interview/20140604/1010528204.html
In conditions of military operations for an airport, control of the runway and airspace around the airport, but not the airport terminal itself. The enemy will be able to freely land reinforcements in the form of troops from both helicopters and transport aircraft. Without air defense systems (at least MANPADS), it is impossible to carry out a capture operation operating airport. At the same time, the seizure of the terminal, which was carried out on May 26, 2014, could only have a vaguely understandable psychological effect. The actions of the militia in Lugansk showed that it is effective to create a no-fly zone over the airfield using light air defense systems, such as MANPADS and ZU-23, which are effective when planes and helicopters take off and land. The militias had with them at the Donetsk airport only 1 dummy MANPADS. The operation began in the absence of full reconnaissance of the situation and with total misinformation on the part of its organizer.
Around 2.00 On May 26, Khodakovsky gave the order to prepare to move part of the detachment to seize the airport. In his words, main task The detachment will “pose in front of journalists’ cameras”, since a 100% agreement has been reached with the Kirovograd residents (3rd Special Forces Regiment) not to fire at each other.
Around 3.00 detachment of approximately 80 people. moved to the airport to complete the assigned task. The fighters partially occupied the building of the new airport terminal. The occupation of the airport terminal building took place without clashes.
Around 7.00 Reinforcements moved to the terminal, which included, among other things, volunteers from Chechnya.
Around 10.00 Khodakovsky completed negotiations with the command of the Kirovohrad special forces and, together with the fighters of the former Donetsk Alpha, left the airport. Direct command was then exercised by Sysenko.
After Khodakovsky’s departure, taking into account the reinforcements that arrived at 07:00, the number of militias occupying the airport was about 120 people. The further actions of the Kirovograd special forces were very different from the “agreements” that were communicated by Khodakovsky to the militia personnel. Ukrainian special forces positions were located in the old airport terminal building and in its surroundings. Without hiding and slowly, the Kirovograd residents began to equip firing positions to fire at the terminal occupied by the militia. We brought up mortars, established positions for the AGS-17 “Plamya”, and dispersed the snipers. Soon, PMC fighters were landed on the airport grounds and took up positions in the control tower and the surrounding area of ​​the airport.
Around 11.00 the enemy opened fire on the militias who occupied the airport. The air strike was carried out by Mi-24 helicopters and Su-25 attack aircraft, using NURS and automatic cannons. PMC snipers opened fire with sniper weapons. In fact, assigned to the groups to lead the operation, Sysenko withdrew from command after realizing what had happened, sending the soldier to a duty-free store to buy alcohol. While the detachment was fighting, he was drinking alcohol, not having the necessary moral and psychological characteristics to organize defense. Instead of the easy capture promised by Khodakovsky, he led the detachment into a trap. Subsequently, the actual leadership of the detachments was carried out by group commanders, who acted for some time at their own discretion. Kirovograd special forces also opened fire with mortars, AGS-17, machine guns and sniper weapons. Return fire was organized from equipped firing points. For this purpose, ATMs were even torn out and stacked in stacks to protect them from bullets and shrapnel. Then this became the basis for accusing the militia of looting, although the airport had been cleared by the Ukrainian military the day before. Some of the fighters, not knowing that the enemy would soon launch an air strike on the terminal, took up positions on the roof, placed firing points there, and brought up the AGS-17.


"Gypsy" with AGS and "Mir" on the roof. "Gypsy" will soon receive a slight wound to the head as a result of an air strike on the terminal, but will remain in service. He will die in one of the KAMAZ vehicles during a breakthrough. “Mir” will die during the breakthrough, his body will lie under sniper fire for 3 days before the militia can take it away.


When Ukrainian aviation began to attack them, the fighters began to retreat from the roof. The materials used in the construction of the airport, when hit by NURS, shells and mines, produced a huge number of additional destructive elements and provided very poor cover. The roof was strewn with gravel, which also acted as destructive elements when hit by shells. The first losses came from aircraft fire on the militias who had taken positions on the roof. The Chechens took the longest positions, trying to hide behind a smoke screen. This measure did not turn out to be very effective. Soon the detachment's losses amounted to 2,200 and several 300, 1,200 and almost all of the 300 were from the Chechen detachment. Some of the existing electronically controlled doors were blocked, although the power supply to the terminal was not interrupted. As a result, the withdrawal was carried out by creating an “artificial exit”. If everyone could come out at once, 300x could be less. After part of the squad left the roof, 200s and 300s remained there. It took a long time to get the 300x out due to heavy sniper fire coming from the control tower. Everyone was pulled out later under heavy fire only on the 3rd attempt. Aviation and artillery fire was very well adjusted. Through the channel of the Ukrainian radio that was given as a “gift”, negotiations between one of the spotters and the mortar gunners were intercepted.




The distance from the new terminal to the control tower, which dominates in height above all other buildings, was 960 m. Despite the considerable distance, the sniper fire was very accurate. It was fired from a sniper weapon with a caliber of at least 12.7 mm (M-82 Barrett or similar rifles). To do this, the dense fire of PMC snipers had to be suppressed with something. Of the heavy weapons, the detachment had only 1 82mm mortar and 1 AGS-17 “Plamya”, which was lowered from the roof. Mines attached to the mortar did not have fuses, so they turned the much-needed means of fire support into a pile of iron. The militia had to work on the control tower from AGS-17. The maximum firing range of an easel grenade launcher is 1700m, but the aiming range is much less. The fire on the tower had to be adjusted for a long time from the 2nd floor of the terminal until the first hits, which weakened the sniper fire. After that, they were able to take 300x from the roof. At the same time, the Kirovograd residents were verbally ready to provide a corridor for the evacuation of the wounded. PMC snipers fired at both the militias and the Kirovograd special forces. Perhaps this was due to poor coordination between the opponents, possibly due to agreements reached on the evacuation of 300x. As a result, the deputy commander of the Kirovograd soldiers actually gave the order to open fire from the ZU-23-2 at the control room, from where the snipers were working. One way or another, many militias were wounded by fire from Kirovograd. By this point in time, Donetsk already knew about the failure of the operation. An operation was hastily prepared to release the detachment that had occupied the airport. About 500 people took part in it. The main problem remained the lack of coordination and unified command. The battles in the vicinity of the airport on May 26 were carried out by: Khodakovsky's Vostok military base and a detachment of the former Donetsk Alpha, Boroday's fighters, Zdrilyuk's detachment, Pushilin's detachment, Oplot. These units also suffered significant losses from sniper fire and possibly from friendly fire in conditions of poor coordination. Snipers worked on almost all approaches to the airport: in the area of ​​the METRO store (2 mercenaries from the Baltic states were destroyed), from the side of SPARTAK (the sniper was working from a construction crane), from the side of the cemetery and runway, from one of the 9-story buildings on Stratonavtov Street. What followed were openly provocative actions. Iskra received an order via mobile phone ( from someone) go for a breakthrough, since the airport is surrounded by Ukrainian military. Don’t wait for the night and go out in small groups, but right now, before the “ring” is closed, load onto KAMAZ trucks and go out into the city, taking 2x 200x and numerous 300x. They will be provided with a corridor from the Donetsk side. In fact, there was a tight ring of encirclement only around the new terminal. On the territory of the airport, Kirovograd residents continued to fire at the militia, and there were PMC snipers in the vicinity. There were no significant enemy troops that tightly surrounded the airport. The militia were able to dive into only 2 KAMAZ trucks; access to the other 2 was tightly blocked by sniper fire. Therefore, KAMAZ trucks were loaded to the brim with people. Only the cover group remained at the airport. She will retreat later along the greenery and will not suffer casualties.
Around 18.30 2 KAMAZ trucks made a breakout from the airport. Having received information that they were surrounded, the KAMAZ trucks drove at full speed, the soldiers fired at everything that moved and even rested. The initiator of this exit tactic was Iskra. Perhaps this played a tragic role when entering the city. The covering group advanced on foot through the greenery near 19.15-19.20 . She suffered no casualties and returned safely to Donetsk, which is additional evidence that there was no tight encirclement around the airport. When the groups made a “breakthrough”, Sysenko remained in the cover group. He died of a heart attack on the eve of the group's retreat from the airport. Before breaking into the greenery, the group had to overcome 300m under fire from snipers and machine guns.
Shooting of KAMAZ vehicles with militias.
At the entrance to Donetsk from the airport at that time there were 80+ Vostok fighters concentrated in an ambush. from the 1st and 2nd bases of the battalion (established name of the units) and other parts of the militia. They received information that fighters of the National Guard of Ukraine were coming from the airport to break into Donetsk. The order was given to fire to kill. 2 KAMAZ trucks with militias leaving the airport were destroyed by fighters of the Vostok battalion with heavy fire from small arms and grenade launchers. There were no Ukrainian special forces in the ambush; there was an order to open fire on their own soldiers.


The first KAMAZ was hit and overturned on the Kievsky village near the Magnolia store. There were more survivors in it than in the 2nd. The 2nd KAMAZ was hit on Stratonavtov Street in the area of ​​the Putilovsky Bridge. When the KAMAZ was riddled and smashed, and the movement around them stopped, the Vostok fighters crawled closer and saw St. George’s ribbons on the corpses. The driver of the 2nd KAMAZ received numerous wounds and blew himself up with a grenade. The 2nd explosion was carried out by one of the wounded militiamen who remained conscious (he had fought in Afghanistan in the past). They thought that the fire was fired by Ukrainian soldiers. Of the 46 fighters traveling in two KAMAZ vehicles, 35 survived. A few days after the treacherous operation, volunteers from Chechnya left the DPR. A significant part of the Vostok battalion, realizing the consequences of the tragic operation, deserted in the coming days.
Departure.
After arriving at the base, the fighters who survived the breakout from the airport discovered strange facts. The personal property and also the remaining weapons of the victims were stolen by the time they returned. AGS-17, traveling in one of the blown up KAMAZ trucks, soon surfaced in Pushilin’s detachment. The realization that they had been betrayed and sent by the command in the person of Khodakovsky to slaughter forced them to disperse throughout the city. Further more. “Schumacher” and “Odessa” (spies) came out to attack several fighters who were camping on leave on the outskirts of Donetsk. They checked on the fighters in a friendly manner and urgently (ostensibly on orders) left for the location of the Vostok battalion. After some time, the militia's attention was attracted by children's crying and women's cries of "Don't shoot!" from the yard of a neighboring house. Jumping out into the bushes, they saw armed men in camouflage surrounding a neighboring house. The arriving Sonderkommando most likely confused the buildings in the dark. Most likely, their task was to clean up the surviving participants in the massacre. After this, the surviving soldiers had only one option - to leave Donetsk. We decided to break through to Bezler in Gorlovka. Some of the wounded who survived the massacre at the airport were able to be transported to Gorlovka in order to avoid “accidents.” New interesting details were also revealed there. It turns out that Bezler himself prepared the operation to seize the Donetsk airport, developed it for 5 days, and conducted reconnaissance. The enemy became aware of this; most likely, Bezler also has Ukrainian agents working for him. Instead of an assault, they decided to make an “assault” on Khodakovsky, at the same time sending a special forces detachment of volunteers. People with experience in conducting special operations were thrown like infantry to treacherous execution. “Mole” with the call sign “Schumacher” was identified by chance from Bezler. The militias who retreated to Gorlovka from Donetsk were able to organize the transportation of their belongings. By chance, as often happens, the transporters caught the Schumacher backpack. When they opened it, they discovered very interesting contents (see at the beginning). Further more - demands were received to return the backpack and its contents. There was a refusal.
Betrayal.
Why should what happened during the departure of the militia detachment from the Donetsk airport be considered precisely as a betrayal? In conditions of poor organization and chaos, losses from friendly fire in war are inevitable. The fact that this was precisely a betrayal, in addition to many other signs, is evidenced by the subsequent coverage of events. Look at this photo.


The worst thing about it is not the pile of militias riddled with bullets and shrapnel, the worst thing is the lenses of professional cameras on the right. A video of a crowd of journalists, including Ukrainian and Western media, being launched into a Donetsk morgue to film corpses. For what? For the report. There is a strict rule - to hide your losses, especially - never show them in all the bloody details. First of all, this undermines the morale of its soldiers and the civilian population, who count on protection from the military. Here, the footage of the mutilated bodies of the militias, which has spread all over the media, is deliberately and massively replicated. This not only allows you to report to the customer, but indeed for many it becomes a signal to think about whether it is worth fighting for the DPR.
We do not undertake to judge whether it is a coincidence or not, but on May 20, the “DPR leadership” (in itself a strong abstraction) intends to nationalize the enterprises of Akhmetov (Khodakovsky’s supervisor). http://youtu.be/8JhpQucgeT0 But by June these plans were publicly abandoned http://ria.ru/world/20140531/1010121645.html It is possible that this comes from the realization that the DPR power bloc, if not completely, it is partially controlled by Akhmetov. The same can be said about the political bloc.
Marinovka.
Additional evidence of this is the battle for the Marinovka checkpoint. June 5, 2014. There, planning and leadership are again carried out by Khodakovsky. The legend is the same: the border guards are demoralized and want to surrender. The operation is top-secret, but it involves journalists from the Western newspaper Sunday Times, who have been with a militia detachment for 3 days, of course, having mobile communications and Internet access. Subsequently, this operation will become the basis for one of the best reports of the Ukrainian Border Guard Service during the entire ATO period. The fighters arrived at the position to attack the border guards. They begin to unload from armored personnel carriers and vehicles. The first mines immediately arrive, exactly in the area where the convoy stops. The experienced gaze of one of the soldiers fixes sighting pegs for mortars at the landing site. Instead of border guards willing to surrender, there is a dense wall of fire. The flanks are covered by units of the Vostok and Oplot battalions. Very soon the cover on the flanks was blown away like the wind. The militia entered into a difficult battle with the enemy located in pre-prepared firing positions. An air strike was carried out from the air. Not a single one of the 4 MANPADS fired... As a result, we had to make a breakthrough in the direction of the Russian Federation. Sunday Times journalist Michael Franchetti, accompanying the detachment, describes with gusto how a detachment of 80 militiamen freely enters the territory of the Russian Federation, which is nothing more than another official confirmation of the Russian Federation’s support for terrorists operating in the SE. Photo report of the Ukrainian border service about the victorious battle:



Then very strange things happen. Khodakovsky is among the militias who crossed over to Russian territory as a result of the battle. He stays there for about 4 days. After which he calmly returns to Donetsk. By this point in time, our special services should have already had complete information about what happened at the Donetsk airport, incl. about Khodakovsky’s role in these events. This person should not only have been interrogated and released, but also detained as a traitor. Why this didn't happen, we don't know.
Border.
After the treacherous operation to seize the Donetsk airport, several wounded militiamen from the Russian Federation are in the DPR. Their evacuation does not require any official recognition or action. But, nevertheless, it is not carried out. The wounded are being transported on the initiative of Russian militias who survived the battle for the airport. At the border with the Russian Federation, transport with wounded people is held for 5 hours. Among them are people with severed lower limbs; one of the wounded in the arm developed gangrene; many require painkillers. There is a total interrogation and verification. Although it is clear that even Ukrainian spies without legs will not run away anywhere. Transportation of the wounded is done at the expense of the militia, transportation of the dead - at the expense of relatives. “Sergei Ivanovich,” who went on a drinking binge in Rostov, does not provide the slightest assistance in organizing the placement of the wounded in medical institutions. The slightly wounded inevitably appear at the volunteer base, thereby unmasking its location. “Sergei Ivanovich” drives them away from there. Their placement in hospitals and support fall on the shoulders of the surviving militias, who have retreated to the Russian Federation for rest and recovery.
Conclusions.
Why do the leadership of Russian militia units arriving in Novorossiya initially turn on traitors like Khodakovsky? Why are their provision and support so poorly organized? There are several working answers to these questions.
Version one. "Fifth column".
The Russian leadership really unofficially supports the DPR and LPR, not limiting itself to working in the information space. At the same time, responsible employees of the involved “public organizations” and “charitable foundations” are either conducting subversive activities, since they were recruited/bought by the enemy, or are completely incompetent from a professional point of view. There is nothing unusual in this version; the columns were sold in both the 1st and 2nd Chechen campaigns. In this sense, the approach of “Sergei Ivanovich”, the actions of Sysenko and the fact of Khodakovsky’s return to Donetsk after being detained by Russian border guards are evidence in favor of this version. If it is fair, immediate personnel decisions should follow, but, first of all, the organization of high-quality counterintelligence cover for everything that Russia is doing in Novorossiya. The situation when units are led by traitors, and SBU agents are infiltrated into groups on the territory of the Russian Federation, is unacceptable.
Version two. Cleaning up passionaries.
According to this version, the Russian leadership really drew “conclusions” from the Kyiv Maidan. From this point of view, the war in Donbass is used not as a means of creating a buffer republic of Novorossiya on the fragments of the former Ukraine, but not least as a way to dispose of an explosive mass inside the Russian Federation. Despite the growth of Putin’s rating, the level of corruption within the country remains extremely high, and the growth in the standard of living of the main segments of the population is extremely low. In order to avoid Maidan within the Russian Federation in a situation of worsening socio-economic crisis, it is better to immediately eliminate the most ardent groups of the population who are ready to take up arms and go to the barricades at the first call. Improvement of the Russian “elite” for last years wore declarative nature and was not accompanied radical redistribution economic leverage within the country. It is extremely doubtful that the main part of the Russian “elite” (far not Russian, as everyone knows very well), supports the idea of ​​​​gathering Russian lands, which Strelkov advocates. For these people, at best, we can only talk about collecting new markets, which is by no means equal to the first. Since the war-ravaged DPR and LPR may turn out to be not so much economic assets as a social burden, dealing with this issue may seem inappropriate to many. But if at the same time there is a chance to get rid of potential dissenters who are ready to reformat the existing political landscape by force, then they will have corridors to Donbass and the Khodakovskys as commanders.
What to do?
In a situation of uncertainty and lack of accurate information about the decisions taken by the Russian leadership, it is nevertheless necessary to formulate a certain position on the Ukrainian issue. Incl. for those people who have certain military experience and intend to take part in hostilities in Novorossiya. Regardless of the moods of the Russian “elite,” the future of the Russian Federation is now being decided in Ukraine. Very soon, it may also be resolved on the country’s Central Asian borders. If you do not have experience of participating in hostilities, or at least serving in the army, then it is better to abandon the idea of ​​\u200b\u200bthe trip. Unprepared romantics are the first to die. Try to acquire basic military skills, fortunately, now there is such an opportunity without the need to serve in the army, even if it involves some expenses. They will still be useful to you to protect the Motherland in near future. If you have experience and motivation, check the transition channel that is offered to you by employees of “public organizations” and “charitable foundations”. No “Sergei Ivanovichs”, Khodakovskys and “Vostoks”. You must know exactly where and under whose command you will fall, if you do not want to return home as a broth in zinc, which, however, is not excluded in any case. The most order and decency in the LPR militia units, in the DPR Strelkov is a reliable commander, but the situation around Slavyansk, which is in an operational environment, may change in the coming days. It is better to advance not individually, but in organized and pre-coordinated groups. Discuss in advance with the “helpers” the conditions for leaving for rest and treatment. Consider getting life insurance and leaving a will. With your loved ones, consider creating a mini-fund to help the families of the dead and support the wounded; the group’s losses will be at least 300.
How to stop betrayal?
On this moment losses as a result of betrayal and actions in Novorossiya by the agents of the SBU, the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Western intelligence services are comparable to the losses of the militia in open hostilities and as a result of air and artillery strikes by Ukrainian troops. Without a real, rather than media, organization of counterintelligence activities, the situation will only get worse. At the same time, the inclusion of former SBU employees who quickly “changed their shoes” into the DPR and LPR format will inevitably be associated with new failures. Directly in the database area, the enemy actively uses agents, incl. of women, young people, children. It is unlikely that without the help of the Russian Federation, the LPR and DPR will be able to organize full-fledged counterintelligence work. The same applies to the activities of the special services of the Russian Federation, if their task is to really support the LPR and DPR, and not to send Russian militias to slaughter.
Continuation and update here

Image copyright Getty Image caption New terminal Donetsk airport was defended for 240 days

The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine confirmed that the “cyborgs” withdrew from the ruins of the new terminal with losses.

The defense of Donetsk airport, or rather its old and new terminals, lasted from May 26 - about 240 days.

However, the Ministry of Defense says, Ukrainian forces are still protecting part of the airport buildings and nearby villages, so it is impossible to talk about the final loss of the facility - the fighting there continues.

Start of fighting

On the night of May 26, 2014, a group of pro-Russian separatists, on their second attempt, occupied part of the airport buildings, which suspended air traffic on May 6.

The militants demanded that the Ukrainian military, located in the old airport terminal, lay down their arms and surrender. The government, instead, issued an ultimatum for the separatists to lay down their arms and vacate administrative buildings.

Image copyright AFP Image caption This is what Donetsk airport looked like at the end of May

The demands of both sides remained unanswered, and the battle began.

“On May 26, army special forces units, with the support of military aviation, struck terrorists who were trying to take control international Airport Donetsk. Attack and army aviation were involved, and an airborne landing was carried out. Ukrainian units acted quickly and effectively - about 45 militants were killed and several dozen more were wounded. A third of the Vostok battalion was destroyed by ATO forces. Panic began in the ranks of the militants, and some terrorist leaders hastily left the city. Ukrainian units have established a foothold in the area of ​​the airport,” the NSDC media center reported.

It was then that the episode with the shot trucks transporting fighters of the so-called “DPR” occurred.

Strategic object

Image copyright AP

For a long time, the situation around the airport remained relatively calm. Serious assaults on the strategic facility began after the conclusion of the Minsk agreements in September 2014.

These agreements, in particular, provide for “the stop of units and military formations of the parties on the line of contact as of September 19, 2014” and the withdrawal of heavy weapons 15 km from this line. The actual fulfillment of these conditions would mean that the separatists would have to liberate a significant part of Donetsk from weapons.

In order to gain an advantage in determining the distribution line near Donetsk, the separatists carried out constant attacks on the airport, the military says.

“The Donetsk airport, together with the adjacent heights, which are under the control of Ukrainian forces, is a springboard for further offensive by the separatists... When creating a buffer zone, the separatists will actually have to retreat to another outskirts of Donetsk,” noted the speaker of the DUK “Right Sector” on January 16 Andrey Sharaskin.

Image copyright Getty

Later, the authorities of the self-proclaimed “DPR” and the Russian Foreign Ministry stated that “Donetsk airport, according to the Minsk agreements, should be transferred to the control of the militias.”

The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied this. “There is not a word in the Minsk agreements about the Donetsk airport,” Ukrainian Foreign Ministry spokesman Yevgeniy Perebiynos said in a commentary to BBC Ukraine on January 19.

Ukrainian "cyborgs"

Image copyright Getty

Over time, after many assaults, the airport also acquired symbolic significance. For Ukraine, this is evidence of the heroism of its fighters who successfully resist the powerful forces of the enemy. The airfield became the “Ukrainian Thermopylae” and the “Donbass House of Pavlov”, and its defenders were called “cyborgs” by the enemy for their tenacity.

IN different time Fighters from the 95th and 79th airborne brigades, soldiers of the 3rd Kirovograd special forces regiment and the Dnepr-1 battalion, artillerymen and tank crews of the 93rd brigade, volunteers from the DUK "Right Sector" and the "Dnepr-1" battalion fought at the airport and adjacent Sands. OUN", military from other units.

Image copyright Gregory Mustang

For the separatists, this was an irritant that needed to be eliminated.

“It has also become a fundamental issue for the separatists. Just as for us it is a symbol of heroism, it has also acquired fundamental significance in the eyes of the separatists,” noted Semyon Semenchenko, commander of the Donbass battalion, deputy chairman of the parliamentary committee on national security and defense.

Planes must fly from Donetsk airport. The main thing for the separatists is to record that they have an airport and planes supposedly take off from there. Alexey Melnik, military expert

At the same time, military experts did not exclude the use of the airport for its intended purpose (especially against the backdrop of statements about the “restoration of LPR aviation”), although given the destruction this is not worth it in the near future.

“Planes must fly from Donetsk airport. The main thing for the separatists is to record that they have an airport and planes supposedly take off from there,” Alexey Melnik, co-director of programs, told the Ukrainian Air Force in October foreign policy and International Security Center. Razumkova.

Previously, the separatists had already captured the airport in Lugansk, although runway and there it was destroyed.

"Remember the Crimean events: Russian troops, who occupied Crimea, the first thing they did was capture all Crimean airfields. These are strategic objects, important communication centers. Just like the big ones sea ​​ports and railway junctions,” explained General Staff representative Vladislav Seleznev.

The end of defense?

Although attempts to take the airport by DPR forces did not stop throughout the fall and throughout December, especially brutal fighting here began after the New Year. On January 13, after several months of shelling, the tower where the Ukrainian flag was flying was destroyed.

Image copyright AFP

The “DPR” stated that Ukrainian forces were shelling residential areas of Donetsk from the airfield and from Peski. The separatists even said that they were ready to guarantee the safety of the “cyborgs” who agreed to peacefully withdraw from the airport.

However, the object’s defenders denied such accusations and did not agree to the proposals and ultimatums of their opponents.

The Ukrainian army responded powerfully to the assault attempts and managed to recapture some of the territories.

It was the panic of the separatists that the Ukrainian side explained the blowing up of the Putilov Bridge near Donetsk airport a few days ago. According to representatives of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the DPR militants thus sought to protect themselves from the entry of ATO forces into Donetsk from the airport.

Separatists say the bridge was destroyed during a breakout attempt by the Ukrainian military.

However, on January 20 and 21, reports of killed and captured “cyborgs” began to appear. Stories about captured Ukrainian fighters appeared in the Russian media.

A few days before, the leaders of the “DPR” repeatedly announced the complete capture of the airport, which, however, was not true at that time.

Image copyright Reuters

Finally, on January 22, the Ministry of Defense stated: “Yesterday, 20 servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine fought out of the territory of the terminals, since their positions were destroyed and were under direct fire. 16 servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were wounded during the battle and captured by terrorists. Within 24 hours, 6 Ukrainian servicemen were killed in the battles for the airport."

“Violent fighting continues near the Donetsk airport. The Ukrainian military, occupying advantageous positions, hold their positions, while simultaneously delivering artillery strikes on the attackers and their firepower,” the ATO said in a statement on Thursday, January 22, in the evening.

Was it necessary to fight?

The airport should have continued to be held, says Nikolai Voronin, who took part in the defense of the airfield as part of the 79th brigade.

Image copyright Getty Image caption The airport was shelled from artillery, Grads, mortars and tanks, snipers were working

“This is a fortress of “Ukrainianness”. This is the facility where there were many enemy losses and relatively few of our losses,” he tells the Ukrainian Air Force and adds that he does not know any of the “cyborgs” who would advocate leaving the airport.

The Ministry of Defense notes that in both terminals there is not a single fortification left that would provide protection to the military from snipers and tanks.

Andrei Sharaskin, a fighter of the Right Sector DUK, generally considers the question of whether it was necessary to hold the airport for so long as rhetorical.

“The new terminal would have held out indefinitely if more reinforcements had arrived on time, rather than 15 people each,” he says.

Andrei Sharaskin also notes that all the surroundings of the Donetsk airport, which were held by the ATO forces, remain with the Ukrainian soldiers: “Both volunteers and military personnel - everyone remains in their positions. We keep the direction.”

 

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