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Battle of Kursk: its role and significance during the war

Fifty days, from July 5 to August 23, 1943, the Battle of Kursk continued, including the Kursk defensive (July 5 - 23), Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive strategic operations of the Soviet troops. In terms of its scope, the forces and means involved, tension, results and military-political consequences, it is one of the largest battles of the Second World War.

General course of the Battle of Kursk

Huge masses of troops and military equipment were involved on both sides in the fierce clash on the Kursk Bulge - more than 4 million people, almost 70 thousand guns and mortars, more than 13 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units, up to 12 thousand aircraft. The fascist German command threw more than 100 divisions into battle, which accounted for over 43% of the divisions located on the Soviet-German front.

The salient in the Kursk region was formed as a result of stubborn battles in winter and early spring 1943. Here the right wing of the German Army Group Center hung over the troops of the Central Front from the north, and the left flank of the Army Group South covered the troops of the Voronezh Front from the south. During the three-month strategic pause that began at the end of March, the warring parties consolidated their positions, replenished their troops with people, military equipment and weapons, accumulated reserves and developed plans for further action.

Considering the great importance of the Kursk salient, the German command decided in the summer to carry out an operation to eliminate it and defeat the Soviet troops occupying the defense there, hoping to regain the lost strategic initiative and change the course of the war in their favor. He developed a plan for an offensive operation, codenamed “Citadel”.

To implement these plans, the enemy concentrated 50 divisions (including 16 tank and motorized), attracted over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2.7 thousand tanks and assault guns and over 2 thousand aircraft. The German command had high hopes for the use of new heavy Tiger and Panther tanks, Ferdinand assault guns, Focke-Wulf-190D fighters and Henschel-129 attack aircraft.

The Kursk salient, which had a length of about 550 km, was defended by troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts, which had 1336 thousand people, more than 19 thousand guns and mortars, over 3.4 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 2.9 thousand aircraft. East of Kursk, the Steppe Front, which was in the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters, was concentrated, which had 573 thousand people, 8 thousand guns and mortars, about 1.4 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, and up to 400 combat aircraft.

The Supreme High Command headquarters, having timely and correctly determined the enemy's plan, made a decision: to move on to a deliberate defense on pre-prepared lines, during which they would bleed the strike groups of German troops, and then go on a counter-offensive and complete their defeat. A rare case in the history of war occurred when the strongest side, which had everything necessary for an offensive, chose the most optimal option for its actions from several possible ones. During April - June 1943, a deeply layered defense was created in the area of ​​the Kursk salient.

The troops and local population dug about 10 thousand km of trenches and communication passages, 700 km of wire barriers were installed in the most dangerous directions, 2 thousand km of additional and parallel roads were built, 686 bridges were restored and rebuilt. Hundreds of thousands of residents of the Kursk, Oryol, Voronezh and Kharkov regions participated in the construction of defensive lines. 313 thousand wagons with military equipment, reserves and supply cargo were delivered to the troops.

Having information about the time of the start of the German offensive, the Soviet command carried out a pre-planned artillery counter-training in areas where enemy strike forces were concentrated. The enemy suffered significant losses, and his plans for a surprise attack were thwarted. On the morning of July 5, German troops went on the offensive, but enemy tank attacks, supported by the fire of thousands of guns and aircraft, were defeated by the insurmountable resilience of Soviet soldiers. On the northern face of the Kursk salient he managed to advance 10 - 12 km, and on the southern face - 35 km.

It seemed that nothing living could resist such a powerful steel avalanche. The sky turned black with smoke and dust. The corrosive gases from the explosions of shells and mines blinded my eyes. From the roar of guns and mortars, the clanging of caterpillars, the soldiers lost their hearing, but they fought with unparalleled courage. Their motto became the words: “Not a step back, stand to the death!” German tanks were shot down by the fire of our guns, anti-tank rifles, tanks and self-propelled guns buried in the ground, hit by aircraft, and blown up by mines. The enemy infantry was cut off from the tanks and exterminated by artillery, mortar, rifle and machine gun fire, or in hand-to-hand combat in the trenches. Hitler's aviation was destroyed by our planes and anti-aircraft artillery.

When German tanks broke into the depths of the defense in one of the sectors of the 203rd Guards Rifle Regiment, the deputy battalion commander for political affairs, Senior Lieutenant Zhumbek Duisov, whose crew was wounded, knocked out three enemy tanks with an anti-tank rifle. The wounded armor-piercers, inspired by the officer’s feat, again took up arms and successfully repelled a new enemy attack.

In this battle, armor-piercing officer Private F.I. Yuplankov knocked out six tanks and shot down one Yu-88 plane, armor-piercing junior sergeant G.I. Kikinadze knocked out four, and Sergeant P.I. Houses - seven fascist tanks. The infantrymen boldly let enemy tanks through their trenches, cut off the infantry from the tanks and destroyed the Nazis with fire from machine guns and machine guns, and burned the tanks with combustible bottles and knocked them out with grenades.

A striking heroic feat was performed by the tank crew of Lieutenant B.C. Shalandina. The company in which he was operating began to be surrounded by a group of enemy tanks. Shalandin and his crew members, senior sergeants V.G. Kustov, V.F. Lekomtsev and Sergeant P.E. Zelenin boldly entered into battle with a numerically superior enemy. Acting from an ambush, they brought enemy tanks within direct shot range, and then, hitting the sides, burned two “tigers” and one medium tank. But Shalandin’s tank was also hit and caught fire. With the car on fire, Shalandin’s crew decided to ram it and immediately crashed into the side of the “tiger.” The enemy tank caught fire. But our entire crew also died. To Lieutenant B.C. Shalandin was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. By order of the Minister of Defense, he was forever included in the lists of the Tashkent Tank School.

Simultaneously with the fighting on the ground, there were fierce battles in the air. An immortal feat was accomplished here by guard pilot Lieutenant A.K. Gorovets. On July 6, as part of a squadron on a La-5 aircraft, he covered his troops. Returning from a mission, Horovets saw large group enemy bombers, but due to damage to the radio transmitter, he was unable to inform the presenter about this and decided to attack them. During the battle, the brave pilot shot down nine enemy bombers, but he himself died.

On July 12, in the Prokhorovka area, the largest oncoming tank battle in World War II took place, in which up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part on both sides. During the day of the battle, the opposing sides lost from 30 to 60% of tanks and self-propelled guns each.

On July 12, the turning point in the Battle of Kursk came, the enemy stopped the offensive, and on July 18, he began to withdraw all his forces to their original position. The troops of the Voronezh Front, and from July 19, the Steppe Front, switched to pursuit and by July 23 drove the enemy back to the line that he occupied on the eve of his offensive. Operation Citadel failed; the enemy failed to turn the tide of the war in their favor.

On July 12, troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts began an offensive in the Oryol direction. On July 15, the Central Front launched a counteroffensive. On August 3, troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began a counteroffensive in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction. The scale of hostilities expanded even further.

Our troops showed massive heroism during the battles on the Oryol salient. Here are just a few examples.

In the battle for a strong point southwest of the village of Vyatki on July 13, the commander of a rifle platoon of the 457th Infantry Regiment of the 129th Infantry Division, Lieutenant N.D., distinguished himself. Marinchenko. Carefully camouflaging himself, he led the platoon to the northern slope of the height unnoticed by the enemy and from close range unleashed a shower of machine gun fire on the enemy. The Germans began to panic. They threw down their weapons and ran. Having captured two 75-mm cannons at a height, Marinchenko’s fighters opened fire on the enemy from them. For this feat, Lieutenant Nikolai Danilovich Marinchenko was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

On July 19, 1943, in the battle for the village of Troena, Kursk Region, a heroic feat was accomplished by the gunner of a platoon of 45-mm cannons of the 896th Infantry Regiment of the 211th Infantry Division, Sergeant N.N. Shilenkov. The enemy here repeatedly launched counterattacks. During one of them, Shilenkov allowed German tanks to reach 100 - 150 m and set one on fire with cannon fire and knocked out three of them.

When the cannon was destroyed by an enemy shell, he took the machine gun and, together with the riflemen, continued to fire at the enemy. Nikolai Nikolaevich Shilenkov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

On August 5, two ancient Russian cities, Orel and Belgorod, were liberated. That same day, in the evening, an artillery salute was fired for the first time in Moscow in honor of the troops who liberated them.

By August 18, Soviet troops, having inflicted a heavy defeat on Army Group Center, completely liberated the Oryol bridgehead. At that time, troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts were fighting in the Kharkov direction. Having repelled strong counterattacks from enemy tank divisions, our units and formations liberated Kharkov on August 23. Thus, the Battle of Kursk ended in a brilliant victory for the Red Army.

The date August 23 is now celebrated in our country as the Day of Military Glory of Russia - the defeat of Nazi troops in the Battle of Kursk (1943).

At the same time, it should be noted that the victory in the Battle of Kursk went to the Soviet troops very at a high price. They lost over 860 thousand people killed and wounded, more than 6 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 5.2 thousand guns and mortars, over 1.6 thousand aircraft. Nevertheless, this victory was joyful and inspiring.

Thus, the victory at Kursk was new convincing evidence of the loyalty of Soviet soldiers to the oath, military duty and combat traditions of our Armed Forces. It is the duty of every soldier of the Russian Army to strengthen and multiply these traditions.

Historical significance of the victory at Kursk

The Battle of Kursk is one of the most important stages on the path to victory in the Great Patriotic War. The crushing defeat of Nazi Germany at the Kursk Bulge testified to the increased economic, political and military power of the Soviet Union. The military feat of the soldiers merged with the selfless work of home front workers, who armed the army with excellent military equipment and provided it with everything necessary for victory. What is the world-historical significance of the defeat of the Nazi troops near Kursk?

Firstly, Hitler’s army suffered a severe defeat, huge losses, which the fascist leadership could no longer make up for with any total mobilizations. The grandiose battle of the summer of 1943 on the Kursk Bulge demonstrated to the whole world the ability of the Soviet state to defeat the aggressor on its own. The prestige of German weapons was irreparably damaged. 30 German divisions were destroyed. The total losses of the Wehrmacht amounted to more than 500 thousand soldiers and officers, over 1.5 thousand tanks and assault guns, 3 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft. By the way, pilots of the French Normandy squadron, who shot down 33 German aircraft in air battles, selflessly fought alongside Soviet pilots in the battles on the Kursk Bulge.

The enemy tank forces suffered the heaviest losses. Of the 20 tank and motorized divisions that took part in the Battle of Kursk, 7 were defeated, and the rest suffered significant losses. The chief inspector of the Wehrmacht tank forces, General Guderian, was forced to admit: “As a result of the failure of the Citadel offensive, we suffered a decisive defeat. The armored forces, replenished with such great difficulty, were put out of action for a long time due to large losses in men and equipment... The initiative finally passed to the Russians.”

Secondly, in the Battle of Kursk, the enemy’s attempt to regain the lost strategic initiative and take revenge for Stalingrad failed.

The offensive strategy of the German troops was a complete failure. The Battle of Kursk led to a further change in the balance of forces at the front, made it possible to finally concentrate the strategic initiative in the hands of the Soviet command, and created favorable conditions for the deployment of a general strategic offensive of the Red Army. The victory at Kursk and the advance of Soviet troops to the Dnieper marked a radical turning point in the course of the war. After the Battle of Kursk, the Nazi command was forced to finally abandon the offensive strategy and go on the defensive along the entire Soviet-German front.

However, at present, some Western historians, shamelessly falsifying the history of the Second World War, are trying in every possible way to belittle the significance of the victory of the Red Army at Kursk. Some of them claim that the Battle of Kursk is an ordinary, unremarkable episode of the Second World War, others in their voluminous works either simply remain silent about the Battle of Kursk, or speak about it sparingly and incomprehensibly, other falsifiers seek to prove that the German- The fascist army was defeated in the Battle of Kursk not under the blows of the Red Army, but as a result of Hitler’s “miscalculations” and “fatal decisions”, due to his reluctance to listen to the opinions of his generals and field marshals. However, all this has no basis and is in conflict with the facts. The German generals and field marshals themselves recognized the inconsistency of such statements. “Operation Citadel was the last attempt to maintain our initiative in the east,” admits the former Nazi Field Marshal, who commanded a group of artillery units.
mission "South" E. Manstein. - With its termination, tantamount to failure, the initiative finally passed to the Soviet side. In this respect, "Citadel" is a decisive, turning point of the war on the Eastern Front."

Thirdly, the victory in the Battle of Kursk is a triumph of Soviet military art. During the battle, Soviet military strategy, operational art and tactics once again proved their superiority over the military art of Hitler's army.

The Battle of Kursk enriched the domestic military art with the EXPERIENCE of organizing a deeply layered, active, sustainable defense, conducting flexible and decisive maneuver of forces and means during defensive and offensive actions.

In the area of ​​strategy, the Soviet Supreme High Command took a creative approach to planning the summer-autumn campaign of 1943. The originality of the decision was expressed in the fact that the side with strategic initiative and overall superiority in forces went on the defensive, deliberately giving an active role to the enemy in the initial phase of the campaign. Subsequently, within the framework of a single process of conducting a campaign, following the defense, a transition to a decisive counter-offensive and the deployment of a general offensive was planned. The problem of creating an insurmountable defense on an operational-strategic scale was successfully solved. Its activity was ensured by the saturation of fronts a large number mobile troops. It was achieved by conducting artillery counter-preparation on the scale of two fronts, wide maneuver of strategic reserves to strengthen them, and launching massive air strikes against enemy groups and reserves. The Supreme High Command headquarters skillfully determined the plan for conducting a counteroffensive in each direction, creatively approaching
choosing the directions of the main attacks and methods of defeating the enemy. Thus, in the Oryol operation, Soviet troops used concentric attacks in converging directions, followed by fragmentation and destruction of the enemy group in parts. In the Belgorod-Kharkov operation, the main blow was delivered by adjacent flanks of the fronts, which ensured the rapid breaking of the enemy’s strong and deep defenses, the dissection of his group into two parts and the exit of Soviet troops to the rear of the enemy’s Kharkov defensive region.

In the Battle of Kursk, the problem of creating large strategic reserves and their effective use was successfully resolved, and strategic air supremacy was finally won, which was held by Soviet aviation until the end of the Great Patriotic War. The Supreme High Command headquarters skillfully carried out strategic interaction not only between the fronts participating in the battle, but also with those operating in other directions.

Soviet operational art in the Battle of Kursk for the first time solved the problem of creating a deliberate positional insurmountable and active operational defense up to 70 km deep.

During the counteroffensive, the problem of breaking through the enemy's deeply layered defense was successfully resolved through the decisive massing of forces and means in the breakthrough areas (from 50 to 90% of their total number), the skillful use of tank armies and corps as mobile groups of fronts and armies, and close cooperation with aviation , which carried out a full front-scale air offensive, which largely ensured the high pace of the offensive ground forces. Valuable experience was gained in conducting oncoming tank battles both in a defensive operation (near Prokhorovka) and during an offensive when repelling counterattacks of large enemy armored groupings.

The successful conduct of the Battle of Kursk was facilitated by the active actions of the partisans. Striking the enemy's rear, they pinned down up to 100 thousand enemy soldiers and officers. The partisans carried out about 1.5 thousand raids on railway lines, disabled more than 1 thousand locomotives and destroyed over 400 military trains.

Fourthly, the defeat of the Nazi troops during the Battle of Kursk was of enormous military-political and international significance. He significantly increased the role and international authority of the Soviet Union. It became obvious that the power of Soviet weapons faced Nazi Germany with inevitable defeat. The sympathy of ordinary people for our country increased even more, the hopes of the peoples of the countries occupied by the Nazis for early liberation strengthened, the front of the national liberation struggle of groups of Resistance fighters in France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway expanded, the anti-fascist struggle intensified both in Germany itself and and other countries of the fascist bloc.

Fifthly, the defeat at Kursk and the results of the battle had a profound impact on the German people, undermined the morale of the German troops and faith in the victorious outcome of the war. Germany was losing influence on its allies, disagreements within the fascist bloc intensified, which later led to a political and military crisis. The beginning of the collapse of the fascist bloc was laid - Mussolini's regime collapsed, and Italy came out of the war on the side of Germany.

The victory of the Red Army at Kursk forced Germany and its allies to go on the defensive in all theaters of World War II, which had a huge impact on its further course. The transfer of significant enemy forces from the west to the Soviet-German front and their further defeat by the Red Army facilitated the landing of Anglo-American troops in Italy and predetermined their success.

Sixth, under the influence of the victory of the Red Army, cooperation between the leading countries of the anti-Hitler coalition strengthened. She provided great influence on the ruling circles of the USA and Great Britain. At the end of 1943, the Tehran Conference took place, at which the leaders of the USSR, USA, and Great Britain I.V. met for the first time. Stalin; F.D. Roosevelt, W. Churchill. At the conference, it was decided to open a second front in Europe in May 1944. Assessing the results of the victory at Kursk, the head of the British government, W. Churchill, noted: “Three huge battles - for Kursk, Orel and Kharkov, all carried out within two months, marked the collapse of the German army on the Eastern Front.”

Victory in the Battle of Kursk was achieved thanks to the further strengthening of the military-economic power of the country and its Armed Forces.

One of the decisive factors that ensured victory at Kursk was the high moral, political and psychological state of the personnel of our troops. In the fierce battle, such powerful sources of victory for the Soviet people and their army as patriotism, friendship of peoples, self-confidence and success emerged with all their might. Soviet soldiers and commanders showed miracles of mass heroism, exceptional courage, perseverance and military skill, for which 132 formations and units received the Guards rank, 26 were awarded the honorary titles of Oryol, Belgorod, and Kharkov. More than 100 thousand soldiers were awarded orders and medals, and 231 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The victory at Kursk was also achieved thanks to a powerful economic base. The increased capabilities of Soviet industry, the heroic feat of home front workers, made it possible to provide the Red Army with huge quantities perfect examples of military equipment and weapons, superior in a number of decisive indicators to the military equipment of Nazi Germany.

Highly appreciating the role and significance of the Battle of Kursk, the courage, resilience and mass heroism shown by the defenders of the cities of Belgorod, Kursk and Orel in the struggle for freedom and independence of the Fatherland, by Presidential Decrees Russian Federation On April 27, 2007, these cities were awarded the honorary title “City of Military Glory.”

Before and during a lesson on this topic, it is advisable to visit the museum of the formation or unit, organize viewing of documentaries and feature films about the Battle of Kursk, and invite veterans of the Great Patriotic War to perform.

In the introductory speech, it is advisable to emphasize the importance of such a historical event as the Battle of Kursk, emphasizing the fact that here a radical turning point in the course of the war ended and the mass expulsion of enemy troops from our territory began.

When covering the first question, it is necessary, using a map, to show the location and balance of forces of the opposing sides at different stages of the Battle of Kursk, while emphasizing that it is an unsurpassed example of Soviet military art. In addition, it is necessary to talk in detail about the exploits, give examples of the courage and heroism of soldiers of their branch of troops committed in the Battle of Kursk.

In the course of considering the second issue, it is necessary to objectively show the significance, role and place of the Battle of Kursk in the Russian military history, take a closer look at the factors that contributed to this great victory.

At the end of the lesson, it is necessary to draw brief conclusions, answer questions from the audience, and thank the invited veterans.

1. Military encyclopedia in 8 volumes. T.4. - M.: Military Publishing House. 1999.

2. Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941 - 1945: Brief History. - M., 1984.

3. Dembitsky N., Strelnikov V. The most important operations of the Red Army and Navy in 1943 // Landmark. - 2003. - No. 1.

4. History of the Second World War 1939 -1945 in 12 volumes. T.7. - M., 1976.

Lieutenant colonel
Dmitry Samosvat,
Candidate of Pedagogical Sciences, Lieutenant Colonel
Alexey Kurshev

After the Battle of Stalingrad, which ended in disaster for Germany, the Wehrmacht attempted revenge the following year, 1943. This attempt went down in history as the Battle of Kursk and became the final turning point in the Great Patriotic War and World War II.

Background to the Battle of Kursk

During the counteroffensive from November 1942 to February 1943, the Red Army managed to defeat a large group of Germans, encircle and force the 6th Wehrmacht Army to surrender at Stalingrad, and liberate very large territories. Thus, in January-February, Soviet troops managed to capture Kursk and Kharkov and thereby cut through the German defenses. The gap reached approximately 200 kilometers in width and 100-150 in depth.

Realizing that a further Soviet offensive could lead to the collapse of the entire Eastern Front, the Nazi command in early March 1943 took a series of energetic actions in the Kharkov area. Very quickly, a strike force was created, which by March 15 again captured Kharkov and attempted to cut off the ledge in the Kursk area. However, here the German advance was stopped.

As of April 1943, the line of the Soviet-German front was practically flat along its entire length, and only in the Kursk area did it bend, forming a large ledge jutting into the German side. The configuration of the front made it clear where the main battles would unfold in the summer campaign of 1943.

Plans and forces of the parties before the Battle of Kursk

In the spring, heated debate broke out among the German leadership regarding the fate of the summer 1943 campaign. Some of the German generals (for example, G. Guderian) generally proposed to refrain from an offensive in order to accumulate forces for a large-scale offensive campaign in 1944. However, most German military leaders were strongly in favor of the offensive already in 1943. This offensive was supposed to be a kind of revenge for the humiliating defeat at Stalingrad, as well as the final turning point of the war in favor of Germany and its allies.

Thus, in the summer of 1943, the Nazi command again planned an offensive campaign. However, it is worth noting that from 1941 to 1943 the scale of these campaigns steadily decreased. So, if in 1941 the Wehrmacht led an offensive along the entire front, then in 1943 it was only a small section of the Soviet-German front.

The meaning of the operation, called “Citadel,” was the offensive of large Wehrmacht forces at the base of the Kursk Bulge and their attack in the general direction of Kursk. The Soviet troops located in the bulge would inevitably be surrounded and destroyed. After this, it was planned to launch an offensive into the gap created in the Soviet defense and reach Moscow from the southwest. This plan, if it had been successfully implemented, would have become a real disaster for the Red Army, because there were a very large number of troops in the Kursk ledge.

The Soviet leadership learned important lessons in the spring of 1942 and 1943. Thus, by March 1943, the Red Army was thoroughly exhausted by offensive battles, which led to defeat near Kharkov. After this, it was decided not to begin the summer campaign with an offensive, since it was obvious that the Germans were also planning to attack. Also, the Soviet leadership had no doubt that the Wehrmacht would advance precisely on the Kursk Bulge, where the configuration of the front line contributed most to this.

That is why, after weighing all the circumstances, the Soviet command decided to exhaust the German troops, inflict serious losses on them and then go on the offensive, finally securing the turning point in the war in favor of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition.

To attack Kursk, the German leadership concentrated a very large group, numbering 50 divisions. Of these 50 divisions, 18 were tank and motorized. From the sky the German group was covered by aircraft of the 4th and 6th air fleets Luftwaffe. Thus, the total number of German troops at the beginning of the battle of Kursk was approximately 900 thousand people, about 2,700 tanks and 2,000 aircraft. Due to the fact that the northern and southern Wehrmacht groupings on the Kursk Bulge were part of different army groups (“Center” and “South”), leadership was exercised by the commanders of these army groups - Field Marshals Kluge and Manstein.

The Soviet group on the Kursk Bulge was represented by three fronts. The northern face of the ledge was defended by troops of the Central Front under the command of Army General Rokossovsky, the southern by troops of the Voronezh Front under the command of Army General Vatutin. Also in the Kursk ledge were the troops of the Steppe Front, commanded by Colonel General Konev. The general leadership of the troops in the Kursk salient was carried out by Marshals Vasilevsky and Zhukov. The number of Soviet troops was approximately 1 million 350 thousand people, 5000 tanks and about 2900 aircraft.

Beginning of the Battle of Kursk (5 – 12 July 1943)

On the morning of July 5, 1943, German troops launched an offensive on Kursk. However, the Soviet leadership knew about the exact time of the start of this offensive, thanks to which it was able to take a number of countermeasures. One of the most significant measures was the organization of artillery counter-preparation, which made it possible to inflict serious losses in the first minutes and hours of the battle and significantly reduce the offensive capabilities of the German troops.

However, the German offensive began and achieved some successes in the early days. The first line of Soviet defense was broken through, but the Germans failed to achieve serious success. On the northern front of the Kursk Bulge, the Wehrmacht struck in the direction of Olkhovatka, but, unable to break through the Soviet defense, they turned away settlement Ponyri. However, here too the Soviet defense was able to withstand the onslaught of German troops. As a result of the battles on July 5-10, 1943, the German 9th Army suffered terrible losses in tanks: about two-thirds of the vehicles were out of action. On July 10, army units went on the defensive.

The situation unfolded more dramatically in the south. Here, in the first days, the German army managed to wedge itself into the Soviet defenses, but never broke through it. The offensive was carried out in the direction of the settlement of Oboyan, which was held by Soviet troops, who also inflicted significant damage on the Wehrmacht.

After several days of fighting, the German leadership decided to shift the direction of the attack to Prokhorovka. Implementing this decision would make it possible to cover a larger area than planned. However, here units of the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army stood in the way of the German tank wedges.

On July 12, one of the largest tank battles in history took place in the Prokhorovka area. On the German side, approximately 700 tanks took part in it, while on the Soviet side - about 800. Soviet troops launched a counterattack on Wehrmacht units in order to eliminate the enemy’s penetration into the Soviet defense. However, this counterattack did not achieve significant results. The Red Army only managed to stop the advance of the Wehrmacht in the south of the Kursk Bulge, but it was possible to restore the situation at the beginning of the German offensive only two weeks later.

By July 15, having suffered huge losses as a result of continuous violent attacks, the Wehrmacht had practically exhausted its offensive capabilities and was forced to go on the defensive along the entire length of the front. By July 17, the withdrawal of German troops to their original lines began. Taking into account the developing situation, as well as pursuing the goal of inflicting a serious defeat on the enemy, the Supreme High Command Headquarters already on July 18, 1943 authorized the transition of Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge to a counteroffensive.

Now the German troops were forced to defend themselves in order to avoid a military catastrophe. However, Wehrmacht units, seriously exhausted in offensive battles, could not offer serious resistance. The Soviet troops, reinforced with reserves, were full of power and readiness to crush the enemy.

To defeat the German troops covering the Kursk Bulge, two operations were developed and carried out: “Kutuzov” (to defeat the Oryol group of the Wehrmacht) and “Rumyantsev” (to defeat the Belgorod-Kharkov group).

As a result of the Soviet offensive, the Oryol and Belgorod groups of German troops were defeated. On August 5, 1943, Orel and Belgorod were liberated by Soviet troops, and the Kursk Bulge practically ceased to exist. On the same day, Moscow for the first time saluted the Soviet troops who liberated the cities from the enemy.

The last battle of the Battle of Kursk was the liberation of the city of Kharkov by Soviet troops. The battles for this city became very fierce, but thanks to the decisive onslaught of the Red Army, the city was liberated by the end of August 23. It is the capture of Kharkov that is considered the logical conclusion of the Battle of Kursk.

Losses of the parties

Estimates of the losses of the Red Army, as well as the Wehrmacht troops, have different estimates. Even more unclear are the large differences between the estimates of the parties' losses in different sources.

Thus, Soviet sources indicate that during the Battle of Kursk the Red Army lost about 250 thousand people killed and about 600 thousand wounded. Moreover, some Wehrmacht data indicate 300 thousand killed and 700 thousand wounded. Armored vehicle losses range from 1,000 to 6,000 tanks and self-propelled guns. Soviet aviation losses are estimated at 1,600 aircraft.

However, regarding the assessment of Wehrmacht losses, the data differ even more. According to German data, the losses of German troops ranged from 83 to 135 thousand people killed. But at the same time, Soviet data indicate the number of dead Wehrmacht soldiers at approximately 420 thousand. The losses of German armored vehicles range from 1,000 tanks (according to German data) to 3,000. Aviation losses amount to approximately 1,700 aircraft.

Results and significance of the Battle of Kursk

Immediately after the Battle of Kursk and directly during it, the Red Army began a series of large-scale operations with the aim of liberating Soviet lands from German occupation. Among these operations: “Suvorov” (operation to liberate Smolensk, Donbass and Chernigov-Poltava.

Thus, the victory at Kursk opened up vast operational scope for action for the Soviet troops. German troops, bloodless and defeated as a result of the summer battles, ceased to be a serious threat until December 1943. However, this does not mean at all that the Wehrmacht was not strong at that time. On the contrary, snapping furiously, the German troops sought to hold at least the Dnieper line.

For the Allied command, which landed troops on the island of Sicily in July 1943, the battle of Kursk became a kind of “help”, since the Wehrmacht was no longer able to transfer reserves to the island - the Eastern Front was a higher priority. Even after the defeat at Kursk, the Wehrmacht command was forced to transfer fresh forces from Italy to the east, and in their place send units battered in battles with the Red Army.

For the German command, the battle of Kursk became the moment when plans to defeat the Red Army and defeat the USSR finally became an illusion. It became clear that for quite a long time the Wehrmacht would be forced to refrain from conducting active operations.

The Battle of Kursk marked the completion of a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War. After this battle, the strategic initiative finally passed into the hands of the Red Army, thanks to which, by the end of 1943, vast territories of the Soviet Union were liberated, including such major cities, like Kyiv and Smolensk.

Internationally, the victory in the Battle of Kursk became the moment when the peoples of Europe enslaved by the Nazis took heart. The people's liberation movement in European countries began to grow even faster. Its culmination came in 1944, when the decline of the Third Reich became very clear.

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Battle of Kursk became one of the most important stages on the path to the victory of the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany. In terms of scope, intensity and results, it ranks among the largest battles of the Second World War. The battle lasted less than two months. During this time, in a relatively small area, a fierce clash of huge masses of troops took place, involving the most modern military equipment of that time. More than 4 million people, over 69 thousand guns and mortars, more than 13 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns and up to 12 thousand combat aircraft were involved in the battles on both sides. From the Wehrmacht side, more than 100 divisions took part in it, which accounted for over 43 percent of the divisions located on the Soviet-German front. Victorious for Soviet Army tank battles were the greatest in the Second World War. " If the battle of Stalingrad foreshadowed the decline of the Nazi army, then the battle of Kursk confronted it with disaster».

The hopes of the military-political leadership did not come true " third reich» for success Operation Citadel . During this battle, Soviet troops defeated 30 divisions, the Wehrmacht lost about 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, 3 thousand guns and more than 3.7 thousand aircraft.

Construction of defensive lines. Kursk Bulge, 1943

Particularly severe defeats were inflicted on the Nazi tank formations. Of the 20 tank and motorized divisions that took part in the Battle of Kursk, 7 were defeated, and the rest suffered significant losses. Nazi Germany could no longer fully compensate for this damage. To the Inspector General of the German Armored Forces Colonel General Guderian I had to admit:

« As a result of the failure of the Citadel Offensive, we suffered a decisive defeat. The armored forces, replenished with such great difficulty, were put out of action for a long time due to large losses in men and equipment. Their timely restoration for conducting defensive actions on the eastern front, as well as for organizing defense in the West, in case of the landing that the Allies threatened to land next spring, was called into question... and there were no more calm days on the eastern front. The initiative has completely passed to the enemy...».

Before Operation Citadel. From right to left: G. Kluge, V. Model, E. Manstein. 1943

Before Operation Citadel. From right to left: G. Kluge, V. Model, E. Manstein. 1943

Soviet troops are ready to meet the enemy. Kursk Bulge, 1943 ( see comments to the article)

The failure of the offensive strategy in the East forced the Wehrmacht command to seek new ways of waging war in order to try to save fascism from the impending defeat. It hoped to transform the war into positional forms, to gain time, hoping to split the anti-Hitler coalition. West German historian W. Hubach writes: " On the eastern front, the Germans made a last attempt to seize the initiative, but to no avail. The failed Operation Citadel was the beginning of the end German army. Since then, the German front in the East has never stabilized.».

The crushing defeat of the Nazi armies on the Kursk Bulge testified to the increased economic, political and military power of the Soviet Union. The victory at Kursk was the result of a great feat of the Soviet Armed Forces and the selfless labor of the Soviet people. This was a new triumph of the wise policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet government.

Near Kursk. At the observation post of the commander of the 22nd Guards Rifle Corps. From left to right: N. S. Khrushchev, commander of the 6th Guards Army, Lieutenant General I. M. Chistyakov, corps commander, Major General N. B. Ibyansky (July 1943)

Planning Operation Citadel , the Nazis had high hopes for new equipment - tanks " tiger" And " panther", assault guns " Ferdinand", airplanes " Focke-Wulf-190A" They believed that the new weapons entering the Wehrmacht would surpass Soviet military equipment and ensure victory. However, this did not happen. Soviet designers created new models of tanks, self-propelled artillery units, aircraft, and anti-tank artillery, which in terms of their tactical and technical characteristics were not inferior to, and often surpassed, similar enemy systems.

Fighting on the Kursk Bulge , Soviet soldiers constantly felt the support of the working class, the collective farm peasantry, and the intelligentsia, who armed the army with excellent military equipment and provided it with everything necessary for victory. Figuratively speaking, in this grandiose battle, a metal worker, a designer, an engineer, and a grain grower fought shoulder to shoulder with an infantryman, a tankman, an artilleryman, a pilot, and a sapper. The military feat of the soldiers merged with the selfless work of home front workers. The unity of the rear and the front, forged by the Communist Party, created an unshakable foundation for the military successes of the Soviet Armed Forces. Much credit for the defeat of the Nazi troops near Kursk belonged to the Soviet partisans, who launched active operations behind enemy lines.

Battle of Kursk was of great importance for the course and outcome of events on the Soviet-German front in 1943. It created favorable conditions for the general offensive of the Soviet Army.

had the greatest international significance. It had a great influence on the further course of the Second World War. As a result of the defeat of significant Wehrmacht forces, favorable conditions for the landing of Anglo-American troops in Italy in early July 1943. The defeat of the Wehrmacht near Kursk directly influenced the plans of the fascist German command related to the occupation of Sweden. The previously developed plan for the invasion of Hitler's troops into this country was canceled due to the fact that the Soviet-German front absorbed all the enemy's reserves. Back on June 14, 1943, the Swedish envoy in Moscow stated: “ Sweden understands perfectly well that if it still remains out of the war, it is only thanks to the military successes of the USSR. Sweden is grateful to the Soviet Union for this and speaks directly about it».

Increased losses on the fronts, especially in the East, the severe consequences of total mobilization and the growing liberation movement in European countries affected the internal situation in Germany and the morale of German soldiers and the entire population. Distrust in the government increased in the country, critical statements against the fascist party and government leadership became more frequent, and doubts about achieving victory grew. Hitler further intensified repression to strengthen the “internal front.” But neither the bloody terror of the Gestapo nor the colossal efforts of Goebbels’s propaganda machine could neutralize the impact that the defeat at Kursk had on the morale of the population and the Wehrmacht soldiers.

Near Kursk. Direct fire at the advancing enemy

Huge losses of military equipment and weapons placed new demands on the German military industry and further complicated the situation with human resources. Attraction to industry, agriculture and transport of foreign workers, to whom Hitler’s “ new order "was deeply hostile, undermined the rear of the fascist state.

After the defeat in Battle of Kursk Germany's influence on the states of the fascist bloc weakened even more, the internal political situation of the satellite countries worsened, and the foreign policy isolation of the Reich increased. The catastrophic result of the Battle of Kursk for the fascist elite predetermined the further cooling of relations between Germany and neutral countries. These countries have reduced supplies of raw materials and materials " third reich».

Victory of the Soviet Army in the Battle of Kursk raised the authority of the Soviet Union even higher as a decisive force opposing fascism. The whole world looked with hope at the socialist power and its army, bringing deliverance to humanity from the Nazi plague.

Victorious completion of the Battle of Kursk strengthened the struggle of the peoples of enslaved Europe for freedom and independence, intensified the activities of numerous groups of the Resistance movement, including in Germany itself. Under the influence of the victories at Kursk, the peoples of the countries of the anti-fascist coalition began to demand even more decisively for the rapid opening of a second front in Europe.

The successes of the Soviet Army affected the position of the ruling circles of the USA and England. In the midst of the Battle of Kursk President Roosevelt in a special message to the head of the Soviet government he wrote: “ During a month of gigantic battles, your armed forces, with their skill, their courage, their dedication and their tenacity, not only stopped the long-planned German offensive, but also launched a successful counter-offensive, which has far-reaching consequences..."

The Soviet Union can be justly proud of its heroic victories. In the Battle of Kursk The superiority of Soviet military leadership and military art manifested itself with renewed vigor. It showed that the Soviet Armed Forces are a well-coordinated organism in which all types and types of troops are harmoniously combined.

The defense of Soviet troops near Kursk withstood severe tests and achieved my goals. The Soviet Army was enriched with the experience of organizing a deeply layered defense, stable in anti-tank and anti-aircraft terms, as well as the experience of decisive maneuver of forces and means. Pre-created strategic reserves were widely used, most of which were included in the specially created Steppe District (front). His troops increased the depth of defense on a strategic scale and took an active part in the defensive battle and counter-offensive. For the first time in the Great Patriotic War, the total depth of the operational formation of defensive fronts reached 50–70 km. The massing of forces and assets in the directions of expected enemy attacks, as well as the overall operational density of troops in defense, have increased. The strength of defense has increased significantly due to the saturation of troops with military equipment and weapons.

Anti-tank defense reached a depth of up to 35 km, the density of artillery anti-tank fire increased, barriers, mining, anti-tank reserves and mobile barrage units found wider use.

German prisoners after the collapse of Operation Citadel. 1943

German prisoners after the collapse of Operation Citadel. 1943

A major role in increasing the stability of the defense was played by the maneuver of second echelons and reserves, which was carried out from the depths and along the front. For example, during the defensive operation on the Voronezh Front, the regrouping involved about 35 percent of all rifle divisions, over 40 percent of anti-tank artillery units and almost all individual tank and mechanized brigades.

In the Battle of Kursk For the third time during the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Armed Forces successfully carried out a strategic counteroffensive. If the preparation for a counteroffensive near Moscow and Stalingrad took place in a situation of heavy defensive battles with superior enemy forces, then different conditions developed near Kursk. Thanks to the successes of the Soviet military economy and targeted organizational measures to prepare reserves, the balance of forces had already developed in favor of the Soviet Army by the beginning of the defensive battle.

During the counteroffensive, Soviet troops showed high skill in organizing and conducting offensive operations in summer conditions. The right choice the moment of transition from defense to counteroffensive, close operational-strategic interaction of five fronts, a successful breakthrough of the enemy’s defense prepared in advance, the skillful conduct of a simultaneous offensive on a wide front with strikes in several directions, the massive use of armored forces, aviation and artillery - all this was of enormous importance to defeat the strategic groups of the Wehrmacht.

In the counteroffensive, for the first time during the war, second echelons of fronts began to be created as part of one or two combined arms armies (Voronezh Front) and powerful groupings of mobile troops. This allowed front commanders to build up attacks of the first echelon and develop success in depth or towards the flanks, break through intermediate defensive lines, and also repel strong counterattacks of Nazi troops.

The art of war was enriched in the Battle of Kursk all types of armed forces and branches of the military. In defense, artillery was more decisively massed in the direction of the enemy's main attacks, which ensured the creation of higher operational densities compared to previous defensive operations. The role of artillery in the counteroffensive increased. The density of guns and mortars in the direction of the main attack of the advancing troops reached 150 - 230 guns, and the maximum was 250 guns per kilometer of front.

Soviet tank troops in the Battle of Kursk successfully solved the most complex and varied tasks both in defense and offensive. If until the summer of 1943 tank corps and armies were used in defensive operations primarily to carry out counterattacks, then in the Battle of Kursk they were also used to hold defensive lines. This was achieved great depth operational defense and increased its stability.

During the counteroffensive, armored and mechanized troops were used en masse, being the main means of front and army commanders in completing a breakthrough of enemy defenses and developing tactical success into operational success. At the same time, the experience of combat operations in the Oryol operation showed the inexpediency of using tank corps and armies to break through positional defenses, since they suffered heavy losses in carrying out these tasks. In the Belgorod-Kharkov direction, the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone was completed by advanced tank brigades, and the main forces of tank armies and corps were used for operations in operational depth.

Soviet military art in the use of aviation has risen to a new level. IN Battle of Kursk The massing of front-line and long-range aviation forces in the main axes was carried out more decisively, and their interaction with ground forces improved.

Has been fully applied new form the use of aviation in a counteroffensive - an air offensive in which attack and bomber aircraft continuously impacted enemy groups and targets, providing support to ground forces. In the Battle of Kursk Soviet aviation finally won strategic air supremacy and thereby contributed to the creation of favorable conditions for subsequent offensive operations.

Successfully passed the test at the Battle of Kursk organizational forms of military branches and special forces. Tank armies new organization, as well as artillery corps and other formations played an important role in winning the victory.

In the Battle of Kursk, the Soviet command demonstrated a creative, innovative approach to solving the most important tasks of the strategy , operational art and tactics, its superiority over the Nazi military school.

Strategic, front-line, army and military logistics agencies have acquired extensive experience in providing comprehensive support to troops. A characteristic feature of the organization of the rear was the approach of rear units and institutions to the front line. This ensured an uninterrupted supply of troops with material resources and timely evacuation of the wounded and sick.

The enormous scope and intensity of the fighting required a large amount of material resources, primarily ammunition and fuel. During the Battle of Kursk, the troops of the Central, Voronezh, Steppe, Bryansk, Southwestern and left wing of the Western Fronts by rail 141,354 wagons with ammunition, fuel, food and other supplies were supplied from central bases and warehouses. By air 1,828 tons of various supplies were delivered to the troops of the Central Front alone.

The medical service of the fronts, armies and formations has been enriched with experience in carrying out preventive and sanitary-hygienic measures, skillful maneuver of forces and means of medical institutions, widespread use of specialized medical care. Despite the significant losses suffered by the troops, many wounded during the Battle of Kursk, thanks to the efforts of military doctors, returned to duty.

Hitler's strategists for planning, organizing and leading Operation Citadel used old, standard methods and methods that did not correspond to the new situation and were well known to the Soviet command. This is recognized by a number of bourgeois historians. So, the English historian A. Clark at work "Barbarossa" notes that the fascist German command again relied on a lightning strike with the widespread use of new military equipment: Junkers, short intensive artillery preparation, close interaction between a mass of tanks and infantry... without due consideration of the changed conditions, except for a simple arithmetic increase in the relevant components." West German historian W. Goerlitz writes that the attack on Kursk was basically carried out “in in accordance with the scheme of previous battles - tank wedges acted to cover from two directions».

Reactionary bourgeois researchers of the Second World War made great efforts to distort events near Kursk . They are trying to rehabilitate the Wehrmacht command, gloss over its mistakes and all the blame for failure of Operation Citadel blamed on Hitler and his closest associates. This position was put forward immediately after the end of the war and has been stubbornly defended to this day. Thus, the former chief of the general staff of the ground forces, Colonel General Halder, was still at work in 1949 "Hitler as a commander", deliberately distorting the facts, claimed that in the spring of 1943, when developing a war plan on the Soviet-German front, “ The commanders of army groups and armies and Hitler's military advisers from the main command of the ground forces tried unsuccessfully to overcome the great operational threat created in the East, to direct him to the only path that promised success - the path of flexible operational leadership, which, like the art of fencing, lies in rapid alternation of cover and strike and compensates for the lack of strength with skillful operational leadership and high fighting qualities of the troops...».

Documents show that both the political and military leadership of Germany made mistakes in planning the armed struggle on the Soviet-German front. The Wehrmacht intelligence service also failed to cope with its tasks. Statements about the non-involvement of the German generals in the development of the most important political and military decisions contradict the facts.

The thesis that the offensive of Hitler’s troops near Kursk had limited goals and that failure of Operation Citadel cannot be considered as a phenomenon of strategic importance.

IN recent years Works have appeared that give a fairly close to objective assessment of a number of events in the Battle of Kursk. American historian M. Caidin in the book "Tigers" are burning" characterizes the Battle of Kursk as " greatest land battle ever fought in history”, and does not agree with the opinion of many researchers in the West that it pursued limited, auxiliary” goals. " History deeply doubts, - writes the author, - in German statements that they did not believe in the future. Everything was decided at Kursk. What happened there determined the future course of events" The same idea is reflected in the annotation to the book, where it is noted that the battle of Kursk “ broke the back of the German army in 1943 and changed the entire course of the Second World War... Few outside Russia understand the enormity of this stunning clash. In fact, even today the Soviets feel bitterness as they see Western historians downplaying the Russian triumph at Kursk».

Why did the last attempt of the fascist German command to carry out a major victorious offensive in the East and regain the lost strategic initiative fail? The main reasons for failure Operation Citadel the increasingly stronger economic, political and military power of the Soviet Union, the superiority of Soviet military art, and the boundless heroism and courage of Soviet soldiers appeared. In 1943, the Soviet war economy produced more military equipment and weapons than the industry of Nazi Germany, which used the resources of the enslaved countries of Europe.

But the growth of the military power of the Soviet state and its Armed Forces was ignored by Nazi political and military leaders. Underestimating the capabilities of the Soviet Union and overestimating its own strengths were an expression of the adventurism of the fascist strategy.

From a purely military point of view, complete failure of Operation Citadel to a certain extent was due to the fact that the Wehrmacht failed to achieve surprise in the attack. Thanks to the accurate work of all types of reconnaissance, including airborne, the Soviet command knew about the impending offensive and accepted necessary measures. The military leadership of the Wehrmacht believed that no defense could resist powerful tank rams, supported by massive air operations. But these predictions turned out to be unfounded; at the cost of huge losses, the tanks only slightly wedged themselves into the Soviet defenses north and south of Kursk and got stuck on the defensive.

An important reason collapse of Operation Citadel The secretiveness of the preparation of Soviet troops for both a defensive battle and a counteroffensive was revealed. The fascist leadership did not have a complete understanding of the plans of the Soviet command. In preparation for July 3, that is, the day before German offensive near Kursk, department for the study of the armies of the East “Assessment of enemy actions during Operation Citadel there is not even a mention of the possibility of a counteroffensive by Soviet troops against Wehrmacht strike forces.

The major miscalculations of fascist German intelligence in assessing the forces of the Soviet Army concentrated in the area of ​​the Kursk salient are convincingly evidenced by the report card of the operational department of the General Staff of the German Army Ground Forces, prepared on July 4, 1943. It even contains information about the Soviet troops deployed in the first operational echelon are reflected inaccurately. German intelligence had very sketchy information about the reserves located in the Kursk direction.

At the beginning of July, the situation on the Soviet-German front and possible decisions of the Soviet command were assessed by the political and military leaders of Germany, essentially, from their previous positions. They firmly believed in the possibility of a major victory.

Soviet soldiers in the battles of Kursk showed courage, resilience and mass heroism. Communist Party and the Soviet government highly appreciated the greatness of their feat. Military orders sparkled on the banners of many formations and units, 132 formations and units received the guards rank, 26 formations and units were awarded the honorary names of Oryol, Belgorod, Kharkov and Karachev. More than 100 thousand soldiers, sergeants, officers and generals were awarded orders and medals, over 180 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, including private V.E. Breusov, division commander Major General L.N. Gurtiev, platoon commander Lieutenant V.V. Zhenchenko, battalion Komsomol organizer Lieutenant N.M. Zverintsev, battery commander Captain G.I. Igishev, private A.M. Lomakin, platoon deputy commander, senior sergeant Kh.M. Mukhamadiev, squad commander Sergeant V.P. Petrishchev, gun commander Junior Sergeant A.I. Petrov, Senior Sergeant G.P. Pelikanov, Sergeant V.F. Chernenko and others.

Victory of Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge testified to the increased role of party political work. Commanders and political workers, party and Komsomol organizations helped the personnel understand the significance of the upcoming battles, their role in defeating the enemy. By personal example, the communists attracted the fighters with them. Political agencies took measures to maintain and replenish party organizations in their divisions. This ensured continuous party influence over all personnel.

An important means of mobilizing soldiers for military exploits was the promotion of advanced experience and the popularization of units and subunits that distinguished themselves in battle. The orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, declaring gratitude to the personnel of the distinguished troops, had great inspiring power - they were widely promoted in units and formations, read out at rallies, and distributed through leaflets. Extracts from the orders were given to each soldier.

The increase in the morale of Soviet soldiers and confidence in victory was facilitated by timely information from personnel about events in the world and in the country, about the successes of the Soviet troops and the defeats of the enemy. Political agencies and party organizations, carrying out active work to educate personnel, played an important role in achieving victories in defensive and offensive battles. Together with their commanders, they held high the banner of the party and were bearers of its spirit, discipline, steadfastness and courage. They mobilized and inspired soldiers to defeat the enemy.

« The giant battle on the Oryol-Kursk Bulge in the summer of 1943, noted L. I. Brezhnev , – broke the back of Nazi Germany and incinerated its armored shock troops. The superiority of our army in combat skills, weapons, and strategic leadership has become clear to the whole world.».

The victory of the Soviet Army in the Battle of Kursk opened up new opportunities for the fight against German fascism and the liberation of Soviet lands temporarily captured by the enemy. Firmly holding the strategic initiative. The Soviet Armed Forces increasingly launched a general offensive.

The Battle of Kursk (also known as the Battle of Kursk) is the largest and most key battle during the Great Patriotic War and the entire Second World War. It was attended by 2 million people, 6 thousand tanks and 4 thousand aircraft.

The Battle of Kursk lasted 49 days and consisted of three operations:

  • Kursk strategic defensive (July 5 - 23);
  • Orlovskaya (July 12 - August 18);
  • Belgorodsko-Kharkovskaya (August 3 – 23).

The Soviets involved:

  • 1.3 million people + 0.6 million in reserve;
  • 3444 tanks + 1.5 thousand in reserve;
  • 19,100 guns and mortars + 7.4 thousand in reserve;
  • 2172 aircraft + 0.5 thousand in reserve.

The following fought on the side of the Third Reich:

  • 900 thousand people;
  • 2,758 tanks and self-propelled guns (of which 218 are under repair);
  • 10 thousand guns;
  • 2050 aircraft.

Source: toboom.name

This battle claimed many lives. But a lot of military equipment “sailed” to the next world. In honor of the 73rd anniversary of the start of the Battle of Kursk, we remember which tanks fought back then.

T-34-76

Another modification of the T-34. Armor:

  • forehead - 45 mm;
  • side - 40 mm.

Gun - 76 mm. The T-34-76 was the most popular tank that took part in the Battle of Kursk (70% of all tanks).


Source: lurkmore.to

Light tank, also known as “firefly” (slang from WoT). Armor - 35-15 mm, gun - 45 mm. The number on the battlefield is 20-25%.


Source: warfiles.ru

A heavy vehicle with a 76mm barrel, named after the Russian revolutionary and Soviet military leader Klim Voroshilov.


Source: mirtankov.su

KV-1S

He is also “Kvass”. High-speed modification of the KV-1. “Fast” implies reducing armor in order to increase the maneuverability of the tank. This doesn't make it any easier for the crew.


Source: wiki.warthunder.ru

SU-152

Heavy self-propelled artillery unit, built on the basis of the KV-1S, armed with a 152 mm howitzer. In the Kursk Bulge there were 2 regiments, that is, 24 pieces.


Source: worldoftanks.ru

SU-122

Medium-heavy self-propelled gun with a 122-mm pipe. 7 regiments, that is, 84 pieces, were thrown into the “execution near Kursk”.


Source: vspomniv.ru

Churchill

Lend-Lease Churchills also fought on the side of the Soviets - no more than a couple of dozen. The armor of the animals is 102-76 mm, the gun is 57 mm.


Source: tanki-v-boju.ru

Ground armored vehicles of the Third Reich

Full name: Panzerkampfwagen III. Popularly known as PzKpfw III, Panzer III, Pz III. Medium tank, with a 37 mm cannon. Armor - 30-20 mm. Nothing special.


Battle of Kursk

July 5 – August 23, 1943
By the spring of 1943, there was a lull on the battlefields. Both warring sides were preparing for the summer campaign. Germany, having carried out total mobilization, concentrated more than 230 divisions on the Soviet-German front by the summer of 1943. The Wehrmacht received many new heavy T-V tanks I "Tiger", medium tanks T-V "Panther", assault guns "Ferdinand", new aircraft "Focke-Wulf 190" and other types of military equipment.

The German command decided to regain the strategic initiative lost after the defeat at Stalingrad. For the offensive, the enemy chose the “Kursk Salient” - a section of the front formed as a result of the winter offensive of the Soviet troops. The plan of the Hitlerite command was to encircle and destroy a group of Red Army troops with converging attacks from the areas of Orel and Belgorod and again develop an offensive against Moscow. The operation was codenamed "Citadel".

Thanks to the actions of Soviet intelligence, the enemy's plans became known to the headquarters of the Supreme High Command. It was decided to build a long-term defense in the depths of the Kursk salient, wear down the enemy in battles and then go on the offensive. In the north of the Kursk salient there were troops of the Central Front (commanded by Army General K.K. Rokossovsky), in the south by troops of the Voronezh Front (commanded by Army General N.F. Vatutin). In the rear of these fronts there was a powerful reserve - the Steppe Front under the command of Army General I.S. Koneva. Marshals A.M. were assigned to coordinate the actions of the fronts on the Kursk salient. Vasilevsky and G.K. Zhukov.

 

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