About new solutions to old problems of low-altitude location. On new solutions to old problems of low-altitude location Federal System of Reconnaissance and Airspace Control

Reliable Aerospace Defense (ASD) of the country is impossible without the creation of an effective reconnaissance and airspace control system. Low-altitude location occupies an important place in it. The reduction of radar reconnaissance units and means has led to the fact that today there are open sections of the state border over the territory of the Russian Federation and hinterland countries. OJSC NPP Kant, part of the state corporation Russian Technologies, is conducting research and development to create a prototype of a multi-position spaced semi-active radar system in the radiation field of cellular communications, radio broadcasting and television systems based on ground and space (Rubezh complex).

Today, the greatly increased accuracy of guidance of weapons systems no longer requires the massive use of air attack weapons (AEA), and the stricter requirements for electromagnetic compatibility, as well as sanitary norms and rules, do not allow “polluting” the populated areas of the country in peacetime with the use of ultra-high frequency radiation (microwave radiation) high-potential radar stations (radars). In accordance with the Federal Law “On the Sanitary and Epidemiological Welfare of the Population” dated March 30, 1999 No. 52-FZ, radiation standards are established that are mandatory throughout Russia. The radiation power of any of the known air defense radars exceeds these standards many times over. The problem is aggravated by the high probability of using low-flying stealth targets, which requires consolidation of the combat formations of the traditional radar fleet and an increase in the cost of maintaining a continuous low-altitude radar field(MVRLP). To create a continuous duty round-the-clock MVRLP with a height of 25 meters (the flight altitude of a cruise missile or ultralight aircraft) along a front of only 100 kilometers, at least two radars of the KASTA-2E2 (39N6) type are required, the power consumption of each of which is 23 kW. Taking into account the average cost of electricity in 2013 prices, the cost of maintaining this section of the MVRLP alone will be at least three million rubles per year. Moreover, the length of the borders of the Russian Federation is 60,900,000 kilometers.

In addition, with the outbreak of hostilities in conditions of active use of electronic jamming (ERS) by the enemy, traditional standby location systems can be significantly suppressed, since the transmitting part of the radar completely unmasks its location.

It is possible to save the expensive resource of radars, increase their capabilities in peacetime and wartime, and also increase the noise immunity of MSRLP by using semi-active location systems with a third-party illumination source.

To detect air and space targets

Research is being widely carried out abroad on the use of third-party radiation sources in semi-active location systems. Passive radar systems that analyze signals reflected from targets from TV broadcasting (terrestrial and satellite), FM radio and cellular telephony, and HF radio communications have become one of the most popular and promising areas of study over the past 20 years. It is believed that the American corporation Lockheed Martin has achieved the greatest success here with its Silent Sentry system.

Avtec Systems, Dynetics, Cassidian, Roke Manor Research, and the French space agency ONERA are developing their own versions of passive radars. Active work on this topic is being carried out in China, Australia, Italy, and the UK.

Hidden "Frontier" of air control

Similar work on detecting targets in the illumination field of television centers was carried out at the Military Engineering Radio Engineering Academy of Air Defense (VIRTA Air Defense) named after Govorov. However, the significant practical groundwork obtained more than a quarter of a century ago on the use of illumination of analog radiation sources to solve problems of semi-active location turned out to be unclaimed.

With the development of digital broadcasting and communications technologies, the possibility of using semi-active location systems with third-party illumination has also appeared in Russia.

The multi-position spaced semi-active radar system "Rubezh" developed by NPP Kant OJSC is designed to detect air and space targets in the field of external illumination. This illumination field is characterized by cost-effective airspace monitoring in peacetime and resistance to electronic countermeasures during war.

The presence of a large number of highly stable radiation sources (broadcasting, communications) both in space and on Earth, forming continuous electromagnetic illumination fields, makes it possible to use them as a signal source in a semi-active system for detection various types goals. In this case, there is no need to spend money on emitting your own radio signals. To receive signals reflected from targets, multi-channel receiving modules (RMs) spaced apart in the area are used, which together with radiation sources create a semi-active location complex. The passive mode of operation of the Rubezh complex makes it possible to ensure the secrecy of these means and to use the structure of the complex in wartime. Calculations show that the secrecy of a semi-active location system in terms of camouflage coefficient is at least 1.5–2 times higher than a radar with a traditional combined design principle.

The use of more cost-effective means of locating the standby mode will significantly save the resource of expensive combat systems by saving the established resource consumption limit. In addition to the standby mode, the proposed complex can also perform tasks in wartime conditions, when all peacetime radiation sources are disabled or switched off.

In this regard, a far-sighted decision would be to create specialized omnidirectional transmitters of hidden noise radiation (100–200 W), which could be thrown or installed in threatened directions (in sectors) in order to create a field of external illumination during a special period. This will make it possible to create a hidden multi-position active-passive wartime system based on the networks of receiving modules remaining from peacetime.

There are no analogues

The Rubezh complex is not an analogue of any of the known models presented in the State Armament Program. At the same time, the transmitting part of the complex already exists in the form of a dense network of base stations (BS) for cellular communications, terrestrial and satellite transmitting centers for radio and television. Therefore, the central task for Kant was the creation of receiving modules for external illumination signals reflected from targets and a signal processing system (software and algorithmic support that implements systems for detecting, processing reflected signals and combating penetrating signals).

The current state of the electronic component base, data transmission and synchronization systems makes it possible to create compact receiving modules with small weight and dimensions. Such modules can be located on cellular communication masts, using the power lines of this system and, due to their low power consumption, not having any impact on its operation.

Sufficiently high probabilistic detection characteristics make it possible to use this tool as an unattended, automatic system for determining the fact of crossing (flying) a certain boundary (for example, a state border) by a low-altitude target with the subsequent issuance of preliminary target designation to specialized ground-based or space-based means about the direction and line of appearance of the intruder.

Thus, calculations show that the illumination field of base stations with a separation between the BS of 35 kilometers and a radiation power of 100 W is capable of detecting low-altitude aerodynamic targets with an ESR of 1 m2 in the “clearance zone” with a probability of correct detection of 0.7 and a probability of false alarm of 10–4 . The number of tracked targets is determined by the performance of computing facilities. The main characteristics of the system were tested by a series of practical experiments on detecting low-altitude targets, conducted by JSC NPP Kant with the assistance of JSC RTI im. Academician A.L. Mints" and the participation of employees of the Higher Academy of East Kazakhstan region named after. G. K. Zhukova. The test results confirmed the prospects of using low-altitude semi-active target location systems in the illumination field of BS cellular communication systems of the GSM standard. When the receiving module was removed at a distance of 1.3–2.6 kilometers from the BS with a radiation power of 40 W, a Yak-52 type target was confidently detected from various observation angles in both the front and rear hemisphere in the first resolution element.

The configuration of the existing cellular communication network makes it possible to build a flexible forefield for monitoring low-altitude air and ground space in the illumination field of the BS network of the GSM communication network in the border strip.

The system is proposed to be built in several detection lines at a depth of 50–100 kilometers, along the front in a strip of 200–300 kilometers and at an altitude of up to 1500 meters. Each detection line represents a sequential chain of detection zones located between the BS. The detection zone is formed by a single-base diversity (bistatic) Doppler radar. This fundamental solution is based on the fact that when a target is detected through the light, its effective reflective surface increases many times over, which makes it possible to detect subtle targets made using Stealth technology.

Increasing the capabilities of aerospace defense

From detection line to detection line, the number and direction of flying targets is clarified. In this case, it becomes possible to algorithmically (calculate) determine the range to the target and its height. The number of simultaneously registered targets is determined by the capacity of information transmission channels over the lines of cellular communication networks.

Information from each detection zone is sent via GSM networks to the Information Collection and Processing Center (ICPC), which can be located many hundreds of kilometers from the detection system. Identification of targets is carried out by direction finding, frequency and time characteristics, as well as when installing video recorders - by images of targets.

Thus, the Rubezh complex will allow:

  • create a continuous low-altitude radar field with multiple multi-frequency overlap of radiation zones created by various illumination sources;
  • provide means of control of air and ground space on the state border and other territories of the country, poorly equipped with traditional radar equipment (the lower limit of the controlled radar field of less than 300 meters is created only around control centers major airports. Over the rest of the territory of the Russian Federation, the lower limit is determined only by the needs of escorting civil aircraft along main airlines that do not fall below 5000 meters);
  • significantly reduce installation and commissioning costs compared to any similar systems;
  • solve problems in the interests of almost all law enforcement agencies of the Russian Federation: the Ministry of Defense (increasing the duty low-altitude radar field in threatened areas), the Federal Security Service (in terms of ensuring the security of state security facilities - the complex can be located in suburban and urban areas to monitor airborne terrorist threats or control the use of ground space ), ATC (light flight control aircraft and unmanned vehicles at low altitudes, including air taxis - according to forecasts of the Ministry of Transport, the annual increase in small general aviation aircraft is 20 percent annually), the FSB (tasks of anti-terrorist protection of strategically important objects and the protection of the state border), the Ministry of Emergency Situations (monitoring fire safety, search crashed aircraft, etc.).

The proposed means and methods for solving the problems of low-altitude radar reconnaissance in no way cancel the means and complexes created and supplied to the RF Armed Forces, but only increase their capabilities.

Reference Information:

Research and production enterprise "Kant" For more than 28 years, it has been developing, producing and maintaining modern means of special communications and data transmission, radio monitoring and electronic warfare, information security systems and information channels. The company's products are supplied to almost all law enforcement agencies of the Russian Federation and are used in solving defense and special tasks.

JSC NPP Kant has a modern laboratory and production base, a highly professional team of scientists and engineering specialists, which allows it to carry out full complex scientific and production tasks: from R&D, serial production to repair and maintenance of equipment in operation.

Authors: Andrey Demidyuk, Executive Director of JSC NPP Kant, Doctor of Military Sciences, Associate Professor Evgeniy Demidyuk, Head of the Innovation Development Department of JSC NPP Kant, Candidate technical sciences, docen

Ashuluk training ground. Radar station "Sky-UE". This three-dimensional radar has no foreign analogues. Photo: Georgy DANILOV Improving the federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control: history, reality, prospects
At the end of the 20th century, the issue of creating a unified radar field for the country was quite acute. Multi-departmental radar systems and equipment, often duplicating each other and consuming colossal budget funds, did not meet the requirements of the country's leadership and the Armed Forces. The need to expand work in this area was obvious.

Ending. Beginning in No. 2, 2012

At the same time, due to limited spatial and functional capabilities, the current FSR and KVP do not provide a sufficient level of integration of departmental radar systems and are unable to fulfill the full scope of the tasks assigned to it.

The limitations and disadvantages of the created FSR and KVP can be briefly defined as follows:
SITV TC EC ATM with air defense control units are not deployed throughout the country, but only in the Central, Eastern and partially North-Western and Caucasian-Ural zones of responsibility for air defense (56% of what is required for the full-scale deployment of FSR and STOL);
less than 40% of the RLP DN of the Ministry of Transport of Russia were modernized in order to perform dual-use functions, while the RLP DN of the Ministry of Defense of Russia ceased to be system-forming in the unified radar system of the FSR and KVP;
Information about the air situation on spatial, qualitative and probabilistic-temporal characteristics issued by the EC EC ATM and RLP often does not meet the modern requirements of air defense control authorities;
radar, flight and planning information received from the EU ATM control center is used in solving air defense (aerospace defense) problems ineffectively due to low level equipping the air defense command post (VKO) with adapted automation systems;
joint automated processing of data from various sources of information from the RF Armed Forces and the ATM EU is not provided, which significantly reduces the reliability of recognition and identification of air objects in peacetime;
the level of equipment of FSR and STOL facilities with high-speed digital means and communication and data transmission systems does not meet modern requirements for the efficiency and reliability of the exchange of radar, flight and planning information;
there are shortcomings in the implementation of a unified technical policy in the creation, production, supply and operation of dual-use equipment used in the FSR and KVP;
the coordination of measures for the technical equipment of facilities allocated to the FSR and KVP is not carried out effectively enough within the framework of various federal targeted programs, including the modernization of the ATM system and the improvement of control and communication systems of the RF Armed Forces;
existing regulatory legal documents do not fully reflect the issues of using SITV, RTP DN of the Russian Ministry of Defense, involved for radar support of EU ATM centers, as well as the use of state identification means of the EU GRLO installed on the RLP of DN of the Ministry of Transport of Russia;
the possibilities of zonal interdepartmental commissions on the use and operation of air defense systems for coordinating the activities of territorial bodies of the Ministry of Transport of Russia and the Ministry of Defense of Russia on issues of use and operation are practically not realized technical means FSR and KVP in areas of responsibility for air defense.

Mobile altimeter type PRV-13
Photo: Georgy DANILOV

To eliminate these shortcomings and realize the national interests of the Russian Federation in the field of use and STOL, full-scale deployment of FSR and STOL is necessary in all regions of Russia, further integration with the EU ATM based on the use of basic information technologies for surveillance and STOL, modernized and promising radar, automation and communication equipment primarily dual-use.

The strategic goal of the development of the FSR and STOL is to ensure the required efficiency of reconnaissance and STOL in the interests of solving air defense (VKO) problems, protecting the state border of the Russian Federation in the airspace, suppressing terrorist acts and other illegal actions in the airspace, ensuring air traffic safety based on integrated use radar systems and equipment of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Transport in the context of a reduction in the total composition of forces, equipment and resources.

In the weekly “Military-Industrial Courier” (No. 5 dated 02/08/2012), the commander of the East Kazakhstan region, Lieutenant General Oleg Ostapenko, drew public attention to the fact that the current state of the low-altitude radar field within the Russian Federation is not the best configuration.

Therefore, customers and performers are full of enthusiasm and find mutually acceptable solutions in the most difficult situations and the casuistry of modern legislation in the interests of implementing the Federal Target Program.

Based on the results of stage II of the Federal Target Program, a significant increase in the efficiency and quality of solving problems of air defense, protection of the state border in the airspace, radar support for aviation flights and air traffic management in important air directions should be ensured with a limited composition of forces, means and resources of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

In accordance with the Aerospace Defense Concept for the period up to 2016 and beyond, approved by the President of the Russian Federation in April 2006, one of the main directions for building the East Kazakhstan region is currently the full-scale deployment of the FSR and KVP throughout the country.

To ensure full integration of departmental radar systems of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Transport and the formation on this basis of a single information space about the state of the air situation as one of the main areas of concentration of efforts in building the country's aerospace defense further development It is advisable to conduct FSR and KVP in the following stages:
Stage III – short term (2011–2015);
Stage IV – medium term (2016–2020);
Stage V – long-term perspective (after 2020).

The main task of developing the FSR and KVP in the short term is the deployment of the FSR and KVP in all regions of Russia. At the same time, during this period, it is necessary to carry out a comprehensive modernization of the EA radar in the interests of increasing the efficiency of using radar, flight and planning information received from the EU ATM bodies of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation to solve air defense (VKO) problems and to increase the area of ​​controlled airspace.

Radar station 22Zh6 "Desna"
Photo: Georgy DANILOV

To create a radar field with improved parameters, a decision was required to continue work within the framework of the Federal Targeted Program “Improving the FSR and KVP (2007–2010)” for the period until 2015. The matter, which is necessary for the country’s defense capability, was not “chuckled out” in the authorities, as is often the case , it received a logical continuation - the Federal Target Program was extended until 2015 in accordance with Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of February 2011 No. 98.

The main task of the development of the FSR and KVP for the medium term (after 2016) and long-term (after 2020) is the creation of a promising integrated dual-use radar system (IDLS DN) of the FSR and KVP in the interests of forming a unified information space about the state of the air situation for authorities air defense management (VKO) and EU ATM.

For the timely completion of the full-scale deployment of the FSR and KVP, it is necessary, first of all, not to miss the organizational and technical issues:
creation of a permanent interdepartmental working group of representatives of interested ministries and departments, scientific organizations and industrial enterprises under the Interdepartmental Internal Affairs Committee of the IVP and KVP for the purpose of promptly resolving problematic issues and preparing proposals on current issues;
preparation of proposals for the formation of a specialized department in the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, as well as the formation of a new 136 KNO FSR and KVP Air Force to coordinate work to improve the federal system on the part of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

Implementation of the concept by 2016 should allow:
carry out the full-scale deployment of the FSR and KVP based on the creation of fragments of the EA radar in all regions of the country and thereby provide the prerequisites for the deployment of an reconnaissance and warning system for an aerospace attack;
improve the quality of solving problems of ensuring national security, defense capability and the economy of the state in the field of use and air defense of the Russian Federation;
bring regulatory legal documents in the field of use and control of airspace into compliance with the current legislation of the Russian Federation, taking into account the reform of the RF Armed Forces, the creation and development of the Air Navigation System (ANS) of Russia;
to ensure the implementation of a unified technical policy in the development, production, deployment, operation and use of dual-use systems and equipment in the field of use and air defense;
create conditions for the rapid development of domestic science and technology in the field of exploration and surface-to-air missions;
reduce the total state costs for the maintenance and development of radar systems of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Transport.

In addition, the implementation of the concept until 2016 will ensure compliance with ICAO requirements for the level of air traffic safety (according to the criterion of disaster risk).

In the near future (until 2016), priority activities for the development of the FSR and KVP, in addition to work within the framework of the Federal Target Program “Improving the FSR and KVP (2007–2015)”, as well as scientific and technical support for FTP activities, should be carried out in the following areas :
Research work commissioned by the Russian Ministry of Defense, aimed at conducting advanced systemic research on the modernization and development of the FSR and KVP;
R&D commissioned by the Russian Ministry of Defense, aimed at the practical implementation of the main provisions of this concept in two main areas: comprehensive modernization of the EA radar and the creation of the head section of the promising IR DN radar;
serial deliveries of new equipment, including dual-use equipment, to FSR and KVP facilities that are part of the RF Armed Forces.

Federal Target Program “Modernization of the EU ATM (2009–2015)”.

With this distribution of activities for each area of ​​work, the implementation of its specific, but interconnected tasks with other work is ensured, and duplication between them is eliminated. In addition, it seems necessary to also organize:
introduction of new means and technologies for identifying and identifying air objects, taking into account modern conditions for airspace control in peacetime;
improvement of interspecific interaction of surveillance and control systems of air and surface space based on the use of over-the-horizon radar (OG radar), automatic dependent surveillance (ADS) systems and promising sources of information;
implementation of integrated digital communication systems based on advanced telecommunication technologies for prompt and sustainable exchange of information between objects.

Solution to the problem of automatic remote delivery of key information for equipment for determining nationality using a hardware-software method using existing communication channels intended for issuing radar information.

Implementation of the concept in the medium and long term (after 2016) will allow:
achieve the strategic goal of the development of the FSR and STOL - to ensure the required efficiency of reconnaissance and STOL in the interests of solving air defense (VKO) tasks, protecting the state border of the Russian Federation in the airspace, suppressing terrorist acts and other illegal actions in the airspace, as well as the required level of air traffic safety in the context of a reduction in the total composition of forces, means and resources;
create an air traffic control system and form on its basis a unified information space about the state of the air situation in the interests of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Russian Ministry of Transport and other ministries and departments;
ensure the introduction of promising means and technologies for identifying air defenses and automatically identifying the degree of their danger;
significantly reduce the cost of operating dual-use surveillance and control equipment due to their operation in automatic mode.

The implementation of the concept will also contribute to the integration of the Russian ANS into the Eurasian and global air navigation systems.

The goal of the development of the FSR and KVP after the completion of the main stages of development, it seems, may be the creation on the basis of the EA radar of a promising IRL DN, ensuring the unification of departmental radar systems of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Transport and the formation on this basis of a single information space about the state of the air situation in the interests of the Ministry of Defense Russia, the Ministry of Transport of Russia and other ministries and departments.

The creation of IRLS DN will eliminate departmental and systemic contradictions through the introduction of basic information technologies for surveillance and STOL, the use of modernized and promising radar, automation and communications equipment, primarily dual-use, as well as the implementation of a unified technical policy in the field of use and STOL.

A promising IRLS should include:
network of unified dual-use information sources (UII DN), providing mining, pre-treatment and issuing information about the air situation in accordance with the requirements of consumers of various departments;
a network of territorial centers for joint information processing (TC SOI) about the air situation;
integrated digital telecommunications network (IDTN).

The main consumers of the information provided by the Air Traffic Control System are the Air Defense Command Center (VKO) and the EC ATM Center.

The DN IRLS should be built on a network principle, which will provide access to any information consumer to any DN UII or SOI TC (subject to restrictions on access rights).

The composition of the technical means of all DN IUIs must be unified and include the following information, processing and communication components (modules):
primary radars (PRL);
secondary radars (SSR), ensuring the receipt of information from the aircraft in all current request-response modes;
ground-based radar means of state identification of the EU GRLO (NRZ);
ADS system receiving devices;
devices for automatic processing and integration of information from the above sources;
terminal devices for interfacing with an integrated digital telecommunications network in order to provide various types of communication (data, voice, video, etc.).

Means for obtaining information about the air situation (PRL, VRL, NRZ, ADS) can be integrated in various versions.

UII DN should be created on the basis of existing dual-use information elements of three types:
RTP DN of the Russian Ministry of Defense (RF Armed Forces);
RTP DN of the Russian Ministry of Defense (RF Armed Forces), solving the tasks of stolport and ensuring aviation flights (flights) in peacetime;
RLP DN of the Ministry of Transport of Russia (EU ATM).

Moreover, in the period 2016–2020. the head section of the IR DN should be created in one of the regions of Russia, and subsequently the deployment of IRLS DN should be ensured in all regions of the country. It is advisable to identify the most developed fragment of the federal system in the north-west of the country as the head section of the IRLS DN.

Within the framework of the head section of the GU IRLS DN, it is necessary to use the existing systems and means of the EA radar, ensuring information and technical interaction between air defense control bodies (VKO) and the EC EC ATM, as well as to deploy promising radar, automation and communication tools that implement new surveillance and STOL technologies and ensuring the construction of UII DN and SOI TC.

Of course, it is highly desirable that plans are carried out. But the question naturally arises: how effective is the airspace reconnaissance and control system as a reconnaissance and warning subsystem of an aerospace attack of the Russian aerospace defense system?

It makes no sense today to restore the airspace radar control system that the mighty USSR once had. Modern-level air defense systems must ensure the solution of assigned combat missions without pushing the “forefield” to the limit. As a last resort, highly mobile long-range radar detection and control systems should operate.

In his article on national security issues, published on February 20, 2012 in " Rossiyskaya newspaper", Vladimir Putin drew attention to the fact that in modern conditions our country cannot rely only on diplomatic and economic methods of resolving contradictions and resolving conflicts.

Russia faces the task of developing its military potential within the framework of a containment strategy and at the level of defense sufficiency. The Armed Forces, intelligence services and other security agencies must be prepared to quickly and effectively respond to new challenges. This is a necessary condition for Russia to feel secure, and for our country’s arguments to be accepted by partners in various international formats.

The joint efforts of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Russian Ministry of Transport and the military-industrial complex to improve the FSR and KVP will significantly improve the spatial and information capabilities of the East Kazakhstan region and the Air Force.

Already today, operational-strategic commands formed throughout the country can and should make maximum effective use of the spatial potential of the unified radar system of the FSR and KVP. Do they actually use and how do they improve the methods of combat operations of active branches of the armed forces, having such a system?

During the exercises, do air defense forces on duty practice their actions aimed at suppressing airspace violations in those regions where today, through the reconstruction of the TRLP DN of the Ministry of Transport of Russia and the reconstruction of the EU ATM centers of the Ministry of Transport of Russia, equipping them with air defense control systems, the information capabilities of the lost in 1990s radar field? Have the issues of determining the nationality of air objects been resolved on the principle of “friend or foe”?

Probably, the widest circles of the Russian public and the country's expert community would be interested in knowing how effectively the created unified FSR and KVP radar system works within the current boundaries of responsibility for air defense. We should not be tormented today and in the historically foreseeable future by the question: is Russia in danger of radar blindness?
Sergey Vasilievich SERGEEV
deputy general director– Head of SPKB OJSC NPO LEMZ
Alexander Evgenievich KISLUKHA
Candidate of Technical Sciences, Advisor for FSR and KVP to the Deputy General Director - Head of the Special Design Bureau of JSC NPO LEMZ, Colonel

of these Federal Rules

144. Monitoring of compliance with the requirements of these Federal Rules is carried out Federal agency air transport, air traffic services (flight control) authorities in the zones and areas established for them.

Control over the use of the airspace of the Russian Federation in terms of identifying aircraft that violate the rules for using airspace (hereinafter referred to as violator aircraft) and aircraft that violate the rules for crossing the state border of the Russian Federation is carried out by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

145. If the air traffic services (flight control) authority identifies a violation of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation, information about this violation is immediately brought to the attention of the air defense authority and the aircraft commander, if radio communication is established with it.

146. Air defense authorities provide radar control of the airspace and provide the relevant centers of the Unified System with data on the movement of aircraft and other material objects:

a) threatening to illegally cross or illegally crossing the state border of the Russian Federation;

b) being unidentified;

c) violating the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation (until the violation ceases);

d) transmitting a "Distress" signal;

e) performing flights of letters “A” and “K”;

f) performing search and rescue flights.

147. Violations of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation include:

a) use of airspace without permission from the relevant center of the Unified System under the permitting procedure for the use of airspace, except for the cases specified in paragraph 114 of these Federal Rules;

b) failure to comply with the conditions specified by the center of the Unified System in the permit to use the airspace;

c) failure to comply with the commands of air traffic services (flight control) and the commands of the duty aircraft of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation;

d) failure to comply with the procedure for using the airspace of the border strip;

e) non-compliance with established temporary and local regimes, as well as short-term restrictions;

f) flight of a group of aircraft in a number exceeding the number specified in the aircraft flight plan;

g) use of the airspace of the prohibited zone, flight restriction zone without permission;

h) landing of an aircraft at an unscheduled (undeclared) airfield (site), except in cases forced landing, as well as cases agreed with the air traffic services authority (flight control);

i) failure by the aircraft crew to comply with the rules of vertical and horizontal separation (except for cases of an emergency on board the aircraft requiring an immediate change in the profile and flight mode);

(see text in the previous edition)

j) deviation of an aircraft beyond the boundaries of the air route, local air line and route, authorized by the air traffic services (flight control) authority, except for cases when such deviation is due to flight safety considerations (avoidance of dangerous meteorological weather phenomena, etc.);

k) entry of an aircraft into controlled airspace without permission from the air traffic services authority (flight control);

M) flight of an aircraft in class G airspace without notifying the air traffic services authority.

148. When identifying an intruder aircraft, the air defense authorities give a “Regime” signal, meaning a requirement to stop violating the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation.

Air defense authorities communicate the “Regime” signal to the relevant centers of the Unified System and begin actions to stop violations of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation.

(see text in the previous edition)

The centers of the Unified System warn the commander of the violating aircraft (if there is radio communication with him) about the “Mode” signal sent by the air defense authorities and assist him in stopping the violation of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation.

(see text in the previous edition)

149. The decision on the further use of the airspace of the Russian Federation, if the commander of the violating aircraft has stopped violating the procedure for its use, is made by:

a) the head of the duty shift of the main center of the Unified System - when performing international flights along air traffic service routes;

b) heads of duty shifts of regional and zonal centers of the Unified System - when performing domestic flights along air traffic service routes;

c) operational duty officer of the air defense agency - in other cases.

(see text in the previous edition)

150. The centers of the Unified System and the air defense authorities notify each other, as well as the user of the airspace, about the decision made in accordance with paragraph 149 of these Federal Rules.

(see text in the previous edition)

151. When illegally crossing the state border of the Russian Federation, using weapons and military equipment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation against an infringing aircraft, as well as when unidentified aircraft and other material objects appear in the airspace, in exceptional cases, air defense authorities give the “Carpet” signal. , meaning the requirement for the immediate landing or withdrawal from the relevant area of ​​all aircraft in the air, with the exception of aircraft involved in combating intruder aircraft and performing search and rescue missions.

(see text in the previous edition)

Air defense authorities communicate the “Carpet” signal, as well as the boundaries of the area of ​​coverage of the specified signal, to the corresponding centers of the Unified System.

(see text in the previous edition)

The Unified System centers immediately take measures to remove aircraft (land them) from the area of ​​coverage of the "Carpet" signal.

(see text in the previous edition)

152. If the crew of the offending aircraft fails to comply with the command of the air traffic services authority (flight control) to stop violating the procedure for using airspace, such information is immediately communicated to the air defense authorities. Air defense authorities take measures against the offending aircraft in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation.

Aircraft crews are obliged to comply with the commands of duty aircraft of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, used to stop violations of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation.

In the event of a forced landing of an intruder aircraft, its landing is carried out at an airfield (heliport, landing site) suitable for landing this type of aircraft.

153. If a threat to flight safety arises, including one related to an act of unlawful interference on board an aircraft, the crew issues a “Distress” signal. On aircraft equipped with a danger alarm system, in the event of an attack on the crew, the “MTR” signal is additionally given. When receiving a “Distress” and (or) “MTR” signal from the aircraft crew, air traffic services (flight control) authorities are obliged to take the necessary measures to provide assistance to the crew in distress and immediately transfer to the centers of the Unified System, aviation coordination centers for search and rescue, as well as to air defense authorities data on his location and other necessary information.

154. After identifying the reasons for the violation of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation, permission to further operate an international flight or a flight associated with crossing more than 2 zones of the Unified System is accepted by the head of the duty shift of the main center of the Unified System, and in other cases - by the heads of duty shifts of the zonal center of the Unified System systems.

The inventions relate to the field of radar and can be used in monitoring the space irradiated external sources radio emissions. The technical result of the proposed technical solutions is to reduce the operating time of the radar in active mode by increasing its operating time in passive mode. The essence of the invention is that control of the airspace irradiated by external radiation sources is carried out by viewing the space with the active channel of the radar station only in those directions of the viewing area in which the ratio of the energy of the external radio-electronic equipment reflected by the object to the noise is greater than the threshold value, for this purpose the reflected object the energy of an external radio-electronic device, the waiting time for irradiation of the inspected direction is the shortest and does not exceed the permissible value. 2 n. and 5 salary f-ly, 2 ill.

The inventions relate to the field of radar and can be used in monitoring space irradiated by external sources of radio emission.

There is a known method for active radar location of objects, which consists in emitting sounding signals, receiving reflected signals, measuring the delay time of signals and angular coordinates of objects, calculating the range to objects (Theoretical foundations of radar, edited by Ya.D. Shirman, M., "Soviet Radio ", 1970, pp. 9-11).

A known radar station (RLS) implements a known method, containing an antenna, an antenna switch, a transmitter, a receiver, an indicator device, a synchronizer, and the signal input/output of the antenna is connected to an antenna switch, the input of which is connected to the output of the transmitter, and the output to the input receiver, the output of the receiver, in turn, is connected to the input of the indicator device, two outputs of the synchronizer are connected to the input of the transmitter and the second input of the indicator device, respectively, the coordinate output of the antenna is connected to the third input of the indicator device (Theoretical Fundamentals of Radar, edited by Ya.D. Shirman, M., "Soviet Radio", 1970, p.221).

The disadvantage of the known method and the device that implements it is that the radiation of radar signals is carried out in each direction of the controlled area. This method makes the radar extremely vulnerable to anti-radar weapons, since with continuous operation of the radar there is a high probability of detecting its signals, determining the direction to the radar and being hit by anti-radar weapons. In addition, the ability to concentrate energy in any areas of the controlled area to ensure the detection of subtle targets or to detect targets under the influence of active interference is very limited. It can only be carried out by reducing the energy emitted to other directions in the zone.

It is known that sources that are not part of the radar can be used as radiation sources. Such radiation sources are usually called “external” (Gladkov V.E., Knyazev I.N. Detection of air targets in the electromagnetic field of external radiation sources. “Radio Engineering”, issue 69, pp. 70-77). External sources of radio emission can be radars of neighboring states and other radio-electronic equipment (RES).

The closest way to control the space irradiated by external sources of radiation includes surveying the space using radar, additionally receiving the energy of the external RES reflected by the object, determining the boundaries of the zone in which the ratio of the reflected energy of the RES to the noise Q is greater than the threshold value Q pores, and emitting energy only in those directions of the zone in which the reflected energy of the RES was detected (RF Patent No. 2215303, 09/28/2001).

The device closest to the claimed one is a radar station (Fig. 1), containing passive and active channels, a coordinate calculation unit, wherein the passive channel includes a series-connected receiving antenna and receiver, the active channel includes a series-connected antenna, antenna switch, receiver and a range calculation device, as well as a synchronizer and a transmitter, the output of which is connected to the input of the antenna switch, with the first and second outputs of the synchronizer connected, respectively, to the input of the transmitter and the second input of the range calculation device (RF Patent No. 2226701, 03/13/2001).

The essence of the known method is as follows.

For the used RES, the value of the ratio of the energy reflected by the object to the noise (i.e., the signal-to-noise ratio) at the reception point is calculated using the formula (Blyakhman A.B., Runova I.A. Bistatic effective area of ​​scattering and detection of objects during transmission radar. "Radio Engineering and Electronics", 2001. Volume 46, No. 4, formula (1) on p. 425):

where Q=P c /P w - signal-to-noise ratio;

P T - average power of the transmitting device;

G T , G R are the gains of the RES transmitting antenna and the radar receiving antenna, respectively;

λ - wavelength;

η - generalized losses;

σ(α B ,α Г) - EPR of the object for a two-position system as a function of the vertical and horizontal diffraction angles α B and α Г, respectively; the diffraction angle is understood as the angle between the direction of irradiation and the line connecting the object and the observation point;

F T (β,θ), F R (β,θ) - radiation patterns of the RES transmitting antenna and the radar receiving antenna, respectively;

R sh - average noise power in the receiving device band;

R T, R R - distance, respectively, from the RES and the receiving device to the object.

The angular boundaries of the zone are calculated vertically and horizontally, in which the values ​​of the signal-to-noise ratio Q are not less than the threshold Q POR. The threshold value Q POR is selected based on the required reliability of detection of the RES energy reflected by the object.

Within the boundaries calculated in this way, the zone is inspected in passive mode (within the frequency range of the selected RES). The active mode is not used. If in a certain direction of the inspected part of the zone the measured RES energy has a level not less than the threshold, then this direction is inspected in the active mode. In this case, a probing signal is emitted, an object is detected and its coordinates are measured. After which the inspection continues in passive mode.

Thus, the number of zone directions inspected in active mode is reduced. Due to this, the concentration of emitted radar energy can be increased in some directions of the zone, which increases the reliability of object detection.

The disadvantage of the known technical solutions is as follows.

As is known, external sources of radiation, for example radars located on the territory of neighboring states, are characterized for an external observer by the randomness of emissions in time. Therefore, the use of such sources that irradiate the inspected area of ​​the zone with a sufficient level of power, as a rule, requires a long waiting time for irradiation.

It can be shown that when using an external radar as an external 1st source, including one located on the territory of a neighboring state, the waiting time for irradiation t i of the inspected direction will be determined by the expression:

where Δα i, Δβ i is the angular size of the set of parts DNA i-th external radar, the radiation level of which provides Q≥Q ERP;

ΔAi; ΔB i - angular size of the external radar viewing area;

T i - space survey period i-th external Radar.

For the case when the fulfillment of the condition Q≥Q ERP is ensured only by the main beam of the bottom of the i-th external radar (which is the case in the prototype), i.e. Δα i Δβ i =Δα i0 Δβ i0 , where Δα i0 Δβ i0 are the angular dimensions of the main beam of the bottom of the i-th external radar, taking into account the fact that the angular dimensions of the external radar viewing area (ΔA i ,ΔB i) are significant, it is true:

and t i →T i .

It follows that since for modern surveillance radars the review period is T i = 5÷15 s and is strictly limited, their use as external radars with a single-channel survey method is practically excluded, since the survey of a space consisting of tens of thousands of directions, at a cost for inspection of each direction 5÷15 s is unacceptable.

In addition, modern radars operate in a wide frequency range and have big number types of signals whose parameters, although known, require a larger number of channels for reception.

Modern radars are required to provide coverage of space sequentially in time without additional stopping of the beam, i.e. "on the way". Due to the fact that the moments of irradiation of the zone by the main beam of the external radar and the moments of reception of radiation by the radar station in the same directions rarely coincide, the achieved operating time of the radar in passive mode in the entire viewing area turns out to be small. Accordingly, the time of its operation in active mode is significant. In the closest technical solutions, when external radars are used as radiation sources, the vast majority of the time the radar operates on radiation in almost the entire viewing area, which, as noted, increases its vulnerability to enemy anti-radar weapons and limits the ability to concentrate energy. This is a disadvantage of the closest technical solutions.

Thus, the solved problem (technical result) of the proposed technical solutions is to reduce the operating time of the radar in active mode by increasing its operating time in passive mode.

The problem is solved by the fact that in the method of monitoring the airspace irradiated by external sources of radiation, which consists of surveying the space by a radar station (radar), in additionally receiving the energy reflected by the object from an external radio-electronic device (RES), in determining the boundaries of the zone within which the ratio of the reflected object RES energy to noise is greater than the threshold value, and in the emission of radar signals only in those directions of the zone in which reflected RES energy is detected, according to the invention, the energy of that external RES is received, the waiting time for irradiation of the inspected direction is the smallest and does not exceed the permissible value.

The problem is also solved by:

Ground-based radars, including radars of neighboring states, are selected as external electronic zones, their parameters and coordinates are determined;

To view a section of the zone, select those external radars for which, other things being equal, the ratio is the greatest, where D MAKCi is the maximum range of the i-th external radar, D FACTi is the distance from the i-th external radar to the viewed section of the zone;

To view a section of the zone, select those external radars for which, other things being equal, the diffraction angles are the smallest;

To view a section of the zone, select external radars with a wide bottom in the elevation plane;

Based on the stored angular coordinates β i, ε i, and the range D FACTi for i=1,...,n external radars calculate the values ​​and angles of diffraction and draw up a map of the correspondence of sections of the controlled area to the parameters of external radar stations to be used when monitoring these sections .

The problem is also solved by the fact that in a radar station containing a passive channel, including a series-connected receiving antenna and a receiver, and an active channel, including a series-connected antenna, an antenna switch, a receiver and a range calculation device, as well as a synchronizer and a transmitter, the output of which is connected with the input of the antenna switch, and the first and second outputs of the synchronizer are connected, respectively, to the input of the transmitter and the second input of the range calculation device, according to the invention, a second input of the receiver, a synchronizer input and a channel control unit containing a memory are introduced, and a calculator connected to its output, the output of which is connected with the second input of the receiver, and its second input is connected to the third output of the synchronizer, as well as a second computer, the input and output of which are connected, respectively, to the output of the receiver and the input of the synchronizer.

The essence of the proposed technical solutions is as follows.

To solve this problem, information is required about the parameters of external radio electronics irradiating the radar coverage area, which comes from electronic reconnaissance equipment, is stored and regularly updated, i.e. a map of the distribution zone is compiled and maintained. Such information contains data on the location of the RES, time intervals of operation of the RES for radiation, wavelengths of emitted signals, radiation power and its change depending on the angles at which the analyzed sections of the viewing area are irradiated.

The available a priori information about all (n) RES irradiating the zone, before examining in passive mode each direction of the radar viewing area, is analyzed and the selection of the external RES that is best suited for use at the current step of the radar operation is made.

An external RES is selected (k-e from i=1,...,n), having:

The shortest waiting time for irradiation of the analyzed area of ​​the zone, not exceeding the permissible t DOP, which is determined based on the permissible time for increasing the review period:

The largest value of the ratio of the maximum range of the RES to the distance of the RES to the viewed section of the zone:

Smallest diffraction angles:

The widest beam (Δθi) in the elevation plane:

In this case, criterion (3) is the most important and therefore mandatory. To carry it out, it is necessary to bring the moment of inspection of the radar direction in passive mode as close as possible to the moment of irradiation of this direction by an external RES, i.e. reduce the waiting time for irradiation by external RES of the direction being inspected by the radar. To reduce this waiting time to the greatest extent, the claimed invention uses a phased array antenna (PAR). Phased array makes it possible to change the position of the beam in the electronic scanning sector in any order. This phased array ability allows, at each moment of time, from a variety of directions in the electronic scanning sector, to select for inspection in passive mode the direction whose waiting time for irradiation by any external RES is the shortest. The use of an arbitrary order for selecting a direction for inspection in passive mode instead of sequential transition from direction to direction can significantly reduce the waiting time for direction irradiation. Obviously, the best effect is achieved when using a two-dimensional phased array.

The receiving position, which is a passive radar with phased array, has frequency-tunable equipment for receiving and processing signals from external electronic zones, in particular external active radars, including those located on the territory of neighboring states. Based on the results of selecting an external RES, the receiving channel equipment is configured.

After selecting the RES, the signal is received via a passive channel. If, during the permissible waiting time, a reflected signal from an external RES is detected, i.e. conditions are met:

then this means that there is an object in this direction. To detect an object and measure its coordinates, a signal is emitted in this direction by the active channel.

If, during the permissible waiting time by the passive channel, the level of received radiation from the RES does not exceed the threshold value, i.e. (7) is not satisfied, this means that there is no object in this direction. The probing signal is not emitted in this direction. The passive channel antenna beam moves to the next, not previously inspected, direction of the monitored area, and the process is repeated.

For the case of using active radars as external RES, including those located on the territory of neighboring states, the criterion for selecting an external radar is the total angular size of the main beam and side lobes, at which the level of received radiation has a signal-to-noise ratio Q not less than the threshold Q POR. Such radars include, first of all, radars whose distance from the area being viewed (D FACT) is significantly less than the maximum range of the radar (D MAX).

So, for example, if the relation , then the energy level of the external radar incident on the inspected area of ​​the zone will be sufficient to detect an object not only in the area of ​​the main lobe, but also in the side lobes (the level of which in this case is -13 dB with a uniform amplitude distribution of the field across the antenna surface), and when further increase in this ratio - and in the background region, i.e. wherein and t i →0.

The specified criterion will also be satisfied for those used as external airfield and route radars, the density of which, as a rule, is quite high and therefore there is a high probability of fulfilling the condition . In addition, modern airfield radars have wide directional patterns in the elevation plane, which ensures that they simultaneously illuminate a large area of ​​the zone.

Favorable conditions for external radars are also achieved when the external radar irradiates the analyzed area of ​​the zone with small diffraction angles. So, with diffraction angles of no more than ±10°, the EPR of an object increases tens and hundreds of times (Blyakhman A.B., Runova I.A. Bistatic effective area of ​​scattering and detection of objects during transmission radar. "Radio Engineering and Electronics", 2001, Volume 46, No. 4, pp. 424-432), which leads to a decrease in the irradiation waiting time t i , since detection of an object becomes possible when it is irradiated by the side lobes and background of the radar bottom.

The choice of external radar is made on the basis of a priori, regularly updated data on the parameters and location of the radar. These data make it possible to draw up a digital map of the correspondence of areas of the controlled space to radar stations to be used as external ones when monitoring these areas. This map makes it possible to automatically adjust the parameters of the receiving channel to view sections of the zone in passive mode.

Thus, a reduction in the waiting time for irradiation by an external RES of the inspected direction in the viewing area is achieved and the solution to the problem is provided - increasing the operating time of the radar in passive mode.

The inventions are illustrated by the following drawings.

Figure 1 is a block diagram of the closest radar;

Figure 2 is a block diagram of the proposed radar.

The inventive radar station (Fig. 2) contains a passive channel 1, an active channel 2 and a channel control unit 3, while the passive channel 1 includes a series-connected receiving antenna 4 and a receiver 5, the active channel 2 includes a series-connected antenna 6, an antenna switch 7, receiver 8 and range calculation device 9, as well as synchronizer 10 and transmitter 11, the output of which is connected to the input of antenna switch 7, with the first and second outputs of synchronizer 10 connected respectively to the input of transmitter 11 and the second input of range calculation device 9, channel control unit 3 includes a memory 12 and a computer 13 connected to its output, the output of which is connected to the second input of the receiver 5, and its second input is connected to the third output of the synchronizer 10, as well as a computer 14, the input and output of which are connected, respectively, to the output of the receiver 5 and the input of the synchronizer 10 .

The inventive radar station can be made using the following functional elements.

Receiving antenna 4 and antenna 6 - phased array with electronic scanning in azimuth and elevation and with circular mechanical rotation in azimuth (Handbook of radar, edited by M. Skolnik, vol. 2, M., "Sov. Radio", 1977, pp.132-138).

Receivers 5 and 8 are of the superheterodyne type (Handbook on the fundamentals of radar technology. M., 1967, pp. 343-344).

Antenna switch 7 - a balanced antenna switch based on a circulator (A.M. Pedak et al. Handbook on the fundamentals of radar technology. Edited by V.V. Druzhinin. Military publishing house, 1967, pp. 166-168).

Range calculation device 9 is a digital computer that calculates the range to an object based on the delay of the reflected signal (Theoretical foundations of radar. /Ed. Ya.D. Shirman, M., "Soviet Radio", 1970, p. 221).

Synchronizer 10 - Radar devices (theory and principles of construction). Ed. V.V.Grigorina-Ryabov, pp.602-603.

Transmitter 11 is a multistage pulse transmitter on a klystron (A.M. Pedak et al. Handbook on the fundamentals of radar technology. Edited by V.V. Druzhinin. Military publishing house, 1967, pp. 277-278).

Memory 12 - storage device (Integrated circuits. Handbook edited by T.V. Tarabrin, - M.: "Radio and Communications", 1984).

Computer 13 is a digital computer that implements the selection of RES in accordance with criteria (3)-(6).

Computer 14 is a digital computer that implements control of the active channel in accordance with criteria (7).

The inventive radar operates as follows.

Data on the location of RES, time intervals of RES operation for radiation, wavelengths of emitted RES signals, radiation power and its change depending on the angles at which sections of the viewing area are irradiated are received from electronic reconnaissance means and recorded in memory 12, where they are stored and regularly are updated.

During the operation of the radar, the directions of the viewing area are analyzed in order to determine the need to emit a probing signal from the active channel to measure the coordinates of the object. For each direction of the viewing area, the RES best suited for use is determined. The choice of RES is carried out in computer 13 by checking criteria (3)-(6) for all external RES, the parameters of which are recorded in memory 12.

After the RES is selected, the receiver 5 is configured to receive signals from this RES. To do this, the signal parameters of the selected RES are supplied from the output of the computer 13 to the receiver 5. After which, using the receiving antenna 4 and receiver 5, the signal of the selected RES is received.

If, upon reception in the analyzed direction, a reflected signal from an external RES is detected that satisfies conditions (7), then to detect an object and measure its coordinates, a control signal is supplied from the output of the computer 14 to the input of the synchronizer 10, according to which the transmitter 11 generates a high-frequency probing signal. From the output of transmitter 11, the high-frequency signal is fed to antenna 6 through an antenna switch and radiated. The signal reflected from the object is received by the antenna 6 and, through the antenna switch 7, is fed to the receiver 8, where it is converted to an intermediate frequency, filtered, amplified and fed to the range calculation device 9. In the range calculation device 9, the range to the object R is calculated from the delay time of the reflected signal 0 . The azimuth and elevation angle of the object (ε 0 and β 0, respectively) are determined by the position of the antenna beam 6.

If, during the permissible waiting time by passive channel 1, the level of received radiation from the RES does not exceed the threshold value, i.e. conditions (7) are not met, then the signal of active channel 2 is not emitted in this direction. The beam of the receiving antenna 4 of the passive channel 1 moves to the next, not previously examined, direction of the controlled zone, and the process is repeated.

1. A method for monitoring airspace irradiated by external sources of radiation, which consists of surveying the space with a radar station (radar) in passive mode, receiving the energy of an external radio-electronic device (RES) reflected by the object, and determining the boundaries of the zone within which the ratio of the energy of the RES reflected by the object to noise is greater than the threshold value, and in the emission of radar signals in the active mode only in those directions of the zone in which the reflected energy of the RES is detected, characterized in that the energy of that external RES is received, the waiting time for irradiation of the inspected direction is the smallest and does not exceed the permissible, determined based on the permissible time for increasing the radar coverage period, while the information used about the time intervals of operation of the radar for radiation from electronic reconnaissance equipment is stored and regularly updated for each direction of the radar coverage area.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that ground-based radars, including radars of neighboring states, are chosen as external electronic zones, and their parameters are determined on the basis of a priori information from electronic reconnaissance means.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that to view a section of the zone, those external radars are selected for which, other things being equal, the ratio is the greatest, where D maxi is the maximum range of the i-th external radar, D facti is the distance from i- th external radar to the area being viewed.

4. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that to view a section of the zone, those external radars are selected for which, other things being equal, the diffraction angles are the smallest.

5. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that to view a section of the zone, external radars with a wide bottom in the elevation plane are selected.

6. The method according to claim 2, or 3, or 4, or 5, characterized in that, on the basis of stored and updated information from electronic reconnaissance means about the location of the RES, time intervals of operation of the RES for radiation, wavelengths of emitted signals, radiation power and its changes depending on the angles at which the analyzed sections of the viewing area are irradiated make up a map of the correspondence of sections of the controlled area to the parameters of external radar stations to be used when monitoring these sections.

7. A radar station comprising a passive channel including a series-connected receiving antenna and a receiver, and an active channel including a series-connected antenna, an antenna switch, a receiver and a range calculation device, as well as a synchronizer and a transmitter, the output of which is connected to the input of the antenna switch, and the first and second outputs of the synchronizer are connected, respectively, to the input of the transmitter and the second input of the range calculation device, characterized in that a channel control unit is introduced into the passive channel, containing a memory and a computer connected to its output, which implements the selection of a radar facility (RES), and a computer is also introduced , which implements control of the active channel, while the output of the computer that implements the choice of RES is connected to the second input of the receiver of the passive channel, and the second input of the computer that implements the choice of RES is connected to the third output of the active channel synchronizer, the input of the computer that implements control of the active channel is connected to the output of the passive channel receiver, and the output is connected to the input of the active channel synchronizer.

The invention relates to geodetic measurements using satellite radio navigation systems, mainly when working under conditions of strong influence of reflected signals, in particular when working in forested areas, as well as in cramped urban conditions

A method for monitoring airspace irradiated by external radiation sources, and a radar station for its implementation

Radar field is a region of space with a given height and lower boundary, within which the radar grouping ensures reliable detection, determination of the coordinates of air targets and their continuous tracking.

The radar field is formed from the radar visibility zones.

Visibility area(detection) is the area of ​​space around the radar within which the station can detect and track air targets with a given probability.

Each type of radar has its own visibility zone, it is determined by the design of the radar antenna and its tactical and technical characteristics (wavelength, transmitter power and other parameters).

The following important features of radar detection zones are noted, which must be taken into account when creating a grouping of reconnaissance units:

The boundaries of radar visibility zones show the target detection range depending on the target's flight altitude.

The formation of the radar direction diagram, especially in the meter and decimeter range, is significantly influenced by the earth's surface.

Consequently, the terrain will have a significant impact on the radar's visibility ranges. Moreover, the influence of the terrain in different directions from the radar station point is different. Consequently, the detection ranges of the same type of air targets at the same altitude in different directions may be different.

Detection radars are used to conduct reconnaissance of enemy air in a circular search mode. The width of the radiation pattern of such a radar is vertical plane limited and usually amounts to 20-30°. This causes the presence of so-called “dead craters” in the radar visibility range, where observation of air targets is impossible.

The possibility of continuous tracking of air targets in the radar visibility zone is also influenced by reflections from local objects, as a result of which an illuminated area appears near the center of the indicator screen. Tracking targets in the area of ​​local objects is difficult. Even if the radar is deployed at a position that meets the requirements for it, in moderately rugged terrain the radius of the zone of local objects reaches 15-20 km relative to the center of the position. Turning on the passive interference protection equipment (moving target selection system) does not completely “remove” marks from local objects from the radar screens, and with a high intensity of reflections from local objects, observation of targets in this area is difficult. In addition, when the radar operates with the SDC equipment turned on, the detection range of air targets is reduced by 10-15%.



The section of the radar visibility zone in the horizontal plane at a given height can be conditionally taken as a ring with the center at the point where the radar is located. The outer radius of the ring is determined by the maximum detection range of an air target of a given type at a given altitude. The inner radius of the ring is determined by the radius of the “dead crater” of the radar.

When creating a radar grouping in the reconnaissance system, the following requirements must be met:

The maximum possible range of confident detection in the most likely direction of enemy air raids (in front of the front edge).

A continuous radar field must cover the space above the entire territory of the operational formation of troops, at all possible flight altitudes of the enemy air force.

The probability of detecting targets at any point in a continuous field should be no lower than 0.75.

The radar field must be highly stable.

Maximum savings in radar reconnaissance resources (number of radars).

You should focus on choosing the optimal height of the lower boundary of the continuous radar field, since this is one of the most important conditions for meeting the listed requirements.

Two neighboring stations provide a continuous radar field only starting from a certain minimum height (H min), and the smaller the distance between the radars, the lower the lower boundary of the continuous field.

That is, the smaller the height of the lower boundary of the field is set, the closer the radar is required to be located, the more radar is required to create the field (which contradicts the above requirements).

In addition, the lower the height of the lower boundary of the field, the smaller the offset of the zone of confident detection at this height in front of the leading edge.

The state and trends in the development of airborne systems already at the present time require the creation of a radar field in the height range of several tens of meters (50-60 m).

However, to create a field with such a height of the lower border, you will need great amount radar equipment. Calculations show that when the height of the lower boundary of the field decreases from 500 m to 300 m, the need for the number of radars increases by 2.2 times, and when decreased from 500 m to 100 m, by 7 times.

In addition, there is no urgent need for a single continuous radar field with such a low altitude.

Currently, it is considered rational to create a continuous field in the front (army) operating zone using ground-based radars with a lower boundary height of 300-500 meters in front of the front edge and in tactical depth.

The height of the upper boundary of the radar field, as a rule, is not specified and is determined by the capabilities of the radars in service with the RTP.

To develop a general methodology for calculating the values ​​of intervals and distances between radar reconnaissance units and radar reconnaissance units in their unified grouping, we will accept the following assumptions:

1. The entire unit is armed with the same type of radar, each unit has one radar;

2. The nature of the terrain does not significantly affect the radar visibility range;

Condition: Let it be necessary to create a continuous radar field with a lower boundary height of “H min”. The radius of the visibility zone (detection range) of the radar at “H min” is known and equal to “D”.

The problem can be solved by positioning the radar in two ways:

At the tops of the squares;

At the vertices of equilateral triangles (in a checkerboard pattern).

In this case, the radar field at “Н min” will look like (Appendix 4 and 5)

The distance between the radars will be equal to:

With the first method d=D =1.41 D;

With the second d=D =1.73 D;

From a comparison of these figures, we can conclude that creating a radar field by placing radars at the vertices of equilateral triangles (in a checkerboard pattern) is more economically profitable since it requires fewer stations.

We will call a grouping of reconnaissance assets located at the corners of an equilateral triangle a grouping of type “A”.

Although beneficial from a cost-saving point of view, type A grouping does not provide other essential requirements. For example, the failure of any of the radars leads to the formation of large gaps in the radar field. Losses of air targets during piloting will be observed even if all radars are working properly, since the “dead craters” in the radar visibility areas are not blocked.

Grouping type “A” has unsatisfactory field characteristics in front of the leading edge. In areas that occupy a total of more than 20% of the width of the front strip, the extension of the reconnaissance zone in front of the front edge is 30-60% less than possible. If we also take into account the distortion of radar visibility zones due to the influence of the nature of the terrain around the positions, then in general we can conclude that a type “A” grouping can only be used in exceptional cases with an acute lack of funds and in secondary directions in the depths of the operational formation of front troops, but not along front lines

The appendix presents a grouping of radars, which we will conditionally call a grouping of type “B”. Here the radars are also located in arshins of equilateral triangles, but with sides equal to the detection range “D” at the height of the lower boundary of the field in several lines. Intervals between radars in lines d=D, and distance between lines

C= D = 0.87 D.

At any point in the field created by a type “B” grouping, the space is viewed simultaneously by three radars, and in some areas even seven. Thanks to this, high stability of the radar field and reliability of tracking air targets is achieved with a detection probability close to unity. This grouping ensures the overlap of radar “dead craters” and areas of local objects (which can only be achieved with d=D), and also eliminates possible gaps in the field due to distortion of radar visibility zones due to the influence of the terrain around the position.

To ensure the continuity of the radar field over time, each radar involved in creating the field must operate around the clock. In practice this is not feasible. Therefore, at each point, not one, but two or more radars must be deployed, which form the radar station.

Typically, each RLP is deployed by one RLR from the ortb.

To create a continuous radar field, it is advisable to place the radar field in several lines in a checkerboard pattern (at the vertices of equilateral triangles),

The intervals between posts must be selected based on the given height of the lower boundary of the radar field (H min).

It is advisable to choose the intervals between radars equal to the detection range of air targets “D” at the height “H min”, the lower boundary of the field in this area (d=D)

The distance between the radar lines should be within 0.8-0.9 of the detection range at the height of the lower boundaries of the “H min” field.

 

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